This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyzes the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.

" Click here to read a chapter from this book A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2002 From South Carolina to South Vietnam, America's two hundred-year involvement in guerrilla warfare has been extensive and varied. America and Guerrilla Warfare analyzes conflicts in which Americans have participated in the role of, on the side of, or in opposition to guerrilla forces, providing a broad comparative and historical perspective on these types of engagements. Anthony James Joes examines nine case studies, ranging from the role of Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, in driving Cornwallis to Yorktown and eventual surrender to the U.S. support of Afghan rebels that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Empire. He analyzes the origins of each conflict, traces American involvement, and seeks patterns and deviations. Studying numerous campaigns, including ones staged by Confederate units during the Civil War, Joes reveals the combination of elements that can lead a nation to success in guerrilla warfare or doom it to failure. In a controversial interpretation, he suggests that valuable lessons were forgotten or ignored in Southeast Asia. The American experience in Vietnam was a debacle but, according to Joes, profoundly atypical of the country's overall experience with guerrilla warfare. He examines several twentieth-century conflicts that should have better prepared the country for Vietnam: the Philippines after 1898, Nicaragua in the 1920s, Greece in the late 1940s, and the Philippines again during the Huk War of 1946-1954. Later, during the long Salvadoran conflict of the 1980s, American leaders seemed to recall what they had learned from their experiences with this type of warfare. Guerrilla insurgencies did not end with the Cold War. As America faces recurring crises in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and possibly Asia, a comprehensive analysis of past guerrilla engagements is essential for today's policymakers.

Between the grinding battles of the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and the finality of the atomic bomb strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the air force conducted a bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands that escalated to new levels of destruction, using tactics generally attributed to terror and wanton destruction. Burning Japan is an investigation of how and why the U.S. Army Air Force shifted its tactics against Japan from a precision bombing strategy to area attacks. The guiding doctrine of the 1930s and 1940s called for focused attacks on specific targets deep behind enemy lines. Eager to prove itself, the nascent Army Air Force at first lauded the indispensability of strategic bombardment in areas otherwise unreachable by the army or navy. But when strategic bombing failed to yield the desired results in Europe and in initial efforts against Japan, the United States switched tactics, a shift culminating in the area firebombing of nearly every major Japanese metropolis and the burning of sixty-six cities to the ground. Daniel T. Schwabe closely examines the planning and implementation of the incendiary missions to determine how an organization dedicated to precision decided on such a dramatic change of tactics. Ultimately, Schwabe maintains, this strategic reimagining helped create a comprehensive offensive strategy that did immense amounts of destruction that crippled Japan and brought an end to World War II.

Why do presidents and their advisors often make sub-optimal decisions on military intervention, escalation, de-escalation, and termination of conflicts? The leading concept of group dynamics, groupthink, offers one explanation: policy-making groups make sub-optimal decisions due to their desire for conformity and uniformity over dissent, leading to a failure to consider other relevant possibilities. But presidential advisory groups are often fragmented and divisive. This book therefore scrutinizes polythink, a group decision-making dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and divergent policy prescriptions, resulting in a disjointed decision-making process or even decision paralysis. The book analyzes eleven national security decisions, including the national security policy designed prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the decisions to enter into and withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2007 "surge" decision, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program, the UN Security Council decision on the Syrian Civil War, the faltering Kerry Peace Process in the Middle East, and the U.S. decision on military operations against ISIS. Based on the analysis of these case studies, the authors address implications of the polythink phenomenon, including prescriptions for avoiding and/or overcoming it, and develop strategies and tools for what they call Productive Polythink. The authors also show the applicability of polythink to business, industry, and everyday decisions.

Intelligence was a central element of the Cold War and the need for it was expected to diminish after the USSR's collapse, yet in recent years it has been in greater demand than ever. The atrocities of 11 September and the subsequent "war on terrorism" now call for an even more intensive effort. Important questions arise on how intelligence fits into the world of increased threats, globalization and expanded international action. This volume contains the recent work on this subject by Michael Herman, British intelligence professional for 35 years and Oxford University academic. It compares intelligence with other government information services, and discusses the British intelligence system and the case for its reform. It also addresses the ethical issues raised by intelligence's methods and results: "do they on balance make for a better world or a worse one?." Other chapters explore a wide range of intelligence topics past and present, including the transatlantic relationship, the alliance strategies of Norway and New Zealand, Mrs Thatcher's "de-unionization" of British Sigint, and personal memories of the British Cabinet Office in the 1970s.
Michael Herman argues for intelligence professionalism as a contribution to international security and for its encouragement as a world standard. The modern challenge is for intelligence to support international cooperation in ways originally developed to advance national interests, while at the same time developing some restraint and international "rules of the game," in the use of intrusive and covert methods on its traditional targets. The effects of 11 September on this challenge are discussed in a thoughtful afterword.

The French Defence Debate examines assertions of consensus and continuity in, and surrounding, France's defence since 1958, with primary reference to the political career of Francois Mitterrand. Mitterrand's influence over defence and security, before and after his election to the presidency, is often underestimated. Nonetheless his impact was substantial, if ultimately for his lack of concern to preserve consensus and his reluctance to instigate necessary changes in France's defence - despite the end of the Cold War, and the military deficiencies and limitations of national independence it exposed.

Keohane examines the main British political parties' attitude to Britain's policy on three key security issues: the use of force; nuclear weapons; and security in Northern Ireland. He analyzes how each of the parties viewed conflicts at Suez, the Falklands and the Gulf, elucidates their perspective on nuclear weapons and concludes with a review of their attitude towards security in Northern Ireland. The text concludes that the parties' policies reflect their distinctive views on security, and that international conditions often severely affect the policy pursued.

Since the end of the Cold War French defence policy has undergone a transformation. France has reformed its national defence to Europeanize and multilateralize its role, moved closer to NATO, and emerged as amongst the world's most active military powers. This book presents a wide-ranging analysis, setting out the background and policy framework of French defence, charting the transformation of policy between 1989 and 1996, and examining the role of the French military within and beyond Europe into the twenty-first century.

This work utilizes a key security concept to examine one of the most dramatic regions of the world. Focusing on ethnic tensions, intra-ASEAN rivalries and the emergence of Chinese hegemony, the security dilemma is used to provide insights into a wide range of the region's contemporary security issues. In addition, the book expounds upon some of the uses of the security dilemma, exploring both its applicability to ethnic tensions and a new variant: a state induced security dilemma.

This book explores the crucial relationship between security and identity in a changing Europe. It covers a series of key policy issues, including NATO enlargement, EU integration, war in the Balkans and Russia's uncertain future. This new agenda is explored through a range of theoretical approaches, from traditional realist to social constructivist and postmodern interpretations. Security and Identity in Europe thus offers an excellent guide to contending theories of international relations and provides innovative insights for students seeking to understand a changing Europe at the beginning of the new millennium.

The Soviet Union remains a superpower with global security interests and ambitions. The doctrines, practices, and capabilities of its still formidable armed forces are shaping world politics just at the same time that the future of the country that created them is in doubt. This book, first published in 1991, analyses the unprecedented changes, as well as the troubling continuities, that characterized Soviet military thinking during the early 1990s. The authors - a group of leading analysts in the US national security community - confront the range of Soviet military strengths, including intercontinental nuclear power, conventional ground, and naval forces and special operations. They address questions of Soviet weapons research and development, military planning and policy making, and the role of civilian critics on Soviet military objectives. Other chapters explore the Red Army's erosion in Eastern Europe as well as the lessons of Afghanistan.

Using the European Defence Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting view of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early 1950s. The British, fearing an 'agonizing reappraisal' of the American defence commitment to Europe if the supranational EDC failed, went to great lengths to ensure the success of the scheme. When, despite these efforts, the EDC finally collapsed in August 1954, NATO was plunged into arguably the most severe crisis in its history. The crisis also possessed an Anglo-American dimension, with London and Washington badly divided on how it should be resolved. In the end, the British were instrumental in the creation of the Western European Union as a successor to the EDC. Their crisis management, however, had been rooted in fear of the 'agonizing reappraisal', a danger dismissed by many historians as exaggerated but which the British, in 1954, were perhaps right to take seriously.

The development of a European security architecture comprising NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE is covered in this book, providing a critical account of the re-projection, and redefinition of western values and institutions, in the post-Cold War era. This transformation is explored in three stages. The first stage covers the period 1990 to 1991, and explains the preservation of a "western security community" inherited from the Cold War, through a process of institutional reconstruction, largely carried out on paper. The second stage from 1991 to 1992 sees the incorporation of a "purpose" for these institutions as a framework for the implementation of collective security. The third stage explores the emerging questions of legitimacy surrounding the new tasks of these institutions.

Winston Churchill once remarked that the secret warfare waged in World War II equaled "the most fantastic inventions of romance and melodrama."

William Breuer vividly confirms that assessment with these compelling accounts of Allied and Axis intelligence throughout World War II. Here are riveting tales of patriotism and treachery, saboteurs, sleepers, and moles, giving fresh perspectives on the best-known interceptions and deceptions of the war—the breaking of the German code Enigma and the Japanese code Purple, Operation Overlord’s successful disguise of the D-Day invasion— as well as little-known feats of civilian bravado in the face of danger.

Meet Sidney Cotton, a British businessman and aviator who took the Luftwaffe’s General Albrecht Kesselring aloft for a test flight at a German air show and then coolly snapped valuable reconnaissance photographs after handing the controls over to the Nazi officer.

Shadow the covert armada that shipped the foundation of Great Britain’s financial security—including $2.5 billion in gold—from London to the Bank of Canada in Ottawa, without suffering a single loss from U-boats at the height of the Battle for the Atlantic.

Discover how U.S. taxpayers footed the bill for a successful Nazi propaganda effort that was documented in the Congressional Record, published by the Government Printing Office, and mailed on a congressman’s postal privileges.

Witness a German military spy so inept he carried his World War I medals on his mission, and another so bold that he advertised for industry secrets in the pages of Popular Aviation magazine. He paid twenty dollars each for the numerous—and significant—replies that poured in.

Drawn extensively from personal interviews, private correspondence, trial records, and declassified documents from official archives, this engrossing volume provides detailed, frequently startling revelations about the secret wars fought behind the battlefields—and the headlines—of World War II.

This war was fought by soldiers out of uniform. Stealth and ingenuity were their weapons. Victory was their only code of conduct."Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail."—Henry L. Stimson

Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of War under President Franklin Roosevelt, was in for a rude shock as the military forces of Germany and Japan armed themselves for their assault on the world. Men at war not only read each other’s mail; they forged it whenever possible.

In Top Secret Tales of World War II, noted military historian William Breuer documents espionage—in all its forms—as it evolved in the hands of both Allied and Axis agents of intelligence and counter-intelligence. He reveals the acts of subversion and sabotage, the bribes, blackmailings, kidnappings, assassinations, grand deceptions, and bizarre assaults that were conducted in the name of victory at all costs.

Focusing on the fascinating characters that played key roles in these pivotal incidents, Breuer brings a fresh dimension to the war’s most notorious acts and provides new insights into missions conducted in such deep shadow they nearly eluded the history books as well as they did the enemy’s detection.

During the presidency of George Bush (1989-93), the proliferation of nuclear chemical and biological weapons, and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, rose greatly in significance as issues on the American security agenda. In the missile field, this became evident by the efforts of certain elements in the executive branch and several congressmen to improve domestic and international implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation examines the political, bureaucratic and systemic issues that interacted to determine the outcome of these efforts.

Keith B. Bickel challenges a host of military and strategic theories that treat particular bureaucratic structures, large organizations, and elites as the progenitors of doctrine. This timely study of how the military draws lessons from interventions focuses on the overlooked role that mid-level combat officers play in creating military doctrine. "Mars Learning" closely evaluates Marine civil and military pacification operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and illuminates the debates surrounding the development of Marine Corps' small wars doctrine between 1915 and 1940. The result is compelling evidence of how field experience obtained before 1940 played a role in shaping the "Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual" and elements of doctrine that exist today. How the Marines organized lessons at that time provides important insights into how doctrine is likely to be generated today in response to post-Cold War interventions around the globe.

This book calls for the progressive creation of supra-national institutions intended to protect life on Earth against natural threats, be these terrestrial (pandemics, super-volcanoes, major earthquakes.) or celestial (comets, asteroids, meteor storms). The protection proffered would need to be pre-emptive though also responsive, reducing the number of adverse events but also their specific consequences. Rancid though the world scene currently looks, this may actually be a good time to look towards a planetary security programme that can build up over a century or more. It would need special international institutions that are sufficiently integrated to cope with the celestial and terrestrial contingencies anticipated yet not so much a class apart as to be a law unto themselves, a military regime able to ride roughshod over general world opinion. Such an holistic approach to planetary security might prove to be a definitive substitute for war between nations. Professor Brown comes to such questions from a broad career background. His lead qualifications are a Masters degree from Oxford in Modern History and a Doctorate of Science from Birmingham (UK) in Applied Geophysics. He has been a naval meteorologist; staff college instructor; part-time but pro-active as a defence correspondent for several of the West's leading journals; and political consultant. From 1980 to 1986, he was Chairman of the Council for Arms Control. From 1993 to 1997 he worked half-time in the Sensors and Electronic Systems directorate of Britain's Ministry of Defence. This was as the Academic Consultant in a small task force specifically created to advise the government of the day apropos what British policy to Strategic Ballistic Missile Defence should be. A declassified rendering of his 90,000-word report (published by Mansfield College, Oxford, in 1998) argued firmly against our going down this path. It could lead to a catastrophic arms race.

This book analyses the new pattern of security concerns of the Central Asian successor states. This region is said to encompass Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan. The main contention of the book is that the security problems of these states are similar to those that faced other 'Third World' countries after they attained independence. That is, due to the arbitrary creation of these states by external powers they lack a certain degree of societal cohesiveness arising from the fact that several ethnic communities reside within their borders. It is this so-called 'insecurity dilemma' of each of the Central Asian states that is therefore examined.

`Careful, original and wide-ranging study of many different aspects of late medieval military history.' HISTORY The Hundred Years War embraced warfare in all aspects, from the grand set pieces of Crecy and Agincourt to the pillaged lands of the dispossessed population. What makes this book different from previous studies emphasising the great battles is its use of less familiar evidence, such as administrative records and landscape archaeology, to gain a truer picture of the realities of medieval warfare. From a general review of battle tactics, the book turns to examine (at points enlisting computer analysis) a number of issues: the composition of the English army, the management of affairs in Aquitaine, the response in England at large to the war and the consequent propaganda and hardship,and the impact of warfare on local communities. Close study of surviving artefacts - weapons, fortifications - also allows realistic assessments of military and naval experiences. Contributors: ANDREW AYTON, MATTHEW BENNETT,ANNE CURRY, IAN FRIEL, ROBERT HARDY, MICHAEL HUGHES, MICHAEL JONES, BRIAN KEMP, JOHN KENYON, MARK ORMROD, ROBERT SMITH, MALCOLM VALE.

World-renowned political thinkers and scientists write on nuclear weapons and war in the twenty-first century. The contributors include Mikhail Gorbachev, who first declared 'A nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought', Robert McNamara, US Defense Secretary at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam War; and Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat, the only scientist to resign from the Manhattan Project, where the world's first nuclear weapons were produced.

‘It is extraordinary how reluctant the British soldier is to show cunning. We try to play the game of war as if it had rules for fair play like cricket and football.’ ‘If you want to make your spell of duty pass quickly, concentrate on prowling properly.’ ‘By Jove, look! There is a suspicious-looking man creeping under those bushes. It will be heaven help that rough chap if he makes a break!’ First published in the 1940s for the newly-recruited British Home Guard, The Art of Prowling showed recruits how to sneak up on the enemy without being seen, how to avoid attracting attention, and why they should never underestimate a German spy. Will you be awarded the Good Prowler’s Badge?

The question of where, and with whom, power lies in the post Cold War world is explored here. The authors identify and discuss the factors which make the United States the world leader in the 1990s, and consider the strengths and weaknesses of countries which may be on the way to becoming leaders in Europe (Russia and the European Union) and Asia (Japan and China). The authors' main argument is that the world is becoming 'unitripolar' with the United States as its pivotal, though not fully hegemonic, power.

For much of the post war era, the substance and scope of international security was defined by the parameters of the Cold War. But the end of the Cold War has created a new global context. This text seeks to map out the nature of post Cold War security by exploring the patterns of international conflict, weighing non state challenges to security, examining inter state cooperation in the security field and evaluating the security dynamics of the Asia Pacific region.

This text considers the ethical credentials of the United States in branding various countries pariah states, and describes the background to the Iraq question (the role of Saddam, the genocidal sanctions regime, amongst other things). A detailed chronology of 1997-98 US/Iraq weapons inspections crisis is given, prior to a profile of the subsequent UN/Iraqi settlement and its aftermath.