During the Allied victory celebrations there were few who chose to raise a glass to the staff. The high cost of casualties endured by the British army tarnished the reputation of the military planners, which has yet to recover. This book examines the work and development of the staff of the British army during the First World War and its critical role in the military leadership team. Their effectiveness was germane to the outcome of events in the front line but not enough consideration has been paid to this level of command and control, which has largely been overshadowed by the debate over generalship. This has painted an incomplete picture of the command function. Characterised as arrogant, remote and out of touch with the realities of the front line, the staff have been held responsible for the mismanagement of the war effort and profligate loss of lives in futile offensives. This book takes a different view. By using their letters and diaries it reveals fresh insights into their experience of the war. It shows that the staff made frequent visits to the front line and were no strangers to combat or hostile fire. Their work is also compared with their counterparts in the French and German armies, highlighting differences in practice and approach. In so doing, this study throws new light upon the characteristics, careers and working lives of these officers, investigating the ways in which they both embraced and resisted change. This offers evidence both for those who wish to exonerate the British command system on the basis of the learning process but also for those critical of its performance, thus advancing understanding of British military history in the First World War.

This book outlines the changes in military strategy, policy, and force structure that prominent civilian and military experts in defense believe the United States must adopt if it is to cope successfully with threats to national security in the 1980s and 1990s.

Throughout human history, scholars, statesmen and military leaders have attempted to define what constitutes the legitimate use of armed force by one community against another. Moreover, if force is to be used, what normative guidelines should govern the conduct of warfare? Based upon the assumption that armed conflict is a human enterprise and therefore subject to human limitations, the Western 'just war tradition' represents an attempt to provide these guidelines. Following on from the success of Hensel's earlier publication, The Law of Armed Conflict, this volume brings together an internationally recognized team of scholars to explore the philosophical and societal foundations of just war tradition. It relates the principles of jus ad bellum to contemporary issues confronting the global community and explores the relationship between the principles of jus in bello and the various principles embodied in the customary law of armed conflict. Applying an interdisciplinary approach to analyzing and assessing the links between just war and the norms of behaviour, the book provides a valuable contribution to international law, international relations and national security studies.

The words of the ancient Chinese sages are as timeless as they are wise. The words of ancient Chinese philosophers have influenced other thinkers across the world for more than 2,000 years, and continue to shape our ideas today. The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy includes translations of Sun Tzu's Art of War, Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching, the teachings of the master sage Confucius, and the writings of Mencius. From insights on warfare and diplomacy to advice on how to deal with one's neighbors and colleagues, this collection of classical Eastern philosophy will provide readers with countless nuggets of wisdom. IBPA Benjamin Franklin Gold Award Winner 2017!

A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2016 Perhaps the most basic national security question that U.S. leaders and the body politic continuously face is where and under what circumstances to consider and in some cases resort to the use of armed force to ensure the country's safety and well-being. The question is perpetual-but the answer is not. This insightful text helps students make sense of the ever-changing environment and factors that influence disagreement over national security risks and policy in the United States. The book takes shape through a focus on three considerations: strategy, policy, and issues. Snow explains the range of plans of action that are possible and resources available for achieving national security goals, as well as the courses of action for achieving those goals in the context of a broad range of security problems that must be dealt with. However, there is little agreement among policymakers on exactly what is the nature of the threats that the country faces. Snow helps readers frame the debate by suggesting some of the prior influences on risk-assessment, some of the current influences on national security debates, and suggestions for how future strategy and policy may be shaped.

The region encompassing Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/Pak region) is undergoing a fundamental strategic change. This book analyses the nature of this strategic change, in ordre to seek possible future scenarios and to examine policy options. It also undertakes a critical review of the basic elements of the Western strategic approach towards dealing with regional conflicts in all parts of the world, with special emphasis on the Af/Pak region. Dealing with the political developments i one of the most volatile regions in the world - Afghanistan and Pakistan - the volume focuses on Western strategic concerns. The withdrawal of ISAF by 2014 will change the overall political setting and the work addresses the challenges that will result for Western policymakers thereafter. It examines the cases of Afghanistan and Pakistan separately, and also looks at the broader region and tries to identify different outcomes. This book will be of much interest to students of Central and South Asian politics, strategic studies, foreign policy and security studies generally.

Since World War II, military intervention in developing world internal conflicts (DWIC) has become the primary form of U.S. military activity, and these interventions have proven unsuccessful in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This book argues such failure was entirely predictable, even inevitable, due both to the nature and dynamics of foreign military intrusion in the affairs of other countries and especially the DWICs that provide the major contemporary form of potential U.S. military in the foreseeable future. Basing its analysis in both human nature (the adverse reaction to prolonged outsider intrusion) and historical analogy, the book argues strongly why military intervention should be avoided as a national security option and the implications of such a policy decision for national security strategy and policy.

The South Asian security complex refers to security interdependencies between the states in the region, and also includes the effect that powerful external actors, such as China, the US and Russia, and geopolitical interests have on regional dynamics. This book focuses on the national securities of a number of South Asian countries in order to discuss a range of issues related to South Asian security. The book makes a distinction between traditional and non-traditional security. While state-centric approaches such as bilateral relations between India and Pakistan are considered to be traditional realist approaches to security, the promotion of economic, environmental and human security reflect global concerns, liberal theories and cosmopolitan values. The book goes beyond traditional security issues to reflect the changing security agenda in South Asia in the twenty-first century, and is a useful contribution to studies on South Asian Politics and Security Studies.

Since World War II, military intervention in developing world internal conflicts (DWIC) has become the primary form of U.S. military activity, and these interventions have proven unsuccessful in places like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This book argues such failure was entirely predictable, even inevitable, due both to the nature and dynamics of foreign military intrusion in the affairs of other countries and especially the DWICs that provide the major contemporary form of potential U.S. military in the foreseeable future. Basing its analysis in both human nature (the adverse reaction to prolonged outsider intrusion) and historical analogy, the book argues strongly why military intervention should be avoided as a national security option and the implications of such a policy decision for national security strategy and policy.

During the decolonization wars in East and Southern Africa, tracking became increasingly valuable as a military tactic. Drawing on archival research and interviews, Stapleton presents a comparative study of the role of tracking in insurgency and counter-insurgency across Kenya, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Web Programming for Business: PHP Object-Oriented Programming with Oracle focuses on fundamental PHP coding, giving students practical, enduring skills to solve data and technical problems in business.

Using Oracle as the backend database, the book is version-neutral, teaching students code that will still work even with changes to PHP and Oracle. The code is clean, clearly explained and solutions-oriented, allowing students to understand how technologies such as XML, RSS or AJAX can be leveraged in business applications. The book is fully illustrated with examples, and includes chapters on:

• Database functionality
• Security programming
• Transformation programming to move data

Powerpoint slides, applied exam questions, and the raw code for all examples are available on a companion website. This book offers an innovative approach that allows anyone with basic SQL and HTML skills to learn PHP object-oriented programming.

This volume discusses the challenges the future holds for different aspects of the intelligence process and for organisations working in the field. The main focus of Western intelligence services is no longer on the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union and its allies. Instead, at present, there is a plethora of threats and problems that deserve attention. Some of these problems are short-term and potentially acute, such as terrorism. Others, such as the exhaustion of natural resources, are longer-term and by nature often more difficult to foresee in their implications. This book analyses the different activities that make up the intelligence process, or the 'intelligence cycle', with a focus on changes brought about by external developments in the international arena, such as technology and security threats. Drawing together a range of key thinkers in the field, The Future of Intelligence examines possible scenarios for future developments, including estimations about their plausibility, and the possible consequences for the functioning of intelligence and security services. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.

Between 2021 and 2031, the UK government is set to spend over GBP230 billion on its military. Who decides how to use these funds, and how can we be sure that the UK's armed forces can meet the threats of tomorrow? This book provides the answers to these crucial questions. Concentrating on decisions taken below the political level, it uncovers the factors that underpin the translation of strategic direction into military capability. In a series of interviews, over 30 top admirals, generals and air marshals give their own views on the procurement and maintenance of the nation's current and future military capability. Their unrivalled professional knowledge and experience affords a fascinating insight into the higher management of national defence.

The human dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) implies an alternative vision of security and co-operation in Europe, based on respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, minority rights and human contacts. Until recently the human dimension has been the main claim to perpetuity of the CSCE. It has been through the years the main point of controversy among its participating states, and has played an important role in the revolutionary events of 1989 which transformed Europe.

This volume brings together scholars from different fields to explore the power, consequences and everyday practices of security expertise. Expertise mediates between different forms of knowledge: scientific and technological, legal, economic and political knowledge. This book offers the first systematic study of security expertise and opens up a productive dialogue between science and technology studies and security studies to investigate the character and consequences of this expertise. In security theory, the study of expertise is crucial to understanding whose knowledge informs security making and to reflect on the impact and responsibility of security analysis. In science and technology studies, the study of security politics adds a challenging new case to the agenda of research on expertise and policy. The contributors investigate cases such as academic security studies, security think tanks, the collaboration between science, anthropology and the military, transnational terrorism, and the ethical consequences of security expertise. Together they challenge our understanding of how expertise works and what consequences it has for security politics and international relations. This book will be of particular interest to students of critical security studies, sociology, science and technology studies, and IR/security studies in general.

This book examines how legal, political, and rights discourses, security policies and practices migrate and translate across the North Atlantic. The complex relationship between liberty and security has been fundamentally recast and contested in liberal democracies since the start of the 'global war on terror'. In addition to recognizing new agencies, political pressures, and new sensitivities to difference, it is important that not to over-state the novelty of the post-9/11 era: the war on terror simply made possible the intensification, expansion, or strengthening of policies already in existence, or simply enabled the shutting down of debate. Working from a common theoretical frame, if different disciplines, these chapters present policy-oriented analyses of the actual practices of security, policing, and law in the European Union and Canada. They focus on questions of risk and exception, state sovereignty and governance, liberty and rights, law and transparency, policing and security. In particular, the essays are concerned with charting how policies, practices, and ideas migrate between Canada, the EU and its member states. By taking 'field' approach to the study of security practices, the volume is not constrained by national case study or the solipsistic debates within subfields and bridges legal, political, and sociological analysis. It will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, sociology, law, global governance and IR in general. Mark B. Salter is Associate Professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa.

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy, in how Taiwan perceives threats to itself, and in how the Taiwanese military are reacting to these perceived threats. This book, which includes contributions by leading Taiwanese military thinkers, explores current military strategy in Taiwan and how it is evolving. It discusses Taiwan's military modernisation, and the implications of the recent defeat after fifty years in power of the Kuomintang Party, implications which include a move away from an authoritarian garrison state culture, and the beginnings of a more open debate about defence. The book concludes with an overall appraisal of Taiwan's defence vision and makes recommendations on how Taiwan's defence might be enhanced.

This is a study of the British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's, need for information on the enemy, and traces the subsequent development of the system.

Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability, 1919-1939 is the first unified study of the development of Britain's anti-submarine capability between the armistice in 1919 and the onset of the second world German submarine attack on Britain's maritime trade in 1939. Well researched and yet accessibly written, this book challenges the widespread belief that the Royal Navy failed to anticipate the threat of the U-boat in the Second World War.

How have US economic defence policies promoted its security since 1933? US Policies of Economic Warfare, 1933-1991 concentrates on an important and neglected facet of America's fight for survival in the latter half of the twentieth century. It explains how US policy-makers crafted and used instruments of economic statecraft against states that posed vital threats to the survival of the USA. This study situates economic defence policy within the broad context of US foreign policy and explores its response to the totalitarianism of the 1930s, the Second World War and the complex strategic and political developments of the Cold War.

The origins of the First World War remain one of the greatest twentieth century historical controversies. In this debate the role of military planning in particular and of militarism in general, are a key focus of attention. Did the military wrest control from the civilians? Were the leaders of Europe eager for a conflict? What military commitments were made between the various alliance blocks? These questions are examined in detail here in eleven essays by distinguished historians and the editor's introduction provides a focus and draws out the comparative approach to the history of military policies and war plans of the great powers.

Despite the substantial output of revisionist scholarship over the last decade reappraising the performance of the British Army on the Western Front during the First World War, there still remains a stubborn perception that its commanders were incompetent, inflexible and unimaginative. Whilst much ink has been spilled vilifying or defending individual commanders, or looking for overarching trends and 'learning curves', this is the first work to examine systematically the vertical nature of command - that is the transmission of plans from the high-command down through the rank structure to the front line. Through such an investigation, a much more rounded measure of the effectiveness of British commanders can be gained; one moves the argument beyond the overly simplistic 'casualties to ground gained' equation that is usually offered. The Battle of Fromelles (19-20 July 1916) was selected as the case study as it was relatively small in scale, in the right period, and retains sufficient primary sources available to sustain the analysis. It also witnessed the first time Australian forces were used in offensive operations on the Western Front, and thus looms large in wider Commonwealth perceptions of 'Bumbling British Generals'. The book follows the progress of the battle plan from its inception in the strategic designs of the supreme commander down through the various intermediate level commands at operational and tactical headquarters until it became the orders that sent the infantry forward into the attack. In so doing it provides a unique insight into the strengths and weaknesses of British command structure, allowing a much more scholarly judgement of its overall effectiveness.

Wars never run according to plan, perhaps never more so than during the Italian campaign, 1943-45, where necessary coordination between the different armies added additional complexity to Allied plans. Errors in the strategies, tactics, the coalition tensions, and operations at campaign command level can be clearly seen in first-hand accounts of the period. This new account examines the Italian campaign, from Sicily to surrender in 1945, exploring the strategy, intentions, motives, plans, and deeds. It then offers a detailed insight into the five commanders who led the battles in Italy - the two British commanders: Montgomery and Alexander; two American: Patton and Clark; and the leading German commander, Field Marshal Kesselring. Their personal notes and accounts, taken alongside archival material, provides some surprising conclusions - Montgomery was not quite the master of war he is portrayed as; Patton had serious flaws, exposed by wasting men's lives to save a relative and overlooking the shooting of prisoners of war; Clark lost lives to bolster his image; Alexander the gentleman was far too vague to be effective as a senior leader. Meanwhile, condemned war criminal Kesselring appears to be the most efficient and also, like Alexander, one of the most popular leaders.