The relationship of the United States and Great Britain has been the subject of numerous studies with a particular emphasis on the idea of a "special relationship" based on traditional common ties of language, history, and political affinity. Although certainly special, Anglo-American cooperation arose from mutual necessity. Soybel examines the "special relationship" through a new lens--that of the most intimate of wartime collaborations, the naval intelligence relationship. Rather than looking at the uses of intelligence and espionage, Soybel explores how the cooperation was established and maintained, particularly through the creation of administrative bureaucracies, as well as how World War I and pre-war efforts helped pave the way towards wartime cooperation. The development of the wartime cooperation in naval intelligence between 1939 and 1943 highlights the best and worst of the alliance and shows both its advantages and its limitations. It demonstrates that the Anglo-American partnership during World War II was a necessary one, and its intimacy demanded by the exigencies of the total war then being fought. Its problems were the result of traditional conflicts based on economics, imperial concerns, and national interests. Its successes found their bases in individual partnerships formed during the war, not in the overall one given mythical status by men like Winston Churchill. While still giving credit to the unique alliance that has survived in the last fifty years, this study shows that the close ties were necessary, not special.

This handbook by 14 well-known experts provides an overall analysis of U.S. military strengths and weaknesses in the 1990s and needs at the turn of the century. The first part of the book covers the U.S. armed forces under the Department of Defense and the military chain of command. The second half of the book deals with the American way of war, different military conflicts, and noncombat contingencies. The introduction defines national security concepts and sets the stage for the assessments that follow; the conclusion evaluates the military challenges confronting the United States in the 21st century. Each chapter offers short lists of readings. A glossary and comprehensive index make this an easy-to-use reference for students, teachers, professionals, and general readers concerned with America's defense needs.

This is the first scholarly work to focus purely on British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's need for information on the enemy. Charles Cattley, the recently expelled British Consul at the Crimean port of Kertch, supplied intelligence on Sevastopol's garrison, on Russian strength, dispositions and reinforcements throughout the Crimea. This system of long-range espionage and prisoner interrogation helped to ensure that the Allies were never caught off guard for the remainder of the war, and also directed their blows with some presicion, thus paving the way to victory. Even after the deaths of Raglan and Cattley before the fall of Sevastopol, the system continued to function and even expand its operations under the direction of other civilians and new commanders. This work demonstrates that intelligence was a fundamental part of the Crimean War and also that this war forms a significant chapter in the history of British intelligence.

Why did NATO expand its membership during the Cold War years, and what was its attraction to new members? This book locates the answers to these questions not solely in the Cold War, but in the historical problems of international order in Europe and the growing idea of the West. A wide range of sources is used, and the analysis looks at a process of neo-enlargement during NATO's inception as well as the formal accessions that followed.

Why has the military not intervened in the post-communist political arena since the advent of democracy in Russia? Do lowered levels of professionalism actually lead to higher levels of intervention? Through a systematic exploration of professionalism within the Russian military, this study addresses these important questions. Moran suggests that by examining the notion of subjective fragmentation, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin utilized a highly effective, yet potentially troublesome, form of civil-military control. Findings that overall levels of praetorian behavior on the part of the Russian military have declined in this period, in spite of declining levels of military professionalism, challenge one of the most basic theoretical assumptions of civil-military relations. Since 1991, post-communist Russia has exhibited all of the classic indicators of a society ripe for a military takeover. Not only have institutional interests of the Russian officer corps been gravely threatened, but surveys conducted within it have found a general lack of sympathy for democratic values. Furthermore, Russia's weak civil society is accompanied by high levels of corruption, rampant crime, secessionist movements, a significant terrorist threat, and a general disrespect for the rule of law. Even further augmenting the chances of a military coup d'^D'etat, public opinion polls of civilians have found that the military is one of the most trusted institutions in the country—so trusted, in fact, that many Russian citizens have expressed support for a military takeover. Moran explains why the military has not capitalized on these factors.

From 1918 to 1939 one issue dominated French foreign and defence policy: the German problem. This work outlines France's strategies for protection and appeasement during this period and places inter-war relations in a larger European context. With contributions from scholars in the field, it examines: relationships with key countries such as Italy and Russia; the significance of inter-war France to 20th-century European integration; the historical context of the policies; and the setbacks and defeats of the period and how they should be evaluated.

Cybersecurity is a complex and contested issue in international politics. By focusing on the 'great powers'--the US, the EU, Russia and China--studies in the field often fail to capture the specific politics of cybersecurity in the Middle East, especially in Egypt and the GCC states. For these countries, cybersecurity policies and practices are entangled with those of long-standing allies in the US and Europe, and are built on reciprocal flows of data, capital, technology and expertise. At the same time, these states have authoritarian systems of governance more reminiscent of Russia or China, including approaches to digital technologies centred on sovereignty and surveillance. This book is a pioneering examination of the politics of cybersecurity in the Middle East. Drawing on new interviews and original fieldwork, James Shires shows how the label of cybersecurity is repurposed by states, companies and other organisations to encompass a variety of concepts, including state conflict, targeted spyware, domestic information controls, and foreign interference through leaks and disinformation. These shifting meanings shape key technological systems as well as the social relations underpinning digital development. But however the term is interpreted, it is clear that cybersecurity is an integral aspect of the region's contemporary politics.

In the immediate post-World War II period, Army aviation began to evolve from an observatory role to a mobility role. Helicopter air mobility began to develop in the Army from 1949 onwards. The outbreak of the Korean war assisted and accelerated the acceptance of greater helicopter air mobility within the Army. The Eisenhower period was a golden age for Army aviation, with rapid and extensive developments in air mobility doctrine and tactics. There was also a strong research and development effort to overcome the initial technological lag. These developments allowed the formation of the first air mobile division in 1965 to meet the growing demands of the Vietnam war. This work gives a new understanding of the process of military innovation. Moreover, this case study has important general implications for future military policy-making.

This work contends that nations embroiled in Continental wars have historically had poor maritime strategies. After an analysis of existing literature on this subject and a discussion of case studies, Rear Admiral Menon develops the argument that those navies that have been involved in such wars have made poor contributions to the overall political objectives. Government neglect, inadequate funding and structures that are more appropriate to purely maritime wars are symptomatic of a universal strategic dilemma that arises from inadequate strategic theory.

Menon argues that current technological trends are likely to lead to fleets re-exerting their lost superiority against land-based means of conducting warfare, so long as the navies involved rebuild their structures to speed up the battle, since faster battle is the current strategic trend. Littoral superiority then becomes a naval objective on which to construct joint warfare.

An extraordinary tale, much-neglected by historians, of courage, bravery and eventual tragedy which took place during the First World War in the Middle East. It is the story of a small group of people, of whom Sarah and Aaron Aaronsohn were the core, who were devoted to the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, and who were convinced that it was in imminent danger of extinction from the Turks.They resolved to help the British in Egypt by collecting military intelligence. Unfortunately, as Peter Calvocoressi points out, their understanding of the British position was quite wrong...[their] miscalculations created the tragedy which this book recounts...'

This monograph draws on the 10-nation CREDIT (Capacity for Research on European Defence and Industrial Technology) network. It covers post-Cold War related issues including: how to reduce and reorient national defence research and development efforts; the debate over dual-use technologies; how the diffusion of technologies of civil origin may affect the international flow of military-relevant technology; and how the competition with the USA will affect the European industry's ability to survive. By providing a comparative study of policy and practice in the countries of western Europe, this book provides insights into how governments and firms can begin to search for European-wide solutions to the dilemmas that face them.

This updated edition of Professor Paul Moorcraft s timely and controversial book examines the international and domestic threats to the West from Jihadism. It joins the dots in the Middle East, Asia and Africa and explains what it means for the home front, mainly Britain but also continental Europe and the USA. More Brits are trying to join the Islamic State than the reserve forces. Why? It puts the whole complex jigsaw together without pulling any punches. After briefly tracing the origins of Jihadism from the time of the Prophet, The Jihadist Threat analyses the fall-out from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and how far these fuelled the rise of the self-styled Islamic State and other terror groups and the extent these pose to European society. Finally, the Author offers suggestions for defeating this existential threat to the Western way of life. This well-illustrated book is written from the inside. Professor Moorcraft, currently the Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, London, has long worked at the heart of the British security establishment and has operated as a war correspondent in over thirty conflict zones since Afghanistan in the 1980s, often alongside frontline Jihadists. Arguably no-one is better qualified to write on this subject and his knowledge coupled with forthright views cannot be ignored. This claim is borne out by his predictions in the original edition which have proved prescient. This is an important work that fully deserves the acclaim it has attracted.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

Knowledge is the basic output of the defense technology establishment in the United States; it is what enables the development of weapon systems. From this premise, this volume explores the process of knowledge production in defense technology from the beginnings of the Cold War to the present time. Produced through the process of research and development (R&D), technical knowledge for defense is an economic commodity. It is "fundable" in the sense of having future value. Like other commodities in the futures market, it is purchased before it is produced. But unlike those other commodities, this knowledge is typically produced through the joint efforts of the customer and the vendor.
This study highlights two polar aspects of knowledge production: technology development and technology transfer. It centers on the present, shifting concept of defense conversion that is redefining defense technology policy. The book also includes cited documents pertaining to the transactions that engage customers and vendors in the process of knowledge production. The documents constitute a literature of needs and claims, and they reveal two chief properties: problem formulation and tactical positioning. Apart from the substantive yield of these particular documents, the strategy of evidence in this volume has broad implications for further study, suggesting a means of analyzing knowledge production in other large social systems.

This book describes, for the first time, allied contingency plans for military operations in the Middle East, in the event of a global conflict with the Soviet Union. It argues that the diplomatic events and crises in the Middle East during the first decade after World War Two can be understood only in the context of the military and strategic assets sought by the allies in that region, in view of the perceived Soviet threat. Professor Cohen synthesises military and diplomatic thought during the crucial decade after World War Two and thus brings a new, comprehensive understanding of the major events of this decade; the Truman Doctrine; the protracted Anglo-Egyptian crisis; the first Arab-Israeli war; the Tripartite Declaration; and the formation of the Baghdad Pact. This valuable study places events in the Middle East within the wider context of the global geo-strategic balance, and the decline of British power. It records also the reluctance of the United States to do what eventually became inevitable - to take over Britain's traditional hegemony in the near and Middle East.

This is the story of Reuven Shiloah - the man who established the Mossad, and laid the foundations for the intelligence community of the State of Israel. Although he was head of the Mossad for only two years, from its inception in April 1951 until his resignation in March 1953, Shiloah was considered an institution in himself, and through the organization that he created, he left his imprint on Israeli intelligence, playing a critical role in the complex and crisis-laden history of the establishment of Israel's formidable intelligence network. Shiloah manoeuvred his way around the grey world of undercover negotiations for three decades, from his induction at the beginning of the 1930s to his untimely death in 1959 at the age of 49. The book is based on private archives, and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad.

In From Flintlock to Rifle, Professor Ross traces the development of infantry tactics from the mid-eighteenth century, when infantry fought in rigid linear formations, until the second half of the nineteenth century, by which time infantrymen with rifled weapons were learning to advance in open order and use aimed fire. The author demonstrates that this transition in tactics involved social and technological change as well as military innovation. Old Regime armies, recruited from a narrow social base and armed with slow-firing, short-range, inaccurate weapons, relied upon harsh discipline and formalized evolutions to attain tactical proficiency. When the French Royal Army collapsed it was replaced with a mass citizen army. This contained elements of the old tactical system but placed a new emphasis on mobility, flexibility, and individual initiative. Napoleon's rivals either imitated aspects of the French system or sought to copy the spirit of the new tactics, engineering social reforms from above and creating their own citizen armies. After 1815, generals and politicians continued to develop tactical doctrines that embodied the lessons of the Napoleonic wars. Industrialization had a swift impact on weapons technology and firearms improved in range, accuracy, and rate of fire. As a result, military men had to modify their drill and battle tactics to cope with increased firepower. A process initiated by the French Revolution was thus accelerated by the Industrial Revolution.

By comparison with the other facets of intelligence, the analytical role provided by intelligence agencies has not received the scholarly attention that it rightly deserves. In October 1994 the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) and the Intelligence Section of the International Studies Association (ISA) attended to this deficit by holding a special international conference on the subject in Ottawa. This volume is the product of that conference. The essays comprising it may be divided into four self-contained sets of essays. The first critically examines the assessment systems now in place in Britain, the USA, Germany and Australia. Each is written by someone who participated at a senior level and hence knows their respective strengths and weaknesses well. The second series of essays looks at the bureaucratic dynamics of analysis and assessment. While two specifically examine how well intelligence producers have related to their political masters, another dissects the internal relationships that have developed between CIA analysts and their managers. The changing ground that intelligence is currently experiencing is the focus of the third section. Here such new analytical priorities as the environment, peacekeeping and arms proliferation are singled out for study. Finally, the volume considers the impact of new technologies and modes of communication on intelligence gathering and analysis.

This book examines the viability of non-provocative defence - the controversial idea that defensive military policies and practices reduce the risk of wars and provide a viable basis for defending a society should war break out. Drawing on case studies from Europe, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and Asia-Pacific, the author concludes that non-provocative defence concepts remain relevant and that they can help in deterring, conducting, and settling wars.

The development of a European security architecture comprising NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE is covered in this book, providing a critical account of the re-projection, and redefinition of western values and institutions, in the post-Cold War era. This transformation is explored in three stages. The first stage covers the period 1990 to 1991, and explains the preservation of a "western security community" inherited from the Cold War, through a process of institutional reconstruction, largely carried out on paper. The second stage from 1991 to 1992 sees the incorporation of a "purpose" for these institutions as a framework for the implementation of collective security. The third stage explores the emerging questions of legitimacy surrounding the new tasks of these institutions.

Sun Tzu's classic on military strategy is profound and absolutely clear. It is valuable in the political and business world today. We present the definitive translation, by Lionel Giles, assistant curator at the British Museum and Keeper of the Department of Oriental Manuscript.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

This is an analysis of the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, which examines the attractions and utility of these weapons for some developing states, the difficulties encountered in trying to control their spread and the lessons from the Rabta controversy and the Gulf War. It reviews the evolution of American chemical weapons policy under the Bush administration, the implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the problems posed by the inherently dynamic nature of these weapons and their tactical flexibility.

Many aspects of the Tet offensive of 1968 are brought to light here. The offensive is acknowledged as the turning point of the Vietnam War. Using Communist Vietnamese documents combined with Western sources, the author provides a more accurate version of the events, their significance, and reveals the crucial role played by US intelligence. This book illustrates that in the 1960s the Communist Vietnamese were well aware of the political and diplomatic nature of a People's War.

This is the first book to appear on British intelligence operations based in both India and London, which defended the Indian Empire against subversion during the first two decades of the twentieth century. It is concerned with the threat to the British Raj posed by the Indian revolutionary movement, the resulting development of the imperial intelligence service and the role it played during the First World War.