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This insightful study explores how a small state with limited economic resources has played an important role in vital, ongoing Middle Eastern political and security controversies. Global Security Watch—Jordan provides readers with an expert, comprehensive overview of significant aspects of Jordan's security, including its political, diplomatic, and alliance-building dimensions. Examining how Jordan emerged from a small Arab kingdom with arbitrary borders and no clear national identity to a confident and modernizing state, the book shows how today's nation effectively copes with a variety of geopolitical challenges. Jordan's close relations with the United States are examined, with special attention paid to ongoing U.S.-Jordanian cooperation in fighting al-Qaeda and its terrorist allies. The work also probes Jordan's involvement in many of the great conflicts in the contemporary Middle East, for example, that between the Israelis and Palestinians, clarifying Jordanian policies, while helping the reader understand many of the regional problems Jordan finds itself forced to address.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for influence in the Middle East and especially the Gulf area since at least Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. While both nations define themselves as Islamic, the differences between their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. In most respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo power, while Iran often seeks revolutionary change throughout the Gulf area and the wider Middle East with varying degrees of intensity. Saudi Arabia also has strong ties with Western nations, while Iran views the United States as its most dangerous enemy. Perhaps the most important difference between the two nations is that Saudi Arabia is a conservative Sunni Muslim Arab state, while Iran is a Shi'ite state whose senior politicians often view their country as the defender and natural leader of Shi'ites throughout the region. The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has been reflected in the politics of a number of regional states where these two powers exercise influence including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and others. The 2011 wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime protests known as the "Arab Spring" introduced new concerns for both Saudi Arabia and Iran to consider within the framework of their regional priorities. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is therefore likely to intensify as a central feature in the Middle Eastern security landscape that reaches into both the Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli theater. This is a reality that will touch upon the interests of the United States in a number of situations. In many instances, Saudi opposition to Iran will serve U.S. interests, but this will not occur under all circumstances. Saudi Arabia remains a deeply anti-revolutionary state with values and priorities which sometimes overlap with those of Washington on matters of strategic interest and often conflict over matters of reform and democracy for other Middle Eastern states. Additionally, in seeking to support Middle Eastern stability, the United States must be prepared to mediate between Riyadh and Baghdad, and thereby help to limit Iranian efforts to insert itself into Iraqi politics.
The United States and Jordan have maintained a valuable mutually-supportive relationship for decades as a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. In this monograph, the author highlights Jordan's ongoing value as a U.S. ally and considers ways that the U.S.-Jordanian alliance might be used to contain and minimize problems of concern to both countries. Although Jordan is not a large country, it is an important geographical crossroads within the Middle East and has been deeply involved in many of the most important events in the region's modern history. In recent years, the importance of the U.S.-Jordanian relationship has increased, and Jordan has emerged as a vital U.S. ally in the efforts to stabilize Iraq and also resist violent extremism and terrorism throughout the region. Amman's traditional role in helping to train friendly Arab military, police, and intelligence forces to its own high standards is a particularly helpful way in which Jordan can enhance efforts to achieve regional security. The United States needs to support efforts to continue and expand this role. Additionally, Jordan maintains a key interest in Palestinian/Israeli issues and has made ongoing efforts to play a constructive role in this setting. Helping Jordan survive, prosper, and modernize correspondingly has become an urgent priority for the United States in its quest for a secure Middle East.
In December 2011, the last U.S. combat troops were withdrawn from Iraq after an almost 9-year presence in that country. This day was welcomed by the U.S. public after years of sacrifice and struggle to build a new Iraq. Yet, the Iraq that U.S. troops have left at the insistence of its government remains a deeply troubled nation. Often Iraqi leaders view political issues in sharply sectarian terms, and national unity is elusive. The Iraqi political system was organized by both the United States and Iraq, although over time, U.S. influence diminished and Iraqi influence increased. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill examines the policies of de-Ba'athification as initiated by the U.S.- led Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and as practiced by various Iraqi political commissions and entities created under the CPA order. He also considers the ways in which the Iraqi de-Ba'athification program has evolved and remained an important but divisive institution over time. Dr. Terrill suggests that many U.S. officials in Iraq saw problems with de-Ba'athification, but they had difficulties softening or correcting the process once it had become firmly established in Iraqi hands. Other U.S. policymakers were slower in recognizing the politicized nature of de-Ba'athification and its devolution into a process in which both its Iraqi supporters and opponents viewed it as an instrument of Shi'ite revenge and political domination of Sunni Arabs. Dr. Terrill's monograph considers both the future of Iraq and the differences and similarities between events in Iraq and the Arab Spring states. He has examined both Ba'athism as a concept and the ways in which it was practiced in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. He notes that the initial principles of Ba'athism were sufficiently broad as to allow their acquisition by a tyrant seeking ideological justification for a merciless regime. His comprehensive analysis of Iraqi Ba'athism ensures that he does not overgeneralize when drawing potential parallels to events in the Arab Spring countries. Dr. Terrill considers the nature of Iraqi de-Ba'athification in considerable depth and carefully evaluates the rationales and results of actions taken by both Americans and Iraqis involved in the process. While there are many differences between the formation of Iraq's post-Saddam Hussein government and the current efforts of some Arab Spring governing bodies to restructure their political institutions, it is possible to identify parallels between Iraq and Arab Spring countries. Some insights for emerging governments may, correspondingly, be guided by a comprehensive understanding of these parallels. The Arab Spring revolutions that have overthrown the governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen at the time of this writing are a regional process of stunning importance. While these revolutions began with a tremendous degree of hope, great difficulties loom in the future. New governments will have to apportion power, build or reform key institutions, establish political legitimacy for those institutions, and accommodate the enhanced expectations of their publics in a post-revolutionary environment. A great deal can go wrong in these circumstances, and it is important to consider ways in which these new governing structures can be supported, so long as they remain inclusive and democratic. Any lessons that can be gleaned from earlier conflicts will be of considerable value to the nations facing these problems as well as to their regional and extra-regional allies seeking to help them.
A central purpose of this monograph is to reexamine two earlier conflicts for insights that may be relevant for ongoing dangers during limited wars involving nations possessing chemical or biological weapons or emerging nuclear arsenals. These conflicts are the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War. Both of these wars were fought at the conventional level, although the prospect of Israel using nuclear weapons (1973), Egypt using biological weapons (1973), or Iraq using chemical and biological weapons (1991) were of serious concern at various points during the fighting. This monograph will consider why efforts at escalation control and intrawar deterrence were successful in the two case studies and assess the points at which these efforts were under the most intensive stress that might have caused them to fail.
During World War II, the U.S. military's extensive planning for the occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict operations and the criticality of detailed planning and preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities...
The Iraq war has been one of the dominant factors influencing U.S. strategic thinking in the Middle East and globally since 2003. Yet the problems of this highly dynamic and fluid war have sometimes forced U.S. policymakers to address near-term issues that cannot be safely postponed at the expense of long-term strategic thought. Such a technique, while understandable, cannot continue indefinitely as an approach to policy. Long-term planning remains vital for advancing regionwide U.S. and Iraqi interests following a U.S. drawdown from Iraq. Such planning must include dealing with current and potential "spillover" from the Iraq war. Regional spillover problems associated with the Iraq war need to be considered and addressed even in the event of strong future success in building the new Iraq. In less optimistic scenarios, these issues will become even more important. Spillover issues addressed herein include: (1) the flow of refugees and displaced persons from Iraq, (2) cross-border terrorism, (3) the potential intensification of separatism and sectarian discord among Iraq's neighbors, and (4) transnational crime. All of these problems will be exceptionally important in the Middle East in the coming years and perhaps decades, and trends involving these issues will need to be closely monitored. The author presents ideas, concerns, and strategies that can help to fill this gap in the literature and enrich the debate on the actual and potential spillover effects of the Iraq war that will face U.S. policymakers, possibly for decades. Of these problems, he clearly is especially concerned with the spread of sectarian divisions which, if not properly managed, can have devastating regional consequences. This monograph forms an important baseline useful for considering future trends in each of the areas that the author has identified.
Yemen is not currently a failed state, but it is experiencing huge political and economic problems that can have a direct impact on U.S. interests in the region. It has a rapidly expanding population with a resource base that is limited and already leaves much of the current population in poverty. The government obtains around a third of its budget revenue from sales of its limited and declining oil stocks, which most economists state will be exhausted by 2017. Yemen also has critical water shortages and a variety of interrelated security problems. In Sa'ada province in Yemen's northern mountainous region, there has been an intermittent rebellion by Houthi tribesmen (now experiencing a cease-fire) who accuse the government of discrimination and other actions against their Zaydi Shi'ite religious sect. In southern Yemen, a powerful independence movement has developed which is mostly nonviolent but is increasingly angry and confrontational. More recently, Yemen has emerged as one of the most important theaters for the struggle against al-Qaeda. Yemen is among the worst places on earth to cede to al-Qaeda in this struggle, but it is also an especially distrustful and wary nation in its relationship with Western nations and particularly the United States. All of these problems are difficult to address because the central government has only limited capacity to extend its influence into tribal areas beyond the capital and major cities. The United States must therefore do what it can to support peaceful resolutions of Yemen's problems with the Houthis and Southern Movement while continuing to assist the government's struggle against al-Qaeda forces in Yemen. It must further pursue these policies in ways that avoid provoking a backlash among the Yemeni population which will not tolerate significant numbers of U.S. combat troops in Yemen.
This monograph considers both the future of Iraq and the differences and similarities between events in Iraq and the Arab Spring states. The author analyzes the nature of Iraqi de-Ba'athification and evaluates the rationales and results of actions taken by both Americans and Iraqis involved in the process. While there are differences between the formation of Iraq's post-Hussein government and the efforts of Arab Spring governing bodies to restructure their political institutions, it is possible to identify parallels. As in Iraq, new Arab Spring governments have to apportion power, build or reform key institutions, establish political legitimacy for those institutions, and accommodate the expectations of their publics in a post-revolutionary environment. A great deal can go wrong, and any lessons that can be gleaned will be of value to those nations facing these problems, as well as to regional and extra-regional allies seeking to help them. (Originally published by SSI)
The political situation within Yemen has catapulted to the top tier of U.S. national security concerns over the last several years as it has become more directly linked to both the problem of international terrorism and the need for future stability in the Arabian Peninsula. On the terrorism front, the December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of a U.S. passenger aircraft in Detroit, Michigan, by an individual trained by Yemeni terrorists was a particularly clear warning to the United States about the dangers of neglecting this geopolitically important country. Yet, this near catastrophe also underscored the need for a careful consideration of U.S. policies regarding Yemen. This requirement may be especially clear when one considers the chain of events that might have been set off had there been a successful terrorist strike in Detroit in which hundreds of Americans were killed. Apart from the human cost of such a tragedy, the U.S. leadership would have been under enormous pressure to respond in a way consistent with the level of public outrage associated with the event. Public pressure might well have existed for military intervention in Yemen with U.S. ground combat troops. Such an intervention is something that the present work insists would infuriate virtually the entire Yemeni population, regardless of the objective merits of the U.S. case for the offensive use of U.S. ground combat forces. In approaching this analysis, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill quotes then Central Command Commander General David Petraeus in an April 2009 statement that the al-Qaeda threat across the Middle East is weakening except in Yemen. In Yemen, the threat still seems to be growing well over a year following this prescient observation. Additionally, while the terrorism threat alone requires an intensive U.S. interest in Yemen, it is not the only reason why an understanding of current Yemeni issues is important for the U.S. national interest. An intermittent insurgency by Zaydi rebels in northern Yemen and an expanding secessionist movement in southern Yemen are also serious problems which may have important implications for the wider Arabian Peninsula. Unfortunately, while these problems are straightforward, their solutions are not. Dr. Terrill also points out how deeply distrustful most Yemenis are of any foreign military presence on their soil and how quickly clerical leadership in Yemen will characterize any U.S. bases in Yemen as colonialism, which the population is required to resist by their religion. The U.S. challenge is therefore to help Yemen destroy al-Qaeda without deploying large numbers of U.S. troops in that country, while encouraging a peaceful and lasting resolution of the government's problems with the northern Zaydi tribesmen and the "Southern Movement," which calls for an independent state in the south. All important U.S. policies on Yemen will have to be coordinated with Saudi Arabia, which is Yemen's largest aid donor and plays a major role in Yemen's politics. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East and the ongoing struggle against al-Qaeda. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they seek to address the complicated interplay of factors related to regional security issues, fighting terrorism, and the support of local allies. This work may also benefit those seeking a greater understanding of long-range issues of Middle Eastern and global security. It is hoped that this work will be of benefit to officers of all services, as well as other U.S. Government officials involved in military and security assistance planning.
The Iraq war has been one of the dominant factors influencing U.S. strategic thinking in the Middle East and globally since 2003. Yet the problems of this highly dynamic and fluid war have sometimes forced U.S. policymakers to address near-term issues that cannot be safely postponed at the expense of long-term strategic thought. Such a technique, while understandable, cannot continue indefinitely as an approach to policy. Long-term planning remains vital for advancing regionwide U.S. and Iraqi interests following a U.S. drawdown from Iraq. Such planning must include dealing with current and potential "spillover" from the Iraq war. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill presents ideas, concerns, and strategies that can help to fill this gap in the literature and enrich the debate on the actual and potential spillover effects of the Iraq war that will face U.S. policymakers, possibly for decades. Regional spillover problems associated with the Iraq war need to be considered and addressed even in the event of strong future success in building the new Iraq. In less optimistic scenarios, these issues will become even more important. Spillover issues addressed herein include: (1) the flow of refugees and displaced persons from Iraq, (2) cross-border terrorism, (3) the potential intensification of separatism and sectarian discord among Iraq's neighbors, and (4) transnational crime. All of these problems will be exceptionally important in the Middle East in the coming years and perhaps decades, and trends involving these issues will need to be closely monitored. Of these problems, Dr. Terrill clearly is especially concerned with the spread of sectarian divisions which, if not properly managed, can have devastating regional consequences. This monograph, however, forms an important baseline useful for considering future trends in each of the areas that he has identified. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the U.S. presence in Iraq and the larger Middle East. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders as they seek to address the complicated interplay of factors related to Middle Eastern security issues and the support of local allies. It may also be useful to those considering how to optimize the U.S. national interest in dealing with nonallied states within the region. This work may also benefit those seeking a greater understanding of long-range issues of Middle Eastern security. We hope this monograph will benefit officers of all services as well as other U.S. Government officials visiting Iraq and its neighbors.
The Middle East is undergoing an era of revolutionary change that is challenging the foreign policies of the United States and virtually all regional states. In this new environment, opportunities and challenges exist for a number of regional and extra-regional states to advance their national interests, while attempting to marginalize those of their rivals. Despite these changes, the Arab Spring and revolutions in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have not altered some of the more fundamental aspects of the Middle East regional situation. One of the most important rivalries defining the strategic landscape of the Middle East is between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The competition between these two states is long-standing, but it is especially important now. Political relationships that have endured for decades, such as the one between Iran and Syria, now seem to be in some danger, depending upon how current struggles play out. The stakes in this rivalry can thus become higher in an environment of revolutionary upheaval. In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill considers an old rivalry as it transitions into a new environment. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been rivals since at least the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. As Dr. Terrill points out, this competition has taken a variety of forms and was especially intense in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution. Under Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), the rivalry relaxed to some extent, but a permanent detente was not possible because of a backlash within the Iranian political system. The successor presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad further damaged relations and the Saudi-Iranian relationship was dealt an especially serious setback over the Saudi-led intervention into Bahrain. Because the current Saudi-Iranian rivalry is taking place in a variety of countries of interest to the United States, an awareness of the motivations and issues associated with the rivalry is important to U.S. policymakers. Dr. Terrill clearly identifies the struggle as region-wide, encompassing countries as far apart as Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and especially Iraq, where the United States is preparing to withdraw almost all of its troops. He also notes that while U.S. interests often overlap with those of Saudi Arabia, such is not always the case. Saudi Arabia and the United States often work well together in seeking to contain Iranian influence, but Saudi Arabia also is an absolute monarchy opposed to Arab democracy or any democratic reform of the existing monarchical systems. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject, as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East and the ongoing challenge of advancing U.S. interests in a time of Middle East turbulence. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders and intelligence professionals as they seek to address the complicated interplay of factors related to regional security issues, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, fighting terrorism, and providing for the support of local allies. This work may also benefit those seeking better understanding of long-range issues of Middle Eastern and global security. We hope this work will be of benefit to officers of all services, as well as other U.S. government officials involved in military and security assistance planning. Strategic Studies Institute.
U.S. political and military difficulties in Iraq have prompted comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. How, in fact, do the two wars compare? What are the differences and similarities, and what insights can be gained from examining them? Does the Vietnam War have instructive lessons for those dealing with today's challenges in Iraq, or is that war simply irrelevant? In the pages that follow, two highly qualified analysts address these questions. Dr. Jeffrey Record, formerly a civilian pacification advisor in Vietnam and author of books on both the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and W. Andrew Terrill, author and co-author of several SSI studies on Iraq, conclude that the military dimensions of the two conflicts bear little comparison. Among other things, the sheer scale of the Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred dwarfs that of the Iraq War. They also conclude, however, that failed U. S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic political support for U. S. war aims in Vietnam are issues pertinent to current U. S. policy in Iraq. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate over Iraq. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies Institute
During World War II, the U. S. military's extensive planning for the occupation of Germany was a major factor in achieving long-term strategic objectives after the war was won. More recent examples of military operations also emphasize the challenges of post-conflict operations and the criticality of detailed planning and preparation. As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of occupying the country. In October 2002, the U. S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, in coordination with the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff/G-3, initiated a study to analyze how American and coalition forces can best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq. The objectives of the project were to determine and analyze probable missions for military forces in a post-Saddam Iraq; examine associated challenges; and formulate strategic recommendations for transferring responsibilities to coalition partners or civilian organizations, mitigating local animosity, and facilitating overall mission accomplishment in the war against terrorism. The Strategic Studies Institute organized an interdisciplinary team under the leadership of Dr. Conrad C. Crane and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. The team's initial findings were vetted at a joint and interagency workshop conducted in December. The final report of the project consists of three parts: a discussion of historical insights from 20th century postwar occupations and post-conflict operations; an analysis of the unique challenges Iraq will present for an occupying power; and a mission matrix that lists 135 specific tasks that mustbe performed to build and sustain a state. The matrix arrays those tasks across four phases of occupation and designates whether coalition military forces or civilian agencies should perform them. The study has much to offer planners and executors of operations to occupy and reconstruct Iraq, but also has many insights that will apply to achieving strategic objectives in any conflict after hostilities are concluded. In recent decades, U. S. civilian and military leadership have shied away from nation-building. However, the current war against terrorism has highlighted the danger posed by failed and struggling states. If this nation and its coalition partners decide to undertake the mission to remove Saddam Hussein, they will also have to be prepared to dedicate considerable time, manpower, and money to the effort to reconstruct Iraq after the fighting is over. Otherwise, the success of military operations will be ephemeral, and the problems they were designed to eliminate could return or be replaced by new and more virulent difficulties. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies Institute
The destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq has opened the path to a new future for Iraqis, although it is not yet certain what direction that future will take. Iraq is a fragile political entity created in the aftermath of World War I through the involuntary union of ethnically and religiously diverse portions of the former Ottoman Empire. In the years following Iraq's creation, a nascent nationalism emerged, which successive leaders sought to nurture and encourage. This effort culminated in Saddam Hussein's efforts to generate a radical Iraq-centered form of Arab nationalism, which served to promote loyalty to the state and more importantly to Saddam. The U.S.-Iraqi War of 2003 did not emerge as a strong test of Iraqi nationalism. While Saddam did have some committed defenders, large segments of the population remained neutral in the confrontation between the U.S.-led coalition and Saddam's defenders. After the war, the United States emerged as a power on probation with the Iraqi population, many of whom were uncertain that their well-being was a major factor in the U.S. decision to intervene and remain in Iraq. Anti-American conspiracy theories became widespread in Iraq, while conservative Muslims worried about the corrupting influence of perceived Western vices. The removal of Saddam's regime created problems and opportunities for Iraqi ethnic and religious communities. Arab Shi'ites, who comprise the majority of the population, saw new opportunities for political leadership, perhaps with a powerful but fragmented clergy leading the way. Sunni Arabs correspondingly worried about a new distribution of power, and many began to view de-Baathification as a process that further threatens their community. Kurds remain interested in de facto, but not formal, independence from Iraq, and the danger of an Arab backlash to Kurdish aspirations is correspondingly serious. Tribal identities further complicate the situation. Some attacks against U.S. forces have occurred following the war with most of the violence associated with residual Saddam loyalists from among the Sunni Arab community. Many Shi'ites are more reluctant to engage in such activity so long as it appears that they can take power by political means. Nevertheless, strong anti-U.S. views are present in the pro-Iranian Shi'ite organizations, and these views may spread among other Shi'ites over time. The possibility of confrontations between U.S. troops and hostile crowds is particularly worrisome as is the availability of massive quantities of weapons to the Iraqi population. In light of this situation, the United States needs to search continually for areas of agreement with the nonextremist clergy while also recognizing issues on which collaboration is not possible. U.S. leaders must also support a continued strong information campaign, expand efforts to challenge Iranian activities in Iraq, and provide troops with extensive training in stabilization and occupation duties. The participation of troops from moderate Arab and Muslim states in stabilization and reconstruction activities is important and should be encouraged. U.S. administrators must also be careful how they use the word de-Baathification since some Baath ideals are not inherently anti-democratic, although the party itself was deeply corrupted by Saddam. Finally, any U.S. efforts to achieve long-term dominance of Iraqi politics can be expected to produce a serious backlash.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for influence in the Middle East and especially the Gulf area since at least Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. While both nations define themselves as Islamic, the differences between their foreign policies could hardly be more dramatic. In most respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo power, while Iran often seeks revolutionary change throughout the Gulf area and the wider Middle East with varying degrees of intensity. Saudi Arabia also has strong ties with Western nations, while Iran views the United States as its most dangerous enemy. Perhaps the most important difference between the two nations is that Saudi Arabia is a conservative Sunni Muslim Arab state, while Iran is a Shi'ite state whose senior politicians often view their country as the defender and natural leader of Shi'ites throughout the region. The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has been reflected in the politics of a number of regional states where these two powers exercise influence including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Bahrain and others. The 2011 wave of pro-democracy and anti-regime protests known as the "Arab Spring" introduced new concerns for both Saudi Arabia and Iran to consider within the framework of their regional priorities. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is therefore likely to intensify as a central feature in the Middle Eastern security landscape that reaches into both the Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli theater. This is a reality that will touch upon the interests of the United States in a number of situations. In many instances, Saudi opposition to Iran will serve U.S. interests, but this will not occur under all circumstances. Saudi Arabia remains a deeply anti-revolutionary state with values and priorities which sometimes overlap with those of Washington on matters of strategic interest and often conflict over matters of reform and democracy for other Middle Eastern states. Additionally, in seeking to support Middle Eastern stability, the United States must be prepared to mediate between Riyadh and Baghdad, and thereby help to limit Iranian efforts to insert itself into Iraqi politics.
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