The technical transformation of the Royal Navy during the Victorian era posed a succession of bewildering design, tactical and operational problems for administrators from the 1830s onwards. These problems have attracted considerable scrutiny. Far less scrutiny, however, has been paid to an equally fundamental strategic quandary created by the switch from sail to steam.

This is the first description of the formation of America's nulcear surveillance system. Drawing on interviews with participants and the little documentation available under the Freedom of Information Act, Ziegler and Jacobson tell a story not told before. They shed new light on questions raised in earlier interpretations of the early Cold War years and reveal the origins of a surveillance activity that is implied, but not explained, in today's headlines. This book provides the first documented description of the genesis and institutionalization of America's nuclear surveillance system. It traces the development of covert technical methods for assessing the nuclear capability of foreign powers from the introduction of these techniques in World War II to 1949, when they were successfully employed to detect the test of Russia's first atomic bomb. Ziegler and Jacobson examine the planning for the system as well as the technical and organizational obstacles that had to be overcome before it could be implemented. They describe the government decision-making processes and the ways individuals and groups with different beliefs and interests were mobilized in support of the program. They also explore the relationships between the intelligence and scientific communities that were forged in this process.

Germany's Schlieffen Plan of the First World War is much talked of but little understood. Translations of primary sources recently available clarify the issues involved. The great deficiency in the discussion of German war planning prior to the Great War has been the dearth of reliable primary sources. Practically nothing was made public before the German Reichsarchiv was destroyed in April 1945,and this problem is compounded for Anglophone historians by the fact that the most interesting secondary literature was printed in German periodicals in the early 1920s. This book makes available in English translationmany of the documents concerning German war planning before 1914 that survived the war, but were kept closely guarded by the East German army archives, and only became available with the fall of the wall. Included are the only archival history of German war planning, Wilhelm Dieckmann's Der Schlieffenplan, Hellmuth Greiner's secret history of the German west front intelligence estimate from 1885 to 1914, and two of the younger Moltke's General Staff exercises. The book also presents other little-known documents found in other German archives as well as the most important parts of the 1920s literature concerning the debate on the German war plan. The picture ofGerman war planning which now emerges is both more complex and more credible than the previous single-minded emphasis on the 'Schlieffenplan'. TERENCE ZUBER has also written Inventing the Schlieffen Plan and The Moltke Myth; born in Cleveland, Ohio, he is currently living in Wurzburg, Germany.

This is a history of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) during the Cold War, based on its secret archives. The author presents detailed descriptions of the build-up of a network of Norwegian signals intelligence stations in the north; border crossings by clandestine agents; the reporting of Norwegian merchant mariners from ports behind the Iron Curtain; the intimate co-operation between the NIS and the secret services of the United States and other countries; as well as the establishment of a stay behind network.

The crisis in Kosovo has excited passion and visionary exaltation of a kind rarely witnessed. The events have been portrayed as a aNew HumanismA, timed fortuitously with a new millennium, which will displace the crass and narrow interest politics of a mean-spirited past. But is this New Humanism guided by power interests or by humanitarian concern? Is the resort to force undertaken ain the name of principles and valuesAe as professed? Or are we witnessing something more crass and familiar? The New Military Humanism is Chomsky at his best: a brilliant and revealing analysis, offering lessons for us all and sounding a clear alarm which none should ignore.

Despite the ongoing drawdown of strategic forces under the terms of START, both the United States and Russia maintain large arsenals of nuclear weapons poised for immediate launch. Under the most optimistic current scenarios, these arsenals will remain very large and launch-ready for more than a decade. This book, by a distinguished group of coauthors, critically evaluates the current policy of retaining and operating large nuclear arsenals. It reviews U.S. nuclear doctrine and strategy, and the role of nuclear weapons in deterring aggression by former Cold War adversaries and other countries with weapons of mass destruction. The risks of inadvertent as well as deliberate nuclear attack are assessed. The authors argue that small arsenals (low hundreds) on low alert satisfy all justifiable requirements for nuclear weapons. They present a blueprint for making deep cuts in U.S. and Russian deployments, and for lowering their alert level. They explain the implications of shifting to small arsenals for further constraining anti-ballistic missile defenses, strengthening verification, and capping or reducing the nuclear arsenals of China, France, and Britain as well as the threshold nuclear states. The political challenges and opportunities, both domestic and international, for achieving deep reductions in the size and readiness of nuclear forces are analyzed by the authors and by distinguished experts from other countries. The coauthors are Bruce Blair, Jonathan Dean, James Goodby, Steve Fetter, Hal Feiveson, George Lewis, Janne Nolan, Theodore Postol, and Frank von Hippel. An appendix with international perspectives by Li Bin (China), Alexei Arbatov (Russia), Therese Delpech (France), PervezHoodbhoy (Pakistan), Shai Feldman (Israel), Harald Mueller (Germany), and Zia Mian and M.V. Ramana (South Asia).

Commanding Military Power offers a new explanation of why some armed forces are stronger than others. Ryan Grauer advances a 'command structure theory' which combines insights from organization theory, international relations, and security studies literatures to provide a unique perspective on military power. Specifically, armed forces organized to facilitate swift and accurate perception of and response to battlefield developments will cope better with war's inherent uncertainty, use resources effectively, and, quite often, win. Case studies of battles from the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Civil War and Korean War, based on new archival research, underscore the argument, showing that even smaller and materially weaker militaries can fight effectively against and defeat larger and better endowed adversaries when they are organizationally prepared to manage uncertainty. That organization often matters more than numbers and specific tools of war has crucial implications for both contemporary and future thinking about and efforts to improve martial strength.

This study analyzes the readiness of the British military establishment for war in 1899 and its performance in the South African War (1899-1902). It focuses on the career of Field Marshal Paul Sanford, 3rd Baron Methuen, whose traditional military training, used so effectively in Queen Victoria's small wars, was put to the test by the modern challenges of the South African War. A subsidiary aim of this work is to correct and refine the historical consensus that Methuen's campaing in the South African War was plagued by practical errors and poor judgement. The South African War was a crucial transitional episode in the history of the British army. Unlike Great Britain's other expeditions, it required the concentrated resources of the entire empire. It was a modern war in the sense that it employed the technology, the weaponry, the communications, and the transportation of the second industrial revolution.

Despite the continuing flood of literature on United States national security policy, there is no current general bibliography on the subject. In this work, the compiler has sought to fill that need by bringing together a highly selective listing of valuable works in the field of national security. Although the book begins with the first Eisenhower administration, the emphasis is clearly on the post-1960 era, and in particular the years following American involvement in the wars of Indochina. With its focus on the executive branch, the bibliography provides an effective introduction to the processes for formulating strategies and military policies, and to a number of major defense and security issues.

In order to identify the major policy declarations, strategy assessments, and reference works for each administration, Beede has divided the bibliography into chapters that cover presidential administrations. Each of these chapters begins with works concerning the decision makers and decision-making process of the administration, and follows with subject groupings on military and defense policies, particular types of strategies, and American alliances and responses to crises. Special chapters cover reference works, studies that address the entire time period, or that deal with several administrations, and analyses of the Vietnam conflict. The materials listed in the volume include a number of publications from the National Defense University. The book contains comprehensive author and subject indexes. It will be an important reference source for students of military history and presidential policy, as well as a valuable addition to university, research, and military libraries.

The essays in this volume are concerned with armed conflicts in South Asia and the conflict management efforts made to mitigate them. Articles in the volume study conflict management, look at the direction armed conflict is likely to take and provide a set of alternative measures that could be perused by the actors. It addresses five key issues: history of the armed conflict, identifying the principal actors of the conflict, describing the course of the conflict and its major trends, evaluating conflict management measures undertaken, if any, presenting appropriate conclusions. It also includes additional chapters on Naxalism and sectarian strife in Pakistan. Designed as an annual series, this important collection discusses India's geo-strategic importance including its common borders with its neighbours; the psychological and economic costs of violence, and the problem of refugee migrants; treaties and ceasefire agreements signed across countries; the role of the UN and other peacekeeping forces; and the future of failed and failing democracies. The book makes an important contribution to analysing armed conflicts and conflict resolution.

Audley End House in Essex - or Station 43 as it was known during the Second World War - was used as the principal training school for SOE's Polish Section between 1942 and 1944. Polish agents at the stately home undertook a series of arduous training courses in guerilla warfare before being parachuted into occupied Europe. In 1943, Audley End was placed exclusively under polish control, a situation unique within SOE. The training was tough and the success rate low, but a total of 527 agents passed through Audley End between 1942 and 1944. Ian Valentine has consulted a wide range of primary sources and interviewed Polish instructors and former agents who trained at Audley End to write the definitive account of this Essex country house and the vital but secret part it played in defeating Hitler. He examines the comprehensive training agents at Audley End and describes the work undertaken by Station 43's agents in Europe, set against the background of Polish wartime history. He also covers the vital link with the RAF's Special Duties squadrons, whose crews risked their lives dropping agents into occupied Europe. Station 43 breaks new ground in telling the hitherto until story of Audley End house and its role as a vital SOE training school.

Building on a strong foundation of primary sources, this unique study traces the role of East Germany's military (NVA) in the country's unification with West Germany. Utilizing interviews with and questionnaires from NVA officers, Herspring unravels the puzzle of the NVA's decision against using force to save the political system it was sworn to serve. The author also examines the integration of a select minority of officers and NCOs into the Bundeswehr. Illuminating the problems encountered by the Bundeswehr as it incorporated these individuals, Herspring constructs an ideal type of officer in one of the most politicized and tightly controlled of all communist militaries. His findings will be invaluable for all military-political specialists and for anyone interested in the process of transition from authoritarian/totalitarian to democratic systems.

This book provides a state of the art discussion of the royal prerogative over war powers in the UK. This issue has received particular attention over proposed military strikes against the Syrian regime and it was claimed by many observers and scholars that parliament now controls decisions in war. However, the record has been mixed- and the most recent decision by Prime Minister May on Syria in 2018 shows that the executive can re-assert prerogative powers and effectively sidestep parliament. The author argues that these dynamics should be seen in the context of the declining authority of the executive and the legislature and in terms of a policy solution, and ultimately she suggests a War Powers Act as a firmer foundation for Britain's war powers.

In 1953, Ian Fleming's literary sensation James Bond emerged onto the world's stage. Nearly seven decades later, he has become a multi-billion-pound film franchise, now equipped with all the gizmos of the modern world. Yet Fleming's creation, who battled his way through the fourteen novels from 1953 to 1966, was a maverick - a man out of place. Bond even admits it, wishing he was back in the real war ... the Second World War. Indeed, the thread of the Second World War runs through the whole of the Bond series, and many were inspired by the real events and people Fleming came across during his time in Naval Intelligence. In Ian Fleming's War, Mark Simmons explores these remarkable similarities, from Fleming's scheme to capture a German naval codebook that appears in Thunderball as Plan Omega, to the exploits of 30 Assault Unit, the commando team he helped to create, which inspired Moonraker.

Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

Why do some American intelligence officials maintain fallout shelters and private contingency plans to evacuate their families in the event of a Russian nuclear strike--even in today's post-Cold War era of U.S.-Russian partnership? The frightening answer lies within the pages of "War Scare," a terrifying assessment of the prospect for nuclear holocaust in our day. Written by Peter Vincent Pry, a former CIA military analyst, "War Scare" provides a history of our country's little-known brushes with nuclear war and warns that, contrary to popular opinion and the assurances of our political leaders, the possibility of a Russian attack still exists. Nuclear deterrence has been the foundation of Western security for the last 50 years, but since the end of the Cold War, Russian military doctrine has become more destabilizing, and much more dangerous, than is commonly believed.

By making use of a wealth of declassified and unclassified material, Dr. Pry illustrates how Russia's brutal past continues to shape the consciousness and decision making of its leaders, many of whom are unreconstructed ideologues from the old Soviet regime. Gripped by a perpetual perception of imminent threat--a war scare--the Russian General Staff, which controls the technical capability of launching a nuclear strike, has shown itself to be unstable at best. The author explores recent history and near-disasters such as the Bosnian crisis, the Norway missile incident, and U.S. air strikes on Iraq from the perspective of the Russian General Staff, believing that only by understanding their viewpoint can we minimize the risk of unintentionally provoking a deadly attack. Wary of NATO expansion and reeling from the Russian economy's descent into chaos, the General Staff may interpret Western military exercises and operations in the Middle East and elsewhere as concealing surprise aggression against Russia. This is a grave situation, indeed, as even after the START I, II, and III agreements, Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world--not to mention significantly expanded chemical and biological warfare capability. "War Scare" convincingly shows that we ignore these facts at our peril.

Little attention has been paid to the murky, ultra-business of gathering intelligence among and forming estimates about friendly powers, and friendly or allied military forces. How rarely have scholars troubled to discover when states entered into coalitions or alliances mainly and explicitly because their intelligence evaluation of the potential partner concluded that making the alliance was, from the originator's national security interest, the best game in town. The twentieth century has been chosen to enhance the coherence of and connections between, the subject matter of this under-explored part of intelligence studies.

Little attention has been paid to the murky, ultra-business of gathering intelligence among and forming estimates about friendly powers, and friendly or allied military forces. How rarely have scholars troubled to discover when states entered into coalitions or alliances mainly and explicitly because their intelligence evaluation of the potential partner concluded that making the alliance was, from the originator's national security interest, the best game in town. The twentieth century has been chosen to enhance the coherence of and connections between, the subject matter of this under-explored part of intelligence studies.

Modern armies are planned and structured to fight massive World War II-type operations involving the large-scale movements of tanks and machinery across continents. In fact they are rarely called upon to participate in such conflicts. It is far more common for them to find themselves involved in lower-level, ill-defined, politically charged, messy situations known collectively as unconventional warfare, typified by the 1990s conflicts in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

This analysis of close air support in world War II focuses on the use of tactical air power by British and American forces during the campaigns in Italy and North-west Europe from 1943-45. Gooderson asks whether the employment of air resources in the close support role provided sufficient advantage at the battlefront to justify the effort and the risk to aircraft and pilots. Or was the use of aircraft behind the battlefront to attack communications, transport and supplies a more effective and cost-efficient strategy?

This analysis of close air support in world War II focuses on the use of tactical air power by British and American forces during the campaigns in Italy and North-west Europe from 1943-45. Gooderson asks whether the employment of air resources in the close support role provided sufficient advantage at the battlefront to justify the effort and the risk to aircraft and pilots. Or was the use of aircraft behind the battlefront to attack communications, transport and supplies a more effective and cost-efficient strategy?

Rear Admiral Raja Menon contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. After an analysis of existing literature on this subject and a discussion of case studies, he develops the argument that those navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to the overall politial objectives. Government neglect, inadequate funding and structures that are more appropriate to purely maritime wars are symptomatic of a universal strategic dilemma that arises from inadequate strategic theory.

Exploratio is the first ever survey of Roman military and civil intelligence. The authors examine in detail the operation and gradual development of Roman intelligence-gathering from shaky beginnings to a high level of excellence. They identify who gathered it, and for whom.
This study shows the effects of intelligence on policy formation at various levels from the purely local through to the global. The consequences of various instances of the mishandling of information are uncovered. Austin and Rankov also demonstrate that intelligence gathering was not necessarily directed from Rome, but had for practical reasons to be carried out and processed on the frontiers themselves.
Exploratio is important reading for all students and teachers of Roman history. It will also appeal to those with a general interest in military or diplomatic history.

eBook available with sample pages: 0203033051

A Cross of Iron provides the fullest account yet of the national security state that emerged in the first decade of the Cold War. Michael J. Hogan traces the process of state-making through struggles to unify the armed forces, harness science to military purposes, mobilize military manpower, control the defense budget, and distribute the cost of defense across the economy. President Harry S. Truman and his successor were in the middle of a fundamental contest over the nation's political identity and postwar purpose, and their efforts determined the size and shape of the national security state that finally emerged.

Richard Sorge was a spy, a Russian spy and an extraordinarily successful one. Two quotes illustrate this. The first is by Larry Collins, 'Richard Sorge's brilliant espionage work saved Stalin and the Soviet Union from defeat in the fall of 1941, probably prevented a Nazi victory in World War Two and thereby assured the dimensions of the world we live in today.' The second is by Frederick Forsyth, 'The spies in history who can say from their graves, the information I supplied to my masters, for better or worse, altered the history of our planet, can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Richard Sorge was in that group.' Masquerading as a Nazi journalist, Richard Sorge worked undetected as head of a Red Army spy ring until he was arrested and executed in Japan during the Second World War. Such an astonishing story as Sorge's is bound to attract attention but not only was this the first book to offer an authoritative account, it has, in many ways, not least in the quality of its writing, never been superseded. The authors rejected legend and found facts that were even stranger. They provide an account as reliable as it is enthralling of possibly the most successful spy who ever operated; a man who for eight years transmitted from Japan a continuous stream of the most valuable information, often derived from the highest quarters, culminating in precise advance information of Hitler's invasion of Russia, of Japan's decision not to attack Russia in 1941, and of the near certainty of war against America that October or November instead. Jointly written books sometimes jar, but not this one. The authors had complementary skills, F. W. Deakin being an authority on twentieth-century European history and G. R Storry no less of an authority on twentieth-century Japan. Together they do justice to 'the man whom I regard as the most formidable spy in history,' (Ian Fleming).