This study is one of the rare contributions to the very small library of genuine strategic studies. Strategy here covers all military activity. The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence, and information warfare. Although this book says interesting things about the future of air power, the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence, the true character of joint warfare, the utility of special warriors, and the limitations of excellence in information warfare, the primary intention is to deepen the understanding of the nature and working of strategy and strategic effect.

American politicians have long been troubled by the question of whether or not to deploy a national missile defense system. The argument has focused upon the questions of cost, both political and fiscal, plus the reliability of the technologies. This study places that debate within the context of an ongoing controversy over the direction of American foreign and defense policy since the 1950s. Since that time several distinct worldviews (labeled Believers, Pragmatists, and Wilsonians) have been articulated, views which predetermine decision-makers' positions on national missile defense. Those worldviews structure how technology tests and costs are evaluated regardless of outcomes. Politics, not technological proficiency, drives policy decisions.

In effect, the debate has been a dialogue of the deaf and blind wherein each perceives only that which fits their predetermined views. This controversy raises questions regarding the use of deterrence as the basis for national policy and the role of technology in making such decisions. Handberg places this debate within the historical flow of events, dating back to the first inkling that national missile defense might be possible. The arrival of the George W. Bush administration moves national missile defense to the forefront with the question of deployment now considered a near reality.

Why have militaries so often failed to learn from conflict and war? Why, for example, despite years of unsuccessful counterinsurgency experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador and repeated recommendations from official Army studies, has the U.S. Army not changed its doctrine for counterinsurgency? Writing for scholars as well as military professionals and policymakers, Downie examines the sources of doctrinal change and innovation from a theoretical perspective and derives practical and relevant policy recommendations.

Contrasting with other findings in this field, Downie provides case studies showing that neither external pressure on a military nor institutional recognition of the requirement for doctrinal change is sufficient to explain the process of doctrinal change. A military innovates when it learns, by proceeding through a learning cycle that includes achieving an organizational consensus that permits adoption of new approaches that respond to factors that make existing doctrine deficient. When that process is blocked, militaries are left with outmoded doctrinal approaches that constrain military performance and lead to defeat. This is an important study for military leaders, civilian policymakers, and scholars and researchers dealing with contemporary U.S. military issues.

The end of the Cold War provides challenges and opportunities for American foreign policy leadership that arguably have been equalled in modern times only by the period in which the Cold War began. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the partners of the Atlantic alliance have achieved a profound diplomatic and political victory of historic importance. The international system which has resulted, however, arguably has more uncertainty and unpredictability than the familiar bipolar competition between the two superpowers and their allies. The book describes these changes and provides suggestions for policy analysis and definition in the future. There is extensive discussion of developments during the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations, with particular reference to the two regions of Europe and Asia.; There is a three-fold division between intellectual, structural and sociological dimensions of foreign policy, focusing respectively on the ideas and themes, alliance and other regional and international organizations - including the private corporation, and human dimensions which both define and influence evolving international relations.

The wars between 1792 and 1815 saw the making of the modern world, with Britain and Russia the key powers to emerge triumphant from a long period of bitter conflict. In this innovative book, Jeremy Black focuses on the strategic contexts and strategies involved, explaining their significance both at the time and subsequently. Reinterpreting French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare, strategy, and their consequences, he argues that Napoleon's failure owed much to his limitations as a strategist. Black uses this framework as a foundation to assess the nature of warfare, the character of strategy, and the eventual ascendance of Britain and Russia in this period. Rethinking the character of strategy, this is the first history to look holistically at the strategies of all the leading belligerents from a global perspective. It will be an essential read for military professionals, students, and history buffs alike.

“How did we move from the inspiring moments of Nelson Mandela’s release after 27 years of incarceration, and the euphoria of our first democratic elections in 1994, to State Capture and the disaster of Jacob Zuma’s reign – a controversial President with over 800 charges of corruption pending? More importantly, what can we as a nation do about it? These are big issues – but Neil Wright does not pull any punches in bringing them out in the open and is not shy to give his opinions and possible solutions. His core message is that for true transformation to happen, it has to happen from the inside out, not imposed from the top down. By embracing the concept of “One Race, the Human Race, Now!” South Africans have the chance to emerge from present challenges and finally shake off the shadow of our divided past.”

Drawing upon a wide range of interviews with many of the key actors, Andrew Dorman examines how defense policy was formulated and implemented during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. This period witnessed major transformations in international and domestic politics, with defense emerging from its traditional postwar position of relative insignificance to become one of the key issues at the 1983 and 1987 general elections. Dorman provides a new understanding of policymaking by analyzing defense policy in terms of three constituent parts: declaratory policy; military strategy and procurement policy.

The wars between 1792 and 1815 saw the making of the modern world, with Britain and Russia the key powers to emerge triumphant from a long period of bitter conflict. In this innovative book, Jeremy Black focuses on the strategic contexts and strategies involved, explaining their significance both at the time and subsequently. Reinterpreting French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare, strategy, and their consequences, he argues that Napoleon's failure owed much to his limitations as a strategist. Black uses this framework as a foundation to assess the nature of warfare, the character of strategy, and the eventual ascendance of Britain and Russia in this period. Rethinking the character of strategy, this is the first history to look holistically at the strategies of all the leading belligerents from a global perspective. It will be an essential read for military professionals, students, and history buffs alike.

In the volatile post-Cold-War era, the small, vulnerable states of the Pacific Islands region face several challenges to their security and sovereignty. This text focuses on these challenges, as part of an examination of security and defence issues in the region. It considers trends and issues since the mid-1980s, and the uncertain prospects leading into the beginning of the next century. The book emphasizes political, diplomatic and military matters, including the role of external powers, but also considers environmental, economic and resources issues.

This book examines how the changing post-Cold War order affected Poland's security policy and particularly how the West's weakening position and Russia's revisionist policy reinforced the traditional view of security in Poland. It addresses the reasons why Poland, a middle power in Central Europe, adopted a bridging strategy in the early 1990s; how this strategy changed along with the redistribution of power in the international system; why, after the 2008 Georgian-Russian War, Poland took steps to support NATO consolidation, strengthen relations with the USA, and expand its own military capabilities; and how the Ukraine crisis affected Poland's security. This overview is an invaluable resource for students of international and European studies, security studies, political science, as well as for decision-makers, politicians, EU staff, and anyone interested in international politics in Central Europe.

An Economist Best Book of 2021 Artificial Intelligence is going to war. Intelligent military systems are already reshaping conflict-from the chaos of battle, with pilotless drones and robot tanks, to the headquarters far from the action, where generals and politicians use technology to weigh up what to do. AI changes how we fight, and even how likely it is that we will. Warbots will be faster, more agile and more deadly than today's crewed weapons. New tactics are already emerging, but much deeper thinking is needed. When will an intelligent machine escalate, and how might you deter it? Can robots predict the future? And what happens to the 'art of war' as machines become creative? An international campaign against 'killer robots' hopes to ban AI from conflict. But the genie is out-autonomous weapons are too useful for states to outlaw. Still, crafting sensible rules for our warbots is possible. This fascinating book shows how it might be done.

To understand wars and armed conflicts, we need to understand the inner logic of military institutions and warrior culture. In Making Warriors in a Global Era, Tone Danielsen employs ethnographic methods to analyze and discuss current debates among both military personnel and academics about the rise of the special operations forces and their effects on how armed conflicts are handled and wars are fought. Based on a decade of research and Danielsen's unprecedented access inside a Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commando, Danielsen describes the culture, experiences, and skill sets of a special operations unit and explores the historical and political implications these types of units have on modern warfare and society as a whole.

Studying the impact of the nuclear revolution on the course of the rivalry between the former USSR and the USA, this book explains why it has been so different from great power in pre-nuclear times, in avoiding war and leading first to a co-operative relationship and then ending peacefully. The book analyzes four aspects of the nuclear revolution: reciprocal restraint, security co-operation, the deadlock of nuclear strategy (including strategic defence), and common deterrence.

Incels. Anti Vaxxers. Conspiracy theorists. Neo-Nazis. Once, these groups all belonged on the fringes of the political spectrum. Today, accelerated by a pandemic, global conflict and rapid technological change, their ideas are becoming more widespread: QAnon proponents run for U.S. Congress, neo-fascists win elections in Europe, and celebrity influencers like Kanye West spread dangerous myths to millions. Going Mainstream asks the question: What is happening here? Going undercover online and in person, UK counter-extremism expert Julia Ebner reveals how, united by a shared sense of grievance and scepticism about institutions, radicalised individuals are influencing the mainstream as never before. Hidden from public scrutiny, they leverage social media to create alternative information ecosystems and build sophisticated networks funded by dark money. Ebner's candid conversations with extremists offer a nuanced and gripping insight into why people have turned to the fringes. She explores why outlandish ideas have taken hold and disinformation is spreading faster than ever. And she speaks to the activists and educators who are fighting to turn the tide. Going Mainstream is a dispatch from the darkest front of the culture wars, and a vital wake-up call.

This edited volume focuses on the South Atlantic regional and national issues with maritime implications: naval policy, security, transnational organized crime, and Europe's legacy and current influence. The work analyzes the positions in favor and against NATO's extended role in the South Atlantic, the historical and current issues related to the Falklands War, the African national deficits, and initiatives to attend the regional maritime problems. Including contributions from Angolan, Brazilian, Senegalese, and US collaborators, the volume offers eclectic conceptual frameworks, rich historical backgrounds, updated data, original analysis models, and policy recommendations.

The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by renewed enthusiasm over the potential of security institutions in Europe. West Europeans, the US and former communist states see them as an indispensable instrument of collective security. Yet, institutions failed to prevent post-communist conflicts, most notably in Yugoslavia. For the future, there is a need for improved coordination among interlocking institutions. This study is both a critical assessment of ongoing institutional changes and an analysis of the agenda for the future.

ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL, CAESAR--each was a master of war. Each had to look beyond the battlefield to decide whom to fight, when, and why; to know what victory was and when to end the war; to determine how to bring stability to the lands he conquered. Each general had to be a battlefield tactician and more: a statesman, a strategist, a leader.
Tactics change, weapons change, but war itself remains much the same throughout the centuries, and a great warrior must know how to define success. Understanding where each of these three great (but flawed) commanders succeeded and failed can serve anyone who wants to think strategically or who has to demonstrate leadership. In "Masters of Command "Barry Strauss explains the qualities these great generals shared, the keys to their success, from ambition and judgment to leadership itself.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases. Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

In attempting to analyze the role of luck in war, a rather narrow definition of luck is necessary. The conventional dictionary definitions of luck are "a force that brings good fortune or adversity" and "the events or circumstances that operate for or against an individual." Those definitions are so broad that they would appear to cover many, perhaps most, events in war. There is in literature an old expression, deus ex machina, a translation into Latin of the original Greek thēos ek mechanēs. While it literally translates as "a god from a machine," its meaning is a person or thing that appears or is introduced suddenly and unexpectedly and provides a contrived solution to an apparently insoluble difficulty. In the book a similar but probably unique concept, felix ex machina, will be used to denote certain extreme instances of luck which was relatively sudden, completely unexpected with dramatic consequences, good or bad, in war.

This book describes the logistical systems and requirements of the North Korean People's Army and Chinese Communist forces during the Korean War. The author examines the performance of the Communist logistical system from June 1950 to July 1953, explaining the failure of the United Nations air interdiction campaign in terms of the constant improvement of Communist logistical capabilities. The author concludes that the United Nations air force damaged, but was unable to destroy, the Communist distribution system. The North Koreans and Chinese Communists were able to supply their front line units sufficiently to enable them to conduct a strong static defense, which prevented a United Nations victory, and in the last months of the war, to mount strong, sustained offensive actions.

How did German intelligence agents in the First World War use dead fish to pass on vital information to their operatives? What did an advertisement for a dog in The Times have to do with the movement of British troops into Egypt? And why did British personnel become suspicious about the trousers hanging on a Belgian woman's washing line? During the First World War, spymasters and their networks of secret agents developed many ingenious - and occasionally hilarious - methods of communication. Puffs of smoke from a chimney, stacks of bread in a bakery window, even knitted woollen jumpers were all used to convey secret messages decipherable only by well-trained eyes. Melanie King retells the astonishing story of these and many other tricks of the espionage trade, now long forgotten, through the memoirs of eight spies. Among them are British intelligence officers working undercover in France and Germany, including a former officer from the Metropolitan Police who once hunted Jack the Ripper. There is also the German Secret Service officer, codenamed Agricola, who spied on the Eastern Front, an American newspaperman and an Austrian agent who disguised himself as everything from a Jewish pedlar to a Russian officer. Drawing on the words of many of the spies themselves, Secrets in a Dead Fish is a fascinating compendium of clever and original ruses that casts new light into the murky world of espionage during the First World War.

Khe Sanh remains to this day, an extremely controversial and emotional aspect of the war in Vietnam. The U.S. Armed Forces fought to defend Khe Sanh in early 1968 and then abandoned the base after a 77-day siege by the North Vietnamese. This book contains fromerly Top Secret messages to President Lyndon Johnson from National Security Advisor W.W. "Walt" Rostow, Gen. William Westmoreland and many others. The siege and loss of Khe Sanh is the tragedy of the war in Vietnam in microcosm.