Despite the substantial output of revisionist scholarship over the last decade reappraising the performance of the British Army on the Western Front during the First World War, there still remains a stubborn perception that its commanders were incompetent, inflexible and unimaginative. Whilst much ink has been spilled vilifying or defending individual commanders, or looking for overarching trends and 'learning curves', this is the first work to examine systematically the vertical nature of command - that is the transmission of plans from the high-command down through the rank structure to the front line. Through such an investigation, a much more rounded measure of the effectiveness of British commanders can be gained; one moves the argument beyond the overly simplistic 'casualties to ground gained' equation that is usually offered. The Battle of Fromelles (19-20 July 1916) was selected as the case study as it was relatively small in scale, in the right period, and retains sufficient primary sources available to sustain the analysis. It also witnessed the first time Australian forces were used in offensive operations on the Western Front, and thus looms large in wider Commonwealth perceptions of 'Bumbling British Generals'. The book follows the progress of the battle plan from its inception in the strategic designs of the supreme commander down through the various intermediate level commands at operational and tactical headquarters until it became the orders that sent the infantry forward into the attack. In so doing it provides a unique insight into the strengths and weaknesses of British command structure, allowing a much more scholarly judgement of its overall effectiveness.

The mysterious life and career of Desmond Morton (1891-1971), Intelligence officer and personal adviser to Winston Churchill during World War II, is exposed for the first time in this study based on full access to official records. After distinguished service as artillery officer and aide-de-camp to General Haig during World War I, Morton worked for the Secret Intelligence Service from 1919-1934, involved in fascinating operations against Bolshevik Russia and a resurgent Germany. The fortunes of SIS in the interwar years are described here in unprecedented detail. As Director of the Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s, Morton's warnings of Germany's military and industrial preparations for war were widely read in Whitehall, though they failed to accelerate British rearmament as much as Morton-and Churchill-considered imperative. Morton had met Churchill on the Western Front in 1916 and supported him throughout the "wilderness years," moving to Downing Street as the Prime Minister's Intelligence adviser in May 1940. There he remained in a liaison role, with the intelligence Agencies and with Allied resistance authorities, until the end of the war, when he became a "troubleshooter" for the Treasury in a series of tricky international assignments. Throughout Morton's career, myth, rumor and deliberate obfuscation have created a misleading picture of his role and influence. The story of this "man of mystery" shines a light into many hitherto shadowy corners of British history in the first half of the 20th century. This book will be of great interest to scholars and informed lay readers with an interest in World War II, intelligence studies and the life of Winston Churchill.

"Of all the books on Native American service in the U.S. armed forces, this is the best.... Readers will find the story of the Comanche Code Talkers compelling, humorous, thought-provoking, and inspiring." -- Tom Holm, author of Strong Hearts, Wounded Souls: Native American Veterans of the Vietnam War

Among the allied troops that came ashore in Normandy on D-Day, June 6, 1944, were thirteen Comanches in the 4th Infantry Division, 4th Signal Company. Under German fire they laid communications lines and began sending messages in a form never before heard in Europe-- coded Comanche. For the rest of World War II, the Comanche Code Talkers played a vital role in transmitting orders and messages in a code that was never broken by the Germans.

This book tells the full story of the Comanche Code Talkers for the first time. Drawing on interviews with all surviving members of the unit, their original training officer, and fellow soldiers, as well as military records and news accounts, William C. Meadows follows the group from their recruitment and training to their active duty in World War II and on through their postwar lives up to the present. He also provides the first comparison of Native American code talking programs, comparing the Comanche Code Talkers with their better-known Navajo counterparts in the Pacific and with other Native Americans who used their languages, coded or not, for secret communication. Meadows sets this history in a larger discussion of the development of Native American code talking in World Wars I and II, identifying two distinct forms of Native American code talking, examining the attitudes of the American military toward Native American codetalkers, and assessing the complex cultural factors that led Comanche and other Native Americans to serve their country in this way.

Despite the ongoing drawdown of strategic forces under the terms of START, both the United States and Russia maintain large arsenals of nuclear weapons poised for immediate launch. Under the most optimistic current scenarios, these arsenals will remain very large and launch-ready for more than a decade. This book, by a distinguished group of coauthors, critically evaluates the current policy of retaining and operating large nuclear arsenals. It reviews U.S. nuclear doctrine and strategy, and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression by former Cold War adversaries and other countries with weapons of mass destruction. The risks of inadvertent as well as deliberate nuclear attack are assessed. The authors argue that small arsenals (low hundreds) on low alert satisfy all justifiable requirements for nuclear weapons. They present a blueprint for making deep cuts in U.S. and Russian deployments, and for lowering their alert level. They explain the implications of shifting to small arsenals for further constraining anti-ballistic missile defenses, strengthening verification, and capping or reducing the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and Britain as well as the threshold nuclear states. The political challenges and opportunities, both domestic and international, for achieving deep reductions in the size and readiness of nuclear forces are analyzed by the authors and by distinguished experts from other countries. The coauthors are Bruce Blair, Jonathan Dean, James Goodby, Steve Fetter, Hal Feiveson, George Lewis, Janne Nolan, Theodore Postol, and Frank von Hippel. An appendix with international perspectives by Li Bin (China), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Therese Delpech (France), PervezHoodbhoy (Pakistan), Shai Feldman (Israel), Harald Mueller (Germany), and Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana (South Asia).

This new volume explores the meaning of security in relation to, and in the context of, ideas that are fundamental to both international and domestic political order.
William Bain argues that the word "security" is devoid of substantive content when divorced from ideas such as sovereignty, war, diplomacy, self-determination, globalization, cultural diversity, intervention, and trusteeship. In other words, "security" cannot be made to yield a real core or an intrinsic content because it discloses no essence that awaits discovery. This clear and accessible book draws on an impressive range of history, philosophy, and law to investigate these and other questions:
- What is the relationship between the ethics of security and the legal institution of state sovereignty? Does security necessarily follow from the mutual recognition of identity?
- Are all states, great and small, of equal moral weight?
- Does the enjoyment of security require cultural homogeneity?
- Is the body of international law that addresses question of intervention still relevant in the new circumstances of a post September 11 world?
- How might security be understood in light of wars that are fought in order to kill rather than to achieve known political aims?
This book will be of particular interest to those conducting empirical and normative research on questions of security. This is also an excellent resource for students to develop an understanding of security in contemporary world affairs.

This book assesses the use of 'mercenaries' by states, and their integration into the national armed forces as part of a new hybridisation trend of contemporary armies. Governments, especially in the West, are undertaking an unprecedented wave of demilitarisation and military budget cuts. Simultaneously, these same governments are increasingly opening their armies up to foreign nationals and outsourcing military operations to private companies. This book explores the impact of this hybridisation on the values, cohesion and effectiveness of the armed forces by comparing and contrasting the experiences of the French Foreign Legion, private military companies in Angola, and the merging of private contractors and American troops in Iraq. Examining the employment of foreign citizens and private security companies as military forces and tools of foreign policy, and their subsequent impact on the national armed forces, the book investigates whether the difficulties of coordinating soldiers of various nationalities and allegiances within public-private joint military operations undermines the legitimacy of the state. Furthermore, the author questions whether this trend for outsourcing security can realistically provide a long term and positive contribution to national security. This book will be of much interest to students of private military companies, strategic studies, international security and IR in general.

Strategy and History comprises a selection of Professor Gray's key contributions to strategic debate over the past thirty years. These essays have been selected both because they had significant messages for contemporary controversies, and because they have some continuing relevance for today and the future. Each essay in this book is really about strategy in the modern world, and reflects the many dimensions of this complex subject. This book covers a wide range of subjects and historical events, but there are key issues covered throughout: being strategic the consequences of actions a respect for Clausewitz's theory of war historical dependency the importance of geography being critical of enthusiasm for technology over human factors the primacy of politics. This important publication provides an invaluable insight into the development of strategic studies over the past 30 years from one of the world's leading theorists and practitioners of the subject. The book will be of great interest to all students and analysts of strategy and international studies.

SOE in France was first published in 1966, followed by a second impression with amendments in 1968. Since these editions were published, other material on SOE has become available. It was, therefore, agreed in 2000 that Professor Foot should produce a revised version. In so doing, in addition to the material in the first edition, the author has had access to previously closed government records, as well as drawing upon his own invaluable wartime experiences and the recollections of those involved.
SOE in France begins by explaining what SOE was, where it fitted into the Allied war machine, and how it worked in France. The narrative then recounts the adventures of its agents who worked on French soil. This intricate tale concentrates on the work of the 400 hand-picked men and women of the 'independent French' section, although it also covers SOE's five other sections that operated mainly in France. All told, the six sections despatched over 1,800 clandestine agents, who between them changed the course of the war. This updated new edition will be essential reading for scholars and for all those with an informed general interest in the activities of the SOE.

This book comparatively examines the preferences of four key arms-producing states towards European joint armaments programmes. The European defence market is characterised by a mixture of inter-state competition and European cooperation, and this work assesses why countries sometimes decide to cooperate with their partners, while in other instances they refrain from doing so. In order to shed light on this empirical puzzle, the book focuses on state-defence industry relations in the four major European arms producers: France, Germany, Italy and the UK. The main argument is that the public or private governance of industrial suppliers and market size are the two decisive variables that explain the simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition in European defence procurement. Specifically, it argues that in public governance ecosystems, arms industries are able to "capture" the state's decision-making processes to their own advantage. In private governance ecosystems, the state is relatively autonomous from defence industry's influence and able to pursue larger macro-economic and military benefits. Moreover, the strategy pursued by governments and defence firms is decisively shaped by market size because of its importance in determining the relative costs and benefits of collaborative arrangements. This book will be of much interest to students of EU policy, defence studies, European politics and International Relations.

This book explores Japan's emerging national security policy in relation to China. It considers the rise of nationalism in contemporary Japan, the recent actions of the Abe government to change Japan's security policy course and the importance of domestic views, both elite and popular, about safety and credibility in shaping security policy. It highlights the lack of strong links between China and Japan and the existence in Japan of significant misconceptions about China. It discusses the politics of Japan's alliances, examines the growth of national pride in Japan and of a more confrontational attitude toward China, and concludes by putting forward some scenarios for likely future developments and some policy proposals for a stable Japan-China relationship.

First published in 2006. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This unique book presents an accurate and reliable assessment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). It brings together leading authors to examine the organization from a range of key angles. This study shows how historians have built on the first international conference on the SOE at the Imperial War Museum in 1998. The release of many records then allowed historians to develop the first authoritative analyses of the organization's activities and several of its agents and staff officers were able to participate. Since this groundbreaking conference, fresh research has continued and its original papers are here amended to take account of the full range of SOE documents that have been released to the National Archives. The fascinating stories they tell range from overviews of work in a single country to particular operations and the impact of key personalities. SOE was a remarkably innovative organization. It played a significant part in the Allied victory while its theories of clandestine warfare and specialised equipment had a major impact upon the post-war world. SOE proved that war need not be fought by conventional methods and by soldiers in uniform. The organization laid much of the groundwork for the development of irregular warfare that characterized the second half of the twentieth century and that is still here, more potent than ever, at the beginning of the twenty-first. This book will be of great interest to students of World War II history, intelligence studies and special operations, as well as general readers with an interest in SOE and World War II.

After the Vietnam War the US Army had to rebuild itself while the US government had to reconsider its military intervention strategy. This book examines how it was done and how this has affected US intervention policy, from the victory of the Gulf War to the failure of Somalia, before examining the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions.
This volume sets out to analyze the changes in US military intervention strategy by examining two separate issues: the nature of the US Army as it rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War, and the attempts by the US to establish criteria for future military interventions. Richard Lock-Pullan first argues that US strategy traditionally relied upon national mobilization to co-ordinate political aims and military means; he subsequently analyses how this changed to a formula of establishing militarily achievable political objectives prior to the use of force. Drawing on a vast body of strategic culture and military innovation literature, the author demonstrates that the strategic lessons were a product of the rebuilding of the Army's identity as it became a professional all-volunteer force and that the Army's new doctrine developed a new 'way of war' for the nation, embodied in the Air Land Battle doctrine, which changed the approach to strategy.
The book finally gives a practical analysis of how the interventions in Panama and the Gulf War vindicated this approach and brought a revived confidence in the use of force while more recent campaigns in Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia exposed its weaknesses and the limiting nature of the Army's thinking.
This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, international relations and American politics aswell as to military professionals.

This volume collects three more military classics: von Leeb's DEFENSE, a realistic and meticulous examination of the concept by one of the outstanding German strategies of World War II; von Freytag-Lorginhoven's THE POWER OR PERSONALITY IN WAR, an enlightened, penetrating analysis of Clausewitz's more important theories and observations on the psychological aspects of leadership; and Erfurth's SURPRISE, an authoritative treatise written prior to World War II on the importance of surprise in mdoern warfare.

In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, and during the ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, much has been heard of the concept of 'asymmetric warfare'. Broadly speaking, this describes a means of fighting through which a weaker power can offset or neutralize the strengths of a more powerful opponent by applying its own strengths to its opponent's weaknesses. Frequently, it is used to describe situations in which formal state power is confronted by non-state or guerrilla activity. Afghanistan features as the focus of this book's investigation since the country has recently been at the hub of confrontations which have borne immediately on current international concerns. It has also, for more than a century and a half, been the arena for a series of conflicts between imperial powers on the one hand and state and non-state power structures on the other. Afghans, moreover, have not changed their spots: they remain basically the same, in terms of personality and society, as they were when they were first described by a British envoy, Mountstewart Elphinstone, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Since that time, the confrontations with which Afghanistan was involved have not only brought repeated misery upon its people, but have had ramifications of an international character. This book deals with each of the five conflicts in which Afghanistan has been embroiled during this time span, namely the First, Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars, the Soviet invasion and the most recent American-led operations.

Russian annexation of Crimea and the subsequent air campaign over Syria took the world by surprise. The capabilities and efficiency of Putin's armed forces during both operations signalled to the world that Russia was back in business as a significant military actor on the international stage. In this cutting-edge study, Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith combine their respective expertise in strategic studies and foreign policy to offer an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of Russia's military revival under Putin's leadership. Whilst the West must adjust to the reality of a modernised and increasingly powerful Russian military, they argue that the renaissance of Russian military might and its implications for the balance of global power can only be fully understood within a wider historical context. Assessing developments in Russian Great Power thinking, military capabilities, Russian strategic thought and views on the use of force throughout the post-Soviet era, the book shows that rather than signifying a sudden Russian military resurgence, recent developments are consistent with longstanding trends in Russian military strategy and foreign policy. This timely and thoughtful book is a must-read for students of politics as well as anyone interested in current affairs.

What if you could combine the agility, adaptability, and cohesion of a small team with the power and resources of a giant organization? When General Stanley McChrystal took command of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq in 2003, he quickly realized that conventional military tactics were failing. The allied forces had a huge advantage in numbers, equipment and training - but none of the enemy's speed and flexibility. McChrystal and his colleagues discarded a century of conventional wisdom to create a 'team of teams' that combined extremely transparent communication with decentralized decision-making authority. Faster, flatter and more flexible, the task force beat back al-Qaeda. In this powerful book, McChrystal and his colleagues show how the challenges they faced in Iraq can be relevant to any leader. Through compelling examples, the authors demonstrate that the 'team of teams' strategy has worked everywhere from hospital emergency rooms to NASA and has the potential to transform organizations large and small. 'A bold argument that leaders can help teams become greater than the sum of their parts' Charles Duhigg, author of The Power of Habit 'An indispensable guide to organizational change' Walter Isaacson, author of Steve Jobs

During the 1990s, military spending, arms procurement and defence industrialisation have all increased rapidly in East Asia. Although these developments do not constitute an arms race, they nevertheless have important implications for suppliers of defence equipment, for arms control and for regional stability. This paper assesses trends in the defence spending of East Asian states, particularly in the light of the economic crisis, which began in mid-1997. It also focuses on three closely-related issues: the nature of the regional market for defence equipment; defence industrialisation; and the effect of trends in defence procurement and industrialisation on East Asian states' military capabilities, and on the regional military balance.

This book shows how the threat of cruise-missile proliferation may unfold and examines its strategic consequences. It argues that, because the unfolding pattern of cruise-missile proliferation remains so unclear, more should be done by affected governments now to dissuade potential adversaries from acquiring cruise missiles or to delay the threat's emergence. The book offers a comprehensive set of policy prescriptions, which when combined, call for a much tighter link between military solution and more robust non-proliferation policies.

Borders dominate the security agenda in South-east Europe. Political and ethnic discontents focus on disputed borders, while traffickers in migrants and drugs ignore them.The EU argues that the Balkan countries should develop models of border management using its policing standards, but the region is rife with corruption and its border guards are both under-resourced and ineffective. This Paper asks how and why border management in South-east Europe is developing as it is, and what this might mean for the future of Europe. Drawing on recent experience in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia and Albania, it looks at the ways in which the regions' borders are managed, and gauges the development of a consensual European approach to border security. It shows how governments and guards understand the predicament of regional insecurity, and how they respond with strategies that accommodate, evade or subvert unavoidable political pressures.

This book assesses the EU and NATO's tools to prevent conflicts and manage international crises. It offers a unique insight into European security policy and questions the realism of the political goals. It argues for more coordination among European states, and an enhancement of the EU's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Over the last decade the failure of countries to emerge from conflict has focused attention on state security sectors. This book examines how the external approaches to security sector reform (SSR) have evolved and what they entail; the specific problems faced by the SSR agenda; and what policy recommendations for engagement can be drawn from reform experiences.

The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel discusses the contribution of the IDF to the development of the Israeli State and society. The Force was a principal player in Israel's early years and had a significant impact on the fields of settlement, immigration absorption and education. Sociological concepts such as 'nation-building', 'melting pot' and 'a nation in uniform' characterize the roles played by the IDF and highlight its involvement in nationally oriented social processes.

The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel discusses the contribution of the IDF to the development of the Israeli State and society. The Force was a principal player in Israel's early years and had a significant impact on the fields of settlement, immigration absorption and education. Sociological concepts such as 'nation-building', 'melting pot' and 'a nation in uniform' characterize the roles played by the IDF and highlight its involvement in nationally oriented social processes.

In the turbulent years before World War II, U.S. strategic planners struggled with the question of Canadian security. Franklin Roosevelt took a unique interest in America's northern neighbor and persistently encouraged Canada to do more to ensure its own defense especially through alliance with the U.S. This aspect of foreign policy resulted in a delicate balancing act between U.S. officials who sought to downplay the strategic importance of Canada and Canadian leaders who saw American overtures as a threat to Canadian sovereignty. The first chapter discusses Roosevelt's early efforts between 1933 and 1937 to increase Canadian interest in North American defense. The second follows events up to the outbreak of war. Although Canada had been seen as part of the rival British Empire, Canada now became a natural ally in hemispheric security efforts. Roosevelt's dealings with Canadian Prime Minister W.L.M. King, who would be branded a puppet for these interactions, and the evolution of continental defense efforts are discussed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter chronicles the wartime struggles of two new allies, as Roosevelt became more concerned with Europe and the coming Soviet threat. The final chapter further explains the declining interest in Canada as World War II becomes the focus of American interests.