This volume brings together many of the world's leading experts in the development of new imaging methodologies to detect, identify, and counter security threats to society. It covers three broadly defined but interrelated areas: the mathematics and computer science of automatic detection and identification; image processing techniques for radar and sonar; and detection of anomalies in biomedical and chemical images.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War had a traumatic effect on the Middle East and its implications were particularly serious for Israel, which felt obliged to reassess its strategic and military perspectives. This is an examination of the lessons that the Gulf War holds for Israel.

This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War.

This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War.

One critical facet of Taiwan's extraordinary development is conspicuously absent from nearly all studies of its recent history: the role of the military in the nation-building process. In this important study, a soldier-citizen describes the role of the Republic of China's military in the political socialization of Taiwan's citizens during the first two decades after the Nationalists' defeat on the Chinese mainland. The book describes in detail how the military was used by the government to promote patriotic values throughout the society, often going beyond what is considered part of the military-commission. Colonel Bullard coins the term "allegiance warfare" to describe the politically neutral involvement of the military in creating and maintaining nationalistic citizen values throughout the society.

"Soldier-citizens" describes the role of the Republic of China's military in the political socialization of Taiwan's citizens during the first two decades after the loss of the Chinese mainland. This book describes in detail how the military was used by the government to promote patriotic values throughout society, often going beyond what is considered part of its military mission.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

Published in 1996, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy is a valuable contribution to the field of Military & Strategic Studies.

Assessing trends toward creating innovative forms of political, economic and security co-operation in Southeast Asia, this text discusses the international dynamics of Southeast Asian security, and its impact on such external factors as the US, China and Japan.

Assessing trends toward creating innovative forms of political, economic and security co-operation in Southeast Asia, this text discusses the international dynamics of Southeast Asian security, and its impact on such external factors as the US, China and Japan.

Leifer's assessment posts a warning sign for those who see no reason to worry about the stability of East Asia. He warns that "the ARF is embryonic, one-dimensional approach" to the major changes taking place in the security environment of the vital East Asian region.

A distinguished group of strategists assesses the balance of opportunities confronting Israel at this critical juncture in its history and offers possible solutions to its pressing dilemmas. The contributors address such issues as the economic consequences of peace for Israeli security, the implications of the new world order for Israel's strategic interests, Israel's nuclear weapons and the operational and strategic challenges posed by the future Middle Eastern battlefield.

This collection of essays by a distinguished group of Israeli, American and British strategists assesses the balance of opportunities and risks confronting Israel at this critical juncture in her history and offers possible solutions to her pressing dilemmas. Among the issues discussed in this volume: the economic consequences of peace for Israeli security; the implications of the New World Order for Israel's strategic interests; military and strategic risks attending the land-for-peace formula and possible solutions; Israel's nuclear weapons and the problem of regional non-conventional proliferation; Israeli-Palestinian water conflicts and ways for their resolution; and, finally, the operational and strategic challenges posed by the Middle Eastern future battlefield.

In this remarkable survey of "the communicative repertory of humans," John Gedo demonstrates the central importance to theory and therapeutics of the communication of information. He begins by surveying those modes of communication encountered in psychoanalysis that go beyond the lexical meaning of verbal dialogue, including "the music of speech," various protolinguistic phenomena, and the language of the body. Then, turning to the analytic dialogue, Gedo explores the implications of these alternative modes of communication for psychoanalytic technique. Individual chapters focus, in turn, on the creation of a "shared language" between analyst and analysand, the consequences of the analytic setting, the form in which the analyst casts particular interventions, the curative limits of empathy, the analyst's affectivity and its communication to the patient, and the semiotic significance of countertransference and projective identification.

Gedo does not proffer semiotics as a substitute for metapsychology. He is explicit that communicative skill is always dependdent on somatic events within the central nervous system. Indeed, it is because Gedo's hierarchical approach to communication builds on our current understanding of a hierarchically organized central nervous system that his clincal observations become insights into basic psychobiological functioning. Grounded in Gedo's four decades of clinical experience, The Languages of Psychoanalysis points to a new venue of clinical research and conceptualization, one in which attentiveness to issues of communication will not only foster linkages with contemporary neuroscience, but also clarify and enlarge the therapeutic possibilities of psychoanalytic treatment.

Of the many functions carried out by intelligence agencies, analysis and assessment has received comparatively little scholarly attention. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays may be divided into four self-contained sets. The first examines critically the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. The second looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.

From an acclaimed military historian, the interlocking lives of three of the most important and consequential generals in World War II Born in the two decades prior to World War I, George Patton, Bernard Montgomery, and Erwin Rommel became among the most recognized and successful military leaders of the 20th century. However, as acclaimed military historian Lloyd Clark reveals in his penetrating and insightful braided chronicle of their lives, they charted very different, often interrupted, paths to their ultimate leadership positions commanding hundreds of thousands of troops during World War II and celebrated as heroes in the United States, Britain, and Germany.Patton was born into a military family and from an early age felt he was destined for glory; following a disjointed childhood, Montgomery found purpose and direction in a military academy; Rommel's father was a former officer, so his pursuit of a military career was logical. Having ascended to the middle ranks, each faced battle for the first time in World War I, a searing experience that greatly influenced their future approach to war and leadership. When war broke out again in 1939, Montgomery and Rommel were immediately engaged, while Patton chafed until the U.S. joined the Allies in 1942 and the three men, by then generals, collided in North Africa in 1943, and then again, climactically, in France after D-Day in 1944.Weaving letters, diary extracts, official reports, and other documents into his original narrative, recounting dramatic battles as they developed on the ground and at headquarters, Clark also explores the controversies that swirled around Patton, Montgomery, and Rommel throughout their careers, sometimes threatening to derail them. Ultimately, however, their unique abilities to bridge the space between leader and led cemented their legendary reputations.

Security intelligence continues to be of central importance to the contemporary world: individuals, organizations and states all seek timely and actionable intelligence in order to increase their sense of security. But what exactly is intelligence? Who seeks to develop it and to what ends? How can we ensure that intelligence is not abused? In this third edition of their classic text, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian set out a comprehensive framework for the study of intelligence, discussing how states organize the collection and analysis of information in order to produce intelligence, how it is acted upon, why it may fail and how the process should be governed in order to uphold democratic rights. Fully revised and updated throughout, the book covers recent developments, including the impact of the Snowden leaks on the role of intelligence agencies in Internet and social media surveillance and in defensive and offensive cyber operations, and the legal and political arrangements for democratic control. The role of intelligence as part of 'hybrid' warfare in the case of Russia and Ukraine is also explored, and the problems facing intelligence in the realm of counterterrorism is considered in the context of the recent wave of attacks in Western Europe. Intelligence in an Insecure World is an authoritative and accessible guide to a rapidly expanding area of inquiry - one that everyone has an interest in understanding.

How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors-their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment-determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor's position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.

Statistical analysis in the 1970s by Colonel Trevor Dupuy of battles in the First World War demonstrated that the German Army enjoyed a consistent 20 per cent superiority in combat effectiveness over the British Army during that war, a superiority that had been asserted in the 1930s by Captain Graeme Wynne. In attempting to explain that advantage, this book follows the theory that such combat superiority can be understood best by means of a comparative study of the armies concerned, proposing that the German Army's superiority was due as much to poor performance by the British Army as to its own high performance. The book also suggests that the key difference between the two armies at this time was one of philosophy. The German Army saw combat as inherently chaotic: to achieve high combat effectiveness it was necessary to decentralise command, ensure a high standard of individual combat skill and adopt flexible tactical systems. The British Army, however, believed combat to be inherently structured: combat effectiveness was deemed to lie in the maintenance of order and symmetry, through centralised decision-making, training focused on developing unthinking obedience and the use of rigid tactics. An examination of the General Staff systems, the development of minor tactics and the evolution of defensive doctrines in both armies tests these hypotheses, while case studies of the battles of Thiepval and St Quentin reveal that both forces contained elements that supported the contrary philosophy to the majority. In the German Army, there was continual rear-guard action against flexibility, with the General Staff itself becoming increasingly narrow in outlook. In the British Army, severalattempts were made to adopt German practices, but misunderstanding and opposition distorted these, as when the system of directive control itself was converted into that of umpiring.

This text prepares the ground - both for US policy makers and America's allies in Asia - for the time in the not too distant future when the United States will no longer be in a position to guarantee the stability of the Asia-Pacific region by its unilateral actions and forward military presence. Arguing that the US-dominated system of Asian security from the Cold war era needs a fundamental transformation over the next ten years, the authors recommend a number of steps the US can take to help develop a moderate multipolar balance of power in Asia.

Contributions to this book question the concept of the clash of cultures. The challenge to the West does not lie in the monolith of Islam turning aggressively outward to Europe and the US, but in the rivalries between regimes ruling over societies divided by an imbalance in wealth and power.

Contributions to this book question the concept of the clash of cultures. The challenge to the West does not lie in the monolith of Islam turning aggressively outward to Europe and the US, but in the rivalries between regimes ruling over societies divided by an imbalance in wealth and power.

This is a comprehensive study of the major changes in infantry tacticts from the time of Frederick the Great to the beginning of what many see as the era of modern war, in the 1860s. Ross lays social and political change side by side with technical change. He argues that the French revolution, due to the fervour and loyalty it inspired in its participants, led to huge citizen armies of devolved command which were able to make use of new tactics that swept the poorly paid and poorly treated professional armies of their enemies from the field. Shortly after the Napoleonic wars other European countries experienced similar social change and by the middle of the Nineteenth Century these massive conscript armies were equipped with breech-loading rifles and more powerful artillery. The battlefield of the late 1860's had become a place where close infantry formations could not survive for long in the linear formations of the past.

The main aim of this book is to argue that the use of private force by states has been restricted by a norm against mercenary use. The book traces the evolution of this norm, from mercenaries in medieval Europe through to private security companies in modern day Iraq, telling a story about how the mercenaries of yesterday have evolved into those of today in the process.
The norm against mercenaries has two components. First, mercenaries are considered to be immoral because they use force outside legitimate, authoritative control. Second, mercenaries are considered to be morally problematic because they fight wars for selfish, financial reasons as opposed to fighting for some kind of larger conception of the common good.
The book examines four puzzles about mercenary use, and argues that they can only be explained by understanding the norm against mercenaries. First, the book argues that moral disapproval of mercenaries led to the disappearance of independent mercenaries from medieval Europe. Second, the transition from armies composed of mercenaries to citizen armies in the nineteenth century can only be understood with attention to the norm against mercenaries. Third, it is impossible to understand why international law regarding mercenaries, created in the 1970s and 1980s, is so ineffective without understanding the norm. Finally, the disappearance of companies like Executive Outcomes and Sandline and the development of today's private security industry cannot be understood without the norm.
This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

Japanese defence and security policies have often been at odds with international norms. When one considers the war renouncing constitution, the popular response to the 1990-1 Gulf crisis, or the limitations on Japanese self-defence-forces when taking part in United Nations peace keeping operations in the early 1990s, Japan appears to be an anomoly in the international community. This study seeks to explain the nature of Japanese defence and security policies by taking account of how the people have responded to militarization and demilitarization processes in the postwar period, especially in the 1980s and early 1990s. The author shows the Japan is moving towards being a "normal" military state and explains how, even 50 years after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the promulgation of an anti-militaristic constitution a few years later, the Japanese people are still influenced in their responses to defence and security policies by these twin experiences. This study challenges many of the preconceived notions on Japanese defense and security policies and the policy making process in Japan.