This book examines the role of Chamberlain and the National Government in responding to the strategic problems created by the emergence of a two-front danger from Germany and Japan. It focuses on the first defence requirements enquiry of 1933-4, when rearmament foundations were laid and foreign policy redefined. It explores the inter-relationship between the different departments of state, and between individuals, in the formulation of policy at a time of crisis, and sheds light on the debate about appeasement.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union, disengagement of the United States and creation of a federal Europe - all this has changed the security context in Europe and stimulated a Europe-wide debate about the future. Questions about the nature of security itself have been raised. The authors question, however, why none of these themes have been raised in Britain? A comparison with Germany shows that there is now a similar spread of party political opinion in the two countries, reflecting a rapid convergence of security interests. Beyond Deterrence argues that it is time that there was also a similar level of public debate.

Initially published on the eve of the German blitzkrieg against France in 1940, this analysis of the German doctrine of defense as it evolved in 1915-1918 is often overlooked because of its misleading title. No understanding of the failure of the Allied offensives on the Western Front in World War I is adequate without reference to this work which explores the problem from the German point of view.

Throughout history, wars have been invariably fought over the control of territory. While political geography addresses the causes of such conflicts, military geography consists of the use of geographical knowledge to describe and analyze the deployment of armed forces. In this work, Patrick O'Sullivan offers an academic and impersonal study of military geography, weighing the balance of advantage for combatants in different geographic settings. He fully explores the effect of geographical circumstances on the outcome of violent conflict, and examines the lessons learned from recent wars about the effects of global position and environmental conditions on the interplay of geostrategy, tactical decisions, and results. The study begins with a look at the global variety of physical habitats and their human occupation, as well as a survey of the geography of war since 1945 including the current geography of conflict. A geographical analysis of selected ancient and modern battles follows, out of which O'Sullivan characterizes classical tactical ploys. A broad examination of modern weapons, tactics, and the required appreciation of the battlefield form the central portion of the book, with two particular topics--guerrilla/counterinsurgency operations and warfare on urban terrain--receiving extensive treatment. The volume concludes by drawing together political geography, strategy, and tactics in a description of the urban-based British Army/IRA conflict, and with an examination of the geographical aptitudes and attitudes of soldiers. This unique work will be an important source for courses in military geography, history, and tactics, and a valuable addition to college and university libraries.

The contributors to this overview of the changes in security studies reflect critically on the past decades since the 1980s and consider what the future holds, in a select few areas of security studies. In spite of the individuality of the approaches and spread of topics, the authors conclude that analysts and policy-makers have not been able to respond well to the changes that have occurred and that they must revise their approach is they are to meet the challenges of the future.

The fundamental issues of maritime strategy and naval power in the Mediterranean, when considered over the broad spectrum of past, present and future, clearly touch on the clash of civilizations. In terms of the millennial political situation, this includes issues of migration, the environment, geography, technology, economic power and rivalries in those fields. It also touches on the structure and interplay of international politics and international law, as well as the traditional calculation of naval strength and diplomatic manoeuvre. It is such broad and fundamental themes that are explored in this volume, the product of the third Naval War College-Yale conference on maritime and naval history.
The very name "Mediterranean," stresses context: the sea among lands. In terms of international security policy and strategy in this maritime region, this volume demonstrates that sea power has a variety of contexts. These contexts have changed over time, although many of the contemporary issues that observers emphasize today are themes that have a long history of their own. Many of these same present and future issues have supplied the context for past events in the Mediterranean, but their importance has sometimes gone unnoticed in maritime history, as the maritime side of affairs has sometimes gone unnoticed within the common discussion of other specialized themes. As several contributors to this volume have suggested, it may be our understanding and our interpretations that must be stretched to include both sides of these issues, if we are to understand fully the varied contexts and impacts of events at sea.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

Charting the evolution of Britain's leading role in the formation of NATO, the book provides a balanced assessment of British foreign and defence policies as the Cold War gathered momentum and a new system of European security was forged in the aftermath of World War II. The author argues that, despite the obvious differences between the periods, there are important lessons to be learned from post-war diplomacy by today's statesmen as they struggle to build another system of European security in the post-Cold War era. The book is based on a wide range of British, American and Canadian archives. Other published works by the author include "British Defence Policy in a Changing World", "Soviet Strategy" (with G. Segal), "Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy", "Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-84", "Contemporary Strategy Vols I and II" (with G. Segal, J. Garnett and P. Williams), "Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace" (with G. Segal, E. Moreton and L. Freedman), "Britain, NATO and Nuclear Weapons" (with K. Booth), "British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance", "Makers of Nuclear Strategy" (with J. Garnett) and "Dilemmas of World Politics" (with N. Rengger).

In the desperate summer of 1942, Hitler seemed to be on the verge of victory in Russia and the Middle East. With Rommel nearing Cairo, a little known lieutenant-general, Bernard Montgomery, took charge of what Churchill called a "baffled and bewildered" British 8th Army. Assuming command, Montgomery issued his famous order, "Here we will stand and fight;...If we can't stay here alive, then let us stay here dead," and led the Army to one of the Allies' greatest victories--El Alamein. "Monty" became an instantly recognizable Allied leader, but as a man with strong views, unbending principles, and outspoken frankness, he was both loved and disliked, praised and criticized. This bibliography presents and evaluates the extensive body of literature that has grown up around the controversial Field Marshal. Any serious study of World War II military campaigns must confront Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, an individualist with both admirers and detractors. This book provides an extensive historiographical overview of the literature in Part I and a bibliography of significant works in Part II. It is a basic reference and research guide for the student, scholar, and general reader.

Providing an invaluable introductory resource for students studying cyber warfare, this book highlights the evolution of cyber conflict in modern times through dozens of key primary source documents related to its development and implementation. This meticulously curated primary source collection is designed to offer a broad examination of key documents related to cyber warfare, covering the subject from multiple perspectives. The earliest documents date from the late 20th century, when the concept and possibility of cyber attacks became a reality, while the most recent documents are from 2019. Each document is accompanied by an introduction and analysis written by an expert in the field that provides the necessary context for readers to learn about the complexities of cyber warfare. The title's nearly 100 documents are drawn primarily but not exclusively from government sources and allow readers to understand how policy, strategy, doctrine, and tactics of cyber warfare are created and devised, particularly in the United States. Although the U.S. is the global leader in cyber capabilities and is largely driving the determination of norms within the cyber domain, the title additionally contains a small number of international documents. This invaluable work will serve as an excellent starting point for anyone seeking to understand the nature and character of international cyber warfare. Covers in detail one of the defining forms of conflict of the 21st century-cyber warfare will significantly impact virtually every American citizen over the next two decades Provides more than 90 primary source documents and matching analysis, allowing readers to investigate the underpinnings of cyber warfare Enables readers to see the development of different concepts of cyber warfare through its chronological organization Reflects the deep knowledge of an editor who is a noted expert in cyber warfare and has taught for the United States Air Force for more than a decade

The threat to use military force is a matter that commands immediate attention from many segments of government. Karsten, Howell, and Allen systematically analyze statistically significant numbers of actual cases to discover the determinants of success or failure of the threat to employ military force. After describing their methodology, they address several questions: what are the general characteristics of the typical threat? what types of threats succeed? what threats lead to war? did threats in the prenuclear past differ in outcome from those in the nuclear present? have the United States' threats differed substantially from those of other nations? can anything be said concerning the long-term consequences of the threats? In a concluding chapter the authors summarize their findings, compare them to the conventional wisdom, and then, as a test, apply them to six historical cases. They end their study with a look at the Solidarity and Falklands crises, and a theoretical scenario that suggests the significance of their findings.

This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.

The relationship of the United States and Great Britain has been the subject of numerous studies with a particular emphasis on the idea of a "special relationship" based on traditional common ties of language, history, and political affinity. Although certainly special, Anglo-American cooperation arose from mutual necessity. Soybel examines the "special relationship" through a new lens--that of the most intimate of wartime collaborations, the naval intelligence relationship. Rather than looking at the uses of intelligence and espionage, Soybel explores how the cooperation was established and maintained, particularly through the creation of administrative bureaucracies, as well as how World War I and pre-war efforts helped pave the way towards wartime cooperation. The development of the wartime cooperation in naval intelligence between 1939 and 1943 highlights the best and worst of the alliance and shows both its advantages and its limitations. It demonstrates that the Anglo-American partnership during World War II was a necessary one, and its intimacy demanded by the exigencies of the total war then being fought. Its problems were the result of traditional conflicts based on economics, imperial concerns, and national interests. Its successes found their bases in individual partnerships formed during the war, not in the overall one given mythical status by men like Winston Churchill. While still giving credit to the unique alliance that has survived in the last fifty years, this study shows that the close ties were necessary, not special.

The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a collection of vignettes written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerrillas. The material was originally collected and published by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College to serve as a text on combat against a guerrilla force in mountain-desert terrain. It was originally intended for internal use only and as such provides examples of both good and bad military practice. The hard lessons learned are not specifically 'Russian' in nature and many of the same mistakes and successes would apply equally to the American Army in Vietnam. Indeed, the knowledge gained from these reports should also apply to future conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rugged terrain.
This is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, but rather a series of snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers. It is an intimate look at the boring, brutal business of counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror.
Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.

This updated edition of Professor Paul Moorcraft s timely and controversial book examines the international and domestic threats to the West from Jihadism. It joins the dots in the Middle East, Asia and Africa and explains what it means for the home front, mainly Britain but also continental Europe and the USA. More Brits are trying to join the Islamic State than the reserve forces. Why? It puts the whole complex jigsaw together without pulling any punches. After briefly tracing the origins of Jihadism from the time of the Prophet, The Jihadist Threat analyses the fall-out from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and how far these fuelled the rise of the self-styled Islamic State and other terror groups and the extent these pose to European society. Finally, the Author offers suggestions for defeating this existential threat to the Western way of life. This well-illustrated book is written from the inside. Professor Moorcraft, currently the Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, London, has long worked at the heart of the British security establishment and has operated as a war correspondent in over thirty conflict zones since Afghanistan in the 1980s, often alongside frontline Jihadists. Arguably no-one is better qualified to write on this subject and his knowledge coupled with forthright views cannot be ignored. This claim is borne out by his predictions in the original edition which have proved prescient. This is an important work that fully deserves the acclaim it has attracted.

From 1918 to 1939 one issue dominated French foreign and defence policy: the German problem. This work outlines France's strategies for protection and appeasement during this period and places inter-war relations in a larger European context. With contributions from scholars in the field, it examines: relationships with key countries such as Italy and Russia; the significance of inter-war France to 20th-century European integration; the historical context of the policies; and the setbacks and defeats of the period and how they should be evaluated.

This work contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. After an analysis of existing literature on this subject and a discussion of case studies, Rear Admiral Menon develops the argument that those navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to the overall political objectives. Government neglect, inadequate funding and structures that are more appropriate to purely maritime wars are symptomatic of a universal strategic dilemma that arises from inadequate strategic theory.

Menon argues that current technological trends are likely to lead to fleets re-exerting their lost superiority against land-based means of conducting warfare, so long as the navies involved rebuild their structures to speed up the battle, since faster battle is the current strategic trend. Littoral superiority then becomes a naval objective on which to construct joint warfare.

In the immediate post-World War II period, Army aviation began to evolve from an observatory role to a mobility role. Helicopter air mobility began to develop in the Army from 1949 onwards. The outbreak of the Korean war assisted and accelerated the acceptance of greater helicopter air mobility within the Army. The Eisenhower period was a golden age for Army aviation, with rapid and extensive developments in air mobility doctrine and tactics. There was also a strong research and development effort to overcome the initial technological lag. These developments allowed the formation of the first air mobile division in 1965 to meet the growing demands of the Vietnam war. This work gives a new understanding of the process of military innovation. Moreover, this case study has important general implications for future military policy-making.

Why has the military not intervened in the post-communist political arena since the advent of democracy in Russia? Do lowered levels of professionalism actually lead to higher levels of intervention? Through a systematic exploration of professionalism within the Russian military, this study addresses these important questions. Moran suggests that by examining the notion of subjective fragmentation, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin utilized a highly effective, yet potentially troublesome, form of civil-military control. Findings that overall levels of praetorian behavior on the part of the Russian military have declined in this period, in spite of declining levels of military professionalism, challenge one of the most basic theoretical assumptions of civil-military relations. Since 1991, post-communist Russia has exhibited all of the classic indicators of a society ripe for a military takeover. Not only have institutional interests of the Russian officer corps been gravely threatened, but surveys conducted within it have found a general lack of sympathy for democratic values. Furthermore, Russia's weak civil society is accompanied by high levels of corruption, rampant crime, secessionist movements, a significant terrorist threat, and a general disrespect for the rule of law. Even further augmenting the chances of a military coup d'^D'etat, public opinion polls of civilians have found that the military is one of the most trusted institutions in the country—so trusted, in fact, that many Russian citizens have expressed support for a military takeover. Moran explains why the military has not capitalized on these factors.

Why did NATO expand its membership during the Cold War years, and what was its attraction to new members? This book locates the answers to these questions not solely in the Cold War, but in the historical problems of international order in Europe and the growing idea of the West. A wide range of sources is used, and the analysis looks at a process of neo-enlargement during NATO's inception as well as the formal accessions that followed.

An extraordinary tale, much-neglected by historians, of courage, bravery and eventual tragedy which took place during the First World War in the Middle East. It is the story of a small group of people, of whom Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn were the core, who were devoted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, and who were convinced that it was in imminent danger of extinction from the Turks.They resolved to help the British in Egypt by collecting military intelligence. Unfortunately, as Peter Calvocoressi points out, their understanding of the British position was quite wrong...[their] miscalculations created the tragedy which this book recounts...'

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.