For supplementary documentation and useful websites, click here. This perceptive book critically explores why the United States continues to pursue failed policies in Latin America. What elements of the U.S. and Latin American political systems have allowed the Cold War, the war on drugs, and the war on terror to be conflated? Why do U.S. policies-ostensibly designed to promote the rule of law, human rights, and democracy-instead contribute to widespread corruption, erosion of government authority, human rights violations, and increasing destabilization? Why have the war on drugs and the war on terror neither reduced narcotics trafficking nor increased citizen security in Latin America? Why do Latin American governments, the European Union, and U.S. policymakers often work at cross-purposes when they all claim to be committed to "democratization" and "development" in the region? Leading scholars answer these questions by detailing the nature of U.S. economic and security strategies in Latin America and the Andean region since 1990. They analyze the impacts and responses to these strategies by policymakers, political leaders, and social movements throughout the region, explaining how programs often generate or exacerbate the very problems they were intended to solve. Reviewing official policy and its defenders and critics alike, this indispensable book focuses on the reasons for the failure of U.S. policies and their disastrous significance for Latin America and the United States alike. Contributions by: Adrian Bonilla, Pilar Gaitan, Monica Herz, Kenneth Lehman, Brian Loveman, Enrique Obando, Orlando J. Perez, Eduardo Pizarro, Philipp Schoenrock-Martinez, and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian

For supplementary documentation and useful websites, click here. This perceptive book critically explores why the United States continues to pursue failed policies in Latin America. What elements of the U.S. and Latin American political systems have allowed the Cold War, the war on drugs, and the war on terror to be conflated? Why do U.S. policies-ostensibly designed to promote the rule of law, human rights, and democracy-instead contribute to widespread corruption, erosion of government authority, human rights violations, and increasing destabilization? Why have the war on drugs and the war on terror neither reduced narcotics trafficking nor increased citizen security in Latin America? Why do Latin American governments, the European Union, and U.S. policymakers often work at cross-purposes when they all claim to be committed to "democratization" and "development" in the region? Leading scholars answer these questions by detailing the nature of U.S. economic and security strategies in Latin America and the Andean region since 1990. They analyze the impacts and responses to these strategies by policymakers, political leaders, and social movements throughout the region, explaining how programs often generate or exacerbate the very problems they were intended to solve. Reviewing official policy and its defenders and critics alike, this indispensable book focuses on the reasons for the failure of U.S. policies and their disastrous significance for Latin America and the United States alike. Contributions by: Adrian Bonilla, Pilar Gaitan, Monica Herz, Kenneth Lehman, Brian Loveman, Enrique Obando, Orlando J. Perez, Eduardo Pizarro, Philipp Schoenrock-Martinez, and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian

This book explores Japan's emerging national security policy in relation to China. It considers the rise of nationalism in contemporary Japan, the recent actions of the Abe government to change Japan's security policy course and the importance of domestic views, both elite and popular, about safety and credibility in shaping security policy. It highlights the lack of strong links between China and Japan and the existence in Japan of significant misconceptions about China. It discusses the politics of Japan's alliances, examines the growth of national pride in Japan and of a more confrontational attitude toward China, and concludes by putting forward some scenarios for likely future developments and some policy proposals for a stable Japan-China relationship.

Are the relationships that the United States forged with North and Central Europe during the Cold War still viable today? As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declines and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) emerges, can the United States and Europe bridge the transatlantic fissures that opened when the United States prepared to go to war with Iraq? In a post-9/11 world, North and Central Europe have had to adapt their national security policies and rethink their relationship with the United States. In an in-depth look at the security policies of the states in North and Central Europe, Andrew Michta highlights how historical legacies, regional geostrategic constraints, and individual capabilities have shaped their response to the new environment. Michta raises the broad question of whether traditional alliances and NATO are still viable ways to deal with new security concerns. The two key questions that arise from this discussion are to what extent NATO still matters to the United States, beyond its political utility, and whether the European Union as a whole can become a partner for the United States in a new security environment. The Limits of Alliance argues that, although NATO will continue to exist in the coming decade, the hollowing-out of the alliance will be accompanied by a shift in transatlantic security relations toward bilateralism determined by regional security considerations.

Are the relationships that the United States forged with North and Central Europe during the Cold War still viable today? As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) declines and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) emerges, can the United States and Europe bridge the transatlantic fissures that opened when the United States prepared to go to war with Iraq? In a post-9/11 world, North and Central Europe have had to adapt their national security policies and rethink their relationship with the United States. In an in-depth look at the security policies of the states in North and Central Europe, Andrew Michta highlights how historical legacies, regional geostrategic constraints, and individual capabilities have shaped their response to the new environment. Michta raises the broad question of whether traditional alliances and NATO are still viable ways to deal with new security concerns. The two key questions that arise from this discussion are to what extent NATO still matters to the United States, beyond its political utility, and whether the European Union as a whole can become a partner for the United States in a new security environment. The Limits of Alliance argues that, although NATO will continue to exist in the coming decade, the hollowing-out of the alliance will be accompanied by a shift in transatlantic security relations toward bilateralism determined by regional security considerations.

SOE in France was first published in 1966, followed by a second impression with amendments in 1968. Since these editions were published, other material on SOE has become available. It was, therefore, agreed in 2000 that Professor Foot should produce a revised version. In so doing, in addition to the material in the first edition, the author has had access to previously closed government records, as well as drawing upon his own invaluable wartime experiences and the recollections of those involved.
SOE in France begins by explaining what SOE was, where it fitted into the Allied war machine, and how it worked in France. The narrative then recounts the adventures of its agents who worked on French soil. This intricate tale concentrates on the work of the 400 hand-picked men and women of the 'independent French' section, although it also covers SOE's five other sections that operated mainly in France. All told, the six sections despatched over 1,800 clandestine agents, who between them changed the course of the war. This updated new edition will be essential reading for scholars and for all those with an informed general interest in the activities of the SOE.

Strategy and History comprises a selection of Professor Gray's key contributions to strategic debate over the past thirty years. These essays have been selected both because they had significant messages for contemporary controversies, and because they have some continuing relevance for today and the future. Each essay in this book is really about strategy in the modern world, and reflects the many dimensions of this complex subject. This book covers a wide range of subjects and historical events, but there are key issues covered throughout: being strategic the consequences of actions a respect for Clausewitz's theory of war historical dependency the importance of geography being critical of enthusiasm for technology over human factors the primacy of politics. This important publication provides an invaluable insight into the development of strategic studies over the past 30 years from one of the world's leading theorists and practitioners of the subject. The book will be of great interest to all students and analysts of strategy and international studies.

From Deterrence to Engagement provides a comprehensive examination of the U.S.-South Korea defense relationship from 1945 to the present. Using deterrence theory as its framework, this work explores the evolving nature of U.S. interests in a region that became a focal point only after the North Korean invasion in 1950. Author Terence Roehrig addresses the changing nature of the threats to U.S. interests in Korea, especially North Korea's buildup and its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, and examines specific measures utilized by the United States to implement its deterrence policy. While U.S. policy regarding Korea has changed over the years, this timely and important work argues that although the U.S. commitment to protect its ally has been credible and effective the same cannot be said for its attempts to prevent North Korean nuclear proliferation. From Deterrence to Engagement is certain to find an audience amongst scholars of defense policy, national security, and Korean security relations.

This unique book presents an accurate and reliable assessment of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). It brings together leading authors to examine the organization from a range of key angles. This study shows how historians have built on the first international conference on the SOE at the Imperial War Museum in 1998. The release of many records then allowed historians to develop the first authoritative analyses of the organization's activities and several of its agents and staff officers were able to participate. Since this groundbreaking conference, fresh research has continued and its original papers are here amended to take account of the full range of SOE documents that have been released to the National Archives. The fascinating stories they tell range from overviews of work in a single country to particular operations and the impact of key personalities. SOE was a remarkably innovative organization. It played a significant part in the Allied victory while its theories of clandestine warfare and specialised equipment had a major impact upon the post-war world. SOE proved that war need not be fought by conventional methods and by soldiers in uniform. The organization laid much of the groundwork for the development of irregular warfare that characterized the second half of the twentieth century and that is still here, more potent than ever, at the beginning of the twenty-first. This book will be of great interest to students of World War II history, intelligence studies and special operations, as well as general readers with an interest in SOE and World War II.

After the Vietnam War the US Army had to rebuild itself while the US government had to reconsider its military intervention strategy. This book examines how it was done and how this has affected US intervention policy, from the victory of the Gulf War to the failure of Somalia, before examining the Bosnian and Kosovo interventions.
This volume sets out to analyze the changes in US military intervention strategy by examining two separate issues: the nature of the US Army as it rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War, and the attempts by the US to establish criteria for future military interventions. Richard Lock-Pullan first argues that US strategy traditionally relied upon national mobilization to co-ordinate political aims and military means; he subsequently analyses how this changed to a formula of establishing militarily achievable political objectives prior to the use of force. Drawing on a vast body of strategic culture and military innovation literature, the author demonstrates that the strategic lessons were a product of the rebuilding of the Army's identity as it became a professional all-volunteer force and that the Army's new doctrine developed a new 'way of war' for the nation, embodied in the Air Land Battle doctrine, which changed the approach to strategy.
The book finally gives a practical analysis of how the interventions in Panama and the Gulf War vindicated this approach and brought a revived confidence in the use of force while more recent campaigns in Somalia, Kosovo and Bosnia exposed its weaknesses and the limiting nature of the Army's thinking.
This book will be of interest to students of strategic studies, international relations and American politics aswell as to military professionals.

In the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001, and during the ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, much has been heard of the concept of 'asymmetric warfare'. Broadly speaking, this describes a means of fighting through which a weaker power can offset or neutralize the strengths of a more powerful opponent by applying its own strengths to its opponent's weaknesses. Frequently, it is used to describe situations in which formal state power is confronted by non-state or guerrilla activity. Afghanistan features as the focus of this book's investigation since the country has recently been at the hub of confrontations which have borne immediately on current international concerns. It has also, for more than a century and a half, been the arena for a series of conflicts between imperial powers on the one hand and state and non-state power structures on the other. Afghans, moreover, have not changed their spots: they remain basically the same, in terms of personality and society, as they were when they were first described by a British envoy, Mountstewart Elphinstone, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Since that time, the confrontations with which Afghanistan was involved have not only brought repeated misery upon its people, but have had ramifications of an international character. This book deals with each of the five conflicts in which Afghanistan has been embroiled during this time span, namely the First, Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars, the Soviet invasion and the most recent American-led operations.

This powerful study makes a compelling case about the key U.S. role in state terrorism in Latin America during the Cold War. Long hidden from public view, Operation Condor was a military network created in the 1970s to eliminate political opponents of Latin American regimes. Its key members were the anticommunist dictatorships of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, later joined by Peru and Ecuador, with covert support from the U.S. government. Drawing on a wealth of testimonies, declassified files, and Latin American primary sources, J. Patrice McSherry examines Operation Condor from numerous vantage points: its secret structures, intelligence networks, covert operations against dissidents, political assassinations worldwide, commanders and operatives, links to the Pentagon and the CIA, and extension to Central America in the 1980s. The author convincingly shows how, using extralegal and terrorist methods, Operation Condor hunted down, seized, and executed political opponents across borders. McSherry argues that Condor functioned within, or parallel to, the structures of the larger inter-American military system led by the United States, and that declassified U.S. documents make clear that U.S. security officers saw Condor as a legitimate and useful 'counterterror' organization. Revealing new details of Condor operations and fresh evidence of links to the U.S. security establishment, this controversial work offers an original analysis of the use of secret, parallel armies in Western counterinsurgency strategies. It will be a clarion call to all readers to consider the long-term consequences of clandestine operations in the name of 'democracy.'

This book assesses the EU and NATO's tools to prevent conflicts and manage international crises. It offers a unique insight into European security policy and questions the realism of the political goals. It argues for more coordination among European states, and an enhancement of the EU's strategic decision-making capabilities.

Borders dominate the security agenda in South-east Europe. Political and ethnic discontents focus on disputed borders, while traffickers in migrants and drugs ignore them.The EU argues that the Balkan countries should develop models of border management using its policing standards, but the region is rife with corruption and its border guards are both under-resourced and ineffective. This Paper asks how and why border management in South-east Europe is developing as it is, and what this might mean for the future of Europe. Drawing on recent experience in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia and Albania, it looks at the ways in which the regions' borders are managed, and gauges the development of a consensual European approach to border security. It shows how governments and guards understand the predicament of regional insecurity, and how they respond with strategies that accommodate, evade or subvert unavoidable political pressures.

During the 1990s, military spending, arms procurement and defence industrialisation have all increased rapidly in East Asia. Although these developments do not constitute an arms race, they nevertheless have important implications for suppliers of defence equipment, for arms control and for regional stability. This paper assesses trends in the defence spending of East Asian states, particularly in the light of the economic crisis, which began in mid-1997. It also focuses on three closely-related issues: the nature of the regional market for defence equipment; defence industrialisation; and the effect of trends in defence procurement and industrialisation on East Asian states' military capabilities, and on the regional military balance.

This book shows how the threat of cruise-missile proliferation may unfold and examines its strategic consequences. It argues that, because the unfolding pattern of cruise-missile proliferation remains so unclear, more should be done by affected governments now to dissuade potential adversaries from acquiring cruise missiles or to delay the threat's emergence. The book offers a comprehensive set of policy prescriptions, which when combined, call for a much tighter link between military solution and more robust non-proliferation policies.

Over the last decade the failure of countries to emerge from conflict has focused attention on state security sectors. This book examines how the external approaches to security sector reform (SSR) have evolved and what they entail; the specific problems faced by the SSR agenda; and what policy recommendations for engagement can be drawn from reform experiences.

The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel discusses the contribution of the IDF to the development of the Israeli State and society. The Force was a principal player in Israel's early years and had a significant impact on the fields of settlement, immigration absorption and education. Sociological concepts such as 'nation-building', 'melting pot' and 'a nation in uniform' characterize the roles played by the IDF and highlight its involvement in nationally oriented social processes.

The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel discusses the contribution of the IDF to the development of the Israeli State and society. The Force was a principal player in Israel's early years and had a significant impact on the fields of settlement, immigration absorption and education. Sociological concepts such as 'nation-building', 'melting pot' and 'a nation in uniform' characterize the roles played by the IDF and highlight its involvement in nationally oriented social processes.

Occasionally, militaries during times of peace achieve major warfighting innovations. Terry Pierce calls these 'disruptive innovations'. The more common innovation phenomenon, however, has been that of integrating new technologies to help perform existing missions better and not change them radically. The author calls these 'sustaining innovations'. The central theme of this book is that senior leaders who have successfully managed disruptive innovations disguised them as sustaining in order to ensure their innovations survived.
The recent innovation history suggests two interesting questions. First, how can senior military leaders achieve a disruptive innovation when they are heavily engaged around the world and they are managing sustaining innovations? Second, what have been the external sources of disruptive (and sustaining) innovations?
This book is essential reading for professionals and students interested in national security, military history and strategic issues.

Emmers questions the dichotomy implicit in this interpretation and investigates what role the balance of power really plays in such cooperative security arrangements and in the calculations of the participants of ASEAN and the ARF. He offers a thorough analysis of the influence the balance of power has had on the formation and evolution of the ASEAN and ARF and reveals the co-existence and inter-relationship between both approaches within the two institutions.
The book contains case studies of Brunei's motives in joining the ASEAN in 1984; ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina Conflict; the workings of the ARF since 1994 and ASEAN's involvement in the South China Sea dispute. It will interest students and researchers of the ASEAN and ARF, the international politics of Southeast Asia, Regionalism and the Balance of Power theory.

This book is a comparative study of the evolution of the German navy in the second half of the nineteenth century. It examines the development of strategy, especially commerce-raiding, in comparison to what other navies were doing in this era of rapid technological change. It is not an insular history, merely listing ship rosters or specific events; it is a history of the German navy in relation to its potential foes. It is also a look at a new military institution involved in an inter-service rivalry for funds, technology and manpower with the prestigious and well-established army.

Cunningham was the best-known and most celebrated British admiral of the Second World War. He held one of the two major fleet commands between 1939 and 1942, and in 1942-43, he was Allied naval commander for the great amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. From 1943 to 1946, he was the First Sea Lord and a participant in the wartime conferences with Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt and the US Chiefs of Staff, deliberating the global strategy for Allied victory.
He also led a very active public life for almost twenty years after his retirement in 1946. Cunningham's papers are abundant for the period 1939-63 and are supplemented here by Cabinet and Admiralty records, papers of his service contemporaries and of Churchill, and by memories of his family and friends, as well as extensive US archives and private papers.

Occasionally, during times of peace, military forces achieve major warfighting innovations. Terry Pierce terms these developments 'disruptive innovations' and shows how senior leaders have often disguised them in order to ensure their innovations survived. He shows how more common innovations however, have been those of integrating new technologies to help perform existing missions better and not change them radically. The author calls these 'sustaining innovations'. The recent innovation history suggests two interesting questions. First, how can senior military leaders achieve a disruptive innovation when they are heavily engaged around the world and they are managing sustaining innovations? Second, what have been the external sources of disruptive (and sustaining) innovations? This book is essential reading for professionals and students interested in national security, military history and strategic issues.