Steven Woodworth's previous book, the critically acclaimed "Jefferson Davis and His Generals," won the prestigious Fletcher Pratt Award and was a main selection of the History Book Club. In that book he showed how the failures of Davis and his military leaders in the west paved the way for Confederate defeat. In Davis and Lee at War, he concludes his study of Davis as rebel commander-in-chief and shows how the lack of a unified purpose and strategy in the east sealed the Confederacy's fate.

Woodworth argues that Davis and Robert E. Lee, the South's greatest military leader, had sharply conflicting views over the proper conduct of the war. Davis was convinced that the South should fight a defensive war, to simply outlast the North's political and popular support for the war. By contrast, Lee and the other eastern generals-notably P.G.T. Beauregard, Gustavus Smith, and Stonewall Jackson-were eager for the offensive. They were convinced that only quick and decisive battlefield victories would prevent the North from eventually defeating them with its overwhelming advantage in men and materials.

Davis and Lee, Woodworth shows, shared a mutual respect for each other for most of the war. But it was respect mixed with a stubborn resistance to the other's influence. The result of this tense tug-of-war was Davis's misguided pursuit of a middle ground that gave neither strategy its best chance for success. The war finally ground to a bloody conclusion with Davis as indecisive as ever and virtually blind to how little confidence his generals had in his leadership.

Drawing extensively upon the papers of Jefferson Davis and the works of leading Civil War historians, Woodworth places the eastern military campaigns in an entirely new light and expands our understanding of Davis as leader of the Confederacy.

The proliferation of advanced weapons to volatile regions of the world has become a major issue in the post Cold War era. It was thought that no Third World nation could ever pose a technologically-based threat to the great powers by acquiring advanced weaponry. But this has proved to be wrong. The Persian Gulf War changed the worldwide perception of the spread of ballistic missiles to countries like Iraq. Access to a new type of weapon--cruise missiles--poses an even greater threat. With technology that is accessible, affordable, and relatively simple to produce, Third World countries could acquire highly accurate, long-range cruise missile forces to escalate local conflicts and threaten the forces and even the territories of the industrial powers. This book is a warning to policymakers. It is not too late to confront the realities of cruise missile proliferation and to devise international responses that could contain the worst possible consequences. Carus proposes a new regime of technology controls, security-building measures, and conflict resolution that need to be considered, and acted on, by policymakers and international relations experts everywhere.

During the Second World War, a secret department was formed at Britain's Air Ministry to co-ordinate a strategy to defeat German bombing by means of deception. With the help of leading technicians from the film industry, ingeniously designed decoy airfields, towns and military bases were built throughout the island. This campaign of illusion, masterminded by the charismatic Colonel John Fisher Turner, did more to protect Britain's forces and civilians from the Nazi threat than, at the time, they were allowed to know. This is the only detailed study of Britain's bombing decoys, both at war, through their design, locations and operations, and at peace, through their fragmentary survival as enigmatic features in today's landscape. It draws upon a wealth of new research into wartime documents, and includes detailed maps and data showing the patterns of decoy sites across the country. Compiled in support of English Heritage's initiatives to study and preserve Britain's wartime remains, "Fields of Deception" explores the history and the legacy of one of the least-known aspects of Britain at war.

In this volume the authors examine relationships between the growth and the economic, political and strategic expansion of a country and its propensity for conflict and war. The intention is to ascertain through the systematic analysis of one case over 100 years the extent to which territorial expansion and armed conflict are less an inevitable consequence of growth and development than an outcome of the demands and requirements of states and their economic, political and strategic security needs. Also of critical concern is the extent to which national expansion, once accepted as a security imperative, may create its own demands and requirements for even further expansion. The study combines historical inquiry with quantitative analysis in order to compare Japanese modes of growth, expansion and conflict from the Meiji Restoration to World War I, during the inter-war period and over the years since 1945. This book should be of interest to postgraduates and academics; politics, history and Japanese studies.

* divergencies between practice and policy in NATO US-European positions
* the high costs of collaborative ventures
* competition versus concentration
* the complexities of adopting a European defence consensus within NATO
At a time when the diminution of NATO's defence-industrial base goes hand in hand with product reorientation and specialisation, this book provides concise, critical and contemporary assessment of European and NATO collaborative issues.
This book identifies, explains and analyses the key issues involved in Europe's defence-industrial reorganisation progress. It tackles head-on controversial issues such as:

Drawing from military geography's spatial roots, its embrace of dynamic systems, and integration of human and biophysical environments, this book helps in understanding the value of analyzing patterns, processes and systems, and cross-scale and multi-disciplinary ways of acting in a complex world, while making the case for a resurgence of strategic and military geography in Australia. Here, leading experts demonstrate that geography retains its relevance in clarifying the scale and dynamics of defense activities in assessments of the international, regional, national, and site impacts of changes in physical, cyber and human geographies. The cases presented show Australia contributing to a growing strategic and military geography.

This book analyzes changing national preferences towards the EU CFSP and ESDP by providing detailed accounts of British, French and German crisis decision-making in FYROM, Afghanistan, Lebanon and DR Congo. While transatlantic relations remain important, crisis management under the EU label is increasingly accepted in national capitals.

Cyber Warfare, Second Edition, takes a comprehensive look at how and why digital warfare is waged. The book explores the participants, battlefields, and the tools and techniques used in today's digital conflicts. The concepts discussed gives students of information security a better idea of how cyber conflicts are carried out now, how they will change in the future, and how to detect and defend against espionage, hacktivism, insider threats and non-state actors such as organized criminals and terrorists. This book provides concrete examples and real-world guidance on how to identify and defend a network against malicious attacks. It probes relevant technical and factual information from an insider's point of view, as well as the ethics, laws and consequences of cyber war and how computer criminal law may change as a result. Logical, physical, and psychological weapons used in cyber warfare are discussed. This text will appeal to information security practitioners, network security administrators, computer system administrators, and security analysts.

During the decade that preceded Mikhail Gorbachev's era of glasnost and perestroika, the KGB headquarters in Moscow was putting out a constant stream of instructions to its Residencies abroad. These top secret documents were principally concerned with agent recruitment, infiltration of key foreign organizations, intelligence collection and interpretation, and influence operations, while endeavouring at all times to promote and protect the interests of the Soviet Union against countries seen as enemies.
Unknown to the KGB, many of these highly classified documents were being secretly copied by Oleg Gordievsky, at that time not only a high-ranking KGB officer based in London but also a long-serving undercover agent for the British.
The selected documents in this volume offer a revealing insight into the attitudes, prejudices and fears of the KGB during what were to prove its declining years.

This major comparative study examines the challenges faced by countries of postcommunist Europe in reforming and professionalizing their armed forces. It explores how the interaction of the common challenges of postcommunism and the diverse circumstances of individual countries shape professionalization processes in this changing region. The detailed country case studies in this volume, written by leading experts to a common analytical framework, compare the experiences of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, FRY, Russia, and Ukraine.

An Economist Best Book of 2021 Artificial Intelligence is going to war. Intelligent military systems are already reshaping conflict-from the chaos of battle, with pilotless drones and robot tanks, to the headquarters far from the action, where generals and politicians use technology to weigh up what to do. AI changes how we fight, and even how likely it is that we will. Warbots will be faster, more agile and more deadly than today's crewed weapons. New tactics are already emerging, but much deeper thinking is needed. When will an intelligent machine escalate, and how might you deter it? Can robots predict the future? And what happens to the 'art of war' as machines become creative? An international campaign against 'killer robots' hopes to ban AI from conflict. But the genie is out-autonomous weapons are too useful for states to outlaw. Still, crafting sensible rules for our warbots is possible. This fascinating book shows how it might be done.

This book is the only full-scale account of the strategic air offensive against Germany published in the last twenty years, and is the only one that treats the British and the Americans with parity. Much of what Levine writes about British operations will be unfamiliar to American readers. He has stressed the importance of winning air superiority and the role of escort fighters in strategic bombing, and has given more attention to the German side than most writers on air warfare have. Levine gets past a simple account of what we did to them and describes the target systems and German countermeasures in detail, providing exact yet dramatic accounts of the great bomber operations--the Ruhr dams, Ploesti, and Regensburg and Schweinfurt. The book is broad-guaged, touching many matters, from the development of bombing doctrine before the war to the technical development of the Luftwaffe and the RAF, jets and V-weapons, to the role of the heavy bombers in supporting land and sea operations.

Levine stresses the impact of bombing on the war, and generally endorses the strategic air campaign as worthwhile and effective. But he concludes that many mistakes were made by the Allies--both the British and the Americans--in tactics, the development of equipment, and in the selection of targets. Levine sees strategic bombing as a powerful tool that was often misused, particularly when the doctrine of area bombing flourished. Scholars, students, and buffs interested in World War II and/or the history of aviation will find this study of great interest.

First Published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

"The King's Finest" exposes the social roots of the generalcy and defines the major factors, both social and military, in a successful career. Hughes places the generalcy in its social context and demonstrates how the entire military structure was designed to preserve an exclusive social homogeneity. He shows exactly how the Prussian army selected, trained, and promoted these preferred types of men to its highest positions. Hughes' evidence suggests that the most fundamental group characteristic of these men was their strong, constant ties to the state apparatus rather than enduring connections with landed interests, industrial circles, or business pressure groups.

This volume takes a perspective on the debate over deterrence theory that has never been used before. Other books either address the differences between the two competing schools of thought--those who support Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and those who support nuclear warfighting--or examine particular policies from within the perspective of one or the other school of thought. Cori Dauber examines deterrence theory at a structural level, which allows a focus on the similarities between the major perspectives on nuclear strategic doctrine. By examining such issues as validity standards and the evaluation of evidence, Dauber is able to assess deterrence as a theory of persuasion, and to examine the way deterrence discourse so shapes the thinking of policy makers and analysts that it still drives our analysis of alternatives, even in the post-Soviet era. Dauber concludes that deterrence is a system designed to use weapons capabilities as a form of non-verbal communication with an Other--for the last forty years, the Soviet Other. Understanding these rhetorical structures and the way they function is essential in predicting the restrictions that deterrence places on the way the United States responds to foreign nations. Cold War Analytical Structures and the Post Post-War World serves as a model for how scholars in argument and persuasion can apply their methods to real world situations.

This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

This book examines the military organization, strategy, and tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas during their efforts to overthrow the government. It is largely based on the authors' personal collections of guerrilla documents captured in the war, interviews with former and captured guerrillas, and personal combat experience during one of the fiercest wars fought in the Western hemisphere in the 20th century. The book describes the guerrilla tactics from a technical point of view, and their evolution during the war in El Salvador. It includes discussions of such tactical concepts as concentration and deconcentration, urban combat, anti-air defense, the use of mines, and homemade weapons. It contains a chapter on the FMLN special forces--they were responsible for most of the spectacular attacks of the war--and it examines the sophisticated logistical system of the FMLN that made the prolonged war possible. Wherever possible, these concepts are illustrated by actual combat experiences from sources on both sides of the conflict. An important text for all concerned with guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency. Latin Americanists and students of the developing world will also find much of interest.

Thalakada argues that the principal purpose of US alliances have shifted since the end of the Cold War from containing communist expansionism (balance of power) to preserving and exercising US power (management of power).He also looks across all US alliances highlighting the trend from regionally-based to more globally-active alliances.

This book assesses the strategic linkages that the Korean Peninsula shares with the Indo-Pacific and provides a succinct picture of issues which will shape the trajectory of the Korean Peninsula in the future. This book analyses how critical actors such as the United States, China, Russia and Japan are caught in a tightly balanced power struggle affecting the Korean Peninsula. It shows how these countries are exerting control over the Korean Peninsula while also holding on to their status as critical actors in the broader Indo-Pacific. The prospects of peace, stability and unity in the Korean Peninsula and the impact of this on Indo-Pacific power politics are explored as well as the contending and competing interests in the region. Chapters present country-specific positions and approaches as case studies and review the impact of power politics on stakeholders' relationships in the Indo-Pacific. The book also argues that the Korean Peninsula and the issue of denuclearization is of primary importance to any direction an Indo-Pacific Partnership may take. Bringing together scholars, journalists and ex-diplomats, this book will be of interest to academics working in the field of international relations, foreign policy, security studies and Asian studies as well as audiences interested

A study of the political utility of navies, meant for war, but for over 40 years used in the "violent peace" of the modern era. This book considers what navies might yet do in total war and have actually done in limited war, and it studies their use in gunboat diplomacy, showing the flag, policing the coastal estate and tackling pirates and terrorists. James Cable also looks at proxy war at sea, naval arms control and the case for ocean-going navies. James Cable has also written "Britain's Naval Future", "Diplomacy at Sea", "The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina", "Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979", "Political Institutions and Issues in Britain" and "The Royal Navy and the Siege of Bilbao".

For over a decade now, thinking on regional relations in the Gulf has focused on the competition for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Today, this perspective is outdated. The smaller Gulf Arab states, led by the United Arab Emirates, are calling for their own goals and interests to be considered and a new regional order has emerged. This book assesses the UAE's increasing power and the future challenges to regional security it could pose. It is a contemporary history and analysis of the changing role of the UAE. Dina Esfandiary argues that the UAE has become more assertive in the pursuit of its own interests in the region and beyond - even when this puts it at odds with its regional allies. This behavior includes the build-up of its military and non-military capabilities, the diversification of its partners, and its willingness to use these resources. The book examines the regional causes of the UAE's growing assertiveness, including the 2011 Arab Uprisings, the impact of the US-announced 'Pivot to Asia' and the perceptions of waning US power in the Middle East, and the 2015 nuclear deal. The UAE's changing role in the region will affect regional security. This book points towards how smaller states in the region will interact with regional hegemons in the long term, as they learn from the UAE's assertiveness and seek to imitate it.

These theoretical essays on different dimensions of war, range from strategic surprise achieved at the outbreak of war to the termination of war and the predicted depreciation of the value of using force among nations. Despite the variety of topics with which they deal, these essays share three common denominators - the impact of technology on modern warfare, the political nature of war and the limits of rational analysis in the study of war.

Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign wars Preparing for the next war at an unknown date against an undetermined opponent is a difficult undertaking with extremely high stakes. Even the most detailed exercises and wargames do not truly simulate combat and the fog of war. Thus, outside of their own combat, militaries have studied foreign wars as a valuable source of battlefield information. The effectiveness of this learning process, however, has rarely been evaluated across different periods and contexts. Through a series of in-depth case studies of the US Army, Navy, and Air Force, Brent L. Sterling creates a better understanding of the dynamics of learning from "other people's wars," determining what types of knowledge can be gained from foreign wars, identifying common pitfalls, and proposing solutions to maximize the benefits for doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Other People's Wars explores major US efforts involving direct observation missions and post-conflict investigations at key junctures for the US armed forces: the Crimean War (1854-56), Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), Spanish Civil War (1936-39), and Yom Kippur War (1973), which preceded the US Civil War, First and Second World Wars, and major army and air force reforms of the 1970s, respectively. The case studies identify learning pitfalls but also show that initiatives to learn from other nations' wars can yield significant benefits if the right conditions are met. Sterling puts forth a process that emphasizes comprehensive qualitative learning to foster better military preparedness and adaptability.