The availability of food is an especially significant issue in zones of conflict because conflict nearly always impinges on the production and the distribution of food, and causes increased competition for food, land and resources Controlling the production of and access to food can also be used as a weapon by protagonists in conflict. The logistics of supply of food to military personnel operating in conflict zones is another important issue. These themes unite this collection, the chapters of which span different geographic areas. This volume will appeal to scholars in a number of different disciplines, including anthropology, nutrition, political science, development studies and international relations, as well as practitioners working in the private and public sectors, who are currently concerned with food-related issues in the field.

The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) is a systematic technique for predicting short-term, unique behaviors. Using primarily qualitative empirical data, LAMP allows the analyst to predict the most likely outcomes for specific research questions across a wide range of intelligence problems, such as cyber threats in the U.S., the possibility of an Al Qaeda attack, the likelihood of Iran providing nuclear capability to terrorist groups, or the future actions of the Mexican drug cartel. LAMP offers an innovative and powerful method for organizing all available information based on the perceptions of the national actors, using it to make relevant predictions as to which alternate future is most likely to occur at a given moment in time. Its transparent structure enables anyone to see how an analyst gets from point A to point B to produce an intelligence estimate. LAMP differs from other analytical techniques in that it is based on determining the relative probability of a range of alternate futures, rather than attempting to determine the quantitative probability of their occurrence. After explaining its theoretical framework, the text leads the reader through the process of predictive analysis before providing practical case studies showing how LAMP is applied against real world problems, such as the possible responses of Israel, the U.S., and Lebanon to the behavior of Hezbollah or the competing visions of the future of Afghanistan. Evaluation of the method is provided with the case studies to show the effectiveness of the LAMP predictions over time. The book is complemented by a website with downloadable software for use by students of intelligence in conducting their own predictive analysis. It will be an essential tool for the analyst and the student, not only for national security issues but also for competitive intelligence.

The great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic "On War," introduced the idea of friction in war. Friction was one of the most important ideas that Clausewitz put forward. His application of the term is generally taken to be limited to events on the field of battle. But had Clausewitz lived to the end of the 20th century, he undoubtedly would have broadened his understanding of friction to include the nexus between war and policy making. He would have done so because his most fundamental insight, apart from the significance of friction in war, was his insistence upon the priority of policy over war.

Cimbala applies the concept of friction to a number of 20th century cases of war and policy making. He also applies it to some plausible scenarios for the next century. Although many U.S. military planners and policy makers appear to place their faith in technology as the sine qua non of success in security and defense policy, technology can be self defeating and myopic if political and strategic vision are lacking. For example, the mindless pursuit of information warfare in all its varieties may convince potential U.S. opponents that infowar is a cost effective way of negating U.S. military power. A provocative analysis for scholars, students, military professionals and other policy makers involved with strategy and military policy issues.

This study begins with a set of strategic assumptions--most notably that the risks of U.S.-Russian war are and will remain extremely low and that the U.S. military remains a stabilizing influence in many geographic theaters. O'Hanlon then shows that the United States' interests in the Third World, while nowhere truly vital, are sufficiently important to justify a measured degree of global military presence and engagement. Historical, political, and military analysis suggests that these interests can be protected efficiently and effectively with a U.S. military reduced in size by roughly 40 to 50 percent in most types of major combat forces, and by 95 percent in nuclear forces. In the realm of conventional forces, these cuts would be about twice as deep as those planned by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney; in the nuclear realm they would be much deeper than those approved by the Bush administration. By contrast, analysis suggests that U.S. capabilities should be largely held constant--or in some cases even expanded--in logistics, intelligence and communications, R&D, and special forces. The resulting force posture would cost about $200 billion in 1991 dollars through the early years of the next century, and perhaps $230 billion annually thereafter. O'Hanlon's is one of the first in-depth studies of how the U.S. military might be reconfigured for the post-Cold War world. This study will prove useful for defense policy makers at the specialized levels and for students of the guns vs. butter policy issues and debates.

The transformation of the European Community into a single market in 1992/3, together with the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, have given new life to Jean Monnet's grand ambitions for European integration. The essays in this volume examine some of the key issues facing the EC in the 1990s, focusing on three important areas - the politics of integration; economics, education, and science, and foreign policy and defense.

2012 Winner of the Shapiro Award for the Best Book in Israel Studies, presented by the Association for Israel Studies Whose life is worth more? That is the question that states inevitably face during wartime. Which troops are thrown to the first lines of battle and which ones remain relatively intact? How can various categories of civilian populations be protected? And when front and rear are porous, whose life should receive priority, those of soldiers or those of civilians? In Israel's Death Hierarchy, Yagil Levy uses Israel as a compelling case study to explore the global dynamics and security implications of casualty sensitivity. Israel, Levy argues, originally chose to risk soldiers mobilized from privileged classes, more than civilians and other soldiers. However, with the mounting of casualty sensitivity, the state gradually restructured what Levy calls its "death hierarchy" to favor privileged soldiers over soldiers drawn from lower classes and civilians, and later to place enemy civilians at the bottom of the hierarchy by the use of heavy firepower. The state thus shifted risk from soldiers to civilians. As the Gaza offensive of 2009 demonstrates, this new death hierarchy has opened Israel to global criticism.

This book is an analysis of President Bush's Regional Defense Strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. This strategy involves a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental United States where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the United States would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation Desert Storm. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25 percent budget cut negotiated with Congress, a greatly depleted Russian threat, and a new international security environment that assumes two-years' warning of a European-centered global war with the former USSR.

There are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends: (1) the continued decline of the Russians as a threat to world stability; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges; (3) the behavior of the allies and Congress; and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy, but rather a fundamental revision of the way the United States has approached defense since 1945. Students and scholars interested in politico-military strategy and government policy will find this book of great interest.

It was logical to expect that the European Economic and Monetary Union would lead ineluctably to an autonomous European defense; the very size of the European Union seems to demand it. The EU eventually will reach the point where its economic and demographic weight will far exceed that of the United States. Can it not be expected too that the EU will seek to make this weight felt internationally? Cogan tracks the halting creation of an independent European military structure, a third way between national armies and ATO, since the Iron Curtain's fall.

With the Cold War's end and subsequent western engagements in Central and Eastern Europe, it is no longer a question of whether NATO and the EU compare; they now must relate. They have to coordinate their planning and force postures so as to avoid duplication of resources and efforts. Although NATO's integrated command structure theoretically was an anomaly with the end of the Cold War, it nevertheless turned out to be the case in Bosnia, and later Kosovo, that nothing was possible until the Americans intervened. The virtue of integrated command -- American participation and know-how -- was once again seen as crucially important, despite the increasingly anachronistic deficit of sovereignty for Western Europe in defense matters. In the long run, Europe's economic power must be balanced by its military and diplomatic might.

A thoroughly up-to-date expert analysis of national security issues in the United States, focusing on the dramatic changes brought about by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Written by one of the nation's foremost security policy analysts, the second edition of U.S. National Security: A Reference Handbook follows the trajectory of American security policy from the Cold War to the World Trade Center attacks to the Bush Administration. It brings the distinctive clarity and objectivity of the first edition to the study of a vastly different world. With over 75 percent new material, U.S. National Security, Second Edition provides an up-to-date assessment of security challenges facing the United States today incorporates the full range of viewpoints on the appropriate responses to specific issues. For readers looking for a clear-eyed assessment of the state of our security, the policies that have and haven't worked, and the opportunities and threats that lie ahead, there is no more essential resource available. A chronology of the post-Cold War period with overwhelming emphasis on the post-9/11 era and profiles of the new personalities at home and abroad affecting U.S. national security A thorough bibliography of media on national security, including online resources, websites, media offerings, and books

This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency wars for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them. In this compelling study, Eland questions the core assumptions of the American foreign policy and defense establishments that call for military interventions around the world and high and increasing defense budgets at home. He outlines a security policy more appropriate to the sober realities of the post-Cold War era. This is an approach that calls for military restraint overseas, taking advantage of the already secure U.S. geostrategic position, while safeguarding vital national interests. Eland details the military force structure needed for this new role and calculates the reduced defense budget required to pay for these forces. This book is a timely wake-up call to those who make American foreign and defense policies. It demands a badly needed re-thinking of America's national interests. In the author's view, America's natural geostrategic position places it at a natural advantage, rendering unnecessary a forward defense posture. A non-interventionist foreign policy would save money by requiring lower defense budgets. An America less willing to get involved in complex overseas disputes unrelated to U.S vital interests would also be less likely to make enemies around the world.

This study was motivated by an awareness of the ever-growing importance of technology on productivity and power in the information age. It examines the relationship among national security, economic competition, and technology. An underlying premise is that in an era of diminished military confrontation, economic and technological power are acquiring enhanced importance in national security considerations. Green believes that this is bound to promote closer coordination between government and private industry, but not without tensions. Using both a public policy and an economic focus, his work seeks to clarify the debate on high technology industrial policy and to address the policy question of whether and how government should respond to competitive assaults in strategic industries.

This volume explores the importance of the West Bank for Israel's security. The author assumes that a political solution to the West Bank issue will be negotiated between Israel and the Jordanians and Palestinians, and that the talks thereafter will focus on the question of security. He examines various security topics based on the current political agreement, and considers alternative political solutions and the security risks they would entail for Israel. In particular, he analyzes the possible military risks of attacks against Israel, launched from or through the West Bank region if it is not under Israeli control, and the ways in which these risks could be minimized.

When states collapse, human and global security are threatened. Order and stability must be restored. This title provides an account of the pursuit of security at the edge of the global order. It sheds light on reform of state police and armed forces, and analyses the security structures that emerge in the absence of the state.

This book provides a comprehensive coverage of crucial issues concerning EU co-operation and European security. At present, Europe is confronted with a number of serious common and global challenges, the most important being the economic crisis, migration issues, geopolitical tensions at its external borders, terrorism, climate change and environmental challenges. These developments have a huge impact on the stability and security of the continent as a whole and on each individual European country. Europe, more particularly the European Union, has to organize its governance and security infrastructure in such a way that it can cope with these global threats. This edited volume collects a number of topics and themes connected to the governance and/or security dimensions of EU co-operation. The book is divided into several parts, which deal respectively with the values and general principles of EU co-operation; institutional aspects of EU co-operation; a number of individual policy domains; areas of European criminal law; the external relations of the EU; and the future functioning of EU co-operation as a whole. The eighteen chapters, written by a team of experts with extensive practical and academic experience, contain insights and information valuable to researchers, students, practitioners and policy makers concerned with EU law and international law.About the editors Jaap de Zwaan is Lector European Integration at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, and Emeritus Professor of the European Union Law at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He served for nearly twenty years as a member of the Diplomatic Service of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he worked notably in the domain of European integration. He was also the Director of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague for almost six years. Martijn Lak is a historian and a Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of European Studies of The Hague University of Applied Sciences. He studied Journalism and History at the University of Applied Sciences Utrecht, and obtained his Ph.D. in 2011. Martijn Lak specializes in post-war Dutch-German economic and political relations and contemporary German history. Abiola Makinwa is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer in commercial Law with a special focus on Anti-Corruption Law and Policy at The Hague University of Applied Sciences. Abiola Makinwa holds a Ph.D. from Erasmus University, Rotterdam. She is a frequent speaker on anti-corruption law and policy and has introduced Anti-Corruption Compliance as an undergraduate course at The Hague University. Piet Willems is a Lecturer in International and European Law at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, where he focuses on project-based learning, moot court coaching and competition law. His research activities focus on regulation in the European Union. He obtained both his Master's degree and his LL.M. in European Law from Ghent University. -based learning, moot court coaching and competition law. His research activities focus on regulation in the European Union. He obtained both his Master's degree and his LL.M. in European Law from Ghent University.

Many studies have covered aspects of military intelligence available to Britain and her allies during the Second World War. This distinguished book provides a succinct and authoritative survey of the vital role Ultra played in achieving final victory., When war began Britain was as ill-prepared in intelligence as armaments. Civilian scientists had discovered the principle of radar in the mid-1930s, but everything had to be learned from scratch in the heat of emergency. First signs of improvement came in mid-1941, when Ultra targeted naval vessels and bomber aircraft onto so many of Rommel's supply ships that the Africa Corps almost withered on the vine. From then on intelligence played an increasingly indispensable part in final victory. Ultra won the Battle of the Atlantic, driving U-boats back to coastal waters by June 1943. Ultra confirmed the whereabouts of the German tanks as Montgomery planned the breakthrough to Alamein. Only 'Bomber' Harris refused to give intelligence the credit it deserved; on the basis of new evidence this fascinating book strongly reinforces criticism this costly mistake.

This collection uses a series of case studies to assess the impact of heretical military leaders who developed policy and strategy during war and peace in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The issue for each contributor is not necessarily to show whether the endeavors of individuals and their unorthodoxy were successful or unsuccessful--though this important consideration is not ignored. Rather, each chapter offers differing points of view on accomplishments and failure because, as is so often the experience in historical study, the record is mixed; and this is especially so in terms of the application of military power in the period since the Napoleonic wars. Technological and scientific innovation, the rise of mass armies, the advent of total war, and the need to develop effective armed forces in a period of rapid change prompted new approaches in policy and strategy. In this period, it is clear that a dialectic in military thinking existed between those who followed what can be thought of as orthodox ideas, based generally on the lessons of preceding wars, and heretics who advocate new policies and strategies.

The battle for control over the National Guard began with passage of the National Defense Act of 1933. The National Guard Association's insistence on a federal role for the Guard prompted the creation of dual status for Guardsmen. After 1933 they were not only soldiers of the state, but of the nation as well. The first test of the Guard's new status came as the world plunged into the Second World War. The compromises, conflicts, emotions, and legal precedents involved in the 1940-41 mobilization were to affect the National Guard and national defense strategy for many years to come. Yet, this important aspect of American history has been largely ignored. In most works on the Roosevelt era the federalization of 18 Guard divisions--which doubled the size of the Army--is given one or two lines. Guard historians have paid close attention to Guardsmen entering federal camps, but gloss over the politics of Army-Guard maneuvering prior to mobilization. This study demonstrates the importance of the political situation between these two defense establishments and their consequences for later defense policy and legislation.

Robert Bruce Sligh shows how the mobilization in 1940-41 spurred increased federal control over the Guard. Although the Army was hesitant to take the Guard into active service, once mobilized the Guard was rapidly co-opted. The Guard's dual goals of increased federal money while staying aloof from federal control were doomed to fail. This book will be of interest to those interested in American military history, national defense policy, National Guard history, and selective service legislation.

This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyzes the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.

For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere--and domestic policy in scores of nations--pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive history of our century's longest struggle.
In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent, concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war, with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult before World War II--when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs--escalated dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere, Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military interventions across the globe--from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam.
Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere, he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's longest international rivalry.

After World War II, Western Europe became closely linked to the United States--economically through a variety of associations within the Atlantic Community, and militarily through NATO.

This volume stresses the strategic importance of Western Europe for the United States. It provides detailed surveys of the background and preparedness of the NATO defense forces and the forces of Austria, Switzerland, and other countries of strategic importance. Each chapter provides a general outline of military developments since 1945, including such topics as: the relationship between armed forces and society; recruitment practices; armaments; organization; relations with NATO; and future projections. The authoritative series of descriptive, historical, and analytical essays in this volume makes it an essential resource for defense specialists, policymakers, and scholars of Western Europe.

There is little general agreement about the battles which have most decisively changed the course of history. Those given the fullest description in this book have been chosen on two considerations: each has played a marked part in the making of history and each illustrates an important change in the making of war.

Providing a timely account of European security developments, this edited collection delves into the theoretical and political debates central to European security cooperation. The essays analyze the interaction between states and institutions as they shape European security cooperation in the wake of the Cold War. After outlining the goals and context of the project, the book turns to case studies of the roles and policies of the U.S., Russia, Germany, and France. European security, institutions, and arms control regimes, such as the European Union, the Western European Union, NATO, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are examined. Conventional forces in Europe, and confidence and security building measures are also explored. Throughout, the contributors focus on the possibilities and limits of security cooperation as Europe prepares for the next century. Students and scholars concerned with international security issues, international relations theory, and European security and politics will be particularly interested.