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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Defence strategy, planning & research
EU security governance assesses the effectiveness of the EU as a security actor. The book has two distinct features. Firstly, it is the first systematic study of the different economic, political and military instruments employed by the EU in the performance of four different security functions. The book demonstrates that the EU has emerged as an important security actor, not only in the non-traditional areas of security, but increasingly as an entity with force projection capabilities. Secondly, the book represents an important step towards redressing conceptual gaps in the study of security governance, particularly as it pertains to the European Union. The book links the challenges of governing Europe's security to the changing nature of the state, the evolutionary expansion of the security agenda, and the growing obsolescence of the traditional forms and concepts of security cooperation. -- .
With contributions from leading experts, Culture and National Security in the Americas examines the most influential historical, geographic, cultural, political, economic, and military considerations shaping national security policies throughout the Americas. In this volume, contributors explore the actors and institutions responsible for perpetuating security cultures over time and the changes and continuities in contemporary national security policies.
General John Bell Hood tried everything he could: Surprise attack. Flanking march. Cavalry raid into the enemy's rear lines. Simply enduring his opponent's semi-siege of the city. But nothing he tried worked. Because by the time he assumed command of Confederate forces protecting Atlanta, his predecessor Joe Johnston's chronic, characteristic strategy of gradual withdrawal had doomed the city to fall to William T. Sherman's Union troops. Joe Johnston lost Atlanta and John Bell Hood has gotten a bum rap, Stephen Davis argues in his new book, Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions. The fall of the city was inevitable because Johnston pursued a strategy that was typical of his career: he fell back. Again and again. To the point where he allowed Sherman's army to within five miles of the city. Against a weaker opponent, Johnston's strategy might have succeeded. But Sherman commanded superior numbers, and he was a bold, imaginative strategist who pressed the enemy daily and used his artillery to pound their lines. Against this combination, Johnston didn't have a chance. And by the time Hood took over the Confederate command, neither did he. Atlanta Will Fall provides a lively, fast-paced overview of the entire Atlanta campaign from Dalton to Jonesboro. Davis describes the battles and analyzes the strategies. He evaluates the three generals, examining their plans of action, their tactics, and their leadership ability. In doing so, he challenges the commonly held perceptions of the two Confederate leaders and provides a new perspective on one of the most decisive battles of the Civil War. An excellent supplemental text for courses on the Civil War and American nineteenth-century history, Atlanta Will Fall will engage students with its brisk, concise examination of the fight for Atlanta.
This volume examines civil-military relations in general and nonmilitary functions in the service of society and democracy in particular in six different nations, against the backdrop of the Israeli experience with a dual-role military. Since its inception, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has functioned as a very effective fighting force while also fulfilling many core nonmilitary roles as a powerful, educational, and remedial agent engaged in strengthening the fabric of Israeli society. The inner workings of the IDF in this area--the subject and dynamics of its broad social agenda, including the dilemmas inherent in education toward broad intellectual autonomy within a regimented system such as the military--are presented, for the first time before a non-Israeli audience, in detail (and with much candor) by both high echelon IDF personnel and junior officers in conscript service directly responsible for carrying out these missions.
Naval intelligence is one of the most vital, and sometimes decisive, forms of intelligence. Over the centuries, and with particular velocity over recent decades, the techniques of detecting and destroying military (and commercial) shipping have improved, leapfrogging the equally frantic race to keep ahead of them and safeguard the huge investments involved. Today the new challenges range from an increasingly aggressive strategy adopted by Pyongyang's submarine fleet and the exclusion of illegal immigrants heading for Australia and southern Europe to the capture of cocaine-laded submarines in the Caribbean and the interdiction of Somali pirates off the Gulf of Aden. Any accurate assessment of the comparative threat these activities pose is just as dependent on good intelligence today as it was to Admiral Lord Nelson in the days of sail. The Historical Dictionary of Naval Intelligence relates the long and fascinating history of naval intelligence through a chronology, an introduction, a bibliography, and hundreds of cross-referenced dictionary entries on the organizations, operations, and events that made Naval intelligence what it is today.
"The guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog's disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with." With these words, Robert Taber began a revolution in conventional military thought that has dramatically impacted the way armed conflicts have been fought since the book's initial publication in 1965. Whether ideological, nationalistic, or religious, all guerrilla insurgencies use similar tactics to advance their cause. "War of the Flea's" timeless analysis of the guerrilla fighter's means and methods provides a fundamental resource for any reader seeking to understand this distinct form of warfare and the challenge it continues to present to today's armed forces in the Philippines, Colombia, and elsewhere.
Exploring the profound differences between what the military services believe-and how they uniquely serve the nation. When the US military confronts pressing security challenges, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps often react differently as they advise and execute civilian defense policies. Conventional wisdom holds that these dynamics tend to reflect a competition for prestige, influence, and dollars. Such interservice rivalries, however, are only a fraction of the real story. In Four Guardians, Jeffrey W. Donnithorne argues that the services act instead as principled agents, interpreting policies in ways that reflect their unique cultures and patterns of belief. Chapter-length portraits of each service highlight the influence of operational environment ("nature") and political history ("nurture") in shaping each service's cultural worldview. The book also offers two important case studies of civil-military policymaking: one, the little-known story of the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in the early 1980s; the other, the four-year political battle that led to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Donnithorne uses these cases to demonstrate the principled agent framework in action while amply revealing the four services as distinctly different political actors. Combining crisp insight and empirical depth with engaging military history, Four Guardians provides practical utility for civil-military scholars, national security practitioners, and interested citizens alike. This timely work brings a new appreciation for the American military, the complex dynamics of civilian control, and the principled ways in which the four guardian services defend their nation.
The book The APPSMO Advantage: Strategic Opportunities is on the Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO). APPSMO is a series of conferences organised by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and its predecessor, the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, for senior military officers of Singapore and other countries of the Asia Pacific, consisting of an intensive week-long programme of lectures, forums, and discussion groups. Very senior speakers share their views on strategic matters, and defence and military issues. The programme brings together key people whose fingers are on the trigger to enable them to communicate with each other directly and informally, thereby enhancing networking among their defence forces, while benefitting from contacts and exchanges between the scholarly and policy communities.
Between 2021 and 2031, the UK government is set to spend over GBP230 billion on its military. Who decides how to use these funds, and how can we be sure that the UK's armed forces can meet the threats of tomorrow? This book provides the answers to these crucial questions. Concentrating on decisions taken below the political level, it uncovers the factors that underpin the translation of strategic direction into military capability. In a series of interviews, over 30 top admirals, generals and air marshals give their own views on the procurement and maintenance of the nation's current and future military capability. Their unrivalled professional knowledge and experience affords a fascinating insight into the higher management of national defence.
Published in 1996, Clausewitz and Modern Strategy is a valuable contribution to the field of Military & Strategic Studies.
A vivid portrayal of what drove George W. Bush to invade Iraq in 2003—an outcome that was in no way predetermined. America's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 is arguably the most important foreign policy choice of the entire post-Cold War era. Nearly two decades after the event, it remains central to understanding current international politics and US foreign relations. In Confronting Saddam Hussein, the eminent historian of US foreign policy Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US chose war and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. He shows how fear, hubris, and power influenced Bush's approach to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. At the core of Leffler's account is his compelling portrait of Saddam Hussein. Rather than stressing Bush's preoccupation with promoting freedom or democracy, Leffler emphasizes Hussein's brutality, opportunism, and unpredictability and illuminates how the Iraqi dictator's record of aggression and intransigence haunted the president and influenced his calculations. Bush was not eager for war, and the decision to invade Iraq was not a fait accompli. Yet the president was convinced that only by practicing coercive diplomacy and threatening force could he alter Hussein's defiance, a view shared by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders around the world, including Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector. Throughout, Leffler highlights the harrowing anxieties surrounding the decision-making process after the devastating attack on 9/11 and explains the roles of contingency, agency, rationality, and emotion. As the book unfolds, Bush's centrality becomes more and more evident, as does the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that contributed to the disastrous occupation of Iraq. A compelling reassessment of George W. Bush's intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.
The balance of power in South Asia is tenuous. Neighbouring states with nuclear arsenal pose a serious threat in times of conflict and the danger of escalation into a nuclear holocaust in South are ever-present.This book locates the change in India's war doctrine at the turn of the century, following the Kargil War in 1999 between India and Pakista
A new investigation into how the advent of precision-guided munitions affects the likelihood of US policy makers to use force. As such, this is an inquiry into the impact of ethics, strategy and military technology on the decision calculus of national leaders. Following the first Gulf War in 1991, this new study shows how US Presidents increasingly used stand-off precision guided munitions (or "PGMs", especially the Tomahawk cruise missile) either to influence foreign adversaries to make specific policy choices or to signal displeasure with their actions. Such uses of force are attractive because they can lead to desirable policy outcomes where conventional diplomacy has failed but without the large cost of lives, economic resources, or political capital that result from large-scale military operations. In a post-9/11 world, understanding alternative uses of force under significant policy constraints is still of supreme importance.
It is not hyperbole to suggest that the foundations of post-cold war security in Europe have been badly damaged by the conflict in Ukraine since 2014. Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine appear to have created a 'simmering' conflict, which may take years to resolve and have profound consequences for the European security environment. This volume explores the various political, economic and social aspects of these profound changes and their wider significance for Europe, bringing together contributions by scholars from across the continent and in various disciplinary fields to offer an authoritative, in-depth examination of the complex causes of the Ukraine crisis and the consequences for Ukrainian statehood, Ukraine's relations with Russia, Russia's own domestic governance and Russia's relations with Europe. This book was originally published as a special issue of Europe-Asia Studies.
This book provides an empirical understanding of how EU-level defence industrial cooperation functions in practice. Using the Liberal Intergovernmental theoretical model, the book argues that while national economic preferences are an essential factor of government interests they only explain part of the dynamic that leads to the development of defence industrial policy at EU level. Moving beyond a simple adumbration of economic preferences, it shows how the EU's institutional framework and corpus of law are used by governments to reaffirm their position as the ultimate arbiter and promoter of national economic preferences in the defence industrial sector. To this end, the work asks why and how EU member state governments, European defence firms, and EU institutions developed EU-level defence industrial policy between 2003 and 2009. The book also analyses significant policy developments, including the establishment of a European Defence Agency and two EU Directives on equipment transfers and defence procurement. This book will be of much interest to students of EU policy, defence studies, security studies and International Relations in general.
Security in Africa: A Critical Approach to Western Indicators of Threat questions the dominant Western narrative of security threats in Africa. Based on an analysis traditional security studies and Western security policy, it argues that commonly used indicators are based on mainstream security studies and provide only circumscribed analyses of threats to international security. By assessing the origins of this traditional approach to security and problematizing failed states, political instability, Muslim populations, and poverty among others, it makes the case for a critical approach to framing security challenges in Africa.
Sun Bins' Art of Warfare is an essential text of Chinese military philosophy and of strategy in general. This book, lost for over two thousand years and rediscovered only in 1972, has not yet reached the prominence of Sunzi's (Sun-tzu) The Art of Warfare, which is the best-known military treatise in the world. Sun Bin's work is an indispensable companion to the work of Sunzi, who is believed to be his ancestor, but deserves to be better known in its own right, both philosophically and historically. Here, noted sinologists D.C. Lau and Roger T. Ames offer an admirably lucid translation, and provide an introduction examining the life, times, and original philosophical contributions of Sun Bin. Sun Bin, advisor to King Wei of the state of Qi, worked and wrote during the mid-fourth century B.C.E. during China's Warring States period. It was a time of unprecedented violence; without a central national authority, nation-states fought fiercely amongst one another. New technologies made fighting more deadly, so that between the mid-fourth and mid-third centuries B.C.E, the number of battlefield casualties increased tenfold. Sun Bin's work is the key to understanding the physical and intellectual revolution that made such "progress" in the efficiency of warfare possible.
At the end of the Second World War, Germany lay at the mercy of its occupiers, all of whom launched programmes of scientific and technological exploitation. Each occupying nation sought to bolster their own armouries and industries with the spoils of war, and Britain was no exception. Shrouded in secrecy yet directed at the top levels of government and driven by ingenuity from across the civil service and armed forces, Britain made exploitation a key priority. By examining factories and laboratories, confiscating prototypes and blueprints, and interrogating and even recruiting German experts, Britain sought to utilise the innovations of the last war to prepare for the next. This ground-breaking book tells the full story of British exploitation for the first time, sheds new light on the legacies of the Second World War, and contributes to histories of intelligence, science, warfare and power in the midst of the twentieth century.
This research guide is an introduction to military intelligence, a neglected aspect of warfare that provides commanders and national leaders with essential information for decision making. The introduction provides the general reader with an explanation of the terminology, procedures, and institutional problems of military intelligence, while outlining the history of this field and identifying areas for further research. The core of the guide is an extensively annotated bibliography of unclassified English language materials on military intelligence, the evolution of intelligence operations, the role of intelligence in air, ground, and naval operations, and specialized fields of espionage, counter intelligence, technical intelligence, and aerial photography. This guide is intended to fill a void in the literature for soldiers, historians, and general readers.
First published in 1979. The report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, which met from early 1975 to mid-1977, represents a unique attempt to portray defence policy in the context of disarmament and the need to restructure and control the institutions of defence - in particular the defence industry. The report presented the fullest study made by any British political party concerning the implications and consequences of its stated defence policy, and embodied an examination of defence from the perspective of approaches of disarmament. At the same time, the search for a new policy in international relations was harmonised with the further development of a new industrial strategy, concentrating upon the potential for converting part of military industry to civil work. This work which presents a distinctive intervention in the general debate concerning defence policy, industrial and technological planning, economic priorities and public policy, will be of considerable relevance to both specialists in each of these fields as well as the general reader.
This book deals with the crucially important NATO crisis of 1966-67, and the intensive reorientation of NATO strategy following the departure of France from integrated military command. It includes four detailed case studies and draws on previously unavailable documents.
This book describes and analyzes the history of the Mediterranean "Double-Cross System" of the Second World War, an intelligence operation run primarily by British officers which turned captured German spies into double agents. Through a complex system of coordination, they were utilized from 1941 to the end of the war in 1945 to secure Allied territory through security and counter-intelligence operations, and also to deceive the German military by passing false information about Allied military planning and operations. The primary questions addressed by the book are: how did the double-cross-system come into existence; what effects did it have on the intelligence war and the broader military conflict; and why did it have those effects? The book contains chapters assessing how the system came into being and how it was organized, and also chapters which analyze its performance in security and counter-intelligence operations, and in deception.
This book examines the major armed conflicts in South Asia. The articles study conflict management, look at the direction the armed conflict is likely to take and provide a set of alternative measures that could be pursued by the actors. Designed as an annual series, the articles provide a brief historical sketch of the emergence of armed conflict, outlining its various phases. This volume examines the various armed conflicts in South Asia in 2009 - in Afghanistan, FATA and NWFP, J&K, North-East India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, and sectarian and Naxalite violence in Pakistan and India respectively. The volume also includes an exclusive chapter on the continuing story of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This important collection discusses India's geo-strategic importance and its common borders with its neighbours; the psychological and economic costs of violence and the problem of refugee migrants; treaties, memorandums and ceasefire agreements signed over the past several years across countries; the role of the United Nations and other peacekeeping forces; and the future of failed and failing states. |
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