Andidora tells the story of four men who successfully commanded battlefleets in the 20th century: Japan's Heihachiro Togo, England's John Jellicoe, and America's William Halsey and Raymond Spruance. This study provides personality profiles and detailed accounts of their major battles. Analyzing their command decisions based on what each commander knew or could have reasonably inferred at the time decisions were made, Andidora compares their accomplishments to those of Horatio Nelson, who delivered stunning naval victories for England during the Napoleonic Wars. However, he concludes that the Nelsonian standard is inappropriate in the modern naval environment due to the increased size and technological complexity of modern fleets and the political imperative to preserve costly and strategically significant naval assets. Trained in England and acquiring the skill and spirit of Nelson's heirs, Togo annihilated his Russian opponents at the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War and, therefore, produced the 20th century's only facsimile of Nelson's Trafalgar. Despite heavy losses against a numerically inferior German Navy at Jutland, Jellicoe's single-minded adherence to an unpopular strategy would prove instrumental in achieving final victory in the First World War. Although strikingly different in personality and leadership style, Halsey and Spruance would both do their part in the naval battles of the Second World War. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Spruance would deal Japanese naval aviation a blow from which it would never recover; while at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Halsey would essentially eliminate the Japanese navy as an effective fighting force.

Knowing how to end war and to prevent the escalation of conflict is of paramount importance today when weapons of mass destruction have spread beyond the control of major powers and democratically accountable governments, and when regional and global stability have become more precarious. Stephen Cimbala and Sidney Waldman have drawn together prominent analysts with different perspectives to discuss key issues before and after the Cold War. This authoritative and provocative study assesses military and political strategies of serious concern to military historians and professionals, political scientists, academics, and policymakers. The book covers all the major aspects of conflict termination before and after the Cold War and defines the basic concepts and principles involved. Noted contributors offer insights into how military and political strategies to end and limit various types of conflict must adapt to political change, to nationalism, irredentism, and boundary disputes. Chapters deal with deterrence, Soviet military doctrine, an American-Soviet war, the changing role of nuclear weapons, behavioral and institutional factors, the maritime component, civil wars, coalition war, nuclear deterrence and political hostility. The book ends with new determinations about the major issues and points to future research agendas.

Presenting alternative methods of conflict resolution, this examination of the philosophy of peace presents nonlethal weaponry as a solution to the destructiveness of war. Conventional lethal weapons and weapons of mass destruction evolved into an unprecedented 900 billion dollar a year defense industry. This industry and its war makers have taken the lives of an estimated 170 million human beings in this century. A new approach appropriate to the new world order must be found. This study provides a historical analysis of weapons and forces in this century and traces the development of nonlethal technologies and weapons. It is the first work to present nonlethal weaponry in the framework of recognizable scenarios based on current world events that show the applicability of current available nonlethal weapons and technology to serve as a force to be reckoned with in a highly politicized world. Morehouse argues that nonlethal weapons and technology could and should become forces for peace in the 21st century.

'Soft' Counterinsurgency reviews the promise and actual achievement of Human Terrain Teams, the small groups of social scientists that were eventually embedded in every combat brigade in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book, based on interviews with both HTT personnel and their military commanders, examines the military's need for sociocultural information, the ethical issues surrounding research carried out in combat zones, and the tensions between military and social science organizational cultures. The account provides a close, detailed account of HTT activities, a critical reflection on the possibilities of creating a 'softer, ' less violent counterinsurgency, and the difficulty of attempting to make war more 'intelligent' and discriminating.

Image Warfare in the War on Terror provides an innovative re-examination of the war on terror. It argues that since 11 September 2001 image warfare has replaced techno-war as the dominant warfighting model. Roger suggests that it is a form of warfare in which Al Qaeda currently dominates while the West is still playing catch-up. By dealing frankly with the deployment of disturbing images generated by the 9/11 attacks - from bin Laden videos, suicide terrorism and hostage executions to prisoner abuses, Roger provides us with a new vocabulary through which these acts can be discussed and understood.

This book offers the first comprehensive assessment, from an International Relations perspective, of image warfare. Through engagement with IR, Media Studies and Visual Culture literatures, Roger introduces three new conceptual terms 'image munitions', 'counter-image munitions' and 'remediation battles'. These terms are then explored in chapters about political communications concerning Bush, Blair and bin Laden; suicides; executions and abuses.

Three policy actions taken during the Revolutionary War period helped form the military supply and acquisition structure still in place today. These include the formation of a management structure; the choice of management methods; and debates related to ancillary issues such as R&D, fostering of expertise, encouraging innovation, and the role of the federal government in the development of an industrial base. To provide valuable context, Horgan looks not only at decisions made by the Continental Congress, but also at the environment in which these plans were made. Of the wide range of methods used to procure the supplies needed for war, many were harsh measures taken by beleaguered policy makers, forced to desperate steps by the demands of war.

The organizational structure created to manage the supply effort was, Horgan reveals, in constant flux, characterized by the abandoning of one failed experiment in favor of another that would soon be exposed as equally unsuccessful. The two major weapons of the period, the big guns of Army artillery and navel ordnance and Navy ships, are examined within this framework. Horgan explores how the Congress managed their acquisition, including procedures related to the manufacture of artillery in private sector founders and government facilities, as well as the construction projects for Navy ships. She demonstrates how policy decisions made during these early years relate to the present policy environment for the acquisition of major weapon systems.

In Russia and Armed Persuasion, Stephen J. Cimbala argues that Russia's war planners and political leaders must make painful adjustments in their thinking about the relationship between military art and policy in the twenty-first century. Russia must master the use of force for persuasion, not just destruction. As the author shows, military persuasion requires that Russian leaders master the politico-military complexity of crisis management, deterrence and arms control, and the limitation of ends and means in war. Russia now has scarce resources to devote to defense and can no longer afford the stick-only diplomacy and strategy that have characterized some of its recent past. Russian and Soviet military thinking historically emphasized the blunderbuss and total war: overwhelming mass, firepower, and conflicts of annihilation or prolonged attrition. However, historical experience also forced Russia and the Soviet Union to come to grips with crisis management and with limited aims and means in the conduct of war. On the one hand, Russia failed the test of military persuasion in its management of the July 1914 crisis that plunged Europe into World War I. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did adjust to the requirements of the nuclear age for crisis management, deterrence, and limited war. Using this mixed record of Russian and Soviet success and failure in twentieth century experience, Cimbala argues that Russia can, and must, improve in the twenty-first century. According to the author, the first decades of this century will pose at least three immediate challenges to Russia's military persuasion. Russia must continue to pursue strategic nuclear arms control and arms reductions, with the United States and avoid re-starting the Cold War by means of an ill-considered race in missile defenses. Second, Russia must maintain a surer grip on the military information revolution, especially as it pertains to the management of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Third, Russia must develop forces that are more flexible in small wars and peace operations: its recent experiences in Chechnya show that it has a long way to go in using economy of force as a military persuader. Cimbala's original analysis demonstrates the similar features in apparently dissimilar, or even opposite, events and processes. For example, he shows how the problem of military persuasion applies equally to the challenge of managing a nuclear crisis and the problem of low-intensity war. In each case, the dilemma is calibrating the military means to the political ends. Controversially, the author argues against both military and academic traditionalists, contending that the complexity of the force-policy relationship in the next century will reward the subtle users of military power and that others will be subject to a 'Gulliver effect' of diminishing returns.

Colonel David T. Twining and his colleagues look at the impact of glasnost and the collapse of the Soviet system on the military. The case study approach used allows for in-depth examination of a number of key issues. Within the former USSR, the remarkable record of sacrifice and valor by women in wartime has not been matched by equal opportunity during peacetime, where they are effectively excluded from meaningful military careers. The KGB, the world's largest security and intelligence organization, proved to be among the most resistant to reform, and this, the book contends, appears to have hastened its doom. The adoption of the rule of law was widely resisted in the Soviet armed forces, and reforms in military service have come from demands by parents and relatives that the military change its lethal ways. Soviet foreign military affairs have also been affected by glasnost. The volume looks at the influence of the war in Afghanistan in the reversal of Moscow's Middle East policy. Equally important, but unheralded, has been the re-establishment of ties with China. Together, the essays in this collection illustrate the impact of a stressed political system struggling to adapt to changing circumstances, caught between the exigencies of reform and revolt. Students and scholars involved in Soviet studies as well as contemporary military studies will find much to ponder.

For more than a decade, international troops have been deployed to Afghanistan. Out of all NATO members, this mission was the most difficult for Germany that had thus far never engaged in combat and offensive military activities. This book analyses how Germany's experiences in Afghanistan have changed the country's strategic culture.

This book highlights recent advances in the development of effective modeling and solution approaches to enhance the performance of military logistics. It seeks to further research in global defense-related topics, including military operations, governmental operations and security, as well as nation support. Additionally its purpose is to promote the global exchange of information and ideas amongst developers and users of military operations research tools and techniques. Over the course of its nine chapters, this edited volume addresses significant issues in military logistics including: a) Restructuring processes via OR methods aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the military logistics, b) Sense-and-Respond logistics prediction and coordination techniques that provide competitive advantage, spanning the full range of military operations across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, c) Procurement and auctioning, d) Inventory and stock control theories and applications, e) Military transport and logistical equipment, and, f) Maintenance, repair and overhaul on operational capability in general and equipment availability. The book aims to bridge the gap between the abundant literature on commercial logistics and its scarce defense & combat counterpart. This collection of useful insights into new trends and research will offer an ideal reference for practitioners and army related personnel interested in integrating scientific rigor to improve logistics management within defense organizations & agencies. Ultimately this book should provide a relevant platform for the latest contributions of operations management, operations research, and computational intelligence towards the enhancement of military logistics.

Offering a new perspective on the widely discussed debate on how the international community would respond to a nuclear-armed Iran, this critical research challenges the prevailing wisdom that a nuclear Iran would provoke a nuclear proliferation cascade in the Middle East.Hobbs and Moran assess the proliferation calculus of four key countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Syria, as well exploring the possibility that Iran would transfer nuclear materials to terrorists groups. The authors conclude that a nuclear domino effect would be highly unlikely, even in the face of an Iranian bomb, thus undermining one of the major arguments used in support of pre-emptive military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.A range of policy measures are outlined, that could be enacted by the international community to further reduce the risk of a regional proliferation cascade, making this text a must-read for policy makers, security and international relations scholars and all those with an interest in the Middle East.

This book is a critical analysis of the issues and problems in the U.S. domestic arena and how these affect and interplay with the formulation and implementation of U.S. national security. The threats and challenges of the external environment are examined and analyzed with respect to their impact on the domestic political-social environment. Special attention is placed on the national security establishment. The result is a book that identifies major linkages between the domestic and national security agendas, showing how these agendas affect each other, and what such linkages mean in terms of national security policy and the ability of the United States to design and implement a national security policy that will be appropriate for the 21st century.

Developments in the Soviet Union necessitate a radical restructuring of U.S.-Soviet relations and the security system that underpins them. Marshall Brement succinctly and masterfully chronicles the history of this relationship and offers a prescription for change in this important book. The United States can influence the power struggle within the USSR by holding out the prospect of going beyond the wary cooperation that our government espouses, to a relationship that embodies comprehensive partnership. It is only through such a relationship that we can achieve a genuine new world order guaranteeing security for decades to come and at the same time sloughing off the burden of excessive defense costs that this nation can no longer afford. The new grand strategy outlined here would demand much of the Soviets, but also offers much. It has a nuclear component, a conventional arms component, an economic component, a Third World component, and a Western Europe component. It sets out clear benchmarks and a method for moving ahead.

Past Soviet and American security policies are so interrelated that they must be changed together, not separately or in sequence. To accomplish this change, the fear doctrine of nuclear deterrence that underlies our entire defense philosophy must be abandoned. The sophistication and power of modern conventional weapons makes it possible for both sides to reduce, even eliminate, nuclear weapons. While establishing a program to eliminate nuclear weapons, we must concurrently lay down benchmarks as to what exactly will be required from both Moscow and Washington to make such a transformation possible, restructure our armed forces to make them less threatening to each other, and engage in a broad-ranging program of economic investment and cooperation in solving critical global problems. These proposals are radical, even visionary. Nevertheless, only through a comprehensive program can a fundamentally different U.S.-Soviet relationship be achieved. This book is addressed not only to the specialist in Soviet and security affairs, but also to a general audience of informed citizens.

A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines systematically the "Colossal Cracks" operational technique employed by Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group and demonstrates the key significance that morale and casualty concerns exerted on this technique. To ensure a full understanding of the campaign, one needs to look not only at Montgomery's methods but at those of his army commanders, Dempsey and Crerar; thus, this study addresses the scant attention to date paid to these two figures. Hart suggests that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested. In fact, "Colossal Cracks," the concentration of massive force at a point of German weakness, represented the most appropriate weapon the 1944 British Army could develop under the circumstances. Previous studies have been characterized by an overemphasis on Montgomery's role in the campaign, rather than a systematic examination of overall British methods. They have ignored the difficulties that the 1944 British Army faced given its manpower shortage, and they have underestimated the appropriateness of Monty's methods to the campaign war aims that Britain pursued: namely, the desire that Britain's modest military forces secure a high profile within a larger Allied effort. The cautious, firepower-laden approach used by the 21st Army Group was both crude and a double-edged sword; however, despite these weaknesses, "Colossal Cracks" represented an appropriate technique given the nature of British war aims and the relative capabilities of the forces involved. It proved to be just enough to defeatthe Germans and keep alive British hopes that her war aims might be achieved.

This book uncovers how US-India relations have changed and intensified during the administrations of Bill Clinton, George Bush Jr., and Barack Obama. Throughout the Cold War, US-India relations were often distant and volatile as India mostly received attention at times of grave international crises, but from the late 1990s onwards, the US showed a more sustained interest in India. How was this shift possible? While previous scholarship has focused on the civilian nuclear deal as a turning point, this book presents an alternative account for this change by analyzing how India's identity has been constructed in different terms after the Cold War. It examines the underlying discourse and explains how this enables or constrains US foreign policymakers when they establish security policies with India and improve US-India relations.

The ebbs and flows of Indian history can also be charted through the country's "maritime blindness" - its onset and the national endeavour to overcome it. The story of developing India's maritime capacity, since independence, is also about the kind of international and regional footprint it needs to have. In this book, the author discusses India's new and old maritime challenges and contextualises them in terms of its inherent institutional strengths to cope with their bewildering complexity. Their complexity is not just due to their sheer scale; the degrading institutional capacities, within countries and internationally, act as threat multipliers. The dynamics of global geopolitics, the seismic perturbations of global economy, and the dizzying pace of technology belie presuppositions for global future; all strategic analysts recognise our current, persisting conundrums. Taking into account the country's critical strategic weight in the maritime domain, the author suggests an approach - about the right 'mix' of the 'traditional' and the 'non-traditional' threats - in the institutional agendas of various governance mechanisms concerning different water bodies, especially the Indian Ocean Region, which also demands of India both hardware and software capacities, including diplomatic. He concludes that the effect of such an approach would be stabilising, consonant with the civilisational vision of the founders of the modern Indian nation.

After briefly dealing with arguments for and against NATO's enlargement as far as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the author shows why the enlargement process must be carried forward to include, in the near future, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Ukraine. Inclusion of the Baltic States and of Ukraine in NATO would stabilize the region by helping the Russian democrats to concentrate on building a genuinely democratic, market-oriented Russian national state, instead of succumbing to the temptation to restore the Soviet Union. Ukraine could also contribute to NATO a sizable conventional military force and a prime strategic area; the Baltic States offer a prime location and an indomitable spirit. The Balts and Ukraine will help NATO when finally admitted as full members.

Using polling data, printed material, and interviews with Lithuanian and Ukrainian diplomats, the book convincingly shows the soundness of the Baltic and Ukrainian security goals without glossing over some difficulties, both internal and external.