At the end of the Second World War, Germany lay at the mercy of its occupiers, all of whom launched programmes of scientific and technological exploitation. Each occupying nation sought to bolster their own armouries and industries with the spoils of war, and Britain was no exception. Shrouded in secrecy yet directed at the top levels of government and driven by ingenuity from across the civil service and armed forces, Britain made exploitation a key priority. By examining factories and laboratories, confiscating prototypes and blueprints, and interrogating and even recruiting German experts, Britain sought to utilise the innovations of the last war to prepare for the next. This ground-breaking book tells the full story of British exploitation for the first time, sheds new light on the legacies of the Second World War, and contributes to histories of intelligence, science, warfare and power in the midst of the twentieth century.

In 1942, Lieutenant-Commander Ian Fleming was personal assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence - the dynamic figure behind James Bond's fictional chief, 'M'. Here, Fleming had a brilliant idea: why not set up a unit of authorised looters, men who would go in hard with the front-line troops and steal enemy intelligence? Known as '30 Assault Unit', they took part in the major campaigns of the Second World War, landing on the Normandy beaches and helping to liberate Paris. 30AU's final amazing coup was to seize the entire archives of the German Navy - thirty tons of documents. Ian Fleming flew out in person to get the loot back to Britain, where it was combed for evidence to use in the Nuremburg trials. In this gripping and highly enjoyable book, Nicholas Rankin, author of the best-selling Churchill's Wizards, puts 30 Assault Unit's fascinating story in a strategic and intelligence context. He also argues that Ian Fleming's Second World War service was one of the most significant periods of his life - without this, the most popular spy fiction of the twentieth century would not have been written.

First published in 1979. The report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, which met from early 1975 to mid-1977, represents a unique attempt to portray defence policy in the context of disarmament and the need to restructure and control the institutions of defence - in particular the defence industry. The report presented the fullest study made by any British political party concerning the implications and consequences of its stated defence policy, and embodied an examination of defence from the perspective of approaches of disarmament. At the same time, the search for a new policy in international relations was harmonised with the further development of a new industrial strategy, concentrating upon the potential for converting part of military industry to civil work. This work which presents a distinctive intervention in the general debate concerning defence policy, industrial and technological planning, economic priorities and public policy, will be of considerable relevance to both specialists in each of these fields as well as the general reader.

From the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning history The Dead Hand comes the riveting story of a spy who cracked open the Soviet military research establishment and a penetrating portrait of the CIA's Moscow station, an outpost of daring espionage in the last years of the Cold War

While driving out of the American embassy in Moscow on the evening of February 16, 1978, the chief of the CIA's Moscow station heard a knock on his car window. A man on the curb handed him an envelope whose contents stunned U.S. intelligence: details of top-secret Soviet research and developments in military technology that were totally unknown to the United States. In the years that followed, the man, Adolf Tolkachev, an engineer in a Soviet military design bureau, used his high-level access to hand over tens of thousands of pages of technical secrets. His revelations allowed America to reshape its weapons systems to defeat Soviet radar on the ground and in the air, giving the United States near total superiority in the skies over Europe.

One of the most valuable spies to work for the United States in the four decades of global confrontation with the Soviet Union, Tolkachev took enormous personal risks--but so did the Americans. The CIA had long struggled to recruit and run agents in Moscow, and Tolkachev was a singular breakthrough. Using spy cameras and secret codes as well as face-to-face meetings in parks and on street corners, Tolkachev and his handlers succeeded for years in eluding the feared KGB in its own backyard, until the day came when a shocking betrayal put them all at risk.

Drawing on previously secret documents obtained from the CIA and on interviews with participants, David Hoffman has created an unprecedented and poignant portrait of Tolkachev, a man motivated by the depredations of the Soviet state to master the craft of spying against his own country. Stirring, unpredictable, and at times unbearably tense, The Billion Dollar Spy is a brilliant feat of reporting that unfolds like an espionage thriller.

George F. Kennan's strategic thought was instrumental in the formulation of the American grand strategy of containment of the Soviet Union. As Dr. Russell points out, Kennan's strategic thought was forged in the diplomatic practice and scholarship of the time. Russell looks beyond containment, however, to sift through Kennan's work to illuminate the worldview that informed his analysis of international relations and American foreign policy.

Kennan's realist worldview contained principles for governing American diplomacy and the use of force to achieve national interests within the bounds set by the international competition for power between nation-states. Kennan's worldview illuminates the continuities of international politics that are often overlooked because of the massive changes in the post-Cold War world. Ironically, Kennan's worldview continues to provide a theoretical footing for guiding American foreign policy after containment. This is an important study for scholars, policymakers, and concerned citizens interested in international relations, American foreign policy, diplomatic history, and strategic studies.

This book describes and analyzes the history of the Mediterranean "Double-Cross System" of the Second World War, an intelligence operation run primarily by British officers which turned captured German spies into double agents. Through a complex system of coordination, they were utilized from 1941 to the end of the war in 1945 to secure Allied territory through security and counter-intelligence operations, and also to deceive the German military by passing false information about Allied military planning and operations. The primary questions addressed by the book are: how did the double-cross-system come into existence; what effects did it have on the intelligence war and the broader military conflict; and why did it have those effects? The book contains chapters assessing how the system came into being and how it was organized, and also chapters which analyze its performance in security and counter-intelligence operations, and in deception.

Intelligence is now acknowledged as the hidden dimension to international diplomacy and national security. It is the hidden piece of the jigsaw puzzle of global relations that cements relationships, undermines alliances and topples tyrants, and after many decades of being deliberately overlooked or avoided, it is now regarded as a subject of legitimate study by academics and historians. This second edition of Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence covers its history through a chronology, an introductory essay, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 500 cross-referenced entries on espionage techniques, categories of agents, crucial operations spies, defectors, moles, double and triple agents, and the tradecraft they apply. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the international intelligence.

Decisions about war have always been made by humans, but now intelligent machines are on the cusp of changing things - with dramatic consequences for international affairs. This book explores the evolutionary origins of human strategy, and makes a provocative argument that Artificial Intelligence will radically transform the nature of war by changing the psychological basis of decision-making about violence. Strategy, Evolution, and War is a cautionary preview of how Artificial Intelligence (AI) will revolutionize strategy more than any development in the last three thousand years of military history. Kenneth Payne describes strategy as an evolved package of conscious and unconscious behaviors with roots in our primate ancestry. Our minds were shaped by the need to think about warfare-a constant threat for early humans. As a result, we developed a sophisticated and strategic intelligence. The implications of AI are profound because they depart radically from the biological basis of human intelligence. Rather than being just another tool of war, AI will dramatically speed up decision making and use very different cognitive processes, including when deciding to launch an attack, or escalate violence. AI will change the essence of strategy, the organization of armed forces, and the international order. This book is a fascinating examination of the psychology of strategy-making from prehistoric times, through the ancient world, and into the modern age.

This book offers the first systematic, comparative analysis of military education and training in Europe within the context of the post-Cold War security environment. Based on an analysis of military education institutions in the UK, Germany, Finland, Romania and the Baltic States, this book demonstrates that the convergence of European military cultures since the end of the Cold War is linked to changes in military education. The process of convergence originates, at least in part, from the full or partial adoption of a new concept by post-commissioning professional military education institutions: the National Defence University. Officers are now educated alongside civilians and public servants, wherein they enjoy a socialization experience that is markedly different from that of previous generations of European officers, and is increasingly similar across national borders. In addition, this book argues that with the control over the curricula and graduation criteria increasingly set by civilian higher education authorities, the European armed forces, while continuing to exist, and hold significant (although declining) capabilities, stand to lose their status as a profession in the traditional sense. This book will be of much interest to students of military, European security policy, European politics, and IR in general.

Bitzinger examines the phenomenon of attempted self-reliance in arms production within Asia, and assesses the extent of success in balancing this independence with the growing requirements of next-generation weapons systems. He analyzes China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. The overarching question in the book is whether self-reliance is a strategically viable solution for development and manufacturing of arms. Given the ever-changing dynamics and increasing demand for sophisticated next-generation weaponry, will these countries be able to individually sustain their domestic defense industries and constantly update their technologies? This is the first book to analyze arms production from a regional perspective.

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy. This book brings together a range of experts from the West and from Taiwan itself who examine the key issues connected with Taiwan's air power, which is a key aspect of the China-Taiwan military balance. During the 1990s, Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly re-equipping its air force with modern air defence and strike aircraft equipped with modern missiles, thereby denying China command of the air in any conflict in the short- to medium-term. In the longer-term, air power will remain a crucial influence on the overall balance, as China's efforts to upgrade its own air force's capabilities begin to undermine Taiwan's current advantages.

This book examines the major armed conflicts in South Asia. The articles study conflict management, look at the direction the armed conflict is likely to take and provide a set of alternative measures that could be pursued by the actors. Designed as an annual series, the articles provide a brief historical sketch of the emergence of armed conflict, outlining its various phases. This volume examines the various armed conflicts in South Asia in 2009 - in Afghanistan, FATA and NWFP, J&K, North-East India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, and sectarian and Naxalite violence in Pakistan and India respectively. The volume also includes an exclusive chapter on the continuing story of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This important collection discusses India's geo-strategic importance and its common borders with its neighbours; the psychological and economic costs of violence and the problem of refugee migrants; treaties, memorandums and ceasefire agreements signed over the past several years across countries; the role of the United Nations and other peacekeeping forces; and the future of failed and failing states.

Desertification in the Mediterranean Region: a Security Issue 1 2 William G. Kepner & Jose Luis Rubio 1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, P.O. Box 93478, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 89193-3478 ([email protected]) 2. Centro de Investigaciones sobre Desertificacion-CIDE, (CSIC, Universitat de Valencia, Generalitat Valenciana), Cami de la Marjal, s/n Apartado Oficial, 46470 Albal, Valencia, Spain ([email protected]) Security issues related to desertification in the Mediterranean Region were the subject of a special NATO workshop held on 2-5 December 2003 at the Museum of Sciences Principe Felipe in Valencia, Spain. This workshop was organized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA), Centre for Desertification Research (Valencia, Spain), and the Desert Research Institute (Reno, Nevada, USA) on behalf of the NATO Science Committee and the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (Public Diplomacy Division). Additionally, the European Society for Soil Conservation participated as a collaborating institution. Other participating institutions included the Spanish Ministry of Environment, Generalitat Valencia (Department of Territory and Housing), the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the City of Art & Sciences of Valencia which hosted the Meeting."

Yugoslav military cooperation with West emerged after the country's split with the U.S.S.R. and its allies in 1948. It came as a surprise for many, since Yugoslavia used to be one of the staunchest followers of Soviet politics. However, faced with possible military escalation of the ideological, political, and economic worsening of relations with the East, the Yugoslav leadership quickly turned to their former "class enemies." For the United States, it presented an opportunity to acquire many unexpected political benefits. Yugoslav alienation from the Kremlin provided territorial consolidation of the southern flank of NATO, denial of direct approach to the Adriatic Sea and Northern Italy to Soviet troops, and dealt a strong political blow to the homogeneity of the Eastern bloc. While not insisting on changing the ideological nature of Yugoslav state, the United States provided much needed material and financial aid, developing the base for entering into sphere of military cooperation. It had two main categories-direct support for Yugoslav forces through shipments of military equipment, as well as Yugoslavia entering into defensive, military alliance (the Balkan Pact) with Greece and Turkey, already full members of NATO. Such trends, aiming towards closer Yugoslav bonding with Western military and political structures, ended in the mid-1950s with Stalin's death, the outbreak of the Trieste crisis, and Tito's reconciliation with Soviet leadership. Developing the new policy of non-alignment with either of the confronting blocs, Yugoslavia stepped out from the program of Western military aid, while the Balkan Pact slowly faded in growing animosity between Greece and Turkey.

Today the vast archipelago of Southeast Asia islands known as Indonesia is in the headlines because of political instability, religious tension, and violence in the streets. Forty years ago similar conditions led the Central Intelligence Agency to mount a top-secret covert action campaign designed to hold that nation's left-leaning President Sukarno's feet to the fire and prevent a strategic crossroad from falling into the communist camp. The Agency supported rebels with weapons, planes, and a memorable cast of bigger-than-life American agents. In a fast-paced, engrossing narrative evoking the novels of John LeCarré and Graham Greene, the authors provide the first unclassified, detailed case study of an operation that has escaped public scrutiny for decades. Their work adds significantly to our understanding of the CIA and American involvement in Asia. Drawing on declassified documents and an extraordinary number of interviews with CIA and Indonesian participants, Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison reconstruct the delicate, dangerous game played by American intelligence agents across the Indonesian archipelago. This is a story of ideologues and soldiers of fortune--historic CIA legends like Allen Dulles and Franklin Wisner, and notorious special operators like Tony ""Poe"" Poshepny, whose reputation reached mythic proportions later in Laos, and Allen Pope, an indefatigable B-26 pilot who was captured and sentenced to die. But it also includes the transfixing exploits of Montana smokejumpers, Polish aircrews, Muslim anti-communist guerrillas, U.S. Navy submarine crews, and Filipino mercenary pilots flying P-51 Mustangs. With the problems in today's Indonesia far from solved and the complex U.S.-Indonesian relationship coming under close scrutiny, this fascinating account of an American covert operation gone bad will play a significant role in shedding new light on the CIA's efforts in Southeast Asia.

"Strategy and Intelligence," which brings together original essays by a number of leading authorities on various aspects of the First World War, aims both to summarise the latest literature on Britain's participation in that war and also to open up new lines of investigation. These include the role of intelligence in land and air battles; Anglo-American financial relations; Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Irish relations; the British Labour movement in the war; and the final campaigns of 1918, which led to the Allied victory. These essays are written not only for the specialist but also to be accessible to students and to the general reader.

In this timely work, James Giermanski describes the advent and development of security operations in the global supply chain, outlining the respective contributions of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders to this worldwide concern. Global Supply Chain Security explores the potential impact of port-related catastrophic events in the United States and their effects worldwide, concentrating, in particular, on the United States' contribution to global container security. Offering insights on deficiencies in U.S. policies, Giermanski underscores the vulnerabilities in the supply chain that U.S. government agencies have ignored, avoided, and even denied. Global Supply Chain Security treats both the terrestrial and maritime borders of the United States, reserving for special analysis the threat to the nation's southern border of hazardous materials or materials in transshipment or in-bond, as well as the questionable leadership exhibited by the Department of Homeland Security in its diagnosis and treatment of these threats. Finally, Giermanski covers the important role played by the private sector and the off-the-shelf, innovative products that have been introduced to supply chain management and security.

In 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in a mere six days. This remarkable military accomplishment would, however, have the ultimate effect of creating an albatross around the neck of the Israeli Army, as Israelis would now expect the next conventional war with the Arabs to achieve similar results: a quick, decisive victory with relatively few casualties. Although Egyptian forces were militarily inferior to those of Israel, President Anwar Sadat developed a successful limited war strategy designed to exploit this unrealistic expectation. Rather than aiming to achieve a military victory or to seize strategic terrain, Sadat merely sought to break a diplomatic stalemate with a major military operation designed to soften Israeli intransigence toward negotiations and to force a change in U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In support of these political aims, the Egyptian Armed Forces set out to discredit the Israeli Army's prowess by inflicting heavy casualties in a limited war. Sadat's success in regaining the entire Sinai without another armed struggle holds an important lesson for the United States. After its dramatic victory in Desert Storm, American armed forces feel compelled to win the next conventional war quickly, decisively, and with relatively few casualties, much like the challenge that faced Israel after the 1967 war.

This book provides a definitive overview of the relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. The secrecy surrounding intelligence means that publication of intelligence is highly restricted, barring occasional whistle-blowing and sanitised official leaks. These characteristics mean that intelligence, if publicised, can be highly manipulated by intelligence elites, while civil society's ability to assess and verify claims is compromised by absence of independent evidence. There are few studies on the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites, which makes it hard to form robust assessments or practical recommendations regarding public oversight of intelligence elites. Addressing that lacuna, this book analyses two case studies of global political significance. The intelligence practices they focus on (contemporary mass surveillance and Bush-era torture-intelligence policies) have been presented as vital in fighting the 'Global War on Terror', enmeshing governments of scores of nation-states, while challenging internationally established human rights to privacy and to freedom from torture and enforced disappearance. The book aims to synthesise what is known on relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. It moves away from disciplinary silos, to make original recommendations for how a variety of academic disciplines most likely to study the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites (international relations, history, journalism and media) could productively cross-fertilise. Finally, it aims to create a practical benchmark to enable civil society to better hold intelligence elites publicly accountable. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, surveillance, media, journalism, civil society, democracy and IR in general.

This book is the first full-spectrum analysis of Russian and European norms of political action, ranging from international law, ethics, and strategy, to the specific norms for the use of force. It brings together leading scholars from these various fields, examining the differences in norm understanding between Russia and Europe. In light of the 2014 occupation and annexation of Crimea by Russia, and its subsequent covert participation in the internal affairs of Ukraine, including aggressive flying and major military exercises, Russia seems to be a classical revisionist power, intent on changing the balance of power in Europe in particular. It also reaches beyond Europe, inserting itself as the key actor in the Syrian war. The book therefore considers how we should understand Russia. It also questions whether or not the West, in particular Europe, responds adequately in this delicate and dangerous new situation. The book concludes that at present Russia acts strategically and with considerable success whereas Europe is reactive in its response.

The words of the ancient Chinese sages are as timeless as they are wise. The words of ancient Chinese philosophers have influenced other thinkers across the world for more than 2,000 years, and continue to shape our ideas today. The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy includes translations of Sun Tzu's Art of War, Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching, the teachings of the master sage Confucius, and the writings of Mencius. From insights on warfare and diplomacy to advice on how to deal with one's neighbors and colleagues, this collection of classical Eastern philosophy will provide readers with countless nuggets of wisdom. IBPA Benjamin Franklin Gold Award Winner 2017!

This book explores the theory and practice of security conflict intervention by examining the experience of the Boko Haram security assault conflict. Through an examination of the realities of conflict it provides pragmatic approaches to strategic security and suggests ways to create practical security research, political controls, military and police mobilization, intelligence management, counterterrorism, and antiterrorism intervention procedures and practices to sustainably resolve conflict. The author argues that every intervention plan must be forged based on the particular security assault conflict dynamics and demands in a nation or region. In all cases, however, the key to securing and guaranteeing public protection and safety is regular inter-agency and multi-disciplinary collaboration. At the micro level, this book is about security strategies for public protection, but at the macro level it is about public domain violence prevention, response, mitigation, recovery, restoration, and protection of the public from the deleterious impacts of emergency events.

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

In this path-breaking theoretical work, political scientist Steven Brams and mathematician Mark Kilgour show how game theory can be applied to the rigorous development and thoughtful analysis of several critical problems that afflict the security of nations, from the deterrence of foes who might launch attacks, to the stabilization of crises that could explode into wars. In addition, they analyze a variety of related questions, including the interlocking preferences that fuel arms races, the strategic impact that Star Wars may have on nuclear deterrence, and optimal strategies for verifying arms control treaties.
Of interest to students on international relations and foreign policy as well as those concerned with the formal analysis of conflict, Game Theory and National Security provides new foundations for understanding the rational basis of international conflict.