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This insightful study explores how a small state with limited
economic resources has played an important role in vital, ongoing
Middle Eastern political and security controversies. Global
Security Watch—Jordan provides readers with an expert,
comprehensive overview of significant aspects of Jordan's security,
including its political, diplomatic, and alliance-building
dimensions. Examining how Jordan emerged from a small Arab kingdom
with arbitrary borders and no clear national identity to a
confident and modernizing state, the book shows how today's nation
effectively copes with a variety of geopolitical challenges.
Jordan's close relations with the United States are examined, with
special attention paid to ongoing U.S.-Jordanian cooperation in
fighting al-Qaeda and its terrorist allies. The work also probes
Jordan's involvement in many of the great conflicts in the
contemporary Middle East, for example, that between the Israelis
and Palestinians, clarifying Jordanian policies, while helping the
reader understand many of the regional problems Jordan finds itself
forced to address.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for
influence in the Middle East and especially the Gulf area since at
least Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
While both nations define themselves as Islamic, the differences
between their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. In
most respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo power, while
Iran often seeks revolutionary change throughout the Gulf area and
the wider Middle East with varying degrees of intensity. Saudi
Arabia also has strong ties with Western nations, while Iran views
the United States as its most dangerous enemy. Perhaps the most
important difference between the two nations is that Saudi Arabia
is a conservative Sunni Muslim Arab state, while Iran is a Shi'ite
state whose senior politicians often view their country as the
defender and natural leader of Shi'ites throughout the region. The
rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has been reflected in the
politics of a number of regional states where these two powers
exercise influence including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain
and others. The 2011 wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime protests
known as the "Arab Spring" introduced new concerns for both Saudi
Arabia and Iran to consider within the framework of their regional
priorities. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is therefore likely to
intensify as a central feature in the Middle Eastern security
landscape that reaches into both the Gulf region and the
Arab-Israeli theater. This is a reality that will touch upon the
interests of the United States in a number of situations. In many
instances, Saudi opposition to Iran will serve U.S. interests, but
this will not occur under all circumstances. Saudi Arabia remains a
deeply anti-revolutionary state with values and priorities which
sometimes overlap with those of Washington on matters of strategic
interest and often conflict over matters of reform and democracy
for other Middle Eastern states. Additionally, in seeking to
support Middle Eastern stability, the United States must be
prepared to mediate between Riyadh and Baghdad, and thereby help to
limit Iranian efforts to insert itself into Iraqi politics.
The United States and Jordan have maintained a valuable
mutually-supportive relationship for decades as a result of shared
interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. In
this monograph, the author highlights Jordan's ongoing value as a
U.S. ally and considers ways that the U.S.-Jordanian alliance might
be used to contain and minimize problems of concern to both
countries. Although Jordan is not a large country, it is an
important geographical crossroads within the Middle East and has
been deeply involved in many of the most important events in the
region's modern history. In recent years, the importance of the
U.S.-Jordanian relationship has increased, and Jordan has emerged
as a vital U.S. ally in the efforts to stabilize Iraq and also
resist violent extremism and terrorism throughout the region.
Amman's traditional role in helping to train friendly Arab
military, police, and intelligence forces to its own high standards
is a particularly helpful way in which Jordan can enhance efforts
to achieve regional security. The United States needs to support
efforts to continue and expand this role. Additionally, Jordan
maintains a key interest in Palestinian/Israeli issues and has made
ongoing efforts to play a constructive role in this setting.
Helping Jordan survive, prosper, and modernize correspondingly has
become an urgent priority for the United States in its quest for a
secure Middle East.
In December 2011, the last U.S. combat troops were withdrawn from
Iraq after an almost 9-year presence in that country. This day was
welcomed by the U.S. public after years of sacrifice and struggle
to build a new Iraq. Yet, the Iraq that U.S. troops have left at
the insistence of its government remains a deeply troubled nation.
Often Iraqi leaders view political issues in sharply sectarian
terms, and national unity is elusive. The Iraqi political system
was organized by both the United States and Iraq, although over
time, U.S. influence diminished and Iraqi influence increased. In
this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill examines the policies of
de-Ba'athification as initiated by the U.S.- led Coalition
Provision Authority (CPA) under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and as
practiced by various Iraqi political commissions and entities
created under the CPA order. He also considers the ways in which
the Iraqi de-Ba'athification program has evolved and remained an
important but divisive institution over time. Dr. Terrill suggests
that many U.S. officials in Iraq saw problems with
de-Ba'athification, but they had difficulties softening or
correcting the process once it had become firmly established in
Iraqi hands. Other U.S. policymakers were slower in recognizing the
politicized nature of de-Ba'athification and its devolution into a
process in which both its Iraqi supporters and opponents viewed it
as an instrument of Shi'ite revenge and political domination of
Sunni Arabs. Dr. Terrill's monograph considers both the future of
Iraq and the differences and similarities between events in Iraq
and the Arab Spring states. He has examined both Ba'athism as a
concept and the ways in which it was practiced in Saddam Hussein's
Iraq. He notes that the initial principles of Ba'athism were
sufficiently broad as to allow their acquisition by a tyrant
seeking ideological justification for a merciless regime. His
comprehensive analysis of Iraqi Ba'athism ensures that he does not
overgeneralize when drawing potential parallels to events in the
Arab Spring countries. Dr. Terrill considers the nature of Iraqi
de-Ba'athification in considerable depth and carefully evaluates
the rationales and results of actions taken by both Americans and
Iraqis involved in the process. While there are many differences
between the formation of Iraq's post-Saddam Hussein government and
the current efforts of some Arab Spring governing bodies to
restructure their political institutions, it is possible to
identify parallels between Iraq and Arab Spring countries. Some
insights for emerging governments may, correspondingly, be guided
by a comprehensive understanding of these parallels. The Arab
Spring revolutions that have overthrown the governments of Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, and Yemen at the time of this writing are a regional
process of stunning importance. While these revolutions began with
a tremendous degree of hope, great difficulties loom in the future.
New governments will have to apportion power, build or reform key
institutions, establish political legitimacy for those
institutions, and accommodate the enhanced expectations of their
publics in a post-revolutionary environment. A great deal can go
wrong in these circumstances, and it is important to consider ways
in which these new governing structures can be supported, so long
as they remain inclusive and democratic. Any lessons that can be
gleaned from earlier conflicts will be of considerable value to the
nations facing these problems as well as to their regional and
extra-regional allies seeking to help them.
A central purpose of this monograph is to reexamine two earlier
conflicts for insights that may be relevant for ongoing dangers
during limited wars involving nations possessing chemical or
biological weapons or emerging nuclear arsenals. These conflicts
are the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War. Both of these
wars were fought at the conventional level, although the prospect
of Israel using nuclear weapons (1973), Egypt using biological
weapons (1973), or Iraq using chemical and biological weapons
(1991) were of serious concern at various points during the
fighting. This monograph will consider why efforts at escalation
control and intrawar deterrence were successful in the two case
studies and assess the points at which these efforts were under the
most intensive stress that might have caused them to fail.
During World War II, the U.S. military's extensive planning for the
occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term
strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of
military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict
operations and the criticality of detailed planning and
preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the
horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the
challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U.S. Army
War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the
Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to
analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the
requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a
war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and
analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam
Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic
recommendations for transferring responsibilities...
The Iraq war has been one of the dominant factors influencing U.S.
strategic thinking in the Middle East and globally since 2003. Yet
the problems of this highly dynamic and fluid war have sometimes
forced U.S. policymakers to address near-term issues that cannot be
safely postponed at the expense of long-term strategic thought.
Such a technique, while understandable, cannot continue
indefinitely as an approach to policy. Long-term planning remains
vital for advancing regionwide U.S. and Iraqi interests following a
U.S. drawdown from Iraq. Such planning must include dealing with
current and potential "spillover" from the Iraq war. Regional
spillover problems associated with the Iraq war need to be
considered and addressed even in the event of strong future success
in building the new Iraq. In less optimistic scenarios, these
issues will become even more important. Spillover issues addressed
herein include: (1) the flow of refugees and displaced persons from
Iraq, (2) cross-border terrorism, (3) the potential intensification
of separatism and sectarian discord among Iraq's neighbors, and (4)
transnational crime. All of these problems will be exceptionally
important in the Middle East in the coming years and perhaps
decades, and trends involving these issues will need to be closely
monitored. The author presents ideas, concerns, and strategies that
can help to fill this gap in the literature and enrich the debate
on the actual and potential spillover effects of the Iraq war that
will face U.S. policymakers, possibly for decades. Of these
problems, he clearly is especially concerned with the spread of
sectarian divisions which, if not properly managed, can have
devastating regional consequences. This monograph forms an
important baseline useful for considering future trends in each of
the areas that the author has identified.
Yemen is not currently a failed state, but it is experiencing huge
political and economic problems that can have a direct impact on
U.S. interests in the region. It has a rapidly expanding population
with a resource base that is limited and already leaves much of the
current population in poverty. The government obtains around a
third of its budget revenue from sales of its limited and declining
oil stocks, which most economists state will be exhausted by 2017.
Yemen also has critical water shortages and a variety of
interrelated security problems. In Sa'ada province in Yemen's
northern mountainous region, there has been an intermittent
rebellion by Houthi tribesmen (now experiencing a cease-fire) who
accuse the government of discrimination and other actions against
their Zaydi Shi'ite religious sect. In southern Yemen, a powerful
independence movement has developed which is mostly nonviolent but
is increasingly angry and confrontational. More recently, Yemen has
emerged as one of the most important theaters for the struggle
against al-Qaeda. Yemen is among the worst places on earth to cede
to al-Qaeda in this struggle, but it is also an especially
distrustful and wary nation in its relationship with Western
nations and particularly the United States. All of these problems
are difficult to address because the central government has only
limited capacity to extend its influence into tribal areas beyond
the capital and major cities. The United States must therefore do
what it can to support peaceful resolutions of Yemen's problems
with the Houthis and Southern Movement while continuing to assist
the government's struggle against al-Qaeda forces in Yemen. It must
further pursue these policies in ways that avoid provoking a
backlash among the Yemeni population which will not tolerate
significant numbers of U.S. combat troops in Yemen.
This monograph considers both the future of Iraq and the
differences and similarities between events in Iraq and the Arab
Spring states. The author analyzes the nature of Iraqi
de-Ba'athification and evaluates the rationales and results of
actions taken by both Americans and Iraqis involved in the process.
While there are differences between the formation of Iraq's
post-Hussein government and the efforts of Arab Spring governing
bodies to restructure their political institutions, it is possible
to identify parallels. As in Iraq, new Arab Spring governments have
to apportion power, build or reform key institutions, establish
political legitimacy for those institutions, and accommodate the
expectations of their publics in a post-revolutionary environment.
A great deal can go wrong, and any lessons that can be gleaned will
be of value to those nations facing these problems, as well as to
regional and extra-regional allies seeking to help them.
(Originally published by SSI)
The political situation within Yemen has catapulted to the top tier
of U.S. national security concerns over the last several years as
it has become more directly linked to both the problem of
international terrorism and the need for future stability in the
Arabian Peninsula. On the terrorism front, the December 25, 2009,
attempted bombing of a U.S. passenger aircraft in Detroit,
Michigan, by an individual trained by Yemeni terrorists was a
particularly clear warning to the United States about the dangers
of neglecting this geopolitically important country. Yet, this near
catastrophe also underscored the need for a careful consideration
of U.S. policies regarding Yemen. This requirement may be
especially clear when one considers the chain of events that might
have been set off had there been a successful terrorist strike in
Detroit in which hundreds of Americans were killed. Apart from the
human cost of such a tragedy, the U.S. leadership would have been
under enormous pressure to respond in a way consistent with the
level of public outrage associated with the event. Public pressure
might well have existed for military intervention in Yemen with
U.S. ground combat troops. Such an intervention is something that
the present work insists would infuriate virtually the entire
Yemeni population, regardless of the objective merits of the U.S.
case for the offensive use of U.S. ground combat forces. In
approaching this analysis, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill quotes then
Central Command Commander General David Petraeus in an April 2009
statement that the al-Qaeda threat across the Middle East is
weakening except in Yemen. In Yemen, the threat still seems to be
growing well over a year following this prescient observation.
Additionally, while the terrorism threat alone requires an
intensive U.S. interest in Yemen, it is not the only reason why an
understanding of current Yemeni issues is important for the U.S.
national interest. An intermittent insurgency by Zaydi rebels in
northern Yemen and an expanding secessionist movement in southern
Yemen are also serious problems which may have important
implications for the wider Arabian Peninsula. Unfortunately, while
these problems are straightforward, their solutions are not. Dr.
Terrill also points out how deeply distrustful most Yemenis are of
any foreign military presence on their soil and how quickly
clerical leadership in Yemen will characterize any U.S. bases in
Yemen as colonialism, which the population is required to resist by
their religion. The U.S. challenge is therefore to help Yemen
destroy al-Qaeda without deploying large numbers of U.S. troops in
that country, while encouraging a peaceful and lasting resolution
of the government's problems with the northern Zaydi tribesmen and
the "Southern Movement," which calls for an independent state in
the south. All important U.S. policies on Yemen will have to be
coordinated with Saudi Arabia, which is Yemen's largest aid donor
and plays a major role in Yemen's politics. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to
the national security debate on this important subject as our
nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated
with the future of the Middle East and the ongoing struggle against
al-Qaeda. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S.
strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they seek to
address the complicated interplay of factors related to regional
security issues, fighting terrorism, and the support of local
allies. This work may also benefit those seeking a greater
understanding of long-range issues of Middle Eastern and global
security. It is hoped that this work will be of benefit to officers
of all services, as well as other U.S. Government officials
involved in military and security assistance planning.
The Iraq war has been one of the dominant factors influencing U.S.
strategic thinking in the Middle East and globally since 2003. Yet
the problems of this highly dynamic and fluid war have sometimes
forced U.S. policymakers to address near-term issues that cannot be
safely postponed at the expense of long-term strategic thought.
Such a technique, while understandable, cannot continue
indefinitely as an approach to policy. Long-term planning remains
vital for advancing regionwide U.S. and Iraqi interests following a
U.S. drawdown from Iraq. Such planning must include dealing with
current and potential "spillover" from the Iraq war. In this
monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill presents ideas, concerns, and
strategies that can help to fill this gap in the literature and
enrich the debate on the actual and potential spillover effects of
the Iraq war that will face U.S. policymakers, possibly for
decades. Regional spillover problems associated with the Iraq war
need to be considered and addressed even in the event of strong
future success in building the new Iraq. In less optimistic
scenarios, these issues will become even more important. Spillover
issues addressed herein include: (1) the flow of refugees and
displaced persons from Iraq, (2) cross-border terrorism, (3) the
potential intensification of separatism and sectarian discord among
Iraq's neighbors, and (4) transnational crime. All of these
problems will be exceptionally important in the Middle East in the
coming years and perhaps decades, and trends involving these issues
will need to be closely monitored. Of these problems, Dr. Terrill
clearly is especially concerned with the spread of sectarian
divisions which, if not properly managed, can have devastating
regional consequences. This monograph, however, forms an important
baseline useful for considering future trends in each of the areas
that he has identified. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased
to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security
debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple
with a variety of problems associated with the U.S. presence in
Iraq and the larger Middle East. This analysis should be especially
useful to U.S. strategic leaders as they seek to address the
complicated interplay of factors related to Middle Eastern security
issues and the support of local allies. It may also be useful to
those considering how to optimize the U.S. national interest in
dealing with nonallied states within the region. This work may also
benefit those seeking a greater understanding of long-range issues
of Middle Eastern security. We hope this monograph will benefit
officers of all services as well as other U.S. Government officials
visiting Iraq and its neighbors.
The Middle East is undergoing an era of revolutionary change that
is challenging the foreign policies of the United States and
virtually all regional states. In this new environment,
opportunities and challenges exist for a number of regional and
extra-regional states to advance their national interests, while
attempting to marginalize those of their rivals. Despite these
changes, the Arab Spring and revolutions in countries such as
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have not altered some of the more
fundamental aspects of the Middle East regional situation. One of
the most important rivalries defining the strategic landscape of
the Middle East is between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The competition
between these two states is long-standing, but it is especially
important now. Political relationships that have endured for
decades, such as the one between Iran and Syria, now seem to be in
some danger, depending upon how current struggles play out. The
stakes in this rivalry can thus become higher in an environment of
revolutionary upheaval. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill
considers an old rivalry as it transitions into a new environment.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have been rivals since at least the 1979
Iranian Islamic Revolution. As Dr. Terrill points out, this
competition has taken a variety of forms and was especially intense
in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. Under Iranian President
Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), the rivalry relaxed to some extent,
but a permanent detente was not possible because of a backlash
within the Iranian political system. The successor presidency of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad further damaged relations and the Saudi-Iranian
relationship was dealt an especially serious setback over the
Saudi-led intervention into Bahrain. Because the current
Saudi-Iranian rivalry is taking place in a variety of countries of
interest to the United States, an awareness of the motivations and
issues associated with the rivalry is important to U.S.
policymakers. Dr. Terrill clearly identifies the struggle as
region-wide, encompassing countries as far apart as Egypt, Bahrain,
Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and especially Iraq, where the United States
is preparing to withdraw almost all of its troops. He also notes
that while U.S. interests often overlap with those of Saudi Arabia,
such is not always the case. Saudi Arabia and the United States
often work well together in seeking to contain Iranian influence,
but Saudi Arabia also is an absolute monarchy opposed to Arab
democracy or any democratic reform of the existing monarchical
systems. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this
important subject, as our nation continues to grapple with a
variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East
and the ongoing challenge of advancing U.S. interests in a time of
Middle East turbulence. This analysis should be especially useful
to U.S. strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they
seek to address the complicated interplay of factors related to
regional security issues, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq,
fighting terrorism, and providing for the support of local allies.
This work may also benefit those seeking better understanding of
long-range issues of Middle Eastern and global security. We hope
this work will be of benefit to officers of all services, as well
as other U.S. government officials involved in military and
security assistance planning. Strategic Studies Institute.
U.S. political and military difficulties in Iraq have prompted
comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. How, in fact, do the
two wars compare? What are the differences and similarities, and
what insights can be gained from examining them? Does the Vietnam
War have instructive lessons for those dealing with today's
challenges in Iraq, or is that war simply irrelevant? In the pages
that follow, two highly qualified analysts address these questions.
Dr. Jeffrey Record, formerly a civilian pacification advisor in
Vietnam and author of books on both the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and
W. Andrew Terrill, author and co-author of several SSI studies on
Iraq, conclude that the military dimensions of the two conflicts
bear little comparison. Among other things, the sheer scale of the
Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred dwarfs
that of the Iraq War. They also conclude, however, that failed U.
S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic
political support for U. S. war aims in Vietnam are issues
pertinent to current U. S. policy in Iraq. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to
the national security debate over Iraq. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
During World War II, the U. S. military's extensive planning for
the occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term
strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of
military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict
operations and the criticality of detailed planning and
preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the
horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the
challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U. S.
Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination
with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a
study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address
the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory
in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine
and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam
Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic
recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition
partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and
facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against
terrorism. The Strategic Studies Institute organized an
interdisciplinary team under the leadership of Dr. Conrad C. Crane
and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. The team's initial findings were vetted
at a joint and interagency workshop conducted in December. The
final report of the project consists of three parts: a discussion
of historical insights from 20th century postwar occupations and
post-conflict operations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq
will present for an occupying power; and a mission matrix that
lists 135 specific tasks that mustbe performed to build and sustain
a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across four phases of
occupation and designates whether coalition military forces or
civilian agencies should perform them. The study has much to offer
planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct
Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving
strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are
concluded. In recent decades, U. S. civilian and military
leadership have shied away from nation-building. However, the
current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by
failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition
partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein,
they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time,
manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the
fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations
will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate
could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties.
Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies Institute
The destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq has opened the
path to a new future for Iraqis, although it is not yet certain
what direction that future will take. Iraq is a fragile political
entity created in the aftermath of World War I through the
involuntary union of ethnically and religiously diverse portions of
the former Ottoman Empire. In the years following Iraq's creation,
a nascent nationalism emerged, which successive leaders sought to
nurture and encourage. This effort culminated in Saddam Hussein's
efforts to generate a radical Iraq-centered form of Arab
nationalism, which served to promote loyalty to the state and more
importantly to Saddam. The U.S.-Iraqi War of 2003 did not emerge as
a strong test of Iraqi nationalism. While Saddam did have some
committed defenders, large segments of the population remained
neutral in the confrontation between the U.S.-led coalition and
Saddam's defenders. After the war, the United States emerged as a
power on probation with the Iraqi population, many of whom were
uncertain that their well-being was a major factor in the U.S.
decision to intervene and remain in Iraq. Anti-American conspiracy
theories became widespread in Iraq, while conservative Muslims
worried about the corrupting influence of perceived Western vices.
The removal of Saddam's regime created problems and opportunities
for Iraqi ethnic and religious communities. Arab Shi'ites, who
comprise the majority of the population, saw new opportunities for
political leadership, perhaps with a powerful but fragmented clergy
leading the way. Sunni Arabs correspondingly worried about a new
distribution of power, and many began to view de-Baathification as
a process that further threatens their community. Kurds remain
interested in de facto, but not formal, independence from Iraq, and
the danger of an Arab backlash to Kurdish aspirations is
correspondingly serious. Tribal identities further complicate the
situation. Some attacks against U.S. forces have occurred following
the war with most of the violence associated with residual Saddam
loyalists from among the Sunni Arab community. Many Shi'ites are
more reluctant to engage in such activity so long as it appears
that they can take power by political means. Nevertheless, strong
anti-U.S. views are present in the pro-Iranian Shi'ite
organizations, and these views may spread among other Shi'ites over
time. The possibility of confrontations between U.S. troops and
hostile crowds is particularly worrisome as is the availability of
massive quantities of weapons to the Iraqi population. In light of
this situation, the United States needs to search continually for
areas of agreement with the nonextremist clergy while also
recognizing issues on which collaboration is not possible. U.S.
leaders must also support a continued strong information campaign,
expand efforts to challenge Iranian activities in Iraq, and provide
troops with extensive training in stabilization and occupation
duties. The participation of troops from moderate Arab and Muslim
states in stabilization and reconstruction activities is important
and should be encouraged. U.S. administrators must also be careful
how they use the word de-Baathification since some Baath ideals are
not inherently anti-democratic, although the party itself was
deeply corrupted by Saddam. Finally, any U.S. efforts to achieve
long-term dominance of Iraqi politics can be expected to produce a
serious backlash.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for
influence in the Middle East and especially the Gulf area since at
least Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
While both nations define themselves as Islamic, the differences
between their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. In
most respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo power, while
Iran often seeks revolutionary change throughout the Gulf area and
the wider Middle East with varying degrees of intensity. Saudi
Arabia also has strong ties with Western nations, while Iran views
the United States as its most dangerous enemy. Perhaps the most
important difference between the two nations is that Saudi Arabia
is a conservative Sunni Muslim Arab state, while Iran is a Shi'ite
state whose senior politicians often view their country as the
defender and natural leader of Shi'ites throughout the region. The
rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has been reflected in the
politics of a number of regional states where these two powers
exercise influence including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain
and others. The 2011 wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime protests
known as the "Arab Spring" introduced new concerns for both Saudi
Arabia and Iran to consider within the framework of their regional
priorities. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is therefore likely to
intensify as a central feature in the Middle Eastern security
landscape that reaches into both the Gulf region and the
Arab-Israeli theater. This is a reality that will touch upon the
interests of the United States in a number of situations. In many
instances, Saudi opposition to Iran will serve U.S. interests, but
this will not occur under all circumstances. Saudi Arabia remains a
deeply anti-revolutionary state with values and priorities which
sometimes overlap with those of Washington on matters of strategic
interest and often conflict over matters of reform and democracy
for other Middle Eastern states. Additionally, in seeking to
support Middle Eastern stability, the United States must be
prepared to mediate between Riyadh and Baghdad, and thereby help to
limit Iranian efforts to insert itself into Iraqi politics.
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