The European Union's evolution to become a global actor is examined through its relationship with the United States from the Yomkippur war to the Gulf conflict. Indepth case-studies of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, martial law in Poland 1981-82 and the Kurdish crisis in Iraq 1991 are shown to support a theoretical critique. The dominant 'realist' approach to international relations is unable to adequately explain transatlantic tensions in this period. New frameworks are needed to explain the 'agency-structure' of internal European and EU-US relationships.

This is the first book to describe British wartime success in breaking Japanese codes of dazzling variety and great complexity which contributed to the victory in Burma three months before Hiroshima. Written for the general reader, this first-hand account describes the difficulty of decoding one of the most complex languages in the world in some of the most difficult conditions. The book was published in 1989 to avoid proposed legislation which would prohibit those in the security services from publishing secret information.

Fundamental changes in international relations during 1989-90 toppled the pillars of the security policy paradigm which had characterised the Cold War. That convulsion swept aside the last of many nuclear debates to rend NATO. Immediately the nuclear problems which had plagued the 1980s were tossed aside. Yet many important and interesting elements of the decade's nuclear history had not been fully explained. With the nuclear issue's rapid shift to irrelevancy, previously hidden information on the period became at once less secret and more easily available. Thus through extensive interviews with participants and careful analysis of open sources, missing parts of the puzzle emerged. This book is intended to provide a fuller explanation of NATO's last great nuclear debate.

Abraham Lincoln's two great legacies to history--his extraordinary power as a writer and his leadership during the Civil War--come together in this close study of the President's use of the telegraph. Invented less than two decades before he entered office, the telegraph came into its own during the Civil War. In a jewel-box of historical writing, Wheeler captures Lincoln as he adapted his folksy rhetorical style to the telegraph, creating an intimate bond with his generals that would ultimately help win the war.

Security Dynamics in the Former Soviet Bloc focuses on four former Soviet sub-regions (the Baltic Sea region, the Slavic republics, the Black Sea region, and Central Asia) to explore the degree to which 'democratic security', which includes de-politicisation of, and civilian oversight of, the military, resolution of conflicts by international cooperation, and involvement in international organisations. It examines how far states in these regions have developed cooperative foreign and security policies towards their immediate neighbours and key Western states and organisations, explores the interplay between internal and external aspects of democratic security building, and uses case-study examples to show how inter-state bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations are developing.

Since the end of the Cold War French defence policy has undergone a transformation. France has reformed its national defence to Europeanize and multilateralize its role, moved closer to NATO, and emerged as amongst the world's most active military powers. This book presents a wide-ranging analysis, setting out the background and policy framework of French defence, charting the transformation of policy between 1989 and 1996, and examining the role of the French military within and beyond Europe into the twenty-first century.

A useful examination of the degree to which a new 'Cold Divide' separates Europe, this book places NATO/Russian relations within a wider analysis of post-Cold War political, social and economic divisions in Europe. It compares and contrasts the interests and perceptions of Western Europe, East Central Europe and Russia in the New European Order. It analyses the role of the European Union, NATO, the OSCE and the WEU in mediating conflict and responding to the challenge of the new European security agenda.

This book examines the role of Chamberlain and the National Government in responding to the strategic problems created by the emergence of a two-front danger from Germany and Japan. It focuses on the first defence requirements enquiry of 1933-4, when rearmament foundations were laid and foreign policy redefined. It explores the inter-relationship between the different departments of state, and between individuals, in the formulation of policy at a time of crisis, and sheds light on the debate about appeasement.

Initially published on the eve of the German blitzkrieg against France in 1940, this analysis of the German doctrine of defense as it evolved in 1915-1918 is often overlooked because of its misleading title. No understanding of the failure of the Allied offensives on the Western Front in World War I is adequate without reference to this work which explores the problem from the German point of view.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union, disengagement of the United States and creation of a federal Europe - all this has changed the security context in Europe and stimulated a Europe-wide debate about the future. Questions about the nature of security itself have been raised. The authors question, however, why none of these themes have been raised in Britain? A comparison with Germany shows that there is now a similar spread of party political opinion in the two countries, reflecting a rapid convergence of security interests. Beyond Deterrence argues that it is time that there was also a similar level of public debate.

In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

In recent years the importance of Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has become more prominent, especially the capabilities and possibilities of reading and deciphering diplomatic, military and commercial communications of other nations.
This growing awareness of the importance of intelligence applies not only to the activities of the big services but also to those smaller nations like The Netherlands. For this reason The Netherlands Intelligence Association (NISA) was recently established in which academics and (former and still active) members of The Netherlands intelligence community work together in order to promote research into the history of Dutch intelligence communities.

For more than 50 years now, Israel's national security conception has changed very little. Its stability derives from its overall success in meeting a variety of challenges throughout this period, and from the fact that the conditions on the basis of which it had originally been formed remained roughly the same.

Throughout history, wars have been invariably fought over the control of territory. While political geography addresses the causes of such conflicts, military geography consists of the use of geographical knowledge to describe and analyze the deployment of armed forces. In this work, Patrick O'Sullivan offers an academic and impersonal study of military geography, weighing the balance of advantage for combatants in different geographic settings. He fully explores the effect of geographical circumstances on the outcome of violent conflict, and examines the lessons learned from recent wars about the effects of global position and environmental conditions on the interplay of geostrategy, tactical decisions, and results. The study begins with a look at the global variety of physical habitats and their human occupation, as well as a survey of the geography of war since 1945 including the current geography of conflict. A geographical analysis of selected ancient and modern battles follows, out of which O'Sullivan characterizes classical tactical ploys. A broad examination of modern weapons, tactics, and the required appreciation of the battlefield form the central portion of the book, with two particular topics--guerrilla/counterinsurgency operations and warfare on urban terrain--receiving extensive treatment. The volume concludes by drawing together political geography, strategy, and tactics in a description of the urban-based British Army/IRA conflict, and with an examination of the geographical aptitudes and attitudes of soldiers. This unique work will be an important source for courses in military geography, history, and tactics, and a valuable addition to college and university libraries.

The contributors to this overview of the changes in security studies reflect critically on the past decades since the 1980s and consider what the future holds, in a select few areas of security studies. In spite of the individuality of the approaches and spread of topics, the authors conclude that analysts and policy-makers have not been able to respond well to the changes that have occurred and that they must revise their approach is they are to meet the challenges of the future.

Charting the evolution of Britain's leading role in the formation of NATO, the book provides a balanced assessment of British foreign and defence policies as the Cold War gathered momentum and a new system of European security was forged in the aftermath of World War II. The author argues that, despite the obvious differences between the periods, there are important lessons to be learned from post-war diplomacy by today's statesmen as they struggle to build another system of European security in the post-Cold War era. The book is based on a wide range of British, American and Canadian archives. Other published works by the author include "British Defence Policy in a Changing World", "Soviet Strategy" (with G. Segal), "Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy", "Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-84", "Contemporary Strategy Vols I and II" (with G. Segal, J. Garnett and P. Williams), "Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace" (with G. Segal, E. Moreton and L. Freedman), "Britain, NATO and Nuclear Weapons" (with K. Booth), "British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance", "Makers of Nuclear Strategy" (with J. Garnett) and "Dilemmas of World Politics" (with N. Rengger).

The fundamental issues of maritime strategy and naval power in the Mediterranean, when considered over the broad spectrum of past, present and future, clearly touch on the clash of civilizations. In terms of the millennial political situation, this includes issues of migration, the environment, geography, technology, economic power and rivalries in those fields. It also touches on the structure and interplay of international politics and international law, as well as the traditional calculation of naval strength and diplomatic manoeuvre. It is such broad and fundamental themes that are explored in this volume, the product of the third Naval War College-Yale conference on maritime and naval history.
The very name "Mediterranean," stresses context: the sea among lands. In terms of international security policy and strategy in this maritime region, this volume demonstrates that sea power has a variety of contexts. These contexts have changed over time, although many of the contemporary issues that observers emphasize today are themes that have a long history of their own. Many of these same present and future issues have supplied the context for past events in the Mediterranean, but their importance has sometimes gone unnoticed in maritime history, as the maritime side of affairs has sometimes gone unnoticed within the common discussion of other specialized themes. As several contributors to this volume have suggested, it may be our understanding and our interpretations that must be stretched to include both sides of these issues, if we are to understand fully the varied contexts and impacts of events at sea.

The threat to use military force is a matter that commands immediate attention from many segments of government. Karsten, Howell, and Allen systematically analyze statistically significant numbers of actual cases to discover the determinants of success or failure of the threat to employ military force. After describing their methodology, they address several questions: what are the general characteristics of the typical threat? what types of threats succeed? what threats lead to war? did threats in the prenuclear past differ in outcome from those in the nuclear present? have the United States' threats differed substantially from those of other nations? can anything be said concerning the long-term consequences of the threats? In a concluding chapter the authors summarize their findings, compare them to the conventional wisdom, and then, as a test, apply them to six historical cases. They end their study with a look at the Solidarity and Falklands crises, and a theoretical scenario that suggests the significance of their findings.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

In the 25 years since the revelation of the so-called 'Ultra secret', the importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of the Second World War has become increasingly evident. Studies of wartime signals intelligence, however, have largely focused on Great Britain and the United States and their successes against, respectively, the German Enigma and Japanese Purple cipher machines. Drawing upon newly available sources in Australia, Britain, China, France and the United States, the articles in this volume demonstrate that the codebreaking war was a truly global conflict in which many countries were active and successful. They discuss the work of Australian, Chinese, Finnish, French and Japanese codebreakers, shed new light on the work of their American and British counterparts, and describe the struggle to apply technology to the problems of radio intercept and cryptanalysis. The contributions also reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

The pioneering essays in this volume explore national security challenges posed by new technologies and examine some ongoing efforts to understand and mitigate their potential negative effects. The authors, drawn from among a roster of international scholars, approach these issues from different yet ultimately complementary angles. Turkish scholar Emin Daskin chronicles the efforts of the Turkish government to develop and implement a Cyber Security Strategy aimed at protecting the country from attacks by both governmental and non-governmental cyber actors. French researcher Christine Dugoin-Clement has studied what she views as a successful case of cyberwarfare, in which Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the eastern separatist region of Donbass have been targeted by cyber attackers attempting to deteriorate their cognition, rendering them less effective in the field. Another French author and military academy instructor, Thomas Flichy de La Neuville, provides a counterpoint study of militarized motorbike attacks in the Sahel, demonstrating that cyberspace is not the only technological sphere in which innovation increasingly threatens security. Finally, American academic Christopher Whyte offers a trenchant critique of current academic studies of cyberterrorism, noting that while "cyberterrorism" appears frequently as a subject of research, the actual work being carried out in this critical area lacks thematic nuance and is only tenuously linked to related major thematic topic areas. The collection highlights the unique challenges faced by countries as they attempt to deal with previously unknown adversaries, as both the nature of the enemy and the field of operations continues to shift with unprecedented speed. It will undoubtedly be of interest to anyone concerned with international relations, cybersecurity, cyberterrorism, and national security in the twenty-first century.

In the desperate summer of 1942, Hitler seemed to be on the verge of victory in Russia and the Middle East. With Rommel nearing Cairo, a little known lieutenant-general, Bernard Montgomery, took charge of what Churchill called a "baffled and bewildered" British 8th Army. Assuming command, Montgomery issued his famous order, "Here we will stand and fight;...If we can't stay here alive, then let us stay here dead," and led the Army to one of the Allies' greatest victories--El Alamein. "Monty" became an instantly recognizable Allied leader, but as a man with strong views, unbending principles, and outspoken frankness, he was both loved and disliked, praised and criticized. This bibliography presents and evaluates the extensive body of literature that has grown up around the controversial Field Marshal. Any serious study of World War II military campaigns must confront Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, an individualist with both admirers and detractors. This book provides an extensive historiographical overview of the literature in Part I and a bibliography of significant works in Part II. It is a basic reference and research guide for the student, scholar, and general reader.

This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.

The relationship of the United States and Great Britain has been the subject of numerous studies with a particular emphasis on the idea of a "special relationship" based on traditional common ties of language, history, and political affinity. Although certainly special, Anglo-American cooperation arose from mutual necessity. Soybel examines the "special relationship" through a new lens--that of the most intimate of wartime collaborations, the naval intelligence relationship. Rather than looking at the uses of intelligence and espionage, Soybel explores how the cooperation was established and maintained, particularly through the creation of administrative bureaucracies, as well as how World War I and pre-war efforts helped pave the way towards wartime cooperation. The development of the wartime cooperation in naval intelligence between 1939 and 1943 highlights the best and worst of the alliance and shows both its advantages and its limitations. It demonstrates that the Anglo-American partnership during World War II was a necessary one, and its intimacy demanded by the exigencies of the total war then being fought. Its problems were the result of traditional conflicts based on economics, imperial concerns, and national interests. Its successes found their bases in individual partnerships formed during the war, not in the overall one given mythical status by men like Winston Churchill. While still giving credit to the unique alliance that has survived in the last fifty years, this study shows that the close ties were necessary, not special.