The issue of security in the Gulf has an importance which goes far beyond the regional location of the area. It is enough to note that instability in the area may result in the interruption of oil supplies to the rest of the world. This book, first published in 1981, considers some of the challenges facing the region following recent developments such as the fall of the Shah and the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the formation of an American task force to intervene in the area, the failure of the Camp David agreement and the Iran-Iraq war.

This book analyses the internal sources of foreign policy within those NATO states whose primary security concerns lie in the southern area of the Alliance. It takes a careful look at foreign and defence policy formulation and assesses the special perspective of each of these countries inturn and the military threats that they face. Attention is paid to the role of the military in society, especially in the geographically peripheral states, as the Alliance seeks to adapt to a possible shift southward of some of its security concerns. A full understanding of the politics in each of these states is essential to determine the relative importance of national and Alliance priorities in each country as the tensions between external policies and internal necessities increase. The book offers an assessment of evolving security requirements in the southern region and of the capacity of NATO Mediterranean states to deal individually and collectively with the changing situation.

Giving an overview of research and development in weaponry in the maritime and aviation sphere as well as land-based technology, this study looks forward to the effects of emerging innovations on defence policy-making.

In Technology Security and National Power, Stephen D. Bryen shows how the United States has squandered its technological leadership through unwise policies. Starting from biblical times, he shows how technology has either increased national power or led to military and political catastrophe. He goes on to show how the US has eroded its technological advantages, endangering its own security. The scope ofTechnology Security and National Power extends across 3,000 years of history, from an induced plague in Athens to chemical weapons at Ypres to an atomic bomb on Hiroshima to the nuclear balance of terror. It describes new weapons systems and stealth jets, cyber attacks on national infrastructure, the looting of America's Defense secrets, and much more. The core thesis is supported by unique insight and new documentation that reaches into today's conflicted world. More than a litany of recent failures and historical errors, this book is a wake-up call for political actors and government officials who seem unable to understand the threat. Technology Security and National Power proposes that the United States can again become a winner in today's globalized environment.

During the past twenty-five years, U.S. strategists have argued that avoiding nuclear war depends on deterring a Soviet first strike by ensuring that U.S. forces could survive a surprise attack in numbers sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation. U.S. military and political leaders have thus emphasized acquiring more powerful and accurate weaponry and providing better protection for it, while defense analysts have focused on assessing the relative strength and survivability of U.S. and Soviet forces. In the process neither has given sufficient attention to the vulnerability of the U.S. command, control, and communications system that would coordinate warning of an attack in progress and the response to it. In this study Bruce G. Blair examines accepted assumptions about mutual deterrence, force strength, and survivability, and concludes that the vulnerability of command, control, and communications not only precludes an effective retaliatory strike but also invites a preemptive Soviet first strike. After summarizing the assumptions and evaluative methodology behind mainstream strategic theory, the study describes the current decentralized command and control system that, under conditions of surprise attack, could be unable to communicate with decisionmakers or with units responsible for executing the decisions. Blair traces in detail the development of the system over three decades; the attempts to improve it through the use of procedural guidelines, alternative and redundant communications channels, and survival tactics; and the continuing vulnerabilities from improved Soviet weapons and the environmental forces engendered by massive nuclear detonations. Blair also analyzes the probable effects of proposals by the Reagan administration to strengthen command, control, and communications systems and provides recommendations for further strengthening and for altering related policies, deployments, and strategies to improve the stability of deterrence.

In Technology Security and National Power, Stephen D. Bryen shows how the United States has squandered its technological leadership through unwise policies. Starting from biblical times, he shows how technology has either increased national power or led to military and political catastrophe. He goes on to show how the US has eroded its technological advantages, endangering its own security. The scope ofTechnology Security and National Power extends across 3,000 years of history, from an induced plague in Athens to chemical weapons at Ypres to an atomic bomb on Hiroshima to the nuclear balance of terror. It describes new weapons systems and stealth jets, cyber attacks on national infrastructure, the looting of America's Defense secrets, and much more. The core thesis is supported by unique insight and new documentation that reaches into today's conflicted world. More than a litany of recent failures and historical errors, this book is a wake-up call for political actors and government officials who seem unable to understand the threat. Technology Security and National Power proposes that the United States can again become a winner in today's globalized environment.

The ideal model of national security decision making, whereby the legislative branch authorizes action to protect national security and the executive branch takes it, has broken down due to the speed and unpredictability of foreign crises and the president's monopoly on foreign intelligence. In response, Congress has ceded the initiative to the president, and then utilized the power of the purse to ratify or restrict what the president has done. This power, by necessity and preference, has become the central congressional tool for participating in national security policy. Inevitably attacks on policy are transformed into attacks on the making and effects of appropriations. In National Security Law and the Power of the Purse, William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen offer a compelling discussion of the constitutional and statutory questions raised by these attacks and in the process suggest answers to these recurring questions. They look at the early history of the power of the purse in national security affairs to illustrate that appropriations for national security have historically played a special substantive role in controlling executive uses of the war power. The authors use this history as a basis for exploring the mechanics and scope of the power of the purse in contemporary national security, presenting Vietnam War appropriations and the Boland Amendments as case studies. National Security Law and the Power of the Purse offers a sophisticated and provocative primer on the power of the purse in national security law. It is essential reading for scholars and students of law and government, public administration, and national security and foreign affairs.

The Treaty on the European Union stipulates that one of the key objectives of the Union is to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Given that the fight against terrorism is a prominent aspect of this general objective, it is remarkable that, in spite of its political relevance and decade-long history, it has only relatively recently received due attention in the academic community. Yet an analysis of the successes and failures of the EU's involvement in this field is imperative and this is a particularly pertinent moment to take stock of progress. The goal of this book is therefore to look back at the post-9/11 period and answer the question of whether, when it comes to the measures taken to combat terrorism following these attacks, the EU has lived up to the promise made in its founding treaties. In pursuing this goal, this volume presents the views of leading experts casting a critical eye over the EU's performance, recognising achievements but also being suitably critical when the realities did not match the European rhetoric. In doing this, the book makes a significant contribution not only to the scholarly investigation of European Union policies, but also to the study of counter-terrorism in general. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

The later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have been acclaimed as the classic period of artillery fortification. This was an era when fortresses and fortress systems shaped the calculations of strategists and statesmen, and often dictated the course of campaigns. The age was one of almost constant conflict and this book, originally published in 1985, explores the influence of the fortress in the dynastic wars of Bourbon, Habsburg and Hohenzollern, the contest for influence in the Baltic, the last crusades of the West against the Turks, and in the peculiar conditions of colonial campaigning and the War of the American Independence.

For decades, the rational actor model served as the preferred guide for U.S. deterrence policy. It has been a convenient and comforting guide because it requires little detailed knowledge of an opponent's unique decision-making process and yet typically provides confident generalizations about how deterrence works. The model tends to postulate common decision-making parameters across the globe to reach generalizations about how deterrence will function and the types of forces that will be "stabilizing" or "destabilizing." Yet a broad spectrum of unique factors can influence an opponent's perceptions and his calculations, and these are not easily captured by the rational actor model. The absence of uniformity means there can be very few deterrence generalizations generated by the use of the rational actor model that are applicable to the entire range of opponents. Understanding Deterrence considers how factors such as psychology, history, religion, ideology, geography, political structure, culture, proliferation and geopolitics can shape a leadership's decision-making process, in ways that are specific and unique to each opponent. Understanding Deterrence demonstrates how using a multidisciplinary approach to deterrence analysis can better identify and assess factors that influence an opponent's decision-making process. This identification and assessment process can facilitate the tailoring of deterrence strategies to specific purposes and result in a higher likelihood of success than strategies guided by the generalizations about opponent decision-making typically contained in the rational actor model. This book was published as a special issue of Comparative Strategy.

"Defense against nuclear attack-so natural and seemingly so compelling a goal-has provoked debate for at least twenty years. Ballistic missle defense systems, formerly called antiballistic missile systems, offer the prospect of remedying both superpowers' alarming vulnerability to nuclear weapons by technological rather than political means. But whether ballistic missile defenses can be made to work and whether it is wise to build them remain controversial. The U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 restricts testing and deployment of ballistic missile defenses but has not prohibited more than a decade of research and development on both sides. As exotic new proposals are put forward for space-based directed-energy systems, questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of missile defense have again become central to the national debate on defense policy. This study, jointly sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, examines the strategic, technological, and political issues raised by ballistic missile defense. Eight contributors take an analytical approach to their areas of expertise, which include the relationship of missile defense to nuclear strategy, the nature and potential applications of current and future technologies, the views on missile defense in the Soviet Union and among the smaller nuclear powers, the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for today's technology, and the present role and historical legacy of ballistic missile defense in the context of East-West relations. The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects. In the final chapter, nine knowledgeable observers offer their varied personal views on the ballistic missile defense question. "

The relationship between intelligence organizations and the national security policymakers which they support has its ups and downs. Sometimes the relationship is a good one; communication flows and both sides benefit from the interaction, but sometimes difficulties arise and problems develop. For example, when knowledge is required for decision but is not available or is inaccurate the outcome is frequently described as an intelligence failure. A subset of this kind of intelligence failure occurs when knowledge is distorted in order to reinforce or oppose policymaker preferences or expectations. Another less successful outcome occurs when good, accurate knowledge is not used to improve policy, but is instead set aside or ignored by those who have the responsibility and obligation to make decisions. This collection explores the difficulties that can arise in the relationship between intelligence and policy. The chapters consider both politicization of, and lack of receptiveness to, intelligence on the part of policymakers from a variety of different angles. Readers will find that this book challenges conventional wisdom and offers new ways of thinking about this important but understudied area. This book was published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

A robust yet accessible history of US involvement in the world's most dangerous waterway, and a guide for what to do about it. Lamentations that the United States is "losing" the South China Sea to China are now common. China has rapidly militarized islands and reefs, projects power across the disputed waterway, and freely harasses US allies and partners. The US has been unable to halt these processes or convince Beijing to respect the rights of smaller neighbors. But what exactly would "losing" mean? In On Dangerous Ground, Gregory B. Poling evaluates US interests in the world's most complex and dangerous maritime disputes by examining more than a century of American involvement in the South China Sea. He focuses on how the disputes there intersected and eventually intertwined with the longstanding US commitment to freedom of the seas and its evolving alliance network in Asia. He shows that these abiding national interests-defense of maritime rights and commitment to allies, particularly the Philippines-have repeatedly pulled US attention to the South China Sea. Understanding how and why is critical if the US and its allies hope to chart a course through the increasingly fraught disputes, while facing a more assertive, more capable, and far less compromising China. With an emphasis on decisions made not just in Washington and Beijing, but also in Manila and other Southeast Asian capitals, On Dangerous Ground seeks to correct the record and balance the China-centric narrative that has come to dominate the issue. It not only provides the most comprehensive account yet of America's history in the South China Sea, but it also demonstrates how that history should inform US national security policy in one of the most important waterways in the world.

*The USA Today bestseller* Surprise... your target. Kill... your enemy. Vanish... without a trace. From Pulitzer Prize finalist Annie Jacobsen, the untold story of the CIA's secret paramilitary units. When diplomacy fails, and war is unwise, the president calls on the CIA's Special Activities Division, a highly classified branch of the CIA and the most effective, black operations force in the world. Originally known as the president's guerrilla warfare corps, SAD conducts risky and ruthless operations that have evolved over time to defend America from its enemies. Almost every American president since World War II has asked the CIA to conduct sabotage, subversion and, yes, assassination. With unprecedented access to forty-two men and women who proudly and secretly worked on CIA covert operations from the dawn of the Cold War to the present day, along with declassified documents and deep historical research, Pulitzer Prize finalist Annie Jacobsen unveils -- like never before -- a complex world of individuals working in treacherous environments populated with killers, connivers and saboteurs. Despite Hollywood notions of off-book operations and external secret hires, covert action is actually one piece in a colossal foreign policy machine. Written with the pacing of a thriller, SURPRISE, KILL, VANISH brings to vivid life the sheer pandemonium and chaos, as well as the unforgettable human will to survive and the intellectual challenge of not giving up hope that define paramilitary and intelligence work. Jacobsen's exclusive interviews -- with members of the CIA's Senior Intelligence Service (equivalent to the Pentagon's generals), its counterterrorism chiefs, targeting officers, and Special Activities Division's Ground Branch operators who conduct today's close-quarters killing operations around the world -- reveal, for the first time, the enormity of this shocking, controversial and morally complex terrain. Is the CIA's paramilitary army America's weaponized strength, or a liability to its principled standing in the world? Every operation reported in this book, however unsettling, is legal.

Focusing on the wartime activities of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Axis-controlled Yugoslavia during World War II, this book chronicles American policy, plans for sending aid and agents, and the establishment of the first training bases in North Africa and the Mediterranean. OSS missions and field operation with the Chetniks and partisans are cataloged and analyzed for the first time, along with OSS views on Yugoslav border claims against Italy and Austria, the OSS position on Slovenia in postwar Yugoslavia, and the role of Yugoslavs cooperating within the OSS.

The Russians are invading. But the locals have a plan.

It's March 2022 and Russian tanks are roaring across the vast, snow-dusted fields of Ukraine. Their destination: Voznesensk, a town with a small bridge that could change the course of the war. The heavily-armed Russians are expecting an easy fight - or no fight at all. After all, Voznesensk is a quiet farming town, full of pensioners. But the locals appear to have other ideas.

Svetlana, a grandmother with arthritis, reacts in fury when Russian troops turn her cottage into their blood-soaked headquarters. Valentin, a quick-talking lawyer, joins the town's 'Dads Army' defenders, crouching in a trench with an AK47. Meanwhile, 21-year-old Sergei grabs a Molotov cocktail and lies in wait for Russian tanks as they push towards Dead Water Bridge.

The odds are terrible. But a plan is emerging, and there's a chance it could save not just Voznesensk, but the rest of southern Ukraine. Meanwhile, inside the tanks, an inner battle rages. As Russian officer Igor Rudenko prepares to invade, he has a secret. He is Ukrainian himself.

A gripping work of reportage that tells the story of a pivotal moment in Ukraine's war, this is a real-life thriller about ordinary people facing extraordinary circumstances with resilience, humour and ingenuity

Concerns over the changing nature of gangs and cartels and their relationships to states in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has resulted in the emergence of a scholarly body of work focused on their national security threat potentials. This body of work, utilizing the third generation gangs and third phase cartel typologies, represents an alternative to traditional gang and organized crime research and one that is increasingly influencing the US defense community. Rather than being viewed only as misguided youth and opportunistic criminals or, in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social or political agendas, more evolved gangs and cartels, are instead seen as developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capacities. This evolutionary process has emerged due to the growing illicit economy and other unintended consequences of globalization.

This important anthology of writings by Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan draws upon a collection of their works from the mid-1990s to the present with the addition of new essays written specifically for this publication. The work will be of great interest to academics and students in the fields of political science and criminal justice and to military, law enforcement, and governmental professionals and policy makers.

This book is a collection of new and previously published works from a variety of publications, a full list of which is on the Citation Information page.

First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Recent debates in security policy have highlighted trends towards fragmentation, informalisation and privatisation in the diverse field of security policy, with its increasingly transnational security risks. In this context, the concept of security governance has risen to prominence and has inspired much valuable research. Yet, there are not only very different conceptual understandings of security governance; there is also a lack of clarity regarding its empirical manifestations and normative connotations. After a decade of research, this book therefore puts security governance to the test and scrutinises its analytical and political pitfalls and potentials. It reviews the concept of security governance and identifies central conceptual, empirical and normative challenges that need to be addressed. Moreover, this book scrutinises critical examples of security governance from EU security policy as well as in a comparative regional perspective. Case studies include EU efforts to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia, combat terrorism inside European societies and protect critical infrastructures. This book was originally published as a special issue of European Security.

The successes of the German Blitzkrieg in 1939-41 were as surprising as they were swift. Allied decision-makers wanted to discover the secret to German success quickly, even though only partial, incomplete information was available to them. The false conclusions drawn became myths about the Blitzkrieg that have lingered for decades. It has been argued that German victories in the early part of the war rested less upon newly developed tanks and aircraft and more on German military traditions: rather than creating a new way of war based on new technology, the Germans fitted the new weapons into their existing ideas on warfare. These doctrines focused on independent action, initiative, flexibility, decentralized decision-making and mobility. The conduct of German soldiers, particularly the lower-ranking men, on the battlefield was at the core of the concept and German victories rested upon the quality of the small combat units. This book focuses on the experience of the enlisted men and junior officers in the Blitzkrieg operations in Poland, Norway, Western Europe and Russia. Using accounts previously unpublished in English, military historian Niklas Zetterling explores how they operated, for example how a company commander led his tanks, how a crew worked together inside a tank, and the role of the repair services. The author fits these narratives into a broader perspective to give the reader a better understanding of why the Germans were so successful in 1939-41.

This comparative analysis of the sometimes fraught process of achieving democratic governance of security intelligence agencies presents material from countries other than those normally featured in the Intelligence Studies literature of North America and Europe. Some of the countries examined are former Communist countries and several in Latin America are former military regimes. Others have been democratic for a long time but still experience widespread political violence. Through a mix of single-country and comparative studies, major aspects of intelligence are considered, including the legacy of, and transition from, authoritarianism; the difficulties of achieving genuine reform; and the apparent inevitability of periodic scandals. Authors consider a range of methodological approaches to the study of intelligence and the challenges of analysing the secret world. Finally, consideration is given to the success - or otherwise - of intelligence reform, and the effectiveness of democratic institutions of control and oversight. This book was originally published as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security.

From the legendary antagonism between Athens and Sparta during the Peloponnesian War to the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars of the twentieth century, the past is littered with long-term strategic rivalries. History tells us that such enduring rivalries can end in one of three ways: a series of exhausting conflicts in which one side eventually prevails, as in the case of the Punic Wars between ancient Rome and Carthage, a peaceful and hopefully orderly transition, like the rivalry between Great Britain and the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, or a one-sided collapse, such as the conclusion of the Cold War with the fall of the Soviet Union. However, in spite of a wealth of historical examples, the future of state rivalries remains a matter of conjecture. Great Strategic Rivalries explores the causes and implications of past strategic rivalries, revealing lessons for the current geopolitical landscape. Each chapter offers an accessible narrative of a historically significant rivalry, comprehensively covering the political, diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions of its history. Featuring original essays by world-class historians-including Barry Strauss, Geoffrey Parker, Williamson Murray, and Geoffrey Wawro-this collection provides an in-depth look at how interstate relations develop into often violent rivalries and how these are ultimately resolved. Much more than an engaging history, Great Strategic Rivalries contains valuable insight into current conflicts around the globe for policymakers and policy watchers alike.

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The National Institute for Public Policy s new book, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence," is the first of its kind. Dr. Keith Payne, the late former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and an unparalleled bipartisan group of senior civilian and military experts critically examined eight basic assumptions of Minimum Deterrence against available evidence. In general, Minimum Deterrence does not fare well under the careful scrutiny.

Proponents of a "Minimum Deterrent" US nuclear force posture believe that anywhere from a handful to a few hundred nuclear weapons are adequate to deter reliably and predictably any enemy from attacking the United States now and in the future. Because nuclear weapons are so destructive, their thinking goes, no foreign leader would dare challenge US capabilities. The benefits, advocates claim, of reducing US nuclear weapons to the "minimum" level needed are: better relations with Russia and China, reinforcement of the arms control and Nonproliferation Treaty, billions of defense dollars in savings, and greater international stability on the way to "nuclear zero."

As political pressure builds to pursue this vision of minimum US deterrence, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence" stands as the seminal study to address the many claims of great benefit against available empirical evidence.

This book was published as a National Institute Press monograph, Keith B. Payne and James Schlesinger, "Minimum Deterrence: Examining the Evidence" (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2013) and as a special issue of "Comparative Strategy.""

At no time since the end of the Cold War has interest been higher in Russian security issues and the role played in this by the modernization of Russia's Armed Forces. The continued transformation of its Armed Forces from Cold War legacy towards a modern combat capable force presents many challenges for the Kremlin. Moscow's security concerns domestically, in the turbulent North Caucasus, and internationally linked to the Arab Spring, as well as its complex relations with the US and NATO and its role in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014 further raises the need to present an informed analytical survey of the country's military, past, present and future. This collection addresses precisely the nature of the challenges facing Russian policymakers as they struggle to rebuild combat capable military to protect Russian interests in the twenty-first century. This book was based on a special issue of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies.