Sure to be found controversial by some, compelling by all, this is the only available book-length examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Of more immediate concern, it is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Adams argues, arose from the DoD's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts-whether they were appropriate or not. What we need to do, he maintains, is to fight the war we have, not the war we want. Over the last several decades, military theorists and others began to believe that new technologies were generating a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), capabilities so revolutionary that they would redefine warfare. Spurred by these beliefs, and led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense (DoD) set out to transform the U.S. armed forces by adopting RMA concepts-and spending billions to make the hypothetical capabilities real. The entire structure of the armed forces changed as a result. This vision, however, was totally dependent on a set of unproven suppositions and often nonexistent capabilities, especially a network of information technologies. Moreover, the services, the media, Congress, and industry each had its own agenda, all of which continue to come into play in the development of RMA strategies. The interplay of politics, technology and military reality offers a fascinating narrative.

Intelligence is now acknowledged as the hidden dimension to international diplomacy and national security. It is the hidden piece of the jigsaw puzzle of global relations that cements relationships, undermines alliances and topples tyrants, and after many decades of being deliberately overlooked or avoided, it is now regarded as a subject of legitimate study by academics and historians. This second edition of Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence covers its history through a chronology, an introductory essay, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 500 cross-referenced entries on espionage techniques, categories of agents, crucial operations spies, defectors, moles, double and triple agents, and the tradecraft they apply. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the international intelligence.

Hurricane Katrina is the latest in a series of major disasters that were not well managed, but it is not likely to be the last. Category 4 and category 5 hurricanes will, according to most predictions, become both more frequent and more intense in the future due to global warming and/or natural weather cycles. In addition, it is often said that another terrorist attack on the United States is inevitable; that it is a question of when, not whether. Add to that the scare over a possible avian flu pandemic. As a result, the United States should expect that disaster response--to natural and other types of disasters--will continue to be of vital concern to the American public and the policymakers and officials who deal with disaster response and relief, including the military. The U.S. disaster relief program reflects a basic division of responsibility between federal, state, and local governments that has generally stood the test of time. At the federal level, a single agency, FEMA--now under the Department of Homeland Security--has been charged with the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the various federal agencies that have a role in disaster relief. A successful disaster response requires three things: timely and effective coordination between state and federal governments; effective coordination among the federal agencies; and effective coordination between and among state and local government agencies. Miskel examines the effects that operational failures after Hurricanes Agnes, Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina have had on the organizational design and operating principles of the disaster response system program. He also discusses the impact of 9/11 and the evolving role ofthe military, and he identifies reforms that should be implemented to improve the nation's ability to respond in the future.

Decisions about war have always been made by humans, but now intelligent machines are on the cusp of changing things - with dramatic consequences for international affairs. This book explores the evolutionary origins of human strategy, and makes a provocative argument that Artificial Intelligence will radically transform the nature of war by changing the psychological basis of decision-making about violence. Strategy, Evolution, and War is a cautionary preview of how Artificial Intelligence (AI) will revolutionize strategy more than any development in the last three thousand years of military history. Kenneth Payne describes strategy as an evolved package of conscious and unconscious behaviors with roots in our primate ancestry. Our minds were shaped by the need to think about warfare-a constant threat for early humans. As a result, we developed a sophisticated and strategic intelligence. The implications of AI are profound because they depart radically from the biological basis of human intelligence. Rather than being just another tool of war, AI will dramatically speed up decision making and use very different cognitive processes, including when deciding to launch an attack, or escalate violence. AI will change the essence of strategy, the organization of armed forces, and the international order. This book is a fascinating examination of the psychology of strategy-making from prehistoric times, through the ancient world, and into the modern age.

"Strategy and Intelligence," which brings together original essays by a number of leading authorities on various aspects of the First World War, aims both to summarise the latest literature on Britain's participation in that war and also to open up new lines of investigation. These include the role of intelligence in land and air battles; Anglo-American financial relations; Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Irish relations; the British Labour movement in the war; and the final campaigns of 1918, which led to the Allied victory. These essays are written not only for the specialist but also to be accessible to students and to the general reader.

Desertification in the Mediterranean Region: a Security Issue 1 2 William G. Kepner & Jose Luis Rubio 1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, P.O. Box 93478, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 89193-3478 ([email protected]) 2. Centro de Investigaciones sobre Desertificacion-CIDE, (CSIC, Universitat de Valencia, Generalitat Valenciana), Cami de la Marjal, s/n Apartado Oficial, 46470 Albal, Valencia, Spain ([email protected]) Security issues related to desertification in the Mediterranean Region were the subject of a special NATO workshop held on 2-5 December 2003 at the Museum of Sciences Principe Felipe in Valencia, Spain. This workshop was organized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA), Centre for Desertification Research (Valencia, Spain), and the Desert Research Institute (Reno, Nevada, USA) on behalf of the NATO Science Committee and the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (Public Diplomacy Division). Additionally, the European Society for Soil Conservation participated as a collaborating institution. Other participating institutions included the Spanish Ministry of Environment, Generalitat Valencia (Department of Territory and Housing), the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the City of Art & Sciences of Valencia which hosted the Meeting."

In this timely work, James Giermanski describes the advent and development of security operations in the global supply chain, outlining the respective contributions of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders to this worldwide concern. Global Supply Chain Security explores the potential impact of port-related catastrophic events in the United States and their effects worldwide, concentrating, in particular, on the United States' contribution to global container security. Offering insights on deficiencies in U.S. policies, Giermanski underscores the vulnerabilities in the supply chain that U.S. government agencies have ignored, avoided, and even denied. Global Supply Chain Security treats both the terrestrial and maritime borders of the United States, reserving for special analysis the threat to the nation's southern border of hazardous materials or materials in transshipment or in-bond, as well as the questionable leadership exhibited by the Department of Homeland Security in its diagnosis and treatment of these threats. Finally, Giermanski covers the important role played by the private sector and the off-the-shelf, innovative products that have been introduced to supply chain management and security.

HarperCollins is proud to present its incredible range of best-loved, essential classics. The ancient Chinese art of warfare written by military strategist Sun Tzu in the 5th century BC.

Military affairs have been affected by major changes in recent years. The bipolar world of two superpowers has gone. The Cold War and the global military confrontation that accompanied it have ended. A new military and political order has emerged in the world, but the world has not become more stable; indeed, wars and armed conflict have become much more common. Forecasting the contours of future armed conflict is no easy task at such times, but this is the primary objective of If War Comes Tomorrow? Focusing on the impact of new technologies, General Gareev considers whether war is still a continuation of politics by other means' or whether the political, ideological, and technical transformation have broken that connection. He explores the linkage between threats to Russian national interests and war as an instrument of policy in great detail and concludes that there is very little prospect either of nuclear war or widespread conventional war. However, he does see local armed conflicts and local wars increasing, with greater emphasis on subversion. He argues that coming decades will see a shift towards a reliance upon indirect means to accomplish limited political ends, and analyses both information warfare and the revolution in military affairs from this perspective.

In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.

Civilian control of the armed forces is crucial for any country hoping to achieve a successful democratic transition. In this remarkable book, Narcis Serra, Spanish Minister of Defence between 1982 and 1991, explains the steps necessary to reduce the powers of armed forces during the process of a democratic transition. Spain's military reform proved a fundamental and necessary element for the consolidation of Spanish democracy and is often viewed as a paradigm case for the transition to democracy. Drawing on this example, Serra outlines a simple model of the process and conditions necessary to any democratic military reform. He argues that progress in military transition must include legal and institutional reforms, changes to the military career structure and doctrine, and control of conflict levels.

This book explores the theory and practice of security conflict intervention by examining the experience of the Boko Haram security assault conflict. Through an examination of the realities of conflict it provides pragmatic approaches to strategic security and suggests ways to create practical security research, political controls, military and police mobilization, intelligence management, counterterrorism, and antiterrorism intervention procedures and practices to sustainably resolve conflict. The author argues that every intervention plan must be forged based on the particular security assault conflict dynamics and demands in a nation or region. In all cases, however, the key to securing and guaranteeing public protection and safety is regular inter-agency and multi-disciplinary collaboration. At the micro level, this book is about security strategies for public protection, but at the macro level it is about public domain violence prevention, response, mitigation, recovery, restoration, and protection of the public from the deleterious impacts of emergency events.

The defence of the Gulf has been a vital strategic concern for close on 100 years. The British first became involved in the Gulf to protect the sea routes to India and with the development of international air routes the Gulf became a crucial staging post. This book, first published in 1986, surveys the strategic issues in the defence of the Gulf from the earliest British involvement up to the Iraq-Iran war. It examines the British retreat from the Gulf and the imperial vestiges that were left behind. It considers the way in which American interests in the Gulf came to replace British interests and it analyses how American foreign policy has responded to this additional responsibility. The book also investigates the regional concerns of Gulf security and the intra-regional conflicts that have erupted in the Iraq-Iran war.

India has the world's fourth largest military and one of the biggest defence budgets. It asserts its political and military profile in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The nation has been in the midst of an ambitious plan to modernize its largely Soviet-era arms since the late 1990s and has spent billions of dollars on latest high-tech military technology. This handbook: canvasses over 60 years of Indian defence policy and the major debates that have shaped it; discusses several key themes such as the origins of the modern armed forces in India; military doctrine and policy; internal and external challenges; and nuclearization and its consequences; includes contributions by well-known scholars, experts in the field and policymakers; and provides an annotated bibliography for further research. Presented in an accessible format, this lucidly written handbook will be an indispensable resource for scholars and researchers of security and defence studies, international relations and political science, as well as for government think tanks and policymakers.

The Practice of Strategy focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practiced over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in present-day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles, but also to times of peace that were over-shadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation-state policies.
Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as 'the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means, ' these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence of political objectives, operational schemes of manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present.
Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.

This book is the first full-spectrum analysis of Russian and European norms of political action, ranging from international law, ethics, and strategy, to the specific norms for the use of force. It brings together leading scholars from these various fields, examining the differences in norm understanding between Russia and Europe. In light of the 2014 occupation and annexation of Crimea by Russia, and its subsequent covert participation in the internal affairs of Ukraine, including aggressive flying and major military exercises, Russia seems to be a classical revisionist power, intent on changing the balance of power in Europe in particular. It also reaches beyond Europe, inserting itself as the key actor in the Syrian war. The book therefore considers how we should understand Russia. It also questions whether or not the West, in particular Europe, responds adequately in this delicate and dangerous new situation. The book concludes that at present Russia acts strategically and with considerable success whereas Europe is reactive in its response.

This fourteenth volume of India's National Security Annual Review intensively analyses India's national security with respect to the changing internal and external dynamics. In the global environment, the situation is characterised by rising tensions between United States and Russia, intensified rivalry between United States (US) and China, and increasing cooperation between China and Russia. For India which seeks peaceful growth to emerge as a major power, this poses severe diplomatic challenges. This volume discusses the complexity of these challenges and the deftness with which India gets the best out of its strategic partnerships with the US and Russia while warding off the transgressions of a mighty adversary like China. It also studies the impact of internal convulsions and external intrusions on India's security from South Asian nations such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Examining the field of internal security, the essays carry rare insights into the causes of expansion of Naxalite violence in tribal areas and the dynamics of conflict resolution in the Northeast, as well as India's deep concern as a growing power with its economic slowdown in the recent past, and energy and cyber security. Bringing together contributions from eminent scholars and diplomats, the volume will be indispensable for policymakers, government think tanks, defence and strategic studies experts, as well as students and researchers of international relations, foreign policy and political science.

As tensions between China and Japan increase, including over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, Japan has adopted under Prime Minister Abe a new security posture. This involves, internally, adapting Japan's constitutional position on defence and, externally, building stronger international relationships in the Asia-Pacific region and more widely. This book presents a comprehensive analysis of these developments. It shows how trust and co-operation with the United States, the only partner with which Japan has a formal alliance, is being rebuilt, discusses how other relationships, both on security and on wider issues, are being formed, in the region and with European countries and the EU, with the relationships with India and Australia being of particular importance, and concludes by assessing the likely impact on the region of Japan's changing posture and new relationships.

This book provides a history of the South China Sea conflict and lays out the stakes for each of the bordering states and China's interaction with them - namely, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia; it also examines the U.S. government's role in the region. China's Naval Operations in the South China Sea is highly topical; it examines the evolving perception of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) of the South China Sea (SCS), and Beijing's accompanying maritime strategy to claim the islands and waters, particularly in the context of the strategies of the neighbouring stake-holding nations. In addition to long-standing territorial disputes over the islands and waters of the SCS, China and the other littoral states - Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia - have growing and often mutually exclusive interests in the offshore energy reserves and fishing grounds. Many other countries outside of the region worry about the protection of sea lines of communication for military and commercial traffic, oil tankers in particular. These differences have been expressed in the increasing frequency and intensity of maritime incidents, involving both naval and civilian vessels, sometimes working in coordination against naval or civilian targets. Each chapter on the littoral states closely examines that state's territorial claims to the islands and waters of the SCS, its primary economic and military interests in these areas, its views on the sovereignty disputes over the entire SCS, its strategy to achieve its objectives, and its views on the U.S. involvement in any and all of these issues.

One of the most significant factors for contemporary international relations is the growth of China's economic, military, and political power. Indeed, few analysts would dispute the observation that China's power has strongly influenced the structure of the international system, major-power strategic relations, international security, the patterns of trans-border economic activities, and most importantly, the political and security dynamics in Asia in the twenty-first century. This book maps the growth of China's political, economic, and military capabilities and its impact on the security order in Asia over the coming decades. While updating the emerging power dimensions and prevailing discourse, it provides a nuanced analysis of whether the growth of Chinese power is resulting in Beijing becoming more assertive, or even aggressive, in its behavior and pursuit of national interests. It also examines how the key Asian countries perceive and react to the growth of China's power and how US rebalancing would play out in the context of Beijing's political, economic, and military power. China's Power and Asian Security will be of huge interest to student and scholars of Asian politics, Chinese politics, security studies and international security and international relations more generally.

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

Military and defense organizations are a vital component to any nation. In order to maintain the standards of these sectors, new procedures and practices must be implemented. Emerging Strategies in Defense Acquisitions and Military Procurement is a pivotal reference source for the latest scholarly research on the present state of defense organizations, examining reforms and solutions necessary to overcome current limitations and make vast improvements to their infrastructure. Highlighting methodologies and theoretical foundations that promote more effective practices in defense acquisition, this book is ideally designed for academicians, practitioners, researchers, upper-level students, and professionals engaged in defense industries.

The issue of security in the Gulf has an importance which goes far beyond the regional location of the area. It is enough to note that instability in the area may result in the interruption of oil supplies to the rest of the world. This book, first published in 1981, considers some of the challenges facing the region following recent developments such as the fall of the Shah and the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the formation of an American task force to intervene in the area, the failure of the Camp David agreement and the Iran-Iraq war.