The threats the world currently faces extend beyond traditional problems such as major power competition, interstate conflict, and nuclear proliferation. Non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, migration, and natural disasters surpass states' capacity to address them. These limitations have led to the proliferation of other actors-regional and international organizations, transnational networks, local and international nongovernmental organizations-that fill the gaps when states' responses are lacking and provide security in places where there is none. In this book, Mely Caballero-Anthony examines how non-traditional security challenges have changed state behavior and security practices in Southeast Asia and the wider East Asia region. Referencing the wide range of transborder security threats confronting Asia today, she analyzes how non-state actors are taking on the roles of "security governors," engaging with states, regional organizations, and institutional frameworks to address multifaceted problems. From controlling the spread of pandemics and transboundary pollution, to managing irregular migration and providing relief and assistance during humanitarian crises, Caballero-Anthony explains how and why non-state actors have become crucial across multiple levels-local, national, and regional-and how they are challenging regional norms and reshaping security governance. Combining theoretical discussions on securitization and governance with a detailed and policy-oriented analysis of important recent developments, Negotiating Governance on Non-Traditional Security in Southeast Asia and Beyond points us toward "state-plus" governance, where a multiplicity of actors form the building blocks for multilateral cooperative security processes to meet future global challenges.

Concerns over the changing nature of gangs and cartels and their relationships to states in the late 20th and early 21st centuries has resulted in the emergence of a scholarly body of work focused on their national security threat potentials. This body of work, utilizing the third generation gangs and third phase cartel typologies, represents an alternative to traditional gang and organized crime research and one that is increasingly influencing the US defense community. Rather than being viewed only as misguided youth and opportunistic criminals or, in their mature forms, as criminal organizations with no broader social or political agendas, more evolved gangs and cartels, are instead seen as developing political, mercenary, and state-challenging capacities. This evolutionary process has emerged due to the growing illicit economy and other unintended consequences of globalization. This important anthology of writings by Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan draws upon a collection of their works from the mid-1990s to the present with the addition of new essays written specifically for this publication. The work will be of great interest to academics and students in the fields of political science and criminal justice and to military, law enforcement, and governmental professionals and policy makers. This book is a collection of new and previously published works from a variety of publications, a full list of which is on the Citation Information page.

This edited volume introduces the reader to the role of space in military and defense strategy, and outlines some of the major foreign and domestic actors in the space arena, as well as constraints of law and treaties on activities in space. It also addresses science and technology as they relate to space policy. The book addresses three main questions: How does the realm of space fit into strategic thinking about national security? How does policy regarding space develop and what considerations, both in the United States and abroad, figure prominently in calculations about space policy? How do different states/nations/actors regard the role of space in their national security calculations and how do these policies impact each other? This book fills a niche in the space policy field, providing insights into space and strategy from international experts from the military, academic and scientific communities. A unique feature of the book is the chapter on science and technology, which utilizes the latest information available concerning space utilization and exploration.

Applying strategic theory to outer space and drawing out the implications for international relations Offers a definitive and original vision of space warfare that theorises often-overlooked aspects of contemporary space activities based in the discipline of Strategic Studies. This original research draws out the implications of spacepower for wider debate in grand strategy and IR. Applies the theory in a topical and contentious area within contemporary grand strategy - anti-access and area-denial warfare in the Taiwan Strait between China and America. Key principles are summarised in seven propositions to make the key take-aways of theory applicable and memorable for researchers and practitioners. This book presents a theory of spacepower and considers the implications of space technology on strategy and international relations. The spectre of space warfare stalks the major powers as outer space increasingly defines geopolitical and military competition. As satellites have become essential for modern warfare, strategists are asking whether the next major war will begin or be decided in outer space. Only strategic theory can explore the decisiveness and effects of war in space upon `grand strategy' and international relations. The author applies the wisdom of military strategy to outer space, and presents a compelling new vision of Earth orbit as a coastline, rather than an open ocean or an extension of airspace as many have assumed. Rooted in the classical military works of Clausewitz, Mahan, and Castex to name a few, this book presents comprehensive principles for strategic thought about space that explain the pervasive and inescapable influence of spacepower on strategy and the changing military balance of the 21st century.

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike. On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.

The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring a "peace dividend" and the opportunity to redirect military policy in the United States. Instead, according to Daniel Wirls, American politics following the Cold War produced dysfunctional defense policies that were exacerbated by the war on terror. Wirls's critical historical narrative of the politics of defense in the United States during this "decade of neglect" and the military buildup in Afghanistan and Iraq explains how and why the U.S. military has become bloated and aimless and what this means for long-term security.

Examining the recent history of U.S. military spending and policy under presidents George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, Wirls finds that although spending decreased from the close of the first Bush presidency through the early years of Clinton's, both administrations preferred to tinker at the edges of defense policy rather than redefine it. Years of political infighting escalated the problem, leading to a military policy stalemate as neither party managed to craft a coherent, winning vision of national security. Wirls argues that the United States has undermined its own long-term security through profligate and often counterproductive defense policies while critical national problems have gone unmitigated and unsolved.

This unified history of the politics of U.S. military policy from the end of the Cold War through the beginning of the Obama presidency provides a clear picture of why the United States is militarily powerful but "otherwise insecure."

Since its publication in 1911, Sir Julian's Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy has remained a key document within naval strategic thinking. Yet despite his undoubted influence, Corbett's theories have not been subjected to scientific review and systematic comparison with other naval thinkers. In this assessment, Dr Widen has provided a fresh interpretation of Corbett's legacy and his continued relevance as a classic theorist of naval war. Divided into three parts, the book begins with a brief biographical overview of Corbett's life, highlighting in particular his bibliographic history and the influences on his thinking. The latter two sections then describe and assess Corbett's views on military and naval theory, respectively. Together these two parts represent his overall theory of maritime strategy, including his conception of limited war, his intellectual debt to Clausewitz, command of the sea, his critic of decisive battle, as well as the different methods of naval operations. By means of a thorough assessment of Corbett's theory of maritime strategy, Dr Widen highlights the continued relevance of his theories. Both the strengths and shortcomings of Corbett's thinking are discussed and reflections offered on their intellectual, practical and doctrinal value. In so doing, Dr Widen has written a book that deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in the past, present or future of maritime strategy.

EUROPE, 1940. NAZI FORCES SWEEP ACROSS THE CONTINENT, WITH A BRITISH INVASION LIKELY ONLY WEEKS AWAY. NEVER BEFORE HAS A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT BEEN SO CRUCIAL TO THE WAR EFFORT. In this definitive appraisal of Anglo-Norwegian cooperation in the Second World War, Tony Insall reveals how some of the most striking successes of the Norwegian resistance were the reports produced by the heroic SIS agents living in the country's desolate wilderness. Their coast-watching intelligence highlighted the movements of the German fleet and led to counter-strikes which sank many enemy ships - most notably the Tirpitz in November 1944. Using previously unpublished archival material from London, Oslo and Moscow, Insall explores how SIS and SOE worked effectively with their Norwegian counterparts to produce some of the most remarkable achievements of the Second World War.

Modern armies are planned and structured to fight massive World War II-type operations involving the large-scale movements of tanks and machinery across continents. In fact they are rarely called upon to participate in such conflicts. It is far more common for them to find themselves involved in lower-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as "unconventional warfare," typified by the 1990s conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Thomas Adams argues that, for the most part, the conventional war-fighting forces of the USA are not the best military forces to deal with such situations, where there is a lack of a clearly-defined enemy and a need for persuasion, negotiation and even community leadership alongside elements who are willing to resort to deadly force. The appropriate components of the US miltary to deal with this, in his view, are the Special Operations Forces (SOF). He discusses the composition of the SOF and their varying roles, discussing their evoluation, strengths and weaknesses, and gives a history of US involvement in non-conventional warfare from the American revolution to the 1990s. He argues that the US Department of Defense still sees military conflict in the form of conventional warfare, with its emphasis on high-technology combat. The very existence of high-technology systems, however, makes conventional warfare less likely, with the result that the US Army may become vulnerable to "low-tech" offensives, and already there has been an increase in "unconventional" conflicts since the demise of the Soviet Union.
Adams proposes a change in strategic thinking together with investment in training and ausable military doctrine to guide develoment. A shift in expectations is required, with a greater willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress.

This book sheds light on the process in which the sub-state actor of Greenland has expanded its autonomy and strengthened its de jure participation in the national security of Denmark. By focusing on the case of the US Thule Air Base in Greenland, the largest military base in the Arctic, the authors endeavor to show that in the relationship between great powers, small countries and local actors within them, it is possible for local actors (sub-national entities) to have an influence on higher-level actors in the field of diplomacy on the national security level. For that purpose, the book examines political trends involving Greenland, Denmark, the US and Russia by using the multilateral multi-archive approach. The authors also take up the cases of Okinawa (Japan) and Olongapo (the Philippines) as reference points that provide additional insight into the interaction between the US policy regarding overseas military bases and the host countries' polities. The competition involving political and economic interests of a number of countries in the Arctic region has been intensifying in recent years, causing significant concern in the international community. Due to the accelerated melting of sea ice and the increase in the accessibility of natural resources and water lanes, the security situation in the Arctic has been changing rapidly, and this book helps meet the need for understanding the political and military factors behind those changes.

Pentagon spending has been the target of decades of criticism and reform efforts. Billions of dollars are spent on weapons programs that are later abandoned. State-of-the-art data centers are underutilized and overstaffed. New business systems are built at great expense but fail to meet the needs of their users. Every Secretary of Defense for the last five Administrations has made it a priority to address perceived bloat and inefficiency by making management reform a major priority. The congressional defense committees have been just as active, enacting hundreds of legislative provisions. Yet few of these initiatives produce significant results, and the Pentagon appears to go on, as wasteful as ever. In this book, Peter Levine addresses why, despite a long history of attempted reform, the Pentagon continues to struggle to reduce waste and inefficiency. The heart of Defense Management Reform is three case studies covering civilian personnel, acquisitions, and financial management. Narrated with the insight of an insider, the result is a clear understanding of what went wrong in the past and a set of concrete guidelines to plot a better future.

The pioneering essays in this volume explore national security challenges posed by new technologies and examine some ongoing efforts to understand and mitigate their potential negative effects. The authors, drawn from among a roster of international scholars, approach these issues from different yet ultimately complementary angles. Turkish scholar Emin Daskin chronicles the efforts of the Turkish government to develop and implement a Cyber Security Strategy aimed at protecting the country from attacks by both governmental and non-governmental cyber actors. French researcher Christine Dugoin-Clement has studied what she views as a successful case of cyberwarfare, in which Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the eastern separatist region of Donbass have been targeted by cyber attackers attempting to deteriorate their cognition, rendering them less effective in the field. Another French author and military academy instructor, Thomas Flichy de La Neuville, provides a counterpoint study of militarized motorbike attacks in the Sahel, demonstrating that cyberspace is not the only technological sphere in which innovation increasingly threatens security. Finally, American academic Christopher Whyte offers a trenchant critique of current academic studies of cyberterrorism, noting that while "cyberterrorism" appears frequently as a subject of research, the actual work being carried out in this critical area lacks thematic nuance and is only tenuously linked to related major thematic topic areas. The collection highlights the unique challenges faced by countries as they attempt to deal with previously unknown adversaries, as both the nature of the enemy and the field of operations continues to shift with unprecedented speed. It will undoubtedly be of interest to anyone concerned with international relations, cybersecurity, cyberterrorism, and national security in the twenty-first century.

This book examines the subject of strategy and its relationship with politics. Despite the fact that strategy is always the product of political process, the relationship between the two concepts and their ancillary activities has scarcely been touched by scholars. This book corrects that serious deficiency, and explains the high relevance of political factors for matters of general defence. Each chapter aims to show how and why strategy and politics interact and how this interaction has had significant consequences historically. Neither strategy nor politics can make sense if considered alone. Strategy requires direction that can only be provided by political process, while politics cannot be implemented without strategy. In summary, this volume will explain: what strategy is (and is not) why strategy is essential what strategy does and how it does it how strategy is made and executed Written by a leading scholar and former practitioner, this book will be essential reading for all students of military strategy, strategic studies, security studies and war and conflict studies.

In this work, two senior naval historians analyze the discussions held in leading Soviet political, military, and naval circles concerning naval strategy and the decisions taken for warship-building programmes. They describe the reconstitution of the fleet under difficult conditions from the end of the Civil War up to the mid-1920s, leading to a change from classical naval strategy to a Jeune ecole model in the first two Five-Year Plans, including efforts to obtain foreign assistance in the design of warships and submarines. Their aim is to explain the reasons for the sudden change in 1935 to begin building a big ocean-going fleet. After a period of co-operation with Germany from 1939-41, the plans came to a halt when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Finally, this work covers the reopening of the naval planning processes in 1944 and 1945 and the discussions of the naval leadership with Stalin, the party and government officials about the direction of the new building programmes as the Cold War began.

The end of one war is frequently the beginning of another because the cessation of conflict produces two new challenges: a contest between the winners and losers over the terms of peace, and a battle within the winning party over the spoils of war. As the victors and the vanquished struggle to establish a new political order, incidents of low-level violence frequently occur and can escalate into an unstable peace or renewed conflict. Michael J. Boyle evaluates the dynamics of post-conflict violence and their consequences in Violence after War. In this systematic comparative study, Boyle analyzes a cross-national dataset of violent acts from 52 post-conflict states and examines, in depth, violence patterns from five recent post-conflict states: Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, and Iraq. In each of the case studies, Boyle traces multiple pathways through which violence emerges in post-conflict states and highlights how the fragmentation of combatants, especially rebel groups, produces unexpected and sometimes surprising shifts in the nature, type, and targets of attack. His case studies are based on unpublished data on violent crime, including some from fieldwork in Kosovo, East Timor, and Bosnia, and a thorough review of narrative and witness accounts of the attacks. The case study of Iraq comes from data that Boyle obtained directly from U.S. Central Command, published here for the first time. Violence after War will be essential reading for all those interested in political violence, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction.

Military Strategy in the 21st Century explores military strategy and the new challenges facing Western democracies in the twenty- first century, including strategy in cyber operations and peacekeeping, challenges for civil-military relations, and the strategic choices of great powers and small states. The volume contributes to a better understanding of military strategy in the twenty- first century, through exploring strategy from three perspectives: first, the study of strategy, and how our understanding of strategy has changed over time; second, new areas for strategic theory, such as peacekeeping and cyberspace; and third, the makers of strategy, and why states choose suboptimal strategies. With the increasing number of threats challenging strategy makers, such as great power rivalry, terrorism, intrastate wars, and transnational criminal organisations, Military Strategy in the 21st Century will be of great value to scholars of IR, Security Studies, Strategic Studies, and War Studies as well as policymakers and practitioners working with military strategy in particular and international security and war in general. The chapters were originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies.

This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction to modern strategy, covering the context, theory, and practice of military strategy in all its different forms. Covering all the main issues in the field, the book explores the major themes through a combination of classical and modern strategic theory, history, and current practice. It is split into three main sections: The first provides the context for contemporary strategy and includes discussions of the human, technological, intelligence, ethical, and grand strategic dimensions. The second part explores the theory and practice of strategy in different geographical domains, including land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. The final part engages with three of the most challenging forms of strategy in the contemporary era: nuclear weapons, terrorism, and insurgency. This second edition brings the book up to date by including discussions of the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); the emergence of robotics and artificial intelligence; major events in space and cyberspace; and the growing profile of nuclear weapons. Each chapter presents the reader with a succinct summary of the topic, provides a challenging analysis of current issues, and finishes with key points, questions for discussion, and further reading. This book will be essential reading for upper-level students of strategic studies, war studies, military history, and international security.

Discerning the early stages of the rebirth of a new Russian empire from the ashes of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Imperial Revival argues that Russia's recent overtly aggressive actions and foreign policy doctrines have signaled a renewal of the Cold War. At the least, Russia's actions represent the potential for renewal. This book explains these developments in a historical context. The book begins by describing Russia's initial policy of rapprochement after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its development into a foreign policy of threatened or actual armed aggression. It identifies today's Russia as a nation determined to re-establish itself as a political and military force. As a prominent figure in the development and continuation of its current foreign policy, Vladimir Putin plays a central role in the topics covered. Previous literature often treats Putin as an individual phenomenon examining his connections to corruption or the secret police, but here David E. McNabb examines him as the latest in a long history of Russian despots who followed similar expansionist policies. He details some of the tactics Putin uses to instill fear and dominate political policies of republics newly independent from Russia. These tactics include the use of energy as a weapon, cyber terrorism, and military support for ethnic Russian separatists in other sovereign nations, most recently exemplified by Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine via armed invasion. In an attempt to demystify Russia's re-emergence as an international political force, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Imperial Revival grounds its analyses in history. It explores as far back as the establishment of the first Russian empire, and regards Putin as a leader determined to establish a fifth imperial incarnation. It provides a nuanced understanding of how Russia arrived at its current position through recent and distant internal and international events.

Historians have portrayed British participation in the Great War as a series of tragic debacles, with lines of men mown down by machine guns, untried new military technology and incompetent generals who threw their troops into improvised and unsuccessful attacks. In this book Paddy Griffith, a renowned military historian, examines the evolution of British infantry tactics during the war and challenges this interpretation, showing that while the British army's plans and technologies persistently failed during the improvised first half of the war, the army gradually improved its technique, technology and, eventually, its self-assurance. By the time of its successful sustained offensive in the autumn of 1918, he argues, the British army was demonstrating a battlefield skill and mobility that would rarely be surpassed even during the Second World War. Evaluating the great gap that exists between theory and practice, between textbook and bullet-swept mudfield, Griffith argues that many battles were carefully planned to exploit advanced tactics and to avoid casualties; but that the breakthrough was simply impossible under the conditions of the time. By the end of 1916 the British were already masters of 'storm-troop tactics' and, in several important respects, further ahead than the Germans would be even in 1918. In fields such as the timing and orchestration of all-arms assaults, predicted artillery fire, 'commando-style' trench raiding, the use of light machine guns or the barrage fire of heavy machine guns, the British led the world. Although British generals were not military geniuses, the book maintains they should at least be credited with having effectively invented much of thetwentieth century's art of war.

Warfare in the twenty-first century goes well beyond conventional armies and nation-states. In a world of diffuse conflicts taking place across sprawling cities, war has become fragmented and uneven to match its settings. Yet the analysis of failed states, civil war, and state building rarely considers the city, rather than the country, as the terrain of battle. In Cities at War, Mary Kaldor and Saskia Sassen assemble an international team of scholars to examine cities as sites of contemporary warfare and insecurity. Reflecting Kaldor's expertise on security cultures and Sassen's perspective on cities and their geographies, they develop new insight into how cities and their residents encounter instability and conflict, as well as the ways in which urban forms provide possibilities for countering violence. Through a series of case studies of cities including Baghdad, Bogota, Ciudad Juarez, Kabul, and Karachi, the book reveals the unequal distribution of insecurity as well as how urban capabilities might offer resistance and hope. Through analyses of how contemporary forms of identity, inequality, and segregation interact with the built environment, Cities at War explains why and how political violence has become increasingly urbanized. It also points toward the capacity of the city to shape a different kind of urban subjectivity that can serve as a foundation for a more peaceful and equitable future.

A critical look into how and why the U.S. military needs to become more adaptable. Every military must prepare for future wars despite not really knowing the shape such wars will ultimately take. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once noted: "We have a perfect record in predicting the next war. We have never once gotten it right." In the face of such great uncertainty, militaries must be able to adapt rapidly in order to win. Adaptation under Fire identifies the characteristics that make militaries more adaptable, illustrated through historical examples and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors David Barno and Nora Bensahel argue that militaries facing unknown future conflicts must nevertheless make choices about the type of doctrine that their units will use, the weapons and equipment they will purchase, and the kind of leaders they will select and develop to guide the force to victory. Yet after a war begins, many of these choices will prove flawed in the unpredictable crucible of the battlefield. For a U.S. military facing diverse global threats, its ability to adapt quickly and effectively to those unforeseen circumstances may spell the difference between victory and defeat. Barno and Bensahel start by providing a framework for understanding adaptation and include historical cases of success and failure. Next, they examine U.S. military adaptation during the nation's recent wars, and explain why certain forms of adaptation have proven problematic. In the final section, Barno and Bensahel conclude that the U.S. military must become much more adaptable in order to address the fast-changing security challenges of the future, and they offer recommendations on how to do so before it is too late.

The part played by code-cracking in World War II has been revealed in popular film and has also inspired several accounts by code-crackers. Much less well-known is how code-cracking was used in operational situations. In this account the "Silent Service" speaks through the voice of a young and inexperienced naval officer whose rites of passage to manhood required him to act as a seagoing eavesdropper, a role calling not only for quick intelligence but also for facing up to excitement and danger. Sir Alan Peacock's story is interlaced with graphic accounts of life on the lower deck, being torpedoed in a Channel action, and how to contribute to intelligence information that was required to foil enemy attacks on Russian convoys whilst facing atrocious weather conditions. The influence this intense experience exerted on Peacock's subsequent career in economics is also discussed.

How a new understanding of warfare can help the military fight today's conflicts more effectively The way wars are fought has changed starkly over the past sixty years. International military campaigns used to play out between large armies at central fronts. Today's conflicts find major powers facing rebel insurgencies that deploy elusive methods, from improvised explosives to terrorist attacks. Small Wars, Big Data presents a transformative understanding of these contemporary confrontations and how they should be fought. The authors show that a revolution in the study of conflict--enabled by vast data, rich qualitative evidence, and modern methods-yields new insights into terrorism, civil wars, and foreign interventions. Modern warfare is not about struggles over territory but over people; civilians-and the information they might choose to provide-can turn the tide at critical junctures. The authors draw practical lessons from the past two decades of conflict in locations ranging from Latin America and the Middle East to Central and Southeast Asia. Building an information-centric understanding of insurgencies, the authors examine the relationships between rebels, the government, and civilians. This approach serves as a springboard for exploring other aspects of modern conflict, including the suppression of rebel activity, the role of mobile communications networks, the links between aid and violence, and why conventional military methods might provide short-term success but undermine lasting peace. Ultimately the authors show how the stronger side can almost always win the villages, but why that does not guarantee winning the war. Small Wars, Big Data provides groundbreaking perspectives for how small wars can be better strategized and favorably won to the benefit of the local population.