"At the moment, the revision of security policy and the formation of a new consensus to support it are still at an early stage of development. The idea of comprehensive security cooperation among the major military establishments to form an inclusive international security arrangement has been only barely acknowledged and is only partially developed. The basic principle of cooperation has been proclaimed in general terms in the Paris Charter issued in November of 1990. Important implementing provisions have been embodied in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Except for the regulation of U.S. and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategic forces, however, these arrangements apply only to the European theater and even there have not been systematically developed. The formation of a new security order requires that cooperative theaters of military engagement be systematically developed. Clearly that exercise will stretch the minds of all those whose thinking about security has been premised on confrontational methods. Nonetheless, such a stretching is unavoidable. The new security problems are driven by powerful forces, reshaping the entire international context. They impose starkly different requirements. They will deflect even the impressive momentum of U.S. military traditions. The eventual outcome is uncertain. It turns upon political debates yet to be held, consensus judgements yet to form, and events and their implications yet to unfold. Fundamental reconceptualization of security policy is a necessary step in the right direction, and it is important to get on with it. Getting on with it means defining the new concept of cooperative security, identifying the trends that motivate it, outlining its implications for practical policy action, and acknowledging its constraints. These tasks are the purpose of this essay. "

The first years of the post-Cold War era have made clear that it is imperative for the Western allies to pursue a common strategy and a concerted diplomacy in order to secure their interests in Europe.;From four national perspectives, the authors examine what must be done for a more egalitarian Alliance to act effectively, on a multilateral basis, in addressing the new security agenda. Each of the contributors has had long experience as a government official or consultant.;The stress of the book is on the means and methods of collective decision-making and diplomacy, not organizational architecture. The book concentrates on the issues of Alliance co-operation that look beyond the transition period, its key premise being that the Western partners' ability to work together on a truly multilateral basis will determine their success or failure in meeting the challenges now at the top of their diplomatic agendas.

With intensified threats to global security from international terrorism worldwide, education systems themselves face these same unprecedented security threats. Schools and universities have become marked loci of interest for the monitoring of extremism and counter-terrorism by security and intelligence agencies. The relationship between education systems and national security is nothing new though - it extends in surprising and unexpected ways into territory which is by turns open and covert, even secret. Acknowledging the genuine political and security concerns which have drawn educational systems ever closer to the intelligence community, this book shows how and why this has happened, and explains why the relationship between education and the security and intelligence communities extends beyond contemporary concerns with counter-terrorism. As the title of this book demonstrates, this is as much an intellectual challenge as a security struggle. Education, Security and Intelligence Studies thus critically engages with multi-disciplinary perspectives on a complex and contentious interface: between systems of often secret and covert national security and intelligence and open systems of national education. Delving into difficult to access and often closely guarded aspects of public life, the book provides the pathfinding groundwork and theoretical modelling for research into a complex of little explored institutional and epistemological interconnectedness between universities and the security and intelligence agencies. This book was originally published as a special issue of the British Journal of Educational Studies.

As the world shifts away from the unquestioned American hegemony that followed in the wake of the Cold War, the United States is likely to face new kinds of threats and sharper resource constraints than it has in the past. However, the country's alliances, military institutions, and national security strategy have changed little since the Cold War. American foreign and defense policies, therefore, should be assessed for their fitness for achieving sustainable national security amidst the dynamism of the international political economy, changing domestic politics, and even a changing climate. This book brings together sixteen leading scholars from across political science, history, and political economy to highlight a range of American security considerations that deserve a larger role in both scholarship and strategic decision-making. In these chapters, scholars of political economy and the American defense budget examine the economic engine that underlies U.S. military might and the ways the country deploys these vast (but finite) resources. Historians illuminate how past great powers coped with changing international orders through strategic and institutional innovations. And regional experts assess America's current long-term engagements, from NATO to the chaos of the Middle East to the web of alliances in Asia, deepening understandings that help guard against both costly commitments and short-sighted retrenchments. This interdisciplinary volume sets an agenda for future scholarship that links politics, economics, and history in pursuit of sustainable security for the United States - and greater peace and stability for Americans and non-Americans alike.

Almost the entire southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. The ones in Latin America and the South Pacific were established during the Cold War, those in Southeast Asia and Africa after its ending. Zones have also been proposed, so far without success, for the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. In this book, analysts from within the respective regions explore the reasons for success and failure in the establishment of the zone, and their utility and limitations as stepping stones to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Distinguished historians and political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as former German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, are the contributors to No End to Alliance . The book focuses on some crucial issues in transatlantic relations in the past, present, and future, with emphasis on America's relations with West Germany, Britain, France, and Scandinavia. While the contributors hold somewhat different views, the emphasis is on the remarkable strength and duration of the Atlantic alliance.

This book examines the defence and security challenges facing the new South Africa in the context of development and nation-building priorities. The transformation of security policy during the transition from apartheid and since the April 1994 elections is examined. Challenges facing the defence force and the police service are examined and the relationships between defence, development and domestic and external security are explored in an integrated way which points to a policy framework for security in the developing world.

This book tells of intelligence successes never before reported, each involving the author during a most unusual career spanning three wars. It gives first-hand accounts which counter the recent bad press received by fine intelligence organizations.

This book examines Nordic relations with the superpowers, 1947-61, within the context of regional integration and cooperation theory. The Nordic region balanced security through a combination of NATO ties, neutralism, and special treaties, and low-voltage diplomacy to keep both superpowers at length. The book uses materials from U.S. and Norwegian archives, summarizes the findings of Nordic secondary literature on security, and utilizes concepts borrowed from international relations theory in order to describe Nordic regional security cooperation and to provide a useful model of peaceful security. To test for applicability in the Third World, the Nordic model is then compared to the regional integration system in Southeast Asia--the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

'Damning' - Mail on Sunday 'Utterly horrific and compelling' - The Guardian 'This investigation rings true' - Publishers Weekly On 1 August, 1990, British Airways Flight 149 departed from Heathrow airport, destined for Kuala Lumpur. It never made it there, and neither did its nearly 400 passengers and crew. Instead, Flight 149 stopped in Kuwait, as Iraqi troops invaded - delivering the passengers and crew into the hands of Saddam Hussein. Why did BA Flight 149 land, even as all other flights were rerouted - and even though British and American governments had clear intelligence that Saddam was about to invade? The answer lies in a secret, unaccountable organization - authorised by Margaret Thatcher - carrying out a 'deniable' intelligence operation. The plane was the 'Trojan Horse', and the plan - as well as the horrific consequences for the civilian passengers - has been lied about, denied and covered up by successive governments ever since. Soon to be a major TV drama, this explosive book is written with the full cooperation of the survivors, as well as astonishing and conclusive input from a senior intelligence source. It is a story of scandal, betrayal and misuse of intelligence at the highest levels of UK and US governments - which has had direct impact on terror attacks in the West and the shape of the Middle East today. It is high time the truth is told.

Often lost in the discussion about the nuclear crisis are its regional dynamics. From 2002 China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea struggled to navigate between the unsettling belligerence of North Korea and the unilateral insistence of the United States. This book focuses on their strategic thinking over four stages of the crisis. Drawing on sources from each of the countries, it examines how the four perceived their role in the Six-Party Talks and the regional context, as they eyed each other. The book emphasizes the significance of these talks for the emerging security framework and great power cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Part of a series of books which provides practitioners and scholars with up-to-date analyses of historical case material, insights based on field experience and imaginative applications for future third-party roles in Third World conflicts. "Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters" features articles on the use of soldiers in disasters by Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss, the role of military forces by John Mackinlay and the UN capacity for humanitarian support organizations by James Jonah.

By utilising the latest research, readers will be given a complete picture of the way Britain fought the Cold War, moving the focus away from the now familiar crises of Suez and Cuba and onto the themes that underpinned the British war strategy. Intelligence, civil defence and nuclear diplomacy are all examined within the context of modern British history at a time of national decline. There is a growing interest in the contexts of the Cold War and this collection will establish itself as the leading volume on the UK's wartime strategy.

Logistics, the movement of forces to battlefields, their supply, and on-going support, is critical to military success. Although this principle is theoretically accepted, the importance of being well-prepared to rapidly transport troops and supplies to distant crisis points has not been complemented, as Menarchik shows, by adequate lift capabilities. The author uses the six-month buildup to Desert Storm as proof that the United States needs to increase the priority of logistics in strategy and improve its strategic transport capabilities, especially "surge" strategic lift. Current transport capabilities will not be positioned or structured to respond effectively to the contingencies associated with America's growing responsibilities given the realities of the New World Order. Menarchik, himself an experienced pilot, policy planner, and operational commander, clearly demonstrates that "Powerlift" directly affects choices, timing, strategy development and implementation, and sweeping policy options. He shows that although combat strategy and tactics receive high profile attention it is "Lift" capability and capacity as a prerequisite that is fundamental to attaining objectives. Readers will learn where, how, and why America needs to improve its capabilities.

This evaluation of the senior leadership in the U.S. army is based, in part, on the personal experience and wisdom of former Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer. But it is supplemented by scores of interviews that the authors conducted with the individuals (and the leaders) who shaped the military since World War II. Many of the issues that had an impact on the leadership of the military over the period discussed are quantifiable, but many are not. Those that are not are evaluated from Meyer's experience and from the experience of the other authorities interviewed.

Governments often act in the name of security to protect their citizenries. For example by legislation or by the recruitment and employment of large numbers of armed personnel to detect and prosecute violent crime, or via engagements in military interventions to repel or pre-empt foreign attacks. These practices are often taken to have strong moral justifications. The value of security is linked to the value of life and the disvalue of violence and injury, and all of these are central both to theoretical accounts of and common sense views about the difference between right and wrong. The essays in this volume seek to increase our understanding of state action in the name of security and take a range of viewpoints and approaches. Some articles attempt to delimit the concept of security, or dispute attempted delimitations; some consider security as a 'good' and ask what sort of good it is, and how valuable; whilst others consider the relation between state action in the name of security and state action in the name of other goods, notably liberty, or consider ethical issues in health security, climate security and cybersecurity. Overall, this collection of essays shows how appeals by governments to the value of security have grown out of relatively recent events and processes at a global level, such as the response to pandemics, the acceleration of climate change, and counter-terrorism. The volume features an introductory essay and forms part of a five-volume series on legal ethics and the enforcement of law.

The Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia--is a region overburdened by unnecessary military expenditures. Despite persistent civil conflicts and militarized regimes in a number of countries in the region, there are actually few genuine external threats, and the armed forces are now largely used to maintain internal security.

A detailed country-by-country assessment of the effectiveness of military forces, and their impact on regional economics, shows that the region remains a mosaic of conflicting national ambitions, but strategic ambitions have been supplanted by internal conflicts, tensions, and politics. Declining military budgets are leading to declining military strength and capability, but they belie the Maghreb's potential for armed conflict and human suffering. Even though the Maghreb is a supplier of oil and natural gas, which usually ensures the attention of the West, this tragedy of arms gets little attention from the outside world. This means that the prospects for the region are continued wasteful military spending, and the resultant harm to national economic and political health.

The book contains lectures of an international NATO-Russian Advanced Research Workshop about the Stand-off-Detection of concealed explosives or explosive charges carried by Suicide-Bombers or in mobile objects (vehicles). The explosives or explosive charges should be detected by harmless methods from a distance and unnoticed by persons under inspection.

The ARW was one of a series of workshops before, dealing with the detection of explosives used by terrorists and was initiated by the "Explosive Detection Working Group" of NATO to create projects of applied research. The aim of the workshop was to present suitable projects, to exchange knowledge and to discuss the feasibility and realization of methods.

Projects aim at improvements in sensing techniques that will allow the shortest developing time and are suitable for commercial production. Potential short time availability was a prioritizing isssue.

A general history of the critical first year of the Korean War, this study deals primarily with relations between General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry S. Truman from June 1950 to April 1951, a period that defined the war's direction until General Mark Clark, the final U.N. Commander, signed the Armistice two years later. Although the ever-changing military situation is outlined, the main focus is on policymaking and the developing friction between Truman and MacArthur. Wainstock contradicts the common view that MacArthur and Truman were constantly at odds on the basic aims of the war. In the matter of carrying the fight to Communist China, MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs differed only on timing, not on the need for such action.

The end of the Cold War has provided historians with a better opportunity to study the forces that shaped the thinking of America's leaders at the time of the Korean War. The sheer quantity of material now available, while daunting, is filled with colorful and outstanding personalities, dramatic action, and momentous actions that have had an impact on world events even to the present day. Wainstock ultimately concludes that Washington placed too much emphasis on anti-Communist ideology, rather than long-term national interest, in the decision first to intervene in the war and later to cross the crucial 38th Parallel. He also emphasizes the important contributions of General Matthew B. Ridgway in stopping the Chinese offensive and in influencing Washington's decision not to carry the war to Communist China.