This book provides an up-to-date, accessible guide to the growing threats in cyberspace that affects everyone from private individuals to businesses to national governments. Cyber Warfare: How Conflicts In Cyberspace Are Challenging America and Changing The World is a comprehensive and highly topical one-stop source for cyber conflict issues that provides scholarly treatment of the subject in a readable format. The book provides a level-headed, concrete analytical foundation for thinking about cybersecurity law and policy questions, covering the entire range of cyber issues in the 21st century, including topics such as malicious software, encryption, hardware intrusions, privacy and civil liberties concerns, and other interesting aspects of the problem. In Part I, the author describes the nature of cyber threats, including the threat of cyber warfare. Part II describes the policies and practices currently in place, while Part III proposes optimal responses to the challenges we face. The work should be considered essential reading for national and homeland security professionals as well as students and lay readers wanting to understand of the scope of our shared cybersecurity problem.

During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control.

To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation -- a process driven by soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study. Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid critique of the army's current capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for retaining lessons learned in Iraq.

The claim by the Ministry of Defence in 2001 that 'the experience of numerous small wars has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict' unravelled spectacularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. One important reason for that, David French suggests, was because contemporary British counter-insurgency doctrine was based upon a serious misreading of the past.
Until now, many observers believed that during the wars of decolonisation in the two decades after 1945, the British had discovered how western liberal notions of right and wrong could be made compatible with the imperatives of waging war amongst the people, that force could be used effectively but with care, and that a more just and prosperous society could emerge from these struggles. By using only the minimum necessary force, and doing so with the utmost discrimination, the British were able to win by securing the 'hearts and minds' of the people. But this was a serious distortion of actual British practice on the ground. David French's main contention is that the British hid their use of naked force behind a carefully constructed veneer of legality. In reality, they commonly used wholesale coercion, including cordon and search operations, mass detention without trial, forcible population resettlement, and the creation of free-fire zones to intimidate and lock-down the civilian population. The British waged their counter-insurgency campaigns by being nasty, not nice, to the people.
The British Way in Counter-Insurgency is a seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice.

The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces.

The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

This narrative chronicles Libya's, and to a vast extent Muammar Gaddafi's, remarkable past, meteoric rise to prominence, and convoluted reign, and introduces potential scenarios that may play out in the near term. After four decades of tyrannical, erratic-and pioneering-changes fueled by oil wealth, Muammar Gaddafi's government fell in 2011, and Libya embarked on a new course without known charts. Libya: History and Revolution covers the nation from its origins as independent land masses and kingdoms to its present as a consolidated nation. The work does not focus on the "old" Libya, but aims to bridge yesterday's Libya with tomorrow's, looking at the nation as a regional economic power and military player in North Africa and the Middle East. The result is a comprehensive yet easy-to-understand introduction to the political, economic, and military history and events that led to Gaddafi's downfall, coupled with a consideration of Libya's past and present. Opening with historical underpinnings, the book focuses on the conflict and revolution in Libya during the Arab Spring that brought Gaddafi down, a change that opened a new future for the oil-rich nation. The book closes with a thoughtful discussion of what may be next for Libya and of possible perils for the nation, the region, and the world, as Libya matures as an independent, representatively governed country. Covers Libya from its ancient beginnings to the present in one easily readable volume Provides a complete history of Gaddafi's Libya and its revolution, including the historical antecedents, Gaddafi's rise to power, his reign, and his fall during the Arab Spring Offers projections about the post-Gaddafi era and prospects for Libya going forward Brings together the perspectives and insights of two authors with distinct yet complementary backgrounds Offers scholars and professors the detail they seek without intimidating the undergraduate or general reader

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires; constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the counterinsurgency effort's force organization; and the conversion cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and its influence on these imperative fundamentals.

Israel's military doctrine was aimed at defeating powerful Arab militaries, mostly those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In the years 1948-1982 Israel and Arab states had a series of wars i.e. high intensity wars. Israel, since 1948, also dealt with guerrilla and terror attacks. Since 1982 and mostly in the last 15 years Israel faced hybrid forces, Hamas and Hezbollah. Those groups are a mix between a conventional military and a guerrilla group. Israel fought against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, mostly in two wars, in 2008-2009 and in 2014. This book begins with explaining Israel's national security policy. Then it focuses on how the IDF (Israel defense forces) had to adjust its doctrine and build up to confront hybrid forces, by examining Israel's air and the ground corps and major issues such as offense and defense, infrastructure and manpower. The IDF can inflict heavy casualties and damages to a hybrid foe. Yet destroying the latter is a tall order because Hezbollah and Hamas are too elusive, they hide inside populated areas etc. However, compared with past wars against Arab states, there is much less danger to Israel let alone to its survival since even a coalition between Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups can't defeat the IDF. Furthermore since fighting a hybrid force is less demanding than running a high intensity war against an Arab state, then Israel does not rely that much on the United States in receiving weapon systems, ammunition and spare parts.

Many have long suspected that when America takes up arms it is a rich man's war, but a poor man's fight. Despite these concerns about social inequality in military sacrifice, the hard data to validate such claims has been kept out of public view. In The Casualty Gap Douglas Kriner and Francis Shen renew the debate over unequal sacrifice by bringing to light mountains of new evidence on the inequality dimensions of American wartime casualties. They demonstrate unequivocally that since the conclusion of World War II communities at the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder have borne a disproportionate share of the human costs of war. Moreover, they show for the first time that when Americans are explicitly confronted with evidence of this inequality, they become markedly less supportive of the nation's war efforts.
The Casualty Gap also uncovers how wartime deaths affect entire communities. Citizens who see the high price war exacts on friends and neighbors become more likely to oppose war and to vote against the political leaders waging it than residents of low-casualty communities. Moreover, extensive empirical evidence connects higher community casualty rates in Korea and Vietnam to lower levels of trust in government, interest in politics, and electoral and non-electoral participation. In this way, the casualty gap threatens the very vibrancy of American democracy by depressing civic engagement in high-casualty communities for years after the last gun falls silent. The Casualty Gap should be read by all who care about bringing to light inequalities in military sacrifice and understanding the effects of war on society and democracy.

Terroredia is a newly coined term by the editor, Dr. Mahmoud Eid, to explain the phenomenal, yet under-researched relationship between terrorists and media professionals in which acts of terrorism and media coverage are exchanged, influenced, and fueled by one another. Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: The Age of Terroredia provides a timely and thorough discussion on a wide range of issues surrounding terrorism in relation to both traditional and new media. Comprised of insights and research from leading experts in the fields of terrorism and media studies, this publication presents various topics relating to Terroredia: understanding of terrorism and the role of the media, terrorism manifestations and media representations of terrorism, types of terrorism and media stereotypes of terrorism, terrorism tactics and media strategies, the war on terrorism, the function of terrorism and the employment of the media, new terrorism and new media, contemporary cases of terrorist-media interactions, the rationality behind terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as the responsibility of the media. This publication is of interest to government officials, media professionals, researchers, and upper-level students interested in learning more about the complex relationship between terrorism and the media.

With one quarter of proven oil reserves and the largest oil production in the world, Saudi Arabia has been at the center of world politics. Its vast oil resources have been utilized in various ways to maximize internal and external security. While oil revenue allowed the Saudi state to buy off legitimacy at home and abroad, the Saudi state exploited oil supply to either forge alliances with or pressure consuming and producing countries. By providing an insightful account of how oil resources shaped Saudi security policies since the mid-twentieth century, Islam Y. Qasem offers a timely contribution to the study of oil politics and the interrelationship between economic interdependence and security.

This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

This superb introduction to NATO is written for the national security novice, yet is full of insights for the more seasoned hand interested in how and why NATO reached its current state. In the more than half-century since NATO was founded, there has been endless debate about its purpose, about whether it is meeting that purpose, and about the strategies it employs to that end. Speculation has also been rife about the organization's "imminent demise." Those questions and more are the subject of NATO: A Guide to the Issues. Covering the organization from its founding in 1949 through the present, the guide examines aspects of NATO that have undergone tremendous change over the years, including its purpose, military mission, geographic concept of operations, and membership. At the same time, it explores key aspects of NATO's organization that have remained constant. These include the ability of members to participate in operations as much or as little as they desire, decision-making by consensus, and a general belief that people from different countries working together on a daily basis promotes cooperation, understanding, and friendship. Illustrations Maps A chronology

The book examines Bernard Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age, embedding his work within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz. Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) was a leading 20th century theorist and philosopher of war. A key architect of American nuclear strategy, Brodie was one of the first civilian defense intellectuals to cross over into the military world. "State of Doom" explores Brodie's evolution as a theorist and his response to the technological innovations that transformed warfare from WWII to the Vietnam War. It situates his theoretical development within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), as Brodie came to be known as "America's Clausewitz." While his first influential works focused on naval strategy, his most lasting impact came within the field of nuclear strategic thinking. Brodie helped conceptualize America's strategy of deterrence, later taking into account America's loss of nuclear monopoly, thermonuclear weapons, and intercontinental missiles. This in-depth exploration of Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age and of his effort to reconcile Clausewitz's theories to the new challenges of the nuclear era will make this book a must read to anyone in strategic studies, international relations, and philosophy of war.

The author, a historian and former Swiss Armoured Corp officer, uses primary documents to describe tank tactics during the first two years of World War II, a period in which armour was employed in the Polish, Western and Russian campaigns. The first year of 'Operation Barbarossa' is examined in great detail using the files of the second Panzer Army whose commander, Guderian, who has been called the father of the German armoured force.

A new framework contextualizes crucial international security issues at sea in the Indo-Pacific Competition at sea is once again a central issue of international security. Nowhere is the urgency to address state-on-state competition at sea more strongly felt than in the Indo-Pacific region, where freedom of navigation is challenged by regional states’ continuous investments in naval power, and the renewed political will to use it to undermine its principles. The New Age of Naval Power in the Indo-Pacific provides an original framework in which five “factors of influence” explain how and why naval power matters in this pivotal part of the world. An international group of contributors make the case that these five factors draw upon a longstanding influence of naval power on regional dynamics and impact the extent to which different states in the region use naval power: the capacity to exert control over sea-lanes, the capacity to deploy a nuclear deterrent at sea, the capacity to implement the law of the sea in an advantageous way, the ability to control marine resources, and the capacity for technological innovation. The New Age of Naval Power in the Indo-Pacific offers a fresh approach for academics and policy makers seeking to navigate the complexity of maritime security and regional affairs.

Written in China more than 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu's classic The Art of War is the first known study of the planning and conduct of military operations. These terse, aphoristic essays are unsurpassed in comprehensiveness and depth of understanding, examining not only battlefield maneuvers, but also relevant economic, political, and psychological factors. Indeed, the precepts outlined by Sun Tzu can be applied outside the realm of military theory. It is read avidly by Japanese businessmen and in fact was touted in the movie Wall Street as the corporate raider's bible.