The Changing Politics of European Security explores the key security challenges confronting Europe, from relations with the US and Russia to the use of military force and the struggle against terrorism. In the future, the authors conclude, European states will act alone, independent of America, on security matters.

The topical study investigates whether strategic norms and beliefs held in different countries have become more similar since 1989 and explores the implications for the viability of a common European Security and Defence Policy. The author argues that national strategic cultures, although distinct, have been subject to three learning mechanisms since 1989: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialisation, and mediatised crises learning. The empirical evidence emerging from various sources shows that some key norms underpinning national strategic cultures have changed substantially, opening opportunities for deeper defence cooperation in Europe.

Defence Planning as Strategic Fact provides and elaborates on an "upstream" focus on the variegated organizational, political and conceptual practices of military, civilian administrative and political leaderships involved in defence planning, offering an important security and strategic studies supplement to the traditional "downstream" focus on the use of force. The book enables the reader to engage with the role of ideas in defence planning, of organizational processes and biases, path dependencies and administrative dynamics under the pressures of continuously changing domestic and international constraints. The chapters show how defence planning must be seen as a constitutive element of defence and strategic studies - that it is a strategic fact of its own which merits particular practical and scholarly attention. As defence planning creates the conditions behind every peace upheld or broken and every war won or lost, Defence Planning as Strategic Fact will be of great use to scholars of defence studies, strategic studies, and military studies. This book was originally published as a special issue of Defence Studies.

The book contains lectures of an international NATO-Russian Advanced Research Workshop about the Stand-off-Detection of concealed explosives or explosive charges carried by Suicide-Bombers or in mobile objects (vehicles). The explosives or explosive charges should be detected by harmless methods from a distance and unnoticed by persons under inspection.

The ARW was one of a series of workshops before, dealing with the detection of explosives used by terrorists and was initiated by the "Explosive Detection Working Group" of NATO to create projects of applied research. The aim of the workshop was to present suitable projects, to exchange knowledge and to discuss the feasibility and realization of methods.

Projects aim at improvements in sensing techniques that will allow the shortest developing time and are suitable for commercial production. Potential short time availability was a prioritizing isssue.

The book contains lectures of an international NATO-Russian Advanced Research Workshop about the Stand-off-Detection of concealed explosives or explosive charges carried by Suicide-Bombers or in mobile objects (vehicles). The explosives or explosive charges should be detected by harmless methods from a distance and unnoticed by persons under inspection.

The ARW was one of a series of workshops before, dealing with the detection of explosives used by terrorists and was initiated by the "Explosive Detection Working Group" of NATO to create projects of applied research. The aim of the workshop was to present suitable projects, to exchange knowledge and to discuss the feasibility and realization of methods.

Projects aim at improvements in sensing techniques that will allow the shortest developing time and are suitable for commercial production. Potential short time availability was a prioritizing isssue.

In a world rife with conflict and tension, how does a great power prosecute an irregular war at a great distance within the context of a regional struggle, all within a global competitive environment? The question, so pertinent today, was confronted by the British nearly 250 years ago during the American War for Independence. And the answer, as this book makes plain, is: not the way the British, under Lieutenant General Charles, Earl Cornwallis, went about it in the American South in the years 1778-81. Southern Gambit presents a closely observed, comprehensive account of this failed strategy. Approaching the campaign from the British perspective, this book restores a critical but little-studied chapter to the narrative of the Revolutionary War - and in doing so, it adds detail and depth to our picture of Cornwallis, an outsize figure in the history of the British Empire. Distinguished scholar of military strategy Stanley D. M. Carpenter outlines the British strategic and operational objectives, devoting particular attention to the strategy of employing Southern Loyalists to help defeat Patriot forces, reestablish royal authority, and tamp down resurgent Patriot activity. Focusing on Cornwallis's operations in the Carolinas and Virginia leading to the surrender at Yorktown in October 1781, Carpenter reveals the flaws in this approach, most notably a fatal misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South and of the Loyalists' support. Compounding this was the strategic incoherence of seeking a conventional war against a brilliant, unconventional opponent, and doing so amidst a breakdown in the unity of command. Ultimately, strategic incoherence, ineffective command and control, and a misreading of the situation contributed to the series of cascading failures of the British effort. Carpenter's analysis of how and why this happened expands our understanding of British decision-making and operations in the Southern Campaign and their fateful consequences in the War for Independence.

Since the end of the Cold War and re-unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union has undergone significant changes. Once a model 'Europeanist', Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory and providing an in-depth analysis of both refugee and security policy, the book develops an innovative framework for analysis that is capable of accounting for an incremental 'de-Europeanization' in Germany's EU policy.

It is not hyperbole to suggest that the foundations of post-cold war security in Europe have been badly damaged by the conflict in Ukraine since 2014. Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine appear to have created a 'simmering' conflict, which may take years to resolve and have profound consequences for the European security environment. This volume explores the various political, economic and social aspects of these profound changes and their wider significance for Europe, bringing together contributions by scholars from across the continent and in various disciplinary fields to offer an authoritative, in-depth examination of the complex causes of the Ukraine crisis and the consequences for Ukrainian statehood, Ukraine's relations with Russia, Russia's own domestic governance and Russia's relations with Europe. This book was originally published as a special issue of Europe-Asia Studies.

During World War II, the US Army and its allies faced a formidable challenge: the need to assault Hitler's 'Fortress Europe' from the sea. As a result, during 1941-45, the US Army had to add amphibious assault to its list of combat capabilities. Officers and troops from across the US Armed Forces had to develop the techniques and technologies to assault the coasts of Axis-occupied Europe, from logistics to beach assault and beachhead consolidation, and more. In order to win and hold a contested beachhead in the face of bitter enemy resistance, the amphibious-warfare specialists played a variety of essential battlefield roles; if the US troops could not establish a beachhead quickly, they risked being thrown back into the sea. For their part, the Germans had to devise a practical defensive doctrine that made the most of the limited resources and troops available and the terrain. The German infantry defenders immediately around the landing areas had to be able to call upon support from nearby artillery, mechanized troops, and armoured forces to have a chance of containing the enemy beachhead. This illustrated study analyses the specialist beach-landing troops involved in three key battles - the Allied amphibious landings at Salerno and Anzio in Italy, and Omaha Beach in Normandy - focusing upon the US Army's various types of beach-assault specialists and their German opponents, whose combat experience and effectiveness varied considerably. Each of the three featured battles is then examined in detail, exploring how the Germans made defensive preparations; how the US troops planned to overcome them; and the immediate actions undertaken by the US amphibious specialists and their German opponents both during and following the main assault landings.

Since the unprecedentedly effective performance of the allied air campaign against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, the role of American air power in future wars has become a topic of often heated public debate. In this balanced appraisal of air power's newly realized strengths in joint warfare, Benjamin Lambeth, a defense analyst and civilian pilot who has flown in most of the equipment described in this book, explores the extent to which the United States can now rely on air-delivered precision weapons in lieu of ground forces to achieve strategic objectives and minimize American casualties.

Beginning with the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia and detailing how failures there set the stage for a sweeping refurbishment of the nation's air warfare capability, Lambeth reviews the recent history of American air power, including its role in the Gulf War and in later operations over Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia. He examines improvements in areas ranging from hardware development to aircrew skills and organizational adaptability.

Lambeth acknowledges that the question of whether air power should operate independently or continue to support land operations is likely to remain contentious. He concludes, however, that air power, its strategic effectiveness proven, can now set the conditions for victory even from the outset of combat if applied to its fullest potential.

In contrast to previous studies of the South Korea-United States alliance, Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig analyze the bigger picture, including the history, economics, security, alliance structure, politics, and the future of the alliance. Taking alliance theory as a starting point, the authors argue that the alliance provides an ideal case study to examine how the political development and economic growth of junior partners impact an alliance. As South Korea's capabilities and ambitions have grown, the alliance has evolved from an asymmetric regional security relationship to an economic partnership with global interests, while China's rise and North Korea's nuclear development mean that South Korea remains of strategic importance for American interests in East Asia. This book will be read both as a major contribution to Korean studies and the study of alliance politics and theory.

From Anders Breivik in Norway, who murdered scores of young people in a bombing and mass-shooting attack, to Omar Mateen, the Orlando killer who perpetrated the worst mass shooting in American history, lone wolves have demonstrated that they can be as dangerous as organized terrorist groups. Who are these terrorists and what can be done about them? An internationally renowned terrorism expert presents the first comprehensive treatment of this important issue. After delving into the diversity in motivations and backgrounds of lone wolf terrorists, Simon makes the following key points about this growing threat: lone wolves have proven to be more creative and dangerous than many terrorist groups; lone wolves are not just Islamist extremists but can be found among all types of political and religious ideologies; the Internet has provided the perfect breeding ground for isolated individuals with terrorist tendencies, but it may also prove to be their undoing; there are few women in this category, but this is likely to change in the coming years; and the common perception that nothing can be done about lone wolves is wrong. In fact, innovative strategies and policies can be developed to both prevent and respond to this type of terrorism. Drawing on his more than twenty-five years of experience studying terrorism, Simon has produced an insightful book that is essential reading for anyone concerned about the potential terrorist threats from violence-prone individuals in our midst.This paperback edition contains a new preface by the author, which reviews lone-wolf incidents since the publication of the original edition.

Timothy W. Crawford's The Power to Divide examines the use of wedge strategies, a form of divisive statecraft designed to isolate adversaries from allies and potential supporters to gain key advantages. With a multidimensional argument about the power of accommodation in competition, and a survey of alliance diplomacy around both World Wars, The Power to Divide artfully analyzes the past and future performance of wedge strategy in great power politics. Crawford argues that nations attempting to use wedge strategy do best when they credibly accommodate likely or established allies of their enemies. He also argues that a divider's own alliances can pose obstacles to success and explains the conditions that help dividers overcome them. He advances these claims in eight focused studies of alliance diplomacy surrounding the World Wars, derived from published official documents and secondary histories. Through those narratives, Crawford adeptly assesses the record of countries that tried an accommodative wedge strategy, and why ultimately, they succeeded or failed. These calculated actions often became turning points, desired or not, in a nation's established power. For policymakers today facing threats to power from great power competitors, Crawford argues that a deeper historical and theoretical grasp of the role of these wedge strategies in alliance politics and grand strategy is necessary. Crawford drives home the contemporary relevance of the analysis with a survey of China's potential to use such strategies to divide India from the US, and the United States' potential to use them to forestall a China-Russia alliance, and closes with a review of key theoretical insights for policy.

This classic text provides a rich and nuanced discussion of American national security policymaking. American National Security remains the ideal foundational text for courses in national security, foreign policy, and security studies. Every chapter in this edition has been extensively revised, and the book includes discussion of recent security policy changes in the Trump administration. Highlights include: * An updated look at national security threats, military operations, and homeland security challenges * An analysis of the evolving roles of the president, Congress, the intelligence community, the military, and other institutions involved in national security * A revised consideration of the strengths, limitations, and employment of instruments of national power, including diplomacy, information, economic tools, and armed forces * An exploration of the economic and national security implications of globalization * An enhanced examination of the proliferation of transnational threats, including security challenges in space and in cyberspace * A new assessment of how international, political, and economic trends may change US leadership of the post-World War II international order * A comprehensive update on changing dynamics in key states and regions, including Russia, China, East Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America An authoritative book that explains US national security policy, actors, and processes in a wide-ranging yet understandable way, American National Security addresses key issues, including challenges to the free and open international order, the reemergence of strategic competition among great powers, terrorism, economic and fiscal constraints, and rapid advances in information and technology.

There is more to defense than military might and more to the military than a fighting force. At a moment of global upheaval, domestic turmoil, and political uncertainty, this timely volume seeks to define and reframe the terms of defense engagement - the use of military capabilities to exert soft power (influence) as opposed to hard power (military force). Defense Engagement since 1900 is a work of applied military history that brings lessons of the past to bear on current issues. In a number of case studies spanning the twentieth century and the globe, the authors explore various dimensions of defense engagement. Their work, which attempts to recast the role of a state's military from wielder of force to employer of power, is squarely aimed at tackling the causes of designated security threats and not merely managing their consequences. The chapters, by scholars and practitioners representing diverse points of view, focus primarily on the British experience - perhaps the most extensive example of the use of military power in a nonmartial fashion in pursuit of policy goals. However, the chapters also consider events in the United States, Canada, Japan, the Middle East, and Africa. Intelligence, diplomacy, deterrence, alliances, coalitions, and networks: all are within the authors' scope as they address the need to use a wide range of attributes and capabilities associated with military power in various contemporary conflicts and national security strategies. The understanding their work provides will prove critically important to strategic thinkers of our day, as democratic states increasingly contend with hybrid, subthreshold, and Gray Zone warfare.

A Cross of Iron provides the fullest account yet of the national security state that emerged in the first decade of the Cold War. Michael J. Hogan traces the process of state-making through struggles to unify the armed forces, harness science to military purposes, mobilize military manpower, control the defense budget, and distribute the cost of defense across the economy. President Harry S. Truman and his successor were in the middle of a fundamental contest over the nation's political identity and postwar purpose, and their efforts determined the size and shape of the national security state that finally emerged.

Sir John W. Wheeler-Bennett tells the story of how the German Army, having survived the disaster of 1918, proceeded to dominate the political life of the German Republic, exercising a virtually paramount degree of power and influence by its very withdrawal from the active arena of politics: and of how, when later it was mistaken enough to play politics instead of controlling them, it began a descent which only ended in abject defeat - militarily, politically and spiritually. The author reveals the extent of the responsibility of the Army for bringing the Nazi regime to power, for tolerating the infamies of that regime once it had attained power, and for not taking the measures - at a time when only the Army could have taken them - to remove it from power. In this second edition a new foreword by Professor Richard Overy sets Wheeler-Bennett's classic text in a modern context.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were catalysts for profound changes in global security and defense, including: alterations in the size, structure and configuration of armed forces; the emergence of asymmetrical warfare; the importance of coalition warfare and defense-industrial cooperation; and reform of the financial, procurement and logistical systems. The contributors to this book evaluate these environmental changes within a defense management context.

"Spies of the Kaiser" examines the scope and objectives of German covert operations in Great Britain before and during the First World War. It assesses the effect of German espionage on Anglo-German relations and discusses the extent to which the fear of German espionage in the United Kingdom shaped the British intelligence community in the early twentieth century. The study is based on original archival material, including hitherto unexploited German records and recently declassified British documents.

'The most comprehensive narrative of intelligence compiled ... unrivalled' Max Hastings, Sunday Times 'Captivating, insightful and masterly' Edward Lucas, The Times The history of espionage is far older than any of today's intelligence agencies, yet the long history of intelligence operations has been largely forgotten. The first mention of espionage in world literature is in the Book of Exodus.'God sent out spies into the land of Canaan'. From there, Christopher Andrew traces the shift in the ancient world from divination to what we would recognize as attempts to gather real intelligence in the conduct of military operations, and considers how far ahead of the West - at that time - China and India were. He charts the development of intelligence and security operations and capacity through, amongst others, Renaissance Venice, Elizabethan England, Revolutionary America, Napoleonic France, right up to sophisticated modern activities of which he is the world's best-informed interpreter. What difference have security and intelligence operations made to course of history? Why have they so often forgotten by later practitioners? This fascinating book provides the answers.

Does the proliferation of security communities around the world presage a new era of competition between regions or an era of intensified global integration? This important new study assesses the relationship between security communities and their neighbours and asks whether processes of regional integration will contribute to a global 'clash of civilizations'. Drawing on four detailed case studies (Western Europe, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and North America), Alex J. Bellamy argues that the more mature a security community becomes, the less likely it is to become a 'regional fortress'. Postgraduates and Undergraduates studying International Relations; Security Studies; Strategic Studies

With the end of the Cold War, the security concerns of the US, the sole superpower in the new international order, became fragmented and proliferated throughout the world. Since September 11, 2001 and the war in Iraq, the US has had to evaluate new global developments in terms of the threats they pose to regional and global stability. The nature of the potential enemy is difficult to anticipate. "United States Post-Cold War Defence Interests" gathers together seasoned analysts to examine traditional military concerns and responses to the new environment.

Among the operations known as Plan Bodyguard, the deception devised to cover the Allies' Normandy landing, was the little known but critical Plan Zeppelin, the largest and most complex of the Bodyguard plans. Zeppelin, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Strategy, succeeded in pinning down sixty German divisions from southern France to the Balkans in time for D-Day. This was the work of "A" Force, Britain's only military organization tasked with carrying out both strategic and tactical deception in World War II. Whitney T. Bendeck's Diversion and Deception finds "A" Force at its finest hour, as the war shifted from North Africa to Europe. Focusing on the years 1943 to 1945, Bendeck describes how "A" Force, under the leadership of Dudley Clarke, orchestrated both strategic and tactical deception plans to create notional threats across the southern perimeter of Europe, with the chief objective of keeping the Germans pinned down across the Mediterranean. Her work offers a close and clarifying look at "A" Force's structure and command, operations and methods, and successes and failures and, consequently, its undeniable contribution to the Allies' victory in World War II. By shining a light on the often overlooked Mediterranean theater and its direct connection to European plans and operations, Diversion and Deception also provides a deeper understanding of Allied grand strategy in the war. Combining military and deception histories-so often viewed in isolation-this book provides context for the deceptions and adds a layer of knowledge regarding the planning of military operations. The result is a more complete and nuanced view of Allied operations than is to be found in most histories of World War II.