This book analyzes the multi-faceted phenomenon of Finnish military effectiveness in the Winter War (1939-40). Drawing on a wide array of primary and secondary sources, Pasi Tuunainen shows how by focusing on their own strengths and pitting these against the weaknesses of their adversary, the Finns were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Red Army whilst minimizing their own losses. The Finns were able to use their resources for effective operational purposes, and perform almost to their full potential. The Finnish small-unit tactics utilized the terrain and Arctic conditions for which they had prepared themselves, as well as forming cohesive units of well-motivated and qualitatively better professional leaders and citizen soldiers who could innovate and adapt. The Finnish Army had highly effective logistics, support and supply systems that kept the troops fighting.

The author develops the concept that logistics constitute a bridge between the national economy and the combat forces. He explains the role of the civilian as well as of the professional, and discusses the differences in their modes of thought and methods of operation.

Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.

This text considers the ethical credentials of the United States in branding various countries pariah states, and describes the background to the Iraq question (the role of Saddam, the genocidal sanctions regime, amongst other things). A detailed chronology of 1997-98 US/Iraq weapons inspections crisis is given, prior to a profile of the subsequent UN/Iraqi settlement and its aftermath.

The more uncertain the developments in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union become, the more urgent is the need to understand Soviet military thinking over 75-year span of Soviet history. Although other books discuss various aspects of Soviet military thought, this study by senior scholars more thoroughly combines the perspectives of history and the social sciences to understand Soviet military doctrine, experience, and tendencies from its birth with Lenin's militarization of Marxism in 1915 to the far-reaching changes introduced by Gorbachev--with all the attendant dilemmas and tensions up to the coup and revolutionary upheavals of 1991. This appraisal of the Soviet way of war is significant for scholars and professionals in Soviet studies, military affairs, and international politics. This collection shows how ideology, technology, experience, and personalities have shaped Soviet military doctrine since the Bolshevik Revolution. This study defines the shifting interplay of defensive and offensive strategies at different times, various policies for dealing with perceived threats of nuclear or conventional war, and reviews current discussions and future policy directions. First, the book describes the form and content of Soviet military doctrine from Lenin's creation of its premises in 1915 until Gorbachev's refutation of these premises in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Next, the book examines Soviet military thinking in light of the experiences of World War I and the Russian Civil War, the episodes of the interwar years, World War II, and the Cold War. The book then assesses the key issues that have marked the changing political and military landscape in the last years ofthe pre-coup Soviet Union. Included is the text of the last full statement of Soviet military doctrine before the coup and the breakup of the old Soviet Union. Finally, the book presents a window into the enduring proclivities of the Soviet/Russian way of war to provide a context for meeting the future and tempering its uncertainties. A concluding bibliographical essay points to significant literature on Soviet military doctrine.

Overturns existing thinking to show that the Royal Navy engaged professionally in war planning in the years before the First World War. It has been widely accepted that British naval war planning from the late nineteenth century to the First World War was amateur and driven by personal political agenda. But Shawn T. Grimes argues that this was far from the case. His extensive original research shows that, in fact, the Royal Navy had a definitive war strategy, which was well thought-through and formulated in a professional manner. Faced by a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat, the Admiralty adopted an offensive strategy from 1888 to 1905 based on observational blockade and combined operations. This strategy was modified after 1905 for war with Wilhelmine Germany. The book shows how specific war plans aimed at Germany's naval and economic assets in the Baltic were drawn up between 1906 and 1908 and that the strategy of primary distant blockade, formulated between 1897 and 1907, became a reality in late 1912 and not July 1914 as previously thought. The book argues that the Naval Intelligence Department, which took a lead in devising these plans, was the Navy's de facto staff. Overall, it is clear that there was a continuity underpinning British thinking about how to wage a naval war. SHAWN GRIMES received his PhD in history from the University of London and has been a Lecturer in European History at the University of Saskatchewan.

This updated edition of Professor Paul Moorcraft s timely and controversial book examines the international and domestic threats to the West from Jihadism. It joins the dots in the Middle East, Asia and Africa and explains what it means for the home front, mainly Britain but also continental Europe and the USA. More Brits are trying to join the Islamic State than the reserve forces. Why? It puts the whole complex jigsaw together without pulling any punches. After briefly tracing the origins of Jihadism from the time of the Prophet, The Jihadist Threat analyses the fall-out from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and how far these fuelled the rise of the self-styled Islamic State and other terror groups and the extent these pose to European society. Finally, the Author offers suggestions for defeating this existential threat to the Western way of life. This well-illustrated book is written from the inside. Professor Moorcraft, currently the Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, London, has long worked at the heart of the British security establishment and has operated as a war correspondent in over thirty conflict zones since Afghanistan in the 1980s, often alongside frontline Jihadists. Arguably no-one is better qualified to write on this subject and his knowledge coupled with forthright views cannot be ignored. This claim is borne out by his predictions in the original edition which have proved prescient. This is an important work that fully deserves the acclaim it has attracted.

This handbook by 14 well-known experts provides an overall analysis of U.S. military strengths and weaknesses in the 1990s and needs at the turn of the century. The first part of the book covers the U.S. armed forces under the Department of Defense and the military chain of command. The second half of the book deals with the American way of war, different military conflicts, and noncombat contingencies. The introduction defines national security concepts and sets the stage for the assessments that follow; the conclusion evaluates the military challenges confronting the United States in the 21st century. Each chapter offers short lists of readings. A glossary and comprehensive index make this an easy-to-use reference for students, teachers, professionals, and general readers concerned with America's defense needs.

Large data sets arriving at every increasing speeds require a new set of efficient data analysis techniques. Data analytics are becoming an essential component for every organization and technologies such as health care, financial trading, Internet of Things, Smart Cities or Cyber Physical Systems. However, these diverse application domains give rise to new research challenges. In this context, the book provides a broad picture on the concepts, techniques, applications, and open research directions in this area. In addition, it serves as a single source of reference for acquiring the knowledge on emerging Big Data Analytics technologies.

This new Handbook is a comprehensive collection of cutting-edge essays on all aspects of Latin American Security by a mix of established and emerging scholars. The Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security identifies the key contemporary topics of research and debate, taking into account that the study of Latin America's comparative and international politics has undergone dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War, the return of democracy and the re-legitimization and re-armament of the military against the background of low-level uses of force short of war. Latin America's security issues have become an important topic in international relations and Latin American studies. This Handbook sets a rigorous agenda for future research and is organised into five key parts: * The Evolution of Security in Latin America * Theoretical Approaches to Security in Latin America * Different 'Securities' * Contemporary Regional Security Challenges * Latin America and Contemporary International Security Challenges With a focus on contemporary challenges and the failures of regional institutions to eliminate the threat of the use of force among Latin Americans, this Handbook will be of great interest to students of Latin American politics, security studies, war and conflict studies and International Relations in general.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu is the best known book on military strategy ever written. Although its wisdom is ancient, its principles and advice are timeless; it remains as influential as ever in military strategy, leadership roles, business tactics, legal challenges, martial arts philosophy and more. Everyone from New England Patriots' coach Bill Belichick to Tupac Shakur have turned to this time tested treatise. This translation is by Hanshi Stephen F. Kaufman, one of America's leading martial artists, and is specifically aimed at martial practitioners to demonstrate how Sun Tzu's strategies can be applied to martial combat. The book's thirteen sections present vital information including: Planning ahead--how a solid battle plan can help lead to victory Attacking the enemy--considerations when choosing to attack or, perhaps even more importantly, when to not attack Flexibility in combat--the importance of changing tactics as the fight evolves Exploiting weakness--how understanding your enemy's shortcomings is crucial to success This edition includes 32 pages of full color images, capturing the pageantry of ancient combat. A new foreword by martial historian and decorated martial artist Alexander Bennett explains the importance of Sun Tzu's text and the value of Kaufman's interpretation for the martial artist.

Learning War examines the U.S. Navy's doctrinal development from 1898-1945 and explains why the Navy in that era was so successful as an organization at fostering innovation. A revolutionary study of one of history's greatest success stories, this book draws profoundly important conclusions that give new insight, not only into how the Navy succeeded in becoming the best naval force in the world, but also into how modern organizations can exploit today's rapid technological and social changes in their pursuit of success. Trent Hone argues that the Navy created a sophisticated learning system in the early years of the twentieth century that led to repeated innovations in the development of surface warfare tactics and doctrine. The conditions that allowed these innovations to emerge are analyzed through a consideration of the Navy as a complex adaptive system. Learning War is the first major work to apply this complex learning approach to military history. This approach permits a richer understanding of the mechanisms that enable human organizations to evolve, innovate, and learn, and it offers new insights into the history of the United States Navy.

Twice a year, 150 anxious recruits gather at SAS headquarters in the UK, their minds focused on one objective: to become SAS soldiers in one of the world's most elite regiments. Yet between arriving and receiving the famous winged dagger badge, stands nearly four months of the toughest military selection process in the world. Could you rise to this exceptional challenge of mind and body? How to Pass the SAS and Special Forces Selection Course shows you how. Beginning with essential preparation, the book covers fitness training, navigation skills and the four-week selection course itself. Find out how to keep the instructors happy, how to deal with exhaustion during Test Week, and how to survive disaster strike on bleak mountains. But having been selected, there's still training. Learn how the recruits acquire the skills of an SAS soldier, from hostage rescue to handling foreign weapons, from parachute training to surviving jungle courses, from escape and evasion to resistance and interrogation. Illustrated with black-and-white photographs and instructive artworks and including first-hand accounts, How to Pass the SAS and Special Forces Selection Course is an exhaustive, lively guide to the process of becoming one of the world's best soldiers.

Security intelligence continues to be of central importance to the contemporary world: individuals, organizations and states all seek timely and actionable intelligence in order to increase their sense of security. But what exactly is intelligence? Who seeks to develop it and to what ends? How can we ensure that intelligence is not abused? In this third edition of their classic text, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian set out a comprehensive framework for the study of intelligence, discussing how states organize the collection and analysis of information in order to produce intelligence, how it is acted upon, why it may fail and how the process should be governed in order to uphold democratic rights. Fully revised and updated throughout, the book covers recent developments, including the impact of the Snowden leaks on the role of intelligence agencies in Internet and social media surveillance and in defensive and offensive cyber operations, and the legal and political arrangements for democratic control. The role of intelligence as part of 'hybrid' warfare in the case of Russia and Ukraine is also explored, and the problems facing intelligence in the realm of counterterrorism is considered in the context of the recent wave of attacks in Western Europe. Intelligence in an Insecure World is an authoritative and accessible guide to a rapidly expanding area of inquiry - one that everyone has an interest in understanding.

In Supreme emergency, an ex-Trident submarine captain considers the evolution of UK nuclear deterrence policy and the implications of a previously unacknowledged aversion to military strategies that threaten civilian casualties. Drawing on extensive archival research, the book provides a unique synthesis of the factors affecting British nuclear policy decision-making and draws parallels between government debates about reprisals for First World War zeppelin raids on London, the strategic bombing raids of the Second World War and the evolution of the UK nuclear deterrent. It concludes that among all the technical factors, an aversion to being seen to condone civilian casualties has inhibited government engagement with the public on deterrence strategy since 1915. -- .

Providing perspectives from five Western capitals, this multinational study examines the formidable political and structural conditions for effective collaboration between NATO and the United Nations in performing peace-making and peacekeeping missions. The diplomatic and military requirements for operating principles of collective security in post-Cold War Europe are illuminated by contrasting the policies of major NATO governments. Candid assessments of the differing national attitudes that lie behind them are offered by an international team of scholars. Their analyses are set against the backdrop of the experience in Yugoslavia, and the momentous decisions on NATO's structural reform and enlargement.

This book provides the first ever intelligence history of Iraq from 1941 to 1945, and is the third and final volume of a trilogy on regional intelligence and counterintelligence operations that includes Nazi Secret Warfare in Occupied Persia (Iran) (2014), and Espionage and Counterintelligence in Occupied Persia (Iran) (2015). This account of covert operations in Iraq during the Second World War is based on archival documents, diaries, and memoirs, interspersed with descriptions of all kinds of clandestine activity, and contextualized with analysis showing the significance of what happened regionally in terms of the greater war. After outlining the circumstances of the rise and fall of the fascist Gaylani regime, Adrian O'Sullivan examines the activities of the Allied secret services (CICI, SOE, SIS, and OSS) in Iraq, and the Axis initiatives planned or mounted against them. O'Sullivan emphasizes the social nature of human intelligence work and introduces the reader to a number of interesting, talented personalities who performed secret roles in Iraq, including the distinguished author Dame Freya Stark.

If you know your enemies and know yourself, you can win numerous battles without a single loss. – Sun Tzu, The Art of War Written in the 6th century BC, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is still used as a book of military strategy today. Napoleon, Mae Zedong and Douglas MacArthur all claimed to have drawn inspiration from it. And beyond the world of war, modern-era business and management gurus have also applied Sun Tzu’s ideas to politics and corporate strategy. This pocket illustrated dual-language edition not only presents the original Chinese characters with James Trapp’s translation on the facing page, it also tests Sun Tzu’s ideas against history. Each of the 13 chapters includes a new commentary giving examples of how Sun Tzu’s wisdom has been borne out on the world’s battlefields. When, for example, has information provided by spies changed the course of a battle? How has history shown Sun Tzu’s ideas on the importance of terrain in conflict to be true? And where can we best find examples of strategic warfare being waged? From the ancient world to the 20th century, the battles featured will be illustrated with colour battle maps, paintings and artworks. Of immense influence to leaders across millennia, The Art of War Illustrated is a classic text richly deserving this illustrated and expanded dual-language edition.

This first history of British Imperial interventions in widely distant geographic areas in north and south Russia at the end of World War I describes the invention of a new kind of intelligence system. This careful study based on an extensive use of documents provides interesting lessons for dealing with Russia today at a similar turning point. Historians, Russian specialists, intelligence professionals, and others will find this a fascinating account of dirty deeds and a helpful analysis of intelligence planning and coordination. This history shows how intelligence was used as a substitute for open diplomacy and how the interventions were turned to economic advantage for both Britain and Canada. The system of intelligence is analyzed in terms of planning, tactics, communications, trade, transport, field operations and networks and coordination. Each of the interventions in the north and south are described in detail. Notes and a lengthy bibliography also offer important evidence of the remarkable events that took place.

Wars never run according to plan, perhaps never more so than during the Italian campaign, 1943-45, where necessary coordination between the different armies added additional complexity to Allied plans. Errors in the strategies, tactics, the coalition tensions, and operations at campaign command level can be clearly seen in first-hand accounts of the period. This new account examines the Italian campaign, from Sicily to surrender in 1945, exploring the strategy, intentions, motives, plans, and deeds. It then offers a detailed insight into the five commanders who led the battles in Italy - the two British commanders: Montgomery and Alexander; two American: Patton and Clark; and the leading German commander, Field Marshal Kesselring. Their personal notes and accounts, taken alongside archival material, provides some surprising conclusions - Montgomery was not quite the master of war he is portrayed as; Patton had serious flaws, exposed by wasting men's lives to save a relative and overlooking the shooting of prisoners of war; Clark lost lives to bolster his image; Alexander the gentleman was far too vague to be effective as a senior leader. Meanwhile, condemned war criminal Kesselring appears to be the most efficient and also, like Alexander, one of the most popular leaders.

This is the first account in English of a much-overlooked, but important, First World War battlefront located in the mountains astride the border between Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Not well known in the West, the battles of Isonzo were nevertheless ferocious, and compiled a record of bloodletting that totaled over 1.75 million for both sides. In sharp contrast to claims that neither the Italian nor the Austrian armies were viable fighting forces, Schindler aims to bring the terrible sacrifices endured by both armies back to their rightful place in the history of 20th century Europe. The Habsburg Empire, he contends, lost the war for military and economic reasons rather than for political or ethnic ones.

Schindler's account includes references to remarkable personalities such as Mussolini; Tito; Hemingway; Rommel, and the great maestro Toscanini. This Alpine war had profound historical consequences that included the creation of the Yugoslav state, the problem of a rump Austrian state looking to Germany for leadership, and the traumatic effects on a generation of young Italian men who swelled the ranks of the fascists. After nearly a century, Isonzo can assume its proper place in the ranks of the tragic Great War clashes, alongside Verdun, the Somme, and Passchendaele.

In The Tank Debate, John Stone highlights the equivocal position that armour has traditionally occupied in Anglo-American thought, and explains why - despite frequent predictions to the contrary - the tank has remained an important instrument of war. This book provides a timely and provocative study of the tank's developmental history, against the changing background of Anglo-American military thought.