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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Defence strategy, planning & research
This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.
The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a collection of vignettes
written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences
fighting the Mujahideen guerrillas. The material was originally
collected and published by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College
to serve as a text on combat against a guerrilla force in
mountain-desert terrain. It was originally intended for internal
use only and as such provides examples of both good and bad
military practice. The hard lessons learned are not specifically
'Russian' in nature and many of the same mistakes and successes
would apply equally to the American Army in Vietnam. Indeed, the
knowledge gained from these reports should also apply to future
conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rugged terrain.
This work contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. After an analysis of existing literature on this subject and a discussion of case studies, Rear Admiral Menon develops the argument that those navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to the overall political objectives. Government neglect, inadequate funding and structures that are more appropriate to purely maritime wars are symptomatic of a universal strategic dilemma that arises from inadequate strategic theory.
From 1918 to 1939 one issue dominated French foreign and defence policy: the German problem. This work outlines France's strategies for protection and appeasement during this period and places inter-war relations in a larger European context. With contributions from scholars in the field, it examines: relationships with key countries such as Italy and Russia; the significance of inter-war France to 20th-century European integration; the historical context of the policies; and the setbacks and defeats of the period and how they should be evaluated.
Health Security Intelligence introduces readers to the world of health security, to threats like COVID-19, and to the many other incarnations of global health security threats and their implications for intelligence and national security. Disease outbreaks like COVID-19 have not historically been considered a national security matter. While disease outbreaks among troops have always been a concern, it was the potential that arose in the first half of the twentieth century to systematically design biological weapons and to develop these at an industrial scale, that initially drew the attention of security, defence and intelligence communities to biology and medical science. This book charts the evolution of public health and biosecurity threats from those early days, tracing how perceptions of these threats have expanded from deliberately introduced disease outbreaks to also incorporate natural disease outbreaks, the unintended consequences of research, laboratory accidents, and the convergence of emerging technologies. This spectrum of threats has led to an expansion of the stakeholders, tools and sources involved in intelligence gathering and threat assessments. This edited volume is a landmark in efforts to develop a multidisciplinary, empirically informed, and policy-relevant approach to intelligence-academia engagement in global health security that serves both the intelligence community and scholars from a broad range of disciplines. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the journal, Intelligence and National Security.
An extraordinary tale, much-neglected by historians, of courage, bravery and eventual tragedy which took place during the First World War in the Middle East. It is the story of a small group of people, of whom Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn were the core, who were devoted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, and who were convinced that it was in imminent danger of extinction from the Turks.They resolved to help the British in Egypt by collecting military intelligence. Unfortunately, as Peter Calvocoressi points out, their understanding of the British position was quite wrong...[their] miscalculations created the tragedy which this book recounts...'
This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.
Knowledge is the basic output of the defense technology
establishment in the United States; it is what enables the
development of weapon systems. From this premise, this volume
explores the process of knowledge production in defense technology
from the beginnings of the Cold War to the present time. Produced
through the process of research and development (R&D),
technical knowledge for defense is an economic commodity. It is
"fundable" in the sense of having future value. Like other
commodities in the futures market, it is purchased before it is
produced. But unlike those other commodities, this knowledge is
typically produced through the joint efforts of the customer and
the vendor.
This book describes, for the first time, allied contingency plans for military operations in the Middle East, in the event of a global conflict with the Soviet Union. It argues that the diplomatic events and crises in the Middle East during the first decade after World War Two can be understood only in the context of the military and strategic assets sought by the allies in that region, in view of the perceived Soviet threat. Professor Cohen synthesises military and diplomatic thought during the crucial decade after World War Two and thus brings a new, comprehensive understanding of the major events of this decade; the Truman Doctrine; the protracted Anglo-Egyptian crisis; the first Arab-Israeli war; the Tripartite Declaration; and the formation of the Baghdad Pact. This valuable study places events in the Middle East within the wider context of the global geo-strategic balance, and the decline of British power. It records also the reluctance of the United States to do what eventually became inevitable - to take over Britain's traditional hegemony in the near and Middle East.
With well over a million copies sold, Sun Tzu's The Art of War is a true masterpiece, a series of brilliant aphorisms that illuminate the planning and conduct of war. Now this classic work is available in an elegant illustrated edition, featuring seventy-five color and black-and-white images. From perceptive descriptions of the nine varieties of terrain, to advice on how to gage an enemy's weaknesses and strengths, to suggestions on the employment of secret agents, here is timeless advice on combat and military strategy. Sun Tzu's writings are unsurpassed in depth of understanding, shedding light not only on battlefield maneuvers, but also on the relevant economic, political, and psychological factors that can shape the outcome of warfare. Equally important, the precepts outlined by Sun Tzu over two thousand years ago can be applied with great success outside the theater of war. Indeed, it is read avidly by corporate executives worldwide and has been touted in the movie Wall Street and the television series The Sopranos as the ultimate guide to strategy. Finally, this edition offers the definitive translation of Sun Tzu's text, by former U.S. Marine Brigadier General Samuel Griffith, who was also an authority of Mao Tse-Tung. Remarkable for its clear organization, lucid prose, and the acuity of its intellectual and moral insights, The Art of War is the definitive study of combat. It is an essential book for military history buffs, and an ideal gift for anyone who is interested in tactics and strategy, whether on the battlefield or in the boardroom.
By comparison with the other facets of intelligence, the analytical role provided by intelligence agencies has not received the scholarly attention that it rightly deserves. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays comprising it may be divided into four self-contained sets of essays. The first critically examines the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. Each is written by someone who participated at a senior level and hence knows their respective strengths and weaknesses well. The second series of essays looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. While two specifically examine how well intelligence producers have related to their political masters, another dissects the internal relationships that have developed between CIA analysts and their managers. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Here such new analytical priorities as the environment, peacekeeping and arms proliferation are singled out for study. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.
This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.
In From Flintlock to Rifle, Professor Ross traces the development of infantry tactics from the mid-eighteenth century, when infantry fought in rigid linear formations, until the second half of the nineteenth century, by which time infantrymen with rifled weapons were learning to advance in open order and use aimed fire. The author demonstrates that this transition in tactics involved social and technological change as well as military innovation. Old Regime armies, recruited from a narrow social base and armed with slow-firing, short-range, inaccurate weapons, relied upon harsh discipline and formalized evolutions to attain tactical proficiency. When the French Royal Army collapsed it was replaced with a mass citizen army. This contained elements of the old tactical system but placed a new emphasis on mobility, flexibility, and individual initiative. Napoleon's rivals either imitated aspects of the French system or sought to copy the spirit of the new tactics, engineering social reforms from above and creating their own citizen armies. After 1815, generals and politicians continued to develop tactical doctrines that embodied the lessons of the Napoleonic wars. Industrialization had a swift impact on weapons technology and firearms improved in range, accuracy, and rate of fire. As a result, military men had to modify their drill and battle tactics to cope with increased firepower. A process initiated by the French Revolution was thus accelerated by the Industrial Revolution.
Leifer's assessment posts a warning sign for those who see no reason to worry about the stability of East Asia. He warns that "the ARF is embryonic, one-dimensional approach" to the major changes taking place in the security environment of the vital East Asian region.
The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.
The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations", "deep battle", and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.
This is the first book to appear on British intelligence operations based in both India and London, which defended the Indian Empire against subversion during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It is concerned with the threat to the British Raj posed by the Indian revolutionary movement, the resulting development of the imperial intelligence service and the role it played during the First World War.
Many aspects of the Tet offensive of 1968 are brought to light here. The offensive is acknowledged as the turning point of the Vietnam War. Using Communist Vietnamese documents combined with Western sources, the author provides a more accurate version of the events, their significance, and reveals the crucial role played by US intelligence. This book illustrates that in the 1960s the Communist Vietnamese were well aware of the political and diplomatic nature of a People's War.
This book traces the history of Australia's highly secret Intelligence Security Organisation. Established in the early days of the Cold War, like most intelligence organisations working under covert conditions, it exceeded the vague powers entrusted to it. It has been the subject of two Royal Commissions in Australia and in recent times several acts of Parliament have been passed in order to make it more accountable to Australia's government and its citizens.
In this volume the authors examine relationships between the growth and the economic, political and strategic expansion of a country and its propensity for conflict and war. The intention is to ascertain through the systematic analysis of one case over 100 years the extent to which territorial expansion and armed conflict are less an inevitable consequence of growth and development than an outcome of the demands and requirements of states and their economic, political and strategic security needs. Also of critical concern is the extent to which national expansion, once accepted as a security imperative, may create its own demands and requirements for even further expansion. The study combines historical inquiry with quantitative analysis in order to compare Japanese modes of growth, expansion and conflict from the Meiji Restoration to World War I, during the inter-war period and over the years since 1945. This book should be of interest to postgraduates and academics; politics, history and Japanese studies.
* divergencies between practice and policy in NATO US-European
positions
During the decade that preceded Mikhail Gorbachev's era of glasnost
and perestroika, the KGB headquarters in Moscow was putting out a
constant stream of instructions to its Residencies abroad. These
top secret documents were principally concerned with agent
recruitment, infiltration of key foreign organizations,
intelligence collection and interpretation, and influence
operations, while endeavouring at all times to promote and protect
the interests of the Soviet Union against countries seen as
enemies. |
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