“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia� – Winston Churchill, 5 March 1946 Following the Allies’ victory in World War II, the European continent was soon divided into two broad zones of influence, with Eastern Europe coming under communist Soviet control, and the west under the oversight of the liberal democracies led by the United States. What developed over the next 40 years was a military and ideological stand-off that defined Europe and much of the world until 1989. In countries such as Germany, the Cold War divided families between the two zones of control. The two opponents competed for global dominance, building up ever greater arsenals of nuclear weapons, funding and fighting costly proxy wars in Southeast Asia, Africa and Central America, deploying espionage and trade embargoes, and even seeking technological advantage in space exploration, which became known as the “Space Race�. The Cold War provides a pictorial examination of this crucial era in 20th century history, offering the reader an instant understanding of the key events and figures in this 40-year period through 150 dramatic photographs.

In an increasingly complex and unpredictable world, a growing number of observers and practitioners have called for a re-examination of our national security system. Central to any such reform effort is an evaluation of Congress. Is Congress adequately organized to deal with national security issues in an integrated and coordinated manner? How have developments in Congress over the past few decades, such as heightened partisanship, message politics, party-committee relationships and bicameral relations, affected topical security issues? This volume examines variation in the ways Congress has engaged federal agencies overseeing our nation's national security as well as various domestic political determinants of security policy.

This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

The book examines Bernard Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age, embedding his work within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz. Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) was a leading 20th century theorist and philosopher of war. A key architect of American nuclear strategy, Brodie was one of the first civilian defense intellectuals to cross over into the military world. "State of Doom" explores Brodie's evolution as a theorist and his response to the technological innovations that transformed warfare from WWII to the Vietnam War. It situates his theoretical development within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), as Brodie came to be known as "America's Clausewitz." While his first influential works focused on naval strategy, his most lasting impact came within the field of nuclear strategic thinking. Brodie helped conceptualize America's strategy of deterrence, later taking into account America's loss of nuclear monopoly, thermonuclear weapons, and intercontinental missiles. This in-depth exploration of Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age and of his effort to reconcile Clausewitz's theories to the new challenges of the nuclear era will make this book a must read to anyone in strategic studies, international relations, and philosophy of war.

In 2015, the United States Department of Defense published its long-awaited Law of War Manual making a significant statement on the position of the US government on important military matters. Whilst readers recognise the Manual's legal and strategic importance, they may question whether particular statements of law are legally accurate or complete. This book offers a unique in-depth review of the complete Manual, including revisions, on a paragraph-by-paragraph, line-by-line and word-by-word basis. The authors offer their personal assessment of the DoD's declared view as to the law that regulates the conduct of warfare, a subject of unparalleled current importance. William H. Boothby and Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg offer a balanced, articulate and authoritative critique for readers perusing the Manual in whatever capacity.

As David Vine demonstrates, the overseas bases raise geopolitical tensions and provoke widespread antipathy towards the United States. They also undermine American democratic ideals, pushing the U.S. into partnerships with dictators and perpetuating a system of second-class citizenship in territories like Guam. They breed sexual violence, destroy the environment, and damage local economies. And their financial cost is staggering: though the Pentagon underplays the numbers, Vine's accounting proves that the bill approaches $100 billion per year. For many decades, the need for overseas bases has been a quasi-religious dictum of U.S. foreign policy. But in recent years, a bipartisan coalition has finally started to question this conventional wisdom. With the U.S. withdrawing from Afghanistan and ending thirteen years of war, there is no better time to re-examine the tenets of our military strategy. Base Nation is an essential contribution to that debate.

The European Rupture focuses on the consequences of the end of the Cold War for defence sectors in Europe. It offers a theoretical framework supported by country case studies from both Western Europe and formerly centrally planned economies.The discussion in the first part of the book analyses the connection between security and the Cold War economy, arguing that the defence sector profoundly shaped the technological development and industrial and social policy in both East and West. It considers some of the issues that have to be confronted in the transition periods, focusing on the new challenges to our perceptions of security, changes in technology and problems of defence conversion. The final part considers the need for new institutional arrangements and how these have to be constructed in order to re-establish a system of international security and economic regulation. It proposes that there should be a shift away from national or bloc security policies towards a more internationalist security policy, and appropriate measures of economic adjustment, especially defence conversion. This book will be of special interest to academics and students interested in European studies, international affairs, international policy and policymakers.

This provocative book seeks to answer a most crucial-and embarrassing-question concerning the U.S. military: why the United States is so often stymied in military confrontations with seemingly weaker opponents, despite its "superpower" status. This fascinating book examines a question that continues to puzzle soldiers, statesmen, and scholars: why do major powers-including the ostensible superpower United States-repeatedly perform poorly against seemingly overmatched adversaries? And what can they, and the United States, do to better achieve their military objectives? How Wars are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military Power argues that beyond relying solely on overwhelming military might, the United States needs to focus more on exploiting weaknesses in their adversaries-such as national will, resource mobilization, and strategic miscues-just as opposing forces have done to gain advantage over our military efforts. The author tests the "vulnerability theory" by revisiting six conflicts from the Philippine War of 1899-1902 to the ongoing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, showing again and again that victory often depends more on outthinking the enemy than outmuscling them. Interviews and data drawn from the author's personal experiences as a U.S. Army officer Six case study chapters on U.S. conflicts where military superiority alone was not the decisive factor in the outcome (the Philippines, World War II, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan)

Reports of NATO's death have been greatly exaggerated. Characterizations of NATO as a "relic" of the past do not square with the fact that the Alliance is busier today than at any time in its history. As Europe has become more unified and more democratic, NATO has assumed new layers of significance in the global security environment. In a post-September 11 world, the old 1990s debate about what is "in area" and what is "out of area" is a luxury that the Alliance can no longer afford. Decisions made at the 2004 Istanbul summit aimed at enhancing NATO's partnerships with the states of Central Asia and extending the partnership concept to the Greater Middle East reflect the Alliance's new, more global presence as do new military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Moore argues that a careful analysis of NATO's new, more global focus suggests that it's not the nature of NATO's mission that has changed, but rather its scope. NATO is approaching its new "out of area" missions with the political tools developed after the Soviet threat faded in the early 1990s when the Allies agreed that, rather than merely defend an old order, they would now create a new one grounded in liberal democratic values, including individual liberty and the rule of law. Indeed, the mission of projecting stability eastward was understood to be inextricable from the promotion of these values. This new mission required that NATO devote greater attention to its political dimension. In fact, as the United States turned to promoting democracy around the world in the wake of September 11, it ultimately sought to enlist NATO in its mission of extending democracy beyond Europe to Central Asia and the Middle East. AsMoore demonstrates in her attempt to provide a full and comprehensive understanding of the new NATO, while divisions within the Alliance persist as to just how global NATO should be, the post-September 11 security environment ensures that NATO's survival depends upon its willingness to project security beyond Europe. That mission will be as much political as it is military.

The Army version "Map Reading and Land Navigation" is the simplest and most straightforward explanation of how to get around with just a compass and a map. This guide is perfect for any outdoorsman or for teaching Boy Scouts how to use a compass.

The United States faces a small number of rogue states that either have or are working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These NASTIs, or NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention, include such states as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies have helped to keep this number small, but U.S. and allied counterproliferation programs are essential to reduce the danger. It is up to deterrence, active defenses, passive defenses, decontamination, and counterforce to turn enemy weapons of mass destruction into instruments of limited destructive effect. Warfighters will also have to adopt a different strategy and concept of operations in fighting an adversary that is so heavily armed. This strategy will feature a combination of deception, dispersion, mobility and maneuver, diffused logistics, remote engagement, missile defense bubbles, non-combatant evacuation operations, and large area decontamination. It will also involve upgrades to NBC passive defense measures and equipment, as well as a counterforce capability that can find and destroy a variety of adversary targets, including mobile launchers and deeply buried and hardened underground structures.

This handbook reveals the techniques and tactics that make the U.S. Army Special Forces some of the most elite and highly skilled soldiers in the world. Trained to succeed in specialized operations such as reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and counter-terrorism, these soldiers undergo a rigorous selection process and operate under the principles of self-sufficiency, stealth, speed, and teamwork. Here readers will discover how guerrilla forces differ from special forces and how unconventional warfare relates to both; how to conduct a raid; how to improvise explosive devices; and how special forces carry out air operations.

The first complete reference on the military-industrial complex, from its Cold War era expansion to the present. The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society addresses the broad subject of the political economy of defense research and its wide-reaching effects on many aspects of American life. Ranging from the massive arms buildup of the Cold War to the influx of private contractors and corporations such as Halliburton, it reveals the interconnectedness of the military, industry, and government within the history of this public/private enterprise. The Military-Industrial Complex and American Society offers over 100 alphabetically organized entries on a wide of range of significant research bodies and government agencies, as well as important people, events, and technologies. In addition, a series of essays looks at such essential topics as propaganda, think tanks, defense budgeting, the defense industry and the economy, and the breakdown of the military-industrial complex in Vietnam. With this work, students, policymakers, and other interested readers will understand the ramifications of the relationships between industry, scientific and technological communities, the government, and society. Over 100 alphabetically organized entries on the government agencies, defense contractors, academic institutions, individuals, historic events, and technological breakthroughs relevant to the emergence and growth of the military-industrial complex Contributions from over 25 accomplished scholars and experts on various aspects of the military-industrial complex and its wide-ranging influence on Cold War and post-Cold War America A detailed chronology of key events in the development of the relationship between industry, science and technology, and the government An extensive bibliography guiding readers to a wealth of additional print resources for further investigation

As the sole remaining superpower, shouldn't the United States be able to call the tune on establishing a secure world to our liking? While most international strategists conjure up history and theory of international relations from the past to examine such a question, Sy Deitchman, in "On Being a Superpower, " focuses on today's changing conditions and attitudes. He starts by addressing hypothetical situations that keep US international security experts awake at night. What would the United States do, he asks, if, in Saudi Arabia, an armed rebellion by Islamic fundamentalists were about to topple the House of Saud while demanding that the US get out of the Middle East? Would the United States go to war to try stop China's invasion of a democratic Taiwan that declares its independence? Could the US really win such a war against a determined country that has over a billion people and nuclear weapons? If a Central American drug cartel gained de facto control of the Panama canal and turned it into a smuggling lynchpin, what would the United States do?Deitchman examines these and other scenarios and then pictures how the US would likely respond, based on our society's current moral concerns, political rhetoric, and overall world view. After reviewing the challenges the world will present to us and examining the current state of our nation and its armed forces, Deitchman describes the strategy for preserving US security that appears to be emerging without explicit planning. He shows how trends in the armed forces parallel the trends in society, and how our argumentative political system is affecting our ability to build and use military power to support our strategy. Deitchman's synthesis of all these themes shows that the existing trends in the nation and the world are not favorable for our future security. Can they be changed? And if so, how? That's the conundrum readers of this book are invited to ponder.

A no-nonsense treatment of information operations, this handbook makes clear what does and does not fall under information operations, how the military plans and executes such efforts, and what the role of IO ought to be in the "war of ideas." Paul provides detailed accounts of the doctrine and practice of the five core information operations capabilities (psychological operations, military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, and computer network operations) and the three "related" capabilities (public affairs, civil-military operations, and military support to public diplomacy). The discussion of each capability includes historical examples, explanations of tools and forces available, and current challenges faced by that community. An appendix of selected excerpts from military doctrine ties the work firmly to the military theory behind information operations. Paul argues that contemporary IO's mixing of capabilities focused on information content with those focused on information systems conflates "apples" with the "apple carts." This important study concludes that information operations would be better poised to contribute to the war of ideas if IO were reorganized, separating content capabilities from systems capabilities and separating the employment of "black" (deceptive or falsely attributed) information from "white" (wholly truthful and correctly attributed) information.

Increasingly the Middle East and its growing population face a highly complex and fragile security system. The rich deposits of natural resources, such as oil and gas, suffer from a strained renewable resource base that includes water and arable land. This leads to water scarcity, desertification, and land degradation. Increasing population, industrialization, and urbanization put more and more demand on the food supply. Energy insecurity may not be generally associated with the Middle East, but the countries in the eastern Mediterranean part have been traditionally vulnerable to it as their fossil fuel endowments have been low. Another issue is the large-scale temporary labor migration and the large number of forced migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons. The book analyzes these emerging security challenges in a comprehensive and systematic manner. It draws national and regional security issues into both the global security and human security perspectives.