The Routledge Handbook on Israeli Security provides an authoritative survey of both the historical roots of Israel's national security concerns and their principal contemporary expressions. Following an introduction setting out its central themes, the Handbook comprises 27 independent chapters, all written by experts in their fields, several of whom possess first-hand diplomatic and/or military experience at senior levels. An especially noteworthy feature of this volume is the space allotted to analyses of the impact of security challenges not just on Israel's diplomatic and military postures (nuclear as well as conventional) but also on its cultural life and societal behavior. Specifically, it aims to fulfill three principal needs. The first is to illustrate the dynamic nature of Israel's security concerns and the ways in which they have evolved in response to changes in the country's diplomatic and geo-strategic environment, changes that have been further fueled by technological, economic and demographic transformations; Second, the book aims to examine how the evolving character of Israel's security challenges has generated multiple - and sometimes conflicting - interpretations of the very concept of "security", resulting in a series of dialogues both within Israeli society and between Israelis and their friends and allies abroad; Finally, it also discusses how areas of private and public life elsewhere considered inherently "civilian" and unrelated to security, such as artistic and cultural institutions, nevertheless do mirror the broader legal, economic and cultural consequences of this Israeli preoccupation with national security. This comprehensive and up-to-date collection of studies provides an authoritative and interdisciplinary guide to both the dynamism of Israel's security dilemmas and to their multiple impacts on Israeli society. In addition to its insights and appeal for all people and countries forced to address the security issue in today's world, this Handbook is a valuable resource for upper-level undergraduates and researchers with an interest in the Middle East and Israeli politics, international relations and security studies.

Published in 1999, this book focuses on organized crime as a worldwide phenomenon that has taken great advantage of enabling technology in banking, communications and transportation to build what is probably the first true 'virtual' corporation in the world. It looks at organized crime as a threat to national and international security ironically stemming, in part, from the collapse of the Soviet empire that provided an already thriving, ruthless and well-organized system of graft, corruption and crime with a new lease of life and also unleashed it on to the world scene. Organized crime is also seen as a system of transnational alliances with the potential to destabilize democratic values and institutions; distort regional, if not worldwide, economies; and subvert the international order by allying itself with terrorist organizations, rogue states and developing countries in search of rapid industrialization and market dominance.

The tragic conclusion to the war in Afghanistan - America's longest and one of its most frustrating - serves as a reminder that the United States too often is at war, and sometimes fails to achieve its short-term or long-term aims. In this timely book, esteemed military expert Michael O'Hanlon examines America's major conflicts since the mid-1800s: the Civil War, the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In this new, concise book, he addresses profound questions. How successful has the United States been when it waged these wars? Were the wars avoidable? Did America's leaders know what they were getting into when they committed to war? And what lessons does history offer for future leaders contemplating war -including the prospects for avoiding war in the first place. The book does not tell stories at the ground level -the day-to-day tactics and human bravery and perseverance that since ancient times have made warfare so tragically fascinating. Instead, the book presents America's major wars on a conceptual level, focusing on strategies, key decisions, innovative technologies and the dynamics that shaped their outcomes. O'Hanlon looks for overarching trends and themes, along with the lessons for the military strategists and political leaders of today and tomorrow. O'Hanlon's unique book - combining brevity and clarity with a broad conceptual approach -is an important one for students of security studies at universities and war colleges as well as generalist policymakers.

During the decolonization wars in East and Southern Africa, tracking became increasingly valuable as a military tactic. Drawing on archival research and interviews, Stapleton presents a comparative study of the role of tracking in insurgency and counter-insurgency across Kenya, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

This book offers an analysis of key individuals who have contributed to both the theory and the practice of counterinsurgency (COIN). Insurgencies have become the dominant form of armed conflict around the world today. The perceptible degeneration of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan into insurgent quagmires has sparked a renewal of academic and military interest in the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. In light of this, this book provides a rigorous analysis of those individuals who have contributed to both the theory and practice of counterinsurgency: 'warrior-scholars'. These are soldiers who have bridged the academic-military divide by influencing doctrinal and intellectual debates about irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is notoriously difficult for the military, and scholarly understanding about this type of warfare is also problematic; especially given the residual anti-intellectualism within Western militaries. Thus, The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare is dedicated to analysing the best perceivable bridge between these two worlds. The authors explore the theoretical and practical contributions made by a selection of warrior-scholars of different nationalities, from periods ranging from the French colonial wars of the mid-twentieth century to the Israeli experiences in the Middle East; from contributions to American counter-insurgency made during the Iraq War, to the thinkers who shaped the US war in Vietnam. This book will be of much interest to students of counterinsurgency, strategic studies, defence studies, war studies and security studies in general.

First published in 1979. The report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, which met from early 1975 to mid-1977, represents a unique attempt to portray defence policy in the context of disarmament and the need to restructure and control the institutions of defence - in particular the defence industry. The report presented the fullest study made by any British political party concerning the implications and consequences of its stated defence policy, and embodied an examination of defence from the perspective of approaches of disarmament. At the same time, the search for a new policy in international relations was harmonised with the further development of a new industrial strategy, concentrating upon the potential for converting part of military industry to civil work. This work which presents a distinctive intervention in the general debate concerning defence policy, industrial and technological planning, economic priorities and public policy, will be of considerable relevance to both specialists in each of these fields as well as the general reader.

A vivid portrayal of what drove George W. Bush to invade Iraq in 2003—an outcome that was in no way predetermined. America's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 is arguably the most important foreign policy choice of the entire post-Cold War era. Nearly two decades after the event, it remains central to understanding current international politics and US foreign relations. In Confronting Saddam Hussein, the eminent historian of US foreign policy Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US chose war and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. He shows how fear, hubris, and power influenced Bush's approach to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. At the core of Leffler's account is his compelling portrait of Saddam Hussein. Rather than stressing Bush's preoccupation with promoting freedom or democracy, Leffler emphasizes Hussein's brutality, opportunism, and unpredictability and illuminates how the Iraqi dictator's record of aggression and intransigence haunted the president and influenced his calculations. Bush was not eager for war, and the decision to invade Iraq was not a fait accompli. Yet the president was convinced that only by practicing coercive diplomacy and threatening force could he alter Hussein's defiance, a view shared by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders around the world, including Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector. Throughout, Leffler highlights the harrowing anxieties surrounding the decision-making process after the devastating attack on 9/11 and explains the roles of contingency, agency, rationality, and emotion. As the book unfolds, Bush's centrality becomes more and more evident, as does the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that contributed to the disastrous occupation of Iraq. A compelling reassessment of George W. Bush's intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.

This edited collection brings together leading scholars to comparatively investigate national security, surveillance and terror in the early 21st century in two major western jurisdictions, Canada and Australia. Observing that much debate about these topics is dominated by US and UK perspectives, the volume provides penetrating analysis of national security and surveillance practices in two under-studied countries that reveals critical insights into current trends. Written by a wide range of experts in their respective fields, this book addresses a fascinating array of timely questions about the relationship among national security, privacy and terror in the two countries and beyond. Chapters include critical assessments of topics such as: National Security Intelligence Collection since 9/11, The Border as Checkpoint in an Age of Hemispheric Security and Surveillance, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Law Enforcement, as well as Federal Government Departments and Security Regimes. An engaging and empirically driven study, this collection will be of great interest to scholars of security and surveillance studies, policing, and comparative criminology.

The book explores how small states adjust their military strategies in response to external shocks. Using primary sources from four Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the 21st century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor. This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defense studies, security studies, and international relations.

From 2003 to 2008, the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq posed a key challenge to political stability in the country and to Coalition objectives there. This paper explains the onset, composition and evolution of this insurgency. It begins by addressing both its immediate and deeper sociopolitical origins, and goes on to examine the multiple ideological strands within the insurgency and their often conflicting methods and goals. Despite organisational incoherence due to the existence of a large number of competing groups, the insurgency in Iraq sustained a particularly high tempo of operations between 2004 and 2006, causing considerable military and civilian casualties. Some insurgent groups focused on attempting to foment civil war between two of Iraq's major communities, the Sunni and Shia Arabs and, by late 2006, they had come close to unravelling Iraq and presenting the Coalition with a major defeat. The adoption of a new approach by the US in 2007 helped reduce the level of violence in Iraq. In addition, deep fissures within the insurgency itself, between those fighting for more practical, immediate goals and the transnational Islamists and their local allies fighting for wider-reaching goals - including the promotion of sectarian strife - contributed to the insurgency's diminution. It remains to be seen whether there will be a widespread recognition among Sunni Iraqis of the need to work with the Coalition to facilitate their community's reintegration into the new Iraqi body politic.

The book examines Bernard Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age, embedding his work within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz. Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) was a leading 20th century theorist and philosopher of war. A key architect of American nuclear strategy, Brodie was one of the first civilian defense intellectuals to cross over into the military world. "State of Doom" explores Brodie's evolution as a theorist and his response to the technological innovations that transformed warfare from WWII to the Vietnam War. It situates his theoretical development within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), as Brodie came to be known as "America's Clausewitz." While his first influential works focused on naval strategy, his most lasting impact came within the field of nuclear strategic thinking. Brodie helped conceptualize America's strategy of deterrence, later taking into account America's loss of nuclear monopoly, thermonuclear weapons, and intercontinental missiles. This in-depth exploration of Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age and of his effort to reconcile Clausewitz's theories to the new challenges of the nuclear era will make this book a must read to anyone in strategic studies, international relations, and philosophy of war.

In 1974 Frederick W. WinterbothaM's book "The Ultra Secret" disclosed the Allied success in breaking the German high command ciphers in World War II, and a new form of history began--the study of intelligence and its impact on military operations and international politics. This guide documents and annotates over 800 sources that have appeared in the past 20 years. It examines and evaluates primary and secondary sources dealing with the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also covers sources on the Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.

The book examines and annotates primary and secondary sources on the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also provides details on sources concerned with Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.

When NATO took charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan in 2003, ISAF conceptualized its mission largely as a stabilization and reconstruction deployment. However, as the campaign has evolved and the insurgency has proved to more resistant and capable, key operational imperatives have emerged, including military support to the civilian development effort, closer partnering with Afghan security forces, and greater military restraint. All participating militaries have adapted, to varying extents, to these campaign imperatives and pressures.
This book analyzes these initiatives and their outcomes by focusing on the experiences of three groups of militaries: those of Britain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the US, which have faced the most intense operational and strategic pressures; Germany, who's troops have faced the greatest political and cultural constraints; and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Taliban, who have been forced to adapt to a very different sets of circumstances.

In World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence, military historian James L. Gilbert provides an authoritative overview of the birth of modern Army intelligence. Following the natural division of the intelligence war, which was fought on both the home front and overseas, Gilbert traces the development and use of intelligence and counterintelligence through the eyes of their principal architects: General Dennis E. Nolan and Colonel Ralph Van Deman. Gilbert explores how on the home front, US Army counterintelligence faced both internal and external threats that began with the Army's growing concerns over the loyalty of resident aliens who were being drafted into the ranks and soon evolved into the rooting out of enemy saboteurs and spies intent on doing great harm to America's war effort. To achieve their goals, counterintelligence personnel relied upon major strides in the areas of code breaking and detection of secret inks. Overseas, the intelligence effort proved far more extensive in terms of resources and missions, even reaching into nearby neutral countries. Intelligence within the American Expeditionary Forces was heavily indebted to its Allied counterparts who not only provided an organizational blueprint but also veteran instructors and equipment needed to train newly arriving intelligence specialists. Rapid advances by American intelligence were also made possible by the appointment of competent leaders and the recruitment of highly motivated and skilled personnel; likewise, the Army's decision to assign the bulk of its linguists to support intelligence proved critical. World War I would witness the linkage between intelligence and emerging technologies-from the use of cameras in aircraft to the intercept of enemy radio transmissions. Equally significant was the introduction of new intelligence disciplines-from exploitation of captured equipment to the translation of enemy documents. These and other functions that emerged from World War I would continue to the present to provide military intelligence with the essential tools necessary to support the Army and the nation. World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence is ideal not only for students and scholars of military history and World War I, but will also appeal to any reader interested in how modern intelligence operations first evolved.

This book provides a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of India's strategic culture in the era of globalization. It examines dominant themes that have governed India's foreign and security policy and events which have shaped India's role in global politics. The author Examines the traditional and new approaches to diplomacy and the state's response to internal and external conflicts; Delineates policy pillars which are required to protect the state's strategic interests and forge new relationships in the current geopolitical climate; Compares the domestic and international security policies followed during the tenures of Narsimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh; and Analyzes how the Narendra Modi era has brought on changes in India's security strategy and the use of soft power and diplomacy. With extensive additions, drawing on recent developments, this edition of the book will be a key text for scholars, teachers and students of defence and strategic studies, international relations, history, political science and South Asian studies.

" Click here to read a chapter from this book A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2002 From South Carolina to South Vietnam, America's two hundred-year involvement in guerrilla warfare has been extensive and varied. America and Guerrilla Warfare analyzes conflicts in which Americans have participated in the role of, on the side of, or in opposition to guerrilla forces, providing a broad comparative and historical perspective on these types of engagements. Anthony James Joes examines nine case studies, ranging from the role of Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, in driving Cornwallis to Yorktown and eventual surrender to the U.S. support of Afghan rebels that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Empire. He analyzes the origins of each conflict, traces American involvement, and seeks patterns and deviations. Studying numerous campaigns, including ones staged by Confederate units during the Civil War, Joes reveals the combination of elements that can lead a nation to success in guerrilla warfare or doom it to failure. In a controversial interpretation, he suggests that valuable lessons were forgotten or ignored in Southeast Asia. The American experience in Vietnam was a debacle but, according to Joes, profoundly atypical of the country's overall experience with guerrilla warfare. He examines several twentieth-century conflicts that should have better prepared the country for Vietnam: the Philippines after 1898, Nicaragua in the 1920s, Greece in the late 1940s, and the Philippines again during the Huk War of 1946-1954. Later, during the long Salvadoran conflict of the 1980s, American leaders seemed to recall what they had learned from their experiences with this type of warfare. Guerrilla insurgencies did not end with the Cold War. As America faces recurring crises in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and possibly Asia, a comprehensive analysis of past guerrilla engagements is essential for today's policymakers.

This book assesses the strategic linkages that the Korean Peninsula shares with the Indo-Pacific and provides a succinct picture of issues which will shape the trajectory of the Korean Peninsula in the future. This book analyses how critical actors such as the United States, China, Russia and Japan are caught in a tightly balanced power struggle affecting the Korean Peninsula. It shows how these countries are exerting control over the Korean Peninsula while also holding on to their status as critical actors in the broader Indo-Pacific. The prospects of peace, stability and unity in the Korean Peninsula and the impact of this on Indo-Pacific power politics are explored as well as the contending and competing interests in the region. Chapters present country-specific positions and approaches as case studies and review the impact of power politics on stakeholders' relationships in the Indo-Pacific. The book also argues that the Korean Peninsula and the issue of denuclearization is of primary importance to any direction an Indo-Pacific Partnership may take. Bringing together scholars, journalists and ex-diplomats, this book will be of interest to academics working in the field of international relations, foreign policy, security studies and Asian studies as well as audiences interested

In the winter of 1875, a young British officer set out across central Asia on an unofficial mission to investigate the latest Russian moves in the Great Game. His goal was the mysterious Central Asian city of Khiva, closed to all European travellers by the Russians following their seizure of it two years earlier. His aim was to discover whether this remote and dangerous oasis could be used as a springboard for an invasion of India. An immediate bestseller when first published in 1877, Burnaby s delight in a life of risk and adventure still burns through the pages, as does his spontaneous affection for the Cossack troopers and Tartar, Khirgiz and Turkoman tribesmen that he encounters on his way.

Increasingly the Middle East and its growing population face a highly complex and fragile security system. The rich deposits of natural resources, such as oil and gas, suffer from a strained renewable resource base that includes water and arable land. This leads to water scarcity, desertification, and land degradation. Increasing population, industrialization, and urbanization put more and more demand on the food supply. Energy insecurity may not be generally associated with the Middle East, but the countries in the eastern Mediterranean part have been traditionally vulnerable to it as their fossil fuel endowments have been low. Another issue is the large-scale temporary labor migration and the large number of forced migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The book analyzes these emerging security challenges in a comprehensive and systematic manner. It draws national and regional security issues into both the global security and human security perspectives.

This provocative book seeks to answer a most crucial-and embarrassing-question concerning the U.S. military: why the United States is so often stymied in military confrontations with seemingly weaker opponents, despite its "superpower" status. This fascinating book examines a question that continues to puzzle soldiers, statesmen, and scholars: why do major powers-including the ostensible superpower United States-repeatedly perform poorly against seemingly overmatched adversaries? And what can they, and the United States, do to better achieve their military objectives? How Wars are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military Power argues that beyond relying solely on overwhelming military might, the United States needs to focus more on exploiting weaknesses in their adversaries-such as national will, resource mobilization, and strategic miscues-just as opposing forces have done to gain advantage over our military efforts. The author tests the "vulnerability theory" by revisiting six conflicts from the Philippine War of 1899-1902 to the ongoing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, showing again and again that victory often depends more on outthinking the enemy than outmuscling them. Interviews and data drawn from the author's personal experiences as a U.S. Army officer Six case study chapters on U.S. conflicts where military superiority alone was not the decisive factor in the outcome (the Philippines, World War II, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan)

Knife / Counter-Knife Combatives by W. Hock Hochheim describes offensive and defensive knife fighting tactics in all ranges of combat including standing, sitting and on the ground. This is a complete survival tactical manual for all aspects of knife combat. W. Hock Hochheim is known worldwide as an authority on knife fighting tactics and strategies. He's the author of more than a dozen books and more than 200 dvds on a broad range of self-defense subjects. He teaches military, police and citizens in 9 countries annually.

This volume in the Weapons of Mass Destruction series makes the case that the United States' expansive missile defence policy has eroded both its own security and that of its allies. These findings are based on an examination of the response of a number of key states to U.S. policy, including Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Situating their argument in the theoretical debate on balancing in unipolarity, the authors contrast their view to influential perspectives that see little evidence of hard balancing against the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. Adopting a neorealist perspective, the authors demonstrate the clear presence of this inter-state practice, providing insight into the international politics of unipolarity, showing how hard balancing and security dilemma-related dynamics operate in the contemporary strategic environment.

This book calls for the progressive creation of supra-national institutions intended to protect life on Earth against natural threats, be these terrestrial (pandemics, super-volcanoes, major earthquakes.) or celestial (comets, asteroids, meteor storms). The protection proffered would need to be pre-emptive though also responsive, reducing the number of adverse events but also their specific consequences. Rancid though the world scene currently looks, this may actually be a good time to look towards a planetary security programme that can build up over a century or more. It would need special international institutions that are sufficiently integrated to cope with the celestial and terrestrial contingencies anticipated yet not so much a class apart as to be a law unto themselves, a military regime able to ride roughshod over general world opinion. Such an holistic approach to planetary security might prove to be a definitive substitute for war between nations. Professor Brown comes to such questions from a broad career background. His lead qualifications are a Masters degree from Oxford in Modern History and a Doctorate of Science from Birmingham (UK) in Applied Geophysics. He has been a naval meteorologist; staff college instructor; part-time but pro-active as a defence correspondent for several of the West's leading journals; and political consultant. From 1980 to 1986, he was Chairman of the Council for Arms Control. From 1993 to 1997 he worked half-time in the Sensors and Electronic Systems directorate of Britain's Ministry of Defence. This was as the Academic Consultant in a small task force specifically created to advise the government of the day apropos what British policy to Strategic Ballistic Missile Defence should be. A declassified rendering of his 90,000-word report (published by Mansfield College, Oxford, in 1998) argued firmly against our going down this path. It could lead to a catastrophic arms race.

Using journalists' own standards as the measure, an exhaustive analysis of nearly 3000 network news reports from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations reveals that the networks may do more to misinform than inform on a whole range of complex issues related to national defense. This study paints a disturbing picture of the inadequate coverage ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, and NBC Nightly News provide to millions of viewers each night. Aubin concludes that network coverage of defense issues was too often tainted by preconceived attitudes and lapses in journalistic standards. While as much as twenty-five cents of every dollar went to the defense budget during some of the periods reviewed, the networks hardly covered the key issues surrounding the Reagan defense buildup or the dramatic cuts that followed the end of the Cold War. In addition to their inadequate coverage, the networks also deprived Americans of balanced coverage of the investments made in high-tech weapons that ultimately prevailed in the Gulf War. Though the networks receive good marks for foreign policy coverage, they need to improve the quality of defense reports. This book provides them with the lessons and prescriptions for doing so, and it serves as a primer for all Americans who want to know just what it was that the networks failed to tell them.

On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup-it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack-Hitler simply beat him to the punch.