Emerging as an effective alternative to organization-based information systems, cloud computing has been adopted by many businesses around the world. Despite the increased popularity, there remain concerns about the security of data in the cloud since users have become accustomed to having control over their hardware and software. Security, Trust, and Regulatory Aspects of Cloud Computing in Business Environments compiles the research and views of cloud computing from various individuals around the world. Detailing cloud security, regulatory and industry compliance, and trust building in the cloud, this book is an essential reference source for practitioners, professionals, and researchers worldwide, as well as business managers interested in an assembled collection of solutions provided by a variety of cloud users.

During the early years of the Iraq War, the US Army was unable to translate initial combat success into strategic and political victory. Iraq plunged into a complex insurgency, and defeating this insurgency required beating highly adaptive foes. A competition between the hierarchical and vertically integrated army and networked and horizontally integrated insurgents ensued. The latter could quickly adapt and conduct networked operations in a decentralized fashion; the former was predisposed to fighting via prescriptive plans under a centralized command and control.

To achieve success, the US Army went through a monumental process of organizational adaptation -- a process driven by soldiers and leaders that spread throughout the institution and led to revolutionary changes in how the army supported and conducted its operations in Iraq. How the army adapted and the implications of this adaptation are the subject of this indispensable study. Intended for policymakers, defense and military professionals, military historians, and academics, this book offers a solid critique of the army's current capacity to adapt to likely future adversary strategies and provides policy recommendations for retaining lessons learned in Iraq.

This narrative chronicles Libya's, and to a vast extent Muammar Gaddafi's, remarkable past, meteoric rise to prominence, and convoluted reign, and introduces potential scenarios that may play out in the near term. After four decades of tyrannical, erratic-and pioneering-changes fueled by oil wealth, Muammar Gaddafi's government fell in 2011, and Libya embarked on a new course without known charts. Libya: History and Revolution covers the nation from its origins as independent land masses and kingdoms to its present as a consolidated nation. The work does not focus on the "old" Libya, but aims to bridge yesterday's Libya with tomorrow's, looking at the nation as a regional economic power and military player in North Africa and the Middle East. The result is a comprehensive yet easy-to-understand introduction to the political, economic, and military history and events that led to Gaddafi's downfall, coupled with a consideration of Libya's past and present. Opening with historical underpinnings, the book focuses on the conflict and revolution in Libya during the Arab Spring that brought Gaddafi down, a change that opened a new future for the oil-rich nation. The book closes with a thoughtful discussion of what may be next for Libya and of possible perils for the nation, the region, and the world, as Libya matures as an independent, representatively governed country. Covers Libya from its ancient beginnings to the present in one easily readable volume Provides a complete history of Gaddafi's Libya and its revolution, including the historical antecedents, Gaddafi's rise to power, his reign, and his fall during the Arab Spring Offers projections about the post-Gaddafi era and prospects for Libya going forward Brings together the perspectives and insights of two authors with distinct yet complementary backgrounds Offers scholars and professors the detail they seek without intimidating the undergraduate or general reader

The claim by the Ministry of Defence in 2001 that 'the experience of numerous small wars has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict' unravelled spectacularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. One important reason for that, David French suggests, was because contemporary British counter-insurgency doctrine was based upon a serious misreading of the past.
Until now, many observers believed that during the wars of decolonisation in the two decades after 1945, the British had discovered how western liberal notions of right and wrong could be made compatible with the imperatives of waging war amongst the people, that force could be used effectively but with care, and that a more just and prosperous society could emerge from these struggles. By using only the minimum necessary force, and doing so with the utmost discrimination, the British were able to win by securing the 'hearts and minds' of the people. But this was a serious distortion of actual British practice on the ground. David French's main contention is that the British hid their use of naked force behind a carefully constructed veneer of legality. In reality, they commonly used wholesale coercion, including cordon and search operations, mass detention without trial, forcible population resettlement, and the creation of free-fire zones to intimidate and lock-down the civilian population. The British waged their counter-insurgency campaigns by being nasty, not nice, to the people.
The British Way in Counter-Insurgency is a seminal reassessment of the historical foundation of British counter doctrine and practice.

The Marine Corps University symposium, "Counterinsurgency Leadership in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond" held on September 23, 2009 at the National Press Club, Washington, DC explored ways to improve counterinsurgency leadership, with particular attention to the leaders of American, Afghan, and Iraqi forces.

The Symposium was sponsored by Marine Corps University and the Marine Corps University Foundation.

This title provides a succinct, readable, and comprehensive treatment of how the Obama administration reacted to what was arguably the most difficult foreign policy challenge of its eight years in office: the Arab Spring. As a prelude to examining how the United States reacted to the first wave of the Arab Spring in the 21st century, this book begins with an examination of how the U.S. reacted to revolution in the 19th and 20th centuries and a summary of how foreign policy is made. Each revolution in the Arab Spring (in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen) and the Obama administration's action-or inaction-in response is carefully analyzed. The U.S.' role is compared to that of regional powers, such as Turkey, Israel, and Iran. The impact of U.S. abdication in the face of pivotal events in the region is the subject of the book's conclusion. While other treatments have addressed how the Arab Spring revolutions have affected the individual countries where these revolutions took place, U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, and President Barack Obama's overall foreign policy, this is the only work that provides a comprehensive examination of both the Arab Spring revolutions themselves and the reaction of the U.S. government to those revolutions. Stands as the only academic book that specifically considers U.S. foreign policy with regard to the Arab Spring Presents the Arab Spring as a pivotal event, the U.S. reaction as a watershed, and an understanding of this interplay as vital to understanding international politics in our time Traces the often roundabout paths to the creation of U.S. policy during the Arab Spring and examines the effects of those policies Serves as an essential text for academics studying the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy, the progress of revolution, and politics in the developing world; policymakers wishing to understand how the Obama administration dealt with the most complex crisis of its eight years; and interested readers

A new framework contextualizes crucial international security issues at sea in the Indo-Pacific Competition at sea is once again a central issue of international security. Nowhere is the urgency to address state-on-state competition at sea more strongly felt than in the Indo-Pacific region, where freedom of navigation is challenged by regional states’ continuous investments in naval power, and the renewed political will to use it to undermine its principles. The New Age of Naval Power in the Indo-Pacific provides an original framework in which five “factors of influence” explain how and why naval power matters in this pivotal part of the world. An international group of contributors make the case that these five factors draw upon a longstanding influence of naval power on regional dynamics and impact the extent to which different states in the region use naval power: the capacity to exert control over sea-lanes, the capacity to deploy a nuclear deterrent at sea, the capacity to implement the law of the sea in an advantageous way, the ability to control marine resources, and the capacity for technological innovation. The New Age of Naval Power in the Indo-Pacific offers a fresh approach for academics and policy makers seeking to navigate the complexity of maritime security and regional affairs.

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires; constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the counterinsurgency effort's force organization; and the conversion cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and its influence on these imperative fundamentals.

Israel's military doctrine was aimed at defeating powerful Arab militaries, mostly those of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In the years 1948-1982 Israel and Arab states had a series of wars i.e. high intensity wars. Israel, since 1948, also dealt with guerrilla and terror attacks. Since 1982 and mostly in the last 15 years Israel faced hybrid forces, Hamas and Hezbollah. Those groups are a mix between a conventional military and a guerrilla group. Israel fought against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, mostly in two wars, in 2008-2009 and in 2014. This book begins with explaining Israel's national security policy. Then it focuses on how the IDF (Israel defense forces) had to adjust its doctrine and build up to confront hybrid forces, by examining Israel's air and the ground corps and major issues such as offense and defense, infrastructure and manpower. The IDF can inflict heavy casualties and damages to a hybrid foe. Yet destroying the latter is a tall order because Hezbollah and Hamas are too elusive, they hide inside populated areas etc. However, compared with past wars against Arab states, there is much less danger to Israel let alone to its survival since even a coalition between Hezbollah, Hamas and other groups can't defeat the IDF. Furthermore since fighting a hybrid force is less demanding than running a high intensity war against an Arab state, then Israel does not rely that much on the United States in receiving weapon systems, ammunition and spare parts.

Many have long suspected that when America takes up arms it is a rich man's war, but a poor man's fight. Despite these concerns about social inequality in military sacrifice, the hard data to validate such claims has been kept out of public view. In The Casualty Gap Douglas Kriner and Francis Shen renew the debate over unequal sacrifice by bringing to light mountains of new evidence on the inequality dimensions of American wartime casualties. They demonstrate unequivocally that since the conclusion of World War II communities at the lower end of the socioeconomic ladder have borne a disproportionate share of the human costs of war. Moreover, they show for the first time that when Americans are explicitly confronted with evidence of this inequality, they become markedly less supportive of the nation's war efforts.
The Casualty Gap also uncovers how wartime deaths affect entire communities. Citizens who see the high price war exacts on friends and neighbors become more likely to oppose war and to vote against the political leaders waging it than residents of low-casualty communities. Moreover, extensive empirical evidence connects higher community casualty rates in Korea and Vietnam to lower levels of trust in government, interest in politics, and electoral and non-electoral participation. In this way, the casualty gap threatens the very vibrancy of American democracy by depressing civic engagement in high-casualty communities for years after the last gun falls silent. The Casualty Gap should be read by all who care about bringing to light inequalities in military sacrifice and understanding the effects of war on society and democracy.

Among the operations known as Plan Bodyguard, the deception devised to cover the Allies' Normandy landing, was the little known but critical Plan Zeppelin, the largest and most complex of the Bodyguard plans. Zeppelin, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Strategy, succeeded in pinning down sixty German divisions from southern France to the Balkans in time for D-Day. This was the work of 'A' Force, Britain's only military organization tasked with carrying out both strategic and tactical deception in World War II. Whitney T. Bendeck's Diversion and Deception finds 'A' Force at its finest hour, as the war shifted from North Africa to Europe. Focusing on the years 1943 to 1945, Bendeck describes how 'A' Force, under the leadership of Dudley Clarke, orchestrated both strategic and tactical deception plans to create notional threats across the southern perimeter of Europe, with the chief objective of keeping the Germans pinned down across the Mediterranean. Her work offers a close and clarifying look at 'A' Force's structure and command, operations and methods, and successes and failures and, consequently, its undeniable contribution to the Allies' victory in World War II. By shining a light on the often overlooked Mediterranean theater and its direct connection to European plans and operations, Diversion and Deception also provides a deeper understanding of Allied grand strategy in the war. Combining military and deception histories - so often viewed in isolation - this book provides context for the deceptions and adds a layer of knowledge regarding the planning of military operations. The result is a more complete and nuanced view of Allied operations than is to be found in most histories of World War II.

This superb introduction to NATO is written for the national security novice, yet is full of insights for the more seasoned hand interested in how and why NATO reached its current state. In the more than half-century since NATO was founded, there has been endless debate about its purpose, about whether it is meeting that purpose, and about the strategies it employs to that end. Speculation has also been rife about the organization's "imminent demise." Those questions and more are the subject of NATO: A Guide to the Issues. Covering the organization from its founding in 1949 through the present, the guide examines aspects of NATO that have undergone tremendous change over the years, including its purpose, military mission, geographic concept of operations, and membership. At the same time, it explores key aspects of NATO's organization that have remained constant. These include the ability of members to participate in operations as much or as little as they desire, decision-making by consensus, and a general belief that people from different countries working together on a daily basis promotes cooperation, understanding, and friendship. Illustrations Maps A chronology

Terroredia is a newly coined term by the editor, Dr. Mahmoud Eid, to explain the phenomenal, yet under-researched relationship between terrorists and media professionals in which acts of terrorism and media coverage are exchanged, influenced, and fueled by one another. Exchanging Terrorism Oxygen for Media Airwaves: The Age of Terroredia provides a timely and thorough discussion on a wide range of issues surrounding terrorism in relation to both traditional and new media. Comprised of insights and research from leading experts in the fields of terrorism and media studies, this publication presents various topics relating to Terroredia: understanding of terrorism and the role of the media, terrorism manifestations and media representations of terrorism, types of terrorism and media stereotypes of terrorism, terrorism tactics and media strategies, the war on terrorism, the function of terrorism and the employment of the media, new terrorism and new media, contemporary cases of terrorist-media interactions, the rationality behind terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as the responsibility of the media. This publication is of interest to government officials, media professionals, researchers, and upper-level students interested in learning more about the complex relationship between terrorism and the media.

In an increasingly complex and unpredictable world, a growing number of observers and practitioners have called for a re-examination of our national security system. Central to any such reform effort is an evaluation of Congress. Is Congress adequately organized to deal with national security issues in an integrated and coordinated manner? How have developments in Congress over the past few decades, such as heightened partisanship, message politics, party-committee relationships and bicameral relations, affected topical security issues? This volume examines variation in the ways Congress has engaged federal agencies overseeing our nation's national security as well as various domestic political determinants of security policy.

This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)