This book shows how the threat of cruise-missile proliferation may unfold and examines its strategic consequences. It argues that, because the unfolding pattern of cruise-missile proliferation remains so unclear, more should be done by affected governments now to dissuade potential adversaries from acquiring cruise missiles or to delay the threat's emergence. The book offers a comprehensive set of policy prescriptions, which when combined, call for a much tighter link between military solution and more robust non-proliferation policies.

Emmers questions the dichotomy implicit in this interpretation and investigates what role the balance of power really plays in such cooperative security arrangements and in the calculations of the participants of ASEAN and the ARF. He offers a thorough analysis of the influence the balance of power has had on the formation and evolution of the ASEAN and ARF and reveals the co-existence and inter-relationship between both approaches within the two institutions.
The book contains case studies of Brunei's motives in joining the ASEAN in 1984; ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina Conflict; the workings of the ARF since 1994 and ASEAN's involvement in the South China Sea dispute. It will interest students and researchers of the ASEAN and ARF, the international politics of Southeast Asia, Regionalism and the Balance of Power theory.

The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel discusses the contribution of the IDF to the development of the Israeli State and society. The Force was a principal player in Israel's early years and had a significant impact on the fields of settlement, immigration absorption and education. Sociological concepts such as 'nation-building', 'melting pot' and 'a nation in uniform' characterize the roles played by the IDF and highlight its involvement in nationally oriented social processes.

The Israeli Defence Forces and the Foundation of Israel discusses the contribution of the IDF to the development of the Israeli State and society. The Force was a principal player in Israel's early years and had a significant impact on the fields of settlement, immigration absorption and education. Sociological concepts such as 'nation-building', 'melting pot' and 'a nation in uniform' characterize the roles played by the IDF and highlight its involvement in nationally oriented social processes.

Occasionally, militaries during times of peace achieve major warfighting innovations. Terry Pierce calls these 'disruptive innovations'. The more common innovation phenomenon, however, has been that of integrating new technologies to help perform existing missions better and not change them radically. The author calls these 'sustaining innovations'. The central theme of this book is that senior leaders who have successfully managed disruptive innovations disguised them as sustaining in order to ensure their innovations survived.
The recent innovation history suggests two interesting questions. First, how can senior military leaders achieve a disruptive innovation when they are heavily engaged around the world and they are managing sustaining innovations? Second, what have been the external sources of disruptive (and sustaining) innovations?
This book is essential reading for professionals and students interested in national security, military history and strategic issues.

This book is a comparative study of the evolution of the German navy in the second half of the nineteenth century. It examines the development of strategy, especially commerce-raiding, in comparison to what other navies were doing in this era of rapid technological change. It is not an insular history, merely listing ship rosters or specific events; it is a history of the German navy in relation to its potential foes. It is also a look at a new military institution involved in an inter-service rivalry for funds, technology and manpower with the prestigious and well-established army.

The vital ingredient in the formulation and execution of a successful foreign policy is intelligence. For the USA, as the Bay of Pigs incident and the Iran-Contra affair have shown, controlling intelligence is a problem which policy-makers and concerned citizens have rarely examined and imperfectly understood. Of the seven contributors, five have direct experience of working with or in intelligence, and all have written extensively on the subject.

Occasionally, during times of peace, military forces achieve major warfighting innovations. Terry Pierce terms these developments 'disruptive innovations' and shows how senior leaders have often disguised them in order to ensure their innovations survived. He shows how more common innovations however, have been those of integrating new technologies to help perform existing missions better and not change them radically. The author calls these 'sustaining innovations'. The recent innovation history suggests two interesting questions. First, how can senior military leaders achieve a disruptive innovation when they are heavily engaged around the world and they are managing sustaining innovations? Second, what have been the external sources of disruptive (and sustaining) innovations? This book is essential reading for professionals and students interested in national security, military history and strategic issues.

Cunningham was the best-known and most celebrated British admiral of the Second World War. He held one of the two major fleet commands between 1939 and 1942, and in 1942-43, he was Allied naval commander for the great amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. From 1943 to 1946, he was the First Sea Lord and a participant in the wartime conferences with Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt and the US Chiefs of Staff, deliberating the global strategy for Allied victory.
He also led a very active public life for almost twenty years after his retirement in 1946. Cunningham's papers are abundant for the period 1939-63 and are supplemented here by Cabinet and Admiralty records, papers of his service contemporaries and of Churchill, and by memories of his family and friends, as well as extensive US archives and private papers.

"MI6 and the Machinery of Spying "traces the development of the agency's internal structure from its inception until the end of the Cold War. The analysis examines how its management structure has been driven by its operational environment on the one hand and its position within the machinery of British central government on the other. Close attention is paid to the agency's institutional links to its consumers in Whitehall and Downing Street, as well as to the causes and consequences of its operational organization and provisions for counter-espionage and security.
The book presents a detailed response to assertions that the SIS was historically chronically mismanaged and badly organized, and to claims that it is unaccountable to political and public oversight. It also argues that where SIS activities have resulted in public disasters and scandals the reason has usually been less its lack of accountability and control than the very high degree of control and direction exercised by opportunistic politicians and the senior Civil Servants.

"MI6 and the Machinery of Spying "traces the development of the agency's internal structure from its inception until the end of the Cold War. The analysis examines how its management structure has been driven by its operational environment on the one hand and its position within the machinery of British central government on the other. Close attention is paid to the agency's institutional links to its consumers in Whitehall and Downing Street, as well as to the causes and consequences of its operational organization and provisions for counter-espionage and security.
The book presents a detailed response to assertions that the SIS was historically chronically mismanaged and badly organized, and to claims that it is unaccountable to political and public oversight. It also argues that where SIS activities have resulted in public disasters and scandals the reason has usually been less its lack of accountability and control than the very high degree of control and direction exercised by opportunistic politicians and the senior Civil Servants.

New developments in the Asia Pacific are forcing regional officials to rethink the way they manage security issues. The contributors to this work explore why some forms of security cooperation and institutionalisation in the region have proven more feasible than others. This work describes the emergence of the professions in late tsarist Russia and their struggle for autonomy from the aristocratic state. It also examines the ways in which the Russian professions both resembled and differed from their Western counterparts.

There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test.
Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

SOE in France was first published in 1966, followed by a second impression with amendments in 1968. Since these editions were published, other material on SOE has become available. It was, therefore, agreed in 2000 that Professor Foot should produce a revised version. In so doing, in addition to the material in the first edition, the author has had access to previously closed government records, as well as drawing upon his own invaluable wartime experiences and the recollections of those involved. SOE in France begins by explaining what SOE was, where it fitted into the Allied war machine, and how it worked in France. The narrative then recounts the adventures of its agents who worked on French soil. This intricate tale concentrates on the work of the 400 hand-picked men and women of the 'independent French' section, although it also covers SOE's five other sections that operated mainly in France. All told, the six sections despatched over 1,800 clandestine agents, who between them changed the course of the war. This updated new edition will be essential reading for scholars and for all those with an informed general interest in the activities of the SOE.

Carter and Ehteshami consider the significant geopolitical, economic and security links between the Middle East and the wider Asian world - links which are often overlooked when the Middle East is considered in isolation or in terms of its relations with the West, but which are of growing importance. Topics covered include Asia's overall geostrategic realities and the Middle East's place within them; relations between the Middle East and China, Russia, central Asia, southeast Asia and south Asia; Islam in central Asia and southeast Asia and the connections with the Middle East; and the important links between the Middle East and India and Pakistan's military and security establishments.

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

Presenting the views of leading experts on strategic considerations in Eurasia, this volume shows that the 11 September attacks and subsequent developments have affected the way in which international relations are evaluated. In addition, these developments have turned the concept of asymmetric threats, including large-scale international terrorist attacks, into genuine realistic dangers threatening our security. As a result, the conventional mindset over issues of war and peace, of existing alliances and partnerships, even of the character of the international system has to be re-evaulated. This volume sheds light on the aspects of change that have taken place in the post-11 September evolution of international relations in Eurasia.

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

Series Information:
Warfare and History

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy. This book brings together a range of experts from the West and from Taiwan itself who examine the key issues connected with Taiwan's air power, which is a key aspect of the China-Taiwan military balance. During the 1990s, Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly re-equipping its air force with modern air defence and strike aircraft equipped with modern missiles, thereby denying China command of the air in any conflict in the short- to medium-term. In the longer-term, air power will remain a crucial influence on the overall balance, as China's efforts to upgrade its own air force's capabilities begin to undermine Taiwan's current advantages.

What special vulnerabilities does the world of the 21st century have to terrorist attacks? What kind of role does the United States see itself playing as the world's only superpower in the coming decades? How should we now characterize the conduct of the US foreign policy? Answers to such questions are perhaps not much clearer now than they were immediately after the attacks, but one of the more positive effects of these attacks has been to stimulate much serious discussion about them, and thus about the place of violence about changing forms of warfare, about different forms of terror, and about challenges to prevailing accounts of the legitimacy of violence in contemporary political life in the context of emerging and in many respects dangerously unstable structures of power and authority on a global scale. These essays do not constitute a unified perspective on what happened on 11 September 2001, and the US response to it. They are perhaps most usefully read as an experiment in writing contemporary history as it evolves. Some essays contradict others, some are quite specific, and others generalize very broadly. They all affirm, however, that there is no simple answer to difficul

During the late 1940s the newly created CIA, in a loose alliance with anti-communist intellectuals and trade unionists, launched a massive, clandestine effort to win the Cold War allegiance of the European left. Drawing on numerous personal interviews and document collections on both sides of the Atlantic, this book examines in detail the origins of the CIA's covert campaign and assesses it's impact on the US's principal Cold War ally, Britain, focusing particularly on attempts to combat communist penetration of British trade unions, stimulate support within the Labour party for key American strategic aims, such as European union, and influence the politics of Bloomsbury literati. The results of this secret intervention were complex and far-reaching. CIA support for such ventures as the Congress for Cultural Freedom and its London-based magazine, Encounter, subtly transformed the political culture of the British left, making it more Atlanticist and less socialist. In other ways, however, the hidden hand of American intelligence failed to control its British assets, whose behaviour often frustrated their secretive patrons in Washington. For that matter, not even the CIA's agen