From the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning history The Dead Hand comes the riveting story of a spy who cracked open the Soviet military research establishment and a penetrating portrait of the CIA's Moscow station, an outpost of daring espionage in the last years of the Cold War

While driving out of the American embassy in Moscow on the evening of February 16, 1978, the chief of the CIA's Moscow station heard a knock on his car window. A man on the curb handed him an envelope whose contents stunned U.S. intelligence: details of top-secret Soviet research and developments in military technology that were totally unknown to the United States. In the years that followed, the man, Adolf Tolkachev, an engineer in a Soviet military design bureau, used his high-level access to hand over tens of thousands of pages of technical secrets. His revelations allowed America to reshape its weapons systems to defeat Soviet radar on the ground and in the air, giving the United States near total superiority in the skies over Europe.

One of the most valuable spies to work for the United States in the four decades of global confrontation with the Soviet Union, Tolkachev took enormous personal risks--but so did the Americans. The CIA had long struggled to recruit and run agents in Moscow, and Tolkachev was a singular breakthrough. Using spy cameras and secret codes as well as face-to-face meetings in parks and on street corners, Tolkachev and his handlers succeeded for years in eluding the feared KGB in its own backyard, until the day came when a shocking betrayal put them all at risk.

Drawing on previously secret documents obtained from the CIA and on interviews with participants, David Hoffman has created an unprecedented and poignant portrait of Tolkachev, a man motivated by the depredations of the Soviet state to master the craft of spying against his own country. Stirring, unpredictable, and at times unbearably tense, The Billion Dollar Spy is a brilliant feat of reporting that unfolds like an espionage thriller.

This Handbook brings together 30 state-of-the-art essays covering the essential aspects of global security research and practice for the 21st century. * Embraces a broad definition of security that extends beyond the threat of foreign military attack to cover new risks for violence * Offers comprehensive coverage framed around key security concepts, risks, policy tools, and global security actors * Discusses pressing contemporary issues including terrorism, disarmament, genocide, sustainability, international peacekeeping, state-building, natural disasters, energy and food security, climate change, and cyber warfare * Includes insightful and accessible contributions from around the world aimed at a broad base of scholars, students, practitioners, and policymakers

" Click here to read a chapter from this book A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2002 From South Carolina to South Vietnam, America's two hundred-year involvement in guerrilla warfare has been extensive and varied. America and Guerrilla Warfare analyzes conflicts in which Americans have participated in the role of, on the side of, or in opposition to guerrilla forces, providing a broad comparative and historical perspective on these types of engagements. Anthony James Joes examines nine case studies, ranging from the role of Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, in driving Cornwallis to Yorktown and eventual surrender to the U.S. support of Afghan rebels that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Empire. He analyzes the origins of each conflict, traces American involvement, and seeks patterns and deviations. Studying numerous campaigns, including ones staged by Confederate units during the Civil War, Joes reveals the combination of elements that can lead a nation to success in guerrilla warfare or doom it to failure. In a controversial interpretation, he suggests that valuable lessons were forgotten or ignored in Southeast Asia. The American experience in Vietnam was a debacle but, according to Joes, profoundly atypical of the country's overall experience with guerrilla warfare. He examines several twentieth-century conflicts that should have better prepared the country for Vietnam: the Philippines after 1898, Nicaragua in the 1920s, Greece in the late 1940s, and the Philippines again during the Huk War of 1946-1954. Later, during the long Salvadoran conflict of the 1980s, American leaders seemed to recall what they had learned from their experiences with this type of warfare. Guerrilla insurgencies did not end with the Cold War. As America faces recurring crises in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and possibly Asia, a comprehensive analysis of past guerrilla engagements is essential for today's policymakers.

This book, first published in 1992, examines the changing post-Cold War changing patterns of security in Europe by analysing the major themes, the primary security organisations and the policies of countries at the forefront of the security debate. Leading experts discuss the problems of nationalism, the difficulties of peacekeeping in Europe, and the future of NATO.

Intelligence continues to undergo significant changes at a remarkable pace, notably developments related to "Big Data," surveillance, and cyber. Intelligence today involves multiagency, multinational, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing and sense-making, conducted by commerce, academic, government, civil society, media, law enforcement, military, and nongovernmental/nonprofit organizations. Increasingly complex systems, including interrelated technical dimensions, are central to modern defense systems. Intelligence Engineering: Operating Beyond the Conventional provides a new framework for generating analysis, exploring how systems to system-of-systems can be harnessed both for and into the future. Intelligence engineering (IE) involves the use of scientific and technical knowledge to artfully create, operate, maintain, and dismantle complex devices, machines, structures, systems, and processes that support and/or disrupt human endeavor occurring in the intelligence context. Spanning both human and technical intelligence realms, IE includes the collection and analysis of information that is of military and/or political value, and that relates to international relations, defense, and national security. Strategic Futures, risk management across to resilience concerns, are similarly engaged.

In 1974 Frederick W. WinterbothaM's book "The Ultra Secret" disclosed the Allied success in breaking the German high command ciphers in World War II, and a new form of history began--the study of intelligence and its impact on military operations and international politics. This guide documents and annotates over 800 sources that have appeared in the past 20 years. It examines and evaluates primary and secondary sources dealing with the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also covers sources on the Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.

The book examines and annotates primary and secondary sources on the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also provides details on sources concerned with Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.

From 2003 to 2008, the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq posed a key challenge to political stability in the country and to Coalition objectives there. This paper explains the onset, composition and evolution of this insurgency. It begins by addressing both its immediate and deeper sociopolitical origins, and goes on to examine the multiple ideological strands within the insurgency and their often conflicting methods and goals. Despite organisational incoherence due to the existence of a large number of competing groups, the insurgency in Iraq sustained a particularly high tempo of operations between 2004 and 2006, causing considerable military and civilian casualties. Some insurgent groups focused on attempting to foment civil war between two of Iraq's major communities, the Sunni and Shia Arabs and, by late 2006, they had come close to unravelling Iraq and presenting the Coalition with a major defeat. The adoption of a new approach by the US in 2007 helped reduce the level of violence in Iraq. In addition, deep fissures within the insurgency itself, between those fighting for more practical, immediate goals and the transnational Islamists and their local allies fighting for wider-reaching goals - including the promotion of sectarian strife - contributed to the insurgency's diminution. It remains to be seen whether there will be a widespread recognition among Sunni Iraqis of the need to work with the Coalition to facilitate their community's reintegration into the new Iraqi body politic.

This is the first systematic study of the relationship between government and defense contractors, examining in detail the political impact of the eight most powerful defense contractors. It details ways in which Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, Rockwell International, and United Technologies influence government, from their basic contract activity, corporate structure, and research efforts, to their Washington offices, Political Action Committee campaign contributions, hiring of government personnel, and membership on federal advisory committees.Adams concludes with specific recommendations for changes in disclosure requirements that would curb some of the political power corporations can wield. It also suggests specific ways in which the Iron Triangle can be made subject to wider congressional and public scrutiny.

In 2015, the United States Department of Defense published its long-awaited Law of War Manual making a significant statement on the position of the US government on important military matters. Whilst readers recognise the Manual's legal and strategic importance, they may question whether particular statements of law are legally accurate or complete. This book offers a unique in-depth review of the complete Manual, including revisions, on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line and word-by-word basis. The authors offer their personal assessment of the DoD's declared view as to the law that regulates the conduct of warfare, a subject of unparalleled current importance. William H. Boothby and Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg offer a balanced, articulate and authoritative critique for readers perusing the Manual in whatever capacity.

In World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence, military historian James L. Gilbert provides an authoritative overview of the birth of modern Army intelligence. Following the natural division of the intelligence war, which was fought on both the home front and overseas, Gilbert traces the development and use of intelligence and counterintelligence through the eyes of their principal architects: General Dennis E. Nolan and Colonel Ralph Van Deman. Gilbert explores how on the home front, US Army counterintelligence faced both internal and external threats that began with the Army's growing concerns over the loyalty of resident aliens who were being drafted into the ranks and soon evolved into the rooting out of enemy saboteurs and spies intent on doing great harm to America's war effort. To achieve their goals, counterintelligence personnel relied upon major strides in the areas of code breaking and detection of secret inks. Overseas, the intelligence effort proved far more extensive in terms of resources and missions, even reaching into nearby neutral countries. Intelligence within the American Expeditionary Forces was heavily indebted to its Allied counterparts who not only provided an organizational blueprint but also veteran instructors and equipment needed to train newly arriving intelligence specialists. Rapid advances by American intelligence were also made possible by the appointment of competent leaders and the recruitment of highly motivated and skilled personnel; likewise, the Army's decision to assign the bulk of its linguists to support intelligence proved critical. World War I would witness the linkage between intelligence and emerging technologies-from the use of cameras in aircraft to the intercept of enemy radio transmissions. Equally significant was the introduction of new intelligence disciplines-from exploitation of captured equipment to the translation of enemy documents. These and other functions that emerged from World War I would continue to the present to provide military intelligence with the essential tools necessary to support the Army and the nation. World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence is ideal not only for students and scholars of military history and World War I, but will also appeal to any reader interested in how modern intelligence operations first evolved.

Using journalists' own standards as the measure, an exhaustive analysis of nearly 3000 network news reports from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations reveals that the networks may do more to misinform than inform on a whole range of complex issues related to national defense. This study paints a disturbing picture of the inadequate coverage ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, and NBC Nightly News provide to millions of viewers each night. Aubin concludes that network coverage of defense issues was too often tainted by preconceived attitudes and lapses in journalistic standards. While as much as twenty-five cents of every dollar went to the defense budget during some of the periods reviewed, the networks hardly covered the key issues surrounding the Reagan defense buildup or the dramatic cuts that followed the end of the Cold War. In addition to their inadequate coverage, the networks also deprived Americans of balanced coverage of the investments made in high-tech weapons that ultimately prevailed in the Gulf War. Though the networks receive good marks for foreign policy coverage, they need to improve the quality of defense reports. This book provides them with the lessons and prescriptions for doing so, and it serves as a primer for all Americans who want to know just what it was that the networks failed to tell them.

On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup-it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack-Hitler simply beat him to the punch.

Like most years in the 50-year history of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2008 saw events that could have significant consequences for international relations and global balances of power. These included the election of Barack Obama as US president; the brief war in Georgia, which caused the West to look at Russia with more watchful eyes; and a cataclysmic crisis in the worlds financial markets that seemed to threaten globalisation and even capitalism, and to herald a period of greater economic austerity. Even as these events occurred, the security issues and risks that have been the core focus of the work of the IISS during the past half-century continued to loom large, among them nuclear proliferation and the relations between the major powers. In addition to these perennial themes was another set of issues that has in recent times risen higher on the international security agenda, including the security ramifications of natural disasters and environmental dangers such as climate change. In its anniversary year, the IISS held several high-level conferences around the world. Speeches given at these events addressed all of these issues, and this Adelphi Paper offers a selection of them. The speakers were statesmen, senior military officers, high officials and international security experts. All were concerned first and foremost with the pressing issues of the moment, as their duties required them to be. But the fact that they also addressed recurrent themes testifies to the enduring nature of the strategic challenges faced by policymakers.

First published in 2010. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor and Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2009. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor and Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2009. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor and Francis, an informa company.

As a British Intelligence Officer during World War II, Hugh Trevor-Roper was expressly forbidden from keeping a diary due to the sensitive and confidential nature of his work. However, he confided a record of his thoughts in a series of slender notebooks inscribed OHMS (On His Majesty's Service). The Wartime Journals reveal the voice and experiences of Trevor-Roper, a war-time 'backroom boy' who spent most of the war engaged in highly-confidential intelligence work in England - including breaking the cipher code of the German secret service, the Abwehr. He became an expert in German resistance plots and after the war interrogated many of Hitler's immediate circle, investigated Hitler's death in the Berlin bunker and personally retrieved Hitler's will from its secret hiding place. The posthumous discovery of Trevor-Roper's secret journals - unknown even to his family and closest confidants - is an exciting archival find and provides an unusual and privileged view of the Allied war effort against Nazi Germany. At the same time they offer an engaging - sometimes mischievous - and reflective study of both the human comedy and personal tragedy of wartime.

Written by the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts, Practise to Deceive is the most in-depth look at deception as a military strategy. Barton Whaley knew the history of denial and deception across time, disciplines, and culture. He was the foremost authority on the intricacies of denial and deception strategy and tactics. For Whaley, deception was a mind-game, requiring imagination, deep critical thought, a profound understanding of the enemy as well as one's self (a variation of Sun Tzu), and patience and fortitude. This book presents 88 vividly descriptive case studies to serve as a handbook for intelligence and military professionals. In Whaley's analysis, variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding who achieves victory in combat.

This edited volume helps bridge the elusive gap between theory and practice in dealing with the issue of "security" broadly conceived. A quarter of a century has passed since the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. Yet our notions of security remain mired in Cold War thinking whose realist ethos is predicated on holding the nation state's power, interests, and survival as the guiding unit of analysis in international relations. Security is ever changing. Confronting new dangers to the individual, the state, and the international order calls for new categories that speak to the new influence of globalization, international institutions, and transnational threats. Composed of original essays by a cosmopolitan mix of leading figures inside and outside the academy, this book proves relevant to any number of classes and courses, and its controversial character makes it all the more necessary and appealing.

The aim of this study is to examine the extent to which the end of the Cold War led to Europeanisation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The analysis takes into consideration previous studies on Europeanisation and its impact on the transformation of national security and defence, and attempts to account for the development of Europeanisation and related mechanisms. These mechanisms, which have been described as framing mechanisms and negative integration, incorporate all the major relevant factors identified here (i.e. a common Strategic Culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, industrial base and defence-spending decline) that contributed to the realisation of the CSDP. The relevance of these factors for CSDP Europeanisation is examined through an historical and empirical analysis, and the relationship between the CSDP and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is also explored. This approach facilitates analysis of the debate concerning the emergence of the CSDP and throws light on the political shift that led European Union (EU) leaders to support the CSDP. Another aspect of this study is the empirical examination of the dynamics and limitations of the European defence sector. The changes which took place in this sector facilitated the emergence of the CSDP and are therefore analysed in the light of globalisation issues, economies of scale, economic crises, military autonomy, new security strategy and Research and Development (R&D) impact. This book will be of interest to students of European security, EU politics, defence studies and International Relations.

This book applies the concept of mediatization to the contemporary dynamic between war, media and society, with a focus on the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Since the beginning of the 21st century the IDF has undergone an intensive process of mediatization that has transformed the media into an interpretative grid for many of its military activities and increasingly utilized media to garner public support and construct civilian perceptions of conflict and security through media activity and strategy. This process can be divided into four distinct chronological phases in accordance with the operational challenges confronted by the IDF during this period, from the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2000, through Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, and the second Lebanon war of 2006, to the series of Gaza confrontations of 2008-2014. The work shows how the IDF's media policy evolved from a narrow perception of its role, and separation between operational and media actions to a cohesive and coherently articulated media strategy that is increasingly intertwined with military action and operational strategy and a vital component of strategic military aims and objectives. This strategic stance has led the IDF to adopt a global media perspective using the most advanced new media platforms, designed to influence public opinion and improve national narratives, both in Israel and the international community. By applying the concept of mediatization to the Israeli case, this book fills a research lacuna and offers a new prism for the study of media-military relations in contemporary conflicts. The book will be of much interest to students of civil-military relations, strategic studies, Middle Eastern Studies, media and communication studies, sociology and IR, in general.

This book delves into the secret histories of the CIA, the FBI, and British and Italian intelligence to study how policymakers can control intelligence agencies and when these agencies will try to remove their own government. For every government they serve, intelligence agencies are both a threat and a necessity. They often provide vital information for national security, but the secrets they possess can also be used against their own masters. This book introduces subversion paradox theory to provide a social scientific explanation of the unequal power dynamic resulting from an often fraught relationship between agencies and their 'masters'. The author also makes a case for the existence of 'deep state' conspiracies, including in highly developed democracies, and cautions those who denounce their existence that trying to control intelligence by politicizing it is likely to backfire. An important intervention in the field of intelligence studies, this book will be indispensable for intelligence professionals and policymakers in understanding and bridging the cultural divide between these two groups. It will also make for a fascinating and informative read to scholars and researchers of diplomacy, foreign policy, international relations, strategic and defence studies, security studies, political studies, policymaking and comparative politics.