The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces.

The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

This work proposes the reorganization of America's ground forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Central to the proposal is the simple thesis that the U.S. Army must take control of its future by exploiting the emerging revolution in military affairs. The analysis argues that a new Army warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint operations; reorganized information age ground forces will be significantly less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the Army's current Cold War division-based organizations. And while ground forces must be equipped with the newest Institute weapons, new technology will not fulfill its promise of shaping the battlefield to American advantage if new devices are merely grafted on to old organizations that are not specifically designed to exploit them. It is not enough to rely on the infusion of new, expensive technology into the American defense establishment to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century. The work makes it clear that planes, ships, and missiles cannot do the job of defending America's global security issues alone. The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires; constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the counterinsurgency effort's force organization; and the conversion cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and its influence on these imperative fundamentals.

This superb introduction to NATO is written for the national security novice, yet is full of insights for the more seasoned hand interested in how and why NATO reached its current state. In the more than half-century since NATO was founded, there has been endless debate about its purpose, about whether it is meeting that purpose, and about the strategies it employs to that end. Speculation has also been rife about the organization's "imminent demise." Those questions and more are the subject of NATO: A Guide to the Issues. Covering the organization from its founding in 1949 through the present, the guide examines aspects of NATO that have undergone tremendous change over the years, including its purpose, military mission, geographic concept of operations, and membership. At the same time, it explores key aspects of NATO's organization that have remained constant. These include the ability of members to participate in operations as much or as little as they desire, decision-making by consensus, and a general belief that people from different countries working together on a daily basis promotes cooperation, understanding, and friendship. Illustrations Maps A chronology

This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

A war of attrition is usually conceptualized as a bloody slogging match, epitomized by imagery of futile frontal assaults on the Western Front of the First World War. As such, many academics, politicians, and military officers currently consider attrition to be a wholly undesirable method of warfare. This first book-length study of wars of attrition challenges this viewpoint. A historical analysis of the strategic thought behind attrition demonstrates that it was often implemented to conserve casualties, not to engage in a bloody senseless assault. Moreover, attrition frequently proved an effective means of attaining a state's political aims in warfare, particularly in serving as a preliminary to decisive warfare, reducing risk of escalation, and coercing an opponent in negotiations.

Malkasian analyzes the thought of commanders who implemented policies of attrition from 1789 to the present. His study includes figures central to the study of war, such as the Duke of Wellington, Carl von Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell Hart, General William Slim, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew Ridgeway, and General William Westmoreland. While special attention is devoted to the Second World War in the Pacific and the Korean War, this study notes the utility of attrition during the Cold War, as the risk of a Third World War rendered more aggressive strategies unattractive. Increasingly, the United States finds itself facing conflicts that are not amenable to a decisive military solution in which opponents seek prolonged war that will inflict as many casualties as possible on American forces.

Terroredia is a newly coined term by the editor, Dr. Mahmoud Eid, to explain the phenomenal, yet under-researched relationship between terrorists and media professionals in which acts of terrorism and media coverage are exchanged, influenced, and fueled by one another. Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: The Age of Terroredia provides a timely and thorough discussion on a wide range of issues surrounding terrorism in relation to both traditional and new media. Comprised of insights and research from leading experts in the fields of terrorism and media studies, this publication presents various topics relating to Terroredia: understanding of terrorism and the role of the media, terrorism manifestations and media representations of terrorism, types of terrorism and media stereotypes of terrorism, terrorism tactics and media strategies, the war on terrorism, the function of terrorism and the employment of the media, new terrorism and new media, contemporary cases of terrorist-media interactions, the rationality behind terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as the responsibility of the media. This publication is of interest to government officials, media professionals, researchers, and upper-level students interested in learning more about the complex relationship between terrorism and the media.

As David Vine demonstrates, the overseas bases raise geopolitical tensions and provoke widespread antipathy towards the United States. They also undermine American democratic ideals, pushing the U.S. into partnerships with dictators and perpetuating a system of second-class citizenship in territories like Guam. They breed sexual violence, destroy the environment, and damage local economies. And their financial cost is staggering: though the Pentagon underplays the numbers, Vine's accounting proves that the bill approaches $100 billion per year. For many decades, the need for overseas bases has been a quasi-religious dictum of U.S. foreign policy. But in recent years, a bipartisan coalition has finally started to question this conventional wisdom. With the U.S. withdrawing from Afghanistan and ending thirteen years of war, there is no better time to re-examine the tenets of our military strategy. Base Nation is an essential contribution to that debate.

This handbook reveals the techniques and tactics that make the U.S. Army Special Forces some of the most elite and highly skilled soldiers in the world. Trained to succeed in specialized operations such as reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and counter-terrorism, these soldiers undergo a rigorous selection process and operate under the principles of self-sufficiency, stealth, speed, and teamwork. Here readers will discover how guerrilla forces differ from special forces and how unconventional warfare relates to both; how to conduct a raid; how to improvise explosive devices; and how special forces carry out air operations.

This wide-ranging book analyses EU-Asia security relations in a systematic, substantive and comparative manner. The contributions assess similarities and differences between the EU and its Asian partners with respect to levels of threat perception, policy response and security cooperation in the context of historical, institutional and external factors - such as the influence of the United States. The book presents original empirical research organised in four parts: a number of contributions providing discussions of the global context in which EU-Asia security relations develop; a series of chapters covering the range of dimensions of EU-Asian security, including both traditional and non-military aspects of security; chapters addressing the specific issues touching on bilateral relations between the EU and its partners in the Asia-Pacific region; and a final part presenting the overall findings across the various contributions together with the future outlook for EU-Asia security relations.

The Army version "Map Reading and Land Navigation" is the simplest and most straightforward explanation of how to get around with just a compass and a map. This guide is perfect for any outdoorsman or for teaching Boy Scouts how to use a compass.

The first complete reference on the military-industrial complex, from its Cold War era expansion to the present. The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society addresses the broad subject of the political economy of defense research and its wide-reaching effects on many aspects of American life. Ranging from the massive arms buildup of the Cold War to the influx of private contractors and corporations such as Halliburton, it reveals the interconnectedness of the military, industry, and government within the history of this public/private enterprise. The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society offers over 100 alphabetically organized entries on a wide of range of significant research bodies and government agencies, as well as important people, events, and technologies. In addition, a series of essays looks at such essential topics as propaganda, think tanks, defense budgeting, the defense industry and the economy, and the breakdown of the military-industrial complex in Vietnam. With this work, students, policymakers, and other interested readers will understand the ramifications of the relationships between industry, scientific and technological communities, the government, and society. Over 100 alphabetically organized entries on the government agencies, defense contractors, academic institutions, individuals, historic events, and technological breakthroughs relevant to the emergence and growth of the military-industrial complex Contributions from over 25 accomplished scholars and experts on various aspects of the military-industrial complex and its wide-ranging influence on Cold War and post-Cold War America A detailed chronology of key events in the development of the relationship between industry, science and technology, and the government An extensive bibliography guiding readers to a wealth of additional print resources for further investigation

Reports of NATO's death have been greatly exaggerated. Characterizations of NATO as a "relic" of the past do not square with the fact that the Alliance is busier today than at any time in its history. As Europe has become more unified and more democratic, NATO has assumed new layers of significance in the global security environment. In a post-September 11 world, the old 1990s debate about what is "in area" and what is "out of area" is a luxury that the Alliance can no longer afford. Decisions made at the 2004 Istanbul summit aimed at enhancing NATO's partnerships with the states of Central Asia and extending the partnership concept to the Greater Middle East reflect the Alliance's new, more global presence as do new military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Moore argues that a careful analysis of NATO's new, more global focus suggests that it's not the nature of NATO's mission that has changed, but rather its scope. NATO is approaching its new "out of area" missions with the political tools developed after the Soviet threat faded in the early 1990s when the Allies agreed that, rather than merely defend an old order, they would now create a new one grounded in liberal democratic values, including individual liberty and the rule of law. Indeed, the mission of projecting stability eastward was understood to be inextricable from the promotion of these values. This new mission required that NATO devote greater attention to its political dimension. In fact, as the United States turned to promoting democracy around the world in the wake of September 11, it ultimately sought to enlist NATO in its mission of extending democracy beyond Europe to Central Asia and the Middle East. AsMoore demonstrates in her attempt to provide a full and comprehensive understanding of the new NATO, while divisions within the Alliance persist as to just how global NATO should be, the post-September 11 security environment ensures that NATO's survival depends upon its willingness to project security beyond Europe. That mission will be as much political as it is military.

A no-nonsense treatment of information operations, this handbook makes clear what does and does not fall under information operations, how the military plans and executes such efforts, and what the role of IO ought to be in the "war of ideas." Paul provides detailed accounts of the doctrine and practice of the five core information operations capabilities (psychological operations, military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations) and the three "related" capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military support to public diplomacy). The discussion of each capability includes historical examples, explanations of tools and forces available, and current challenges faced by that community. An appendix of selected excerpts from military doctrine ties the work firmly to the military theory behind information operations. Paul argues that contemporary IO's mixing of capabilities focused on information content with those focused on information systems conflates "apples" with the "apple carts." This important study concludes that information operations would be better poised to contribute to the war of ideas if IO were reorganized, separating content capabilities from systems capabilities and separating the employment of "black" (deceptive or falsely attributed) information from "white" (wholly truthful and correctly attributed) information.