Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. The majority of this manual, however, is now finally available to the general public. An abridged version, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, was published, but this original document goes into much greater detail about the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting. It discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment." Much of what Grabo writes in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, this book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time.

Friedrich Beck was the single most important figure in the transformation of the inept Habsburg military into the modern military state that would wage World War I. He correctly perceived that only an elite body of officers responsible for war planning and preparation could provide lasting security for the Austro-Hungarian empire. After firmly establishing the general staff as an institution, Beck led war planning to counter threats from Russia, Italy, and the Balkans; and spearheaded a vast rebuilding of the rail network. While his rise to power marked a return to the favorite system of military administration of the early Franz Joseph period, Beck proved himself a man with real military ability that revolutionized an army.

Stranded behind enemy lines? Or in America's wilderness? Reach for the U.S. Military Pocket Survival Guide. A decade after its original publication in 1999, this classic manual-included in the survival kits of all branches of the U.S. military-has now been revised and updated for 2009 by military survival expert Matt Larsen. Every combatant's essential guide to outdoor survival, concealment, movement, improvised communications, and recovery in hostile territory, the U.S. Military Pocket Survival Guide represents an invaluable distillation of the information contained in the survival "bible," the U.S. Air Force's enormous Search and Rescue Survival Training.

The incredible true story of the only woman to have worked during the Second World War as a codebreaker at both Bletchley Park and the Pentagon    Betty Webb is the only surviving codebreaker to have worked on both Nazi and Japanese codes at Bletchley Park during the Second World War. This is the tale of her extraordinary life.  Betty has had a ringside seat to history. Born one hundred years ago, she spent her childhood in the Shropshire countryside during the 1920s – without heating, electricity or running water. As a schoolgirl, thanks to her mother’s desire for her to learn to speak German proficiently, she took part in an exchange programme and spent time in Nazi Germany. It was 1937 and Germany was on the cusp of war. As a small act of rebellion, she refused to give the Nazi salute alongside her classmates.  Back in England, after graduating from school, Betty faced the usual limited opportunities for employment on offer to women at the time. However, with the war in full swing, fate intervened and in 1941, wanting to play her part in the war effort, Betty joined the Auxiliary Territorial Service (Women’s Army). After being interviewed by an intelligence officer, she found herself at Euston station with her kit-bag, a travel warrant in her pocket and instructions to get off the train at Bletchley Park. There, having signed the Official Secrets Act with a gun laid next to her on the table highlighting the enormous importance of the work she was about to do, she joined the ranks of the other men and women ‘codebreakers’.  Between 1941 and 1945 Betty Webb played a vital role in the top-secret efforts being made to decipher the secret communications of the Germans and later the Japanese. In 1945, as other members of the forces returned home from the war in Europe, she was sent to the Pentagon and was in Washington DC when the atomic bombs fell and when Eisenhower announced the end of the war.  Betty was unable to reveal the true nature of her work, even to her parents, until years later. In this fascinating book, she revisits the key moments of her life and recounts the incredible stories from her time at Bletchley Park.

This book describes how the growing awareness of the strategic importance of science in the 1930s caused the Allied and German leadership to build scientific information supply systems that survived into the postwar era. Using archival materials from five countries, Richards traces the successes and failures of these early scientific intelligence agencies. She focuses on the OSS unit supplying copy for the US government's wartime program to reprint current German scientific journals. She describes as well the methods used by the OSS to spirit individual journal issues from inside the Reich to microfilm squads on Germany's periphery, and gives special attention to the Allied quest for information about the mythical German atomic bomb. Richards also describes the supply system set up by the Nazi government, and how its increasing desperation for Allied scientific news led in the last year of the war to a submarine landing of Abwehr agents on the U.S. coast to microfilm periodicals at the New York Public Library. The final chapter of her book looks at how the wartime experience with scientific information influenced postwar patterns of scientific documentation and librarianship in each country.

Fear and ignorance have colored the perception of chemical and biological (CB) warfare both in the public and military spheres. Media coverage following the alleged gassing of sheep at Dugway Proving Ground in 1968 has led most people to believe that CB warfare is an unstoppable doomsday weapon of mass destruction. Yet, in 1972, General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, attempted to disestablish the Chemical Corps because he saw no need for it. Had that decision not been reversed in 1976, there would not have been any chemical defense specialists or equipment available for Operation Desert Storm in 1990.

This study tracks events relating to the Department of Defense's CB warfare program between 1968 and 1990, as it evolved up to the Gulf War. It also details how the military develops and procures CB defense equipment to protect today's soldiers. Mauroni draws parallels between the development of binary chemical weapons, the chemical demilitarization program, and the DoD CB terrorism response efforts, as each has very similar issues and solutions. He seeks to educate leading officials and the general public about the facts behind CB warfare and the options for coping with it in the future. With proper training and equipment, the challenge of CB warfare can be met and dealt with on the modern battlefield.

How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S. intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies, and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both at within the United States and abroad. The U.S. government's progress in establishing a system for homeland security is considerable, yet, besides shifts in alert status, most U.S. residents are unaware of the work being done to keep them safe. Describing the system already in place, Hulnick adds further ideas about what more is needed to protect Americans in the ever-changing world of intelligence. To create a truly valuable program, it is suggested the the United States consider not only new strategies and tactics, but also the need to break down the barriers between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

A riveting introduction to the complex and evolving field of geospatial intelligence. Although geospatial intelligence is a term of recent origin, its underpinnings have a long and interesting history. Geospatial Intelligence: Origins and Evolution shows how the current age of geospatial knowledge evolved from its ancient origins to become ubiquitous in daily life across the globe. Within that framework, the book weaves a tapestry of stories about the people, events, ideas, and technologies that affected the trajectory of what has become known as GEOINT. Author Robert M. Clark explores the historical background and subsequent influence of fields such as geography, cartography, remote sensing, photogrammetry, geopolitics, geophysics, and geographic information systems on GEOINT. Although its modern use began in national security communities, Clark shows how GEOINT has rapidly extended its reach to other government agencies, NGOs, and corporations. This global explosion in the use of geospatial intelligence has far-reaching implications not only for the scientific, academic, and commercial communities but for a society increasingly reliant upon emerging technologies. Drones, the Internet of things, and cellular devices transform how we gather information and how others can collect that information, to our benefit or detriment.

The United States must devise entirely new military and political strategies because threats to the nation's security have shifted so markedly. This work provides the first comparative analysis of unconventional conflicts, using Malaya and Vietnam as lessons for developing effective policies and operations to counter strife, drug wars, and new types of Third World conflict today. This text for students, experts, and policymakers in military studies, history, and international relations combines insights from primary and secondary sources, participant-observer experiences, and scholarly and professional thinking in order to formulate practical recommendations for future policy. Sarkesian provides a comparative framework for analyzing unconventional conflicts, describing past strategies used by Great Britain, France, and the United States. He defines the military posture and nature of conflict, leadership, and indigenous situations in Malaya and Vietnam. He analyzes the nature of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary systems. Sarkesian describes a new U.S. national security agenda to deal with a transformed geostrategic world landscape. A lengthy bibliography adds to the usefulness of this provocative text for classes in contemporary military studies, world history, war and peace, U.S. foreign policy, and conflict management.

ASEAN's role as a security provider remains largely a matter of scholarly debate. Through the lens of the concept of regional security partnership, this book uncovers a more nuanced understanding of ASEAN capacity, highlighting both its merits and fragilities in coping with traditional and emerging security problems.

The ebbs and flows of Indian history can also be charted through the country's "maritime blindness" - its onset and the national endeavour to overcome it. The story of developing India's maritime capacity, since independence, is also about the kind of international and regional footprint it needs to have. In this book, the author discusses India's new and old maritime challenges and contextualises them in terms of its inherent institutional strengths to cope with their bewildering complexity. Their complexity is not just due to their sheer scale; the degrading institutional capacities, within countries and internationally, act as threat multipliers. The dynamics of global geopolitics, the seismic perturbations of global economy, and the dizzying pace of technology belie presuppositions for global future; all strategic analysts recognise our current, persisting conundrums. Taking into account the country's critical strategic weight in the maritime domain, the author suggests an approach - about the right 'mix' of the 'traditional' and the 'non-traditional' threats - in the institutional agendas of various governance mechanisms concerning different water bodies, especially the Indian Ocean Region, which also demands of India both hardware and software capacities, including diplomatic. He concludes that the effect of such an approach would be stabilising, consonant with the civilisational vision of the founders of the modern Indian nation.

Why do Britain, France, and Italy provide or refuse military support for U.S.-led uses of force? This book provides a unique, multiple-case study analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing. Sixty original interviews with top policymakers and analysts provide insight into allies' decisions regarding the Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003). The cases show that neoclassical realist factors--alliance value, threat, prestige, and electoral politics--explain allies' decisions better than constructivist factors--identity and norms. The book briefly covers additional cases (Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia) and concludes with recommendations for increasing future allied military support.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a great deal of debate about what U.S. foreign policy should be and how priorities should be reordered. This comprehensive, well-written, provocative assessment has set out to provide answers to key questions. Written by leading experts on their respective regions, who also are professors of national security policy at the National War College in Washington, D.C., this book charts a path for post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. Each chapter follows a common framework and research design and is informed by a team teaching method, as well as by long experience in policymaking and in academic institutions. The survey consists of chapters dealing with each of the major geopolitical regions of the world and asks a set of common questions: What are the dynamic changes that have occurred in the region? How have security and foreign policy issues changed since the Cold War? What is the history of U.S. policy in the region? How must U.S. policy change to adjust to new realities? An introduction and conclusion point to issues of comparison and sum up conclusions reached by the different contributors. This short overview is intended for courses in U.S. foreign policy and world affairs and for the use of upper-level undergraduate and graduate students, teachers, policymakers, and general readers in political science, world history, and military studies.

In the spring of 1944, Adolf Hitler firmly believed that the Allies would invade the Continent by landing troops on the beaches of Normandy, but anti-Nazi officers in German Intelligence ultimately persuaded him that Normandy would be a mere diversion. The "real" invasion, Hitler was assured, would be at Calais. "Righteous Deception" focuses on the activities of two officers whose consciences kept them from siding with Hitler and the Nazis. Their campaign of misinformation and deception convinced Hitler to keep half of the German forces in northern France to defend against an invasion that would never come. This decision ultimately cost Hitler the war.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of German Military Intelligence, turned against Hitler within a year after he had come to power. Canaris and his circle of friends in an opposition movement known as the "Schwarze Kapelle" (Black Orchestra) did everything possible to prevent Hitler from winning the war, which believed would be a catastrophe. Colonel Alexis von Roenne headed the "Fremde Heere West," the branch of Intelligence responsible for evaluating the strength of Allied forces. In a key position to alter findings and other information pertaining to Allied forces in Britain, he doubled the estimated number of troops assembling for D-Day, giving the impression that the Allies had enough men and equipment in Britain for both an invasion in Calais and a diversion in Normandy.

In the late 19th century, the United States began a period of increased engagement in the Western Pacific--a situation that continues to this day. Nimmo provides a study of U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military relations with the nations of East Asia and the Pacific from the late 1800s to 1945. In addition to interaction with China, Korea, and Japan, the book includes U.S. involvement in Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. This one-volume treatment, ranging from the Spanish American War to the Second World War, examines the continuity in U.S. policy during this crucial period. Particular attention is devoted to the U.S. response to Japan's territorial aggression during this period, primarily its undeclared wars against China, in Manchuria in 1931, and in North and Central China from 1937 to 1945.

This examination counters revisionist claims that the United States led Japan into war in 1941 and that war could have been avoided by the pursuit of a more conciliatory policy on the part of the U.S. It explores why it was necessary for the U.S. to demand unconditional surrender and refutes claims that Japan was a victim of the war. The acquisition of U.S. territory in the Pacific initially began with the annexation of Hawaii and continued with the former possessions of Spain, ceded in the Spanish American War. Nimmo follows this story through the Philippine War, efforts to promote Philippine independence, the Commonwealth era, and finally independence in 1946.

This comparative work examines the political role played by armed forces in South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The work brings together theory and empirical study, analyzing how security threats have shaped the military's organization, doctrine, and domestic political role at various stages of political development, from the state-building period to today's post-democratization era. Using four representative case studies, Woo sets to answer: What determines the armed forces' political influence? How does it affect political development? How do democratically elected leaders establish civilian control over them? The book first looks at how security threats led to military expansion and authoritarianism at the onset of the Cold War. Next, it examines military dictatorial rule, followed by a study of the military's withdrawal process during democratization. Lastly, it focuses on contemporary civil-military dynamics in the four countries, discussing the obstacles faced by civilian authority and what maybe the most desirable model for civil-military relations in post-democratization Asian societies. "Security Challenges and Military Politics in East Asia" will be an essential resource for anyone studying Asian political development, civil-military relations, and comparative democratization.

The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence is a state-of-the-art work on intelligence and national security. Edited by Loch Johnson, one of the world's leading authorities on the subject, the handbook examines the topic in full, beginning with an examination of the major theories of intelligence. It then shifts its focus to how intelligence agencies operate, how they collect information from around the world, the problems that come with transforming "raw" information into credible analysis, and the difficulties in disseminating intelligence to policymakers. It also considers the balance between secrecy and public accountability, and the ethical dilemmas that covert and counterintelligence operations routinely present to intelligence agencies. Throughout, contributors factor in broader historical and political contexts that are integral to understanding how intelligence agencies function in our information-dominated age.
The book is organized into the following sections: theories and methods of intelligence studies; historical background; the collection and processing of intelligence; the analysis and production of intelligence; the challenges of intelligence dissemination; counterintelligence and counterterrorism; covert action; intelligence and accountability; and strategic intelligence in other nations.

Knife / Counter-Knife Combatives by W. Hock Hochheim describes offensive and defensive knife fighting tactics in all ranges of combat including standing, sitting and on the ground. This is a complete survival tactical manual for all aspects of knife combat. W. Hock Hochheim is known worldwide as an authority on knife fighting tactics and strategies. He's the author of more than a dozen books and more than 200 dvds on a broad range of self-defense subjects. He teaches military, police and citizens in 9 countries annually.

In this concise introduction to the complexities of contemporary western intelligence and its dynamics during an era of globalization, Adam Svendsen discusses intelligence cooperation in the early 21st century, with a sharp focus on counter-terrorism and WMD counter-proliferation during the 'War on Terror.'

Since the end of the Cold War and re-unification, Germany's policy toward and within the European Union has undergone significant changes. Once a model 'Europeanist', Germany has become increasingly reluctant to support the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. Integrating insights from foreign policy analysis, integration theory, and social theory and providing an in-depth analysis of both refugee and security policy, the book develops an innovative framework for analysis that is capable of accounting for an incremental 'de-Europeanization' in Germany's EU policy.

The Changing Politics of European Security explores the key security challenges confronting Europe, from relations with the US and Russia to the use of military force and the struggle against terrorism. In the future, the authors conclude, European states will act alone, independent of America, on security matters.

This study examines three major bomber aircraft acquisition programs: the B-36, the B-52, and the B-2. The central question for each of these programs is whether they were chosen to fit national strategic objectives or to meet the more narrow political and economic needs of the so-called military-industrial complex. The book concludes that U.S. Air Force senior leadership acquired better bombers than did civilian defense leaders. The extensive use of original documents in this book reveals that Air Force generals were less concerned about defending their own interests than previous research has implied.

By September 1944, Allied forces had broken out from the Normandy beachheads, liberated Paris, and found themselves poised on the German border. As this offensive gained momentum, Patton and Montgomery, hoping to exploit the enemy's temporary weakness in the West, concocted their own alternatives to Eisenhower's broad front strategy. Each proposed a single thrust aimed directly into the German heartland, designed to bring the troops home by Christmas. This study examines this so-called broad front-single thrust controversy and concludes that the idea of early victory was wishful thinking--a product of the erroneous and dangerous assumption that the Nazi regime was already tottering on the brink of collapse.

Precisely because of its lightning pace, the Allied advance resulted in severe logistical problems, limiting Patton's proposed operation to only ten combat divisions, while Montgomery's closer proximity to the coast might have allowed for as many as sixteen. But it should have been obvious that either thrust faced certain destruction against the 250 divisions still fielded by the Wehrmacht on all fronts in September. In light of this substantial German military capacity, despite serious losses and strategic setbacks, the single thrust could not have been a decisive war-ending maneuver. In fact, Andidora argues, it could not even have provided for its own security against the forces that would have coalesced against it. Rather than unnecessarily prolonging the war, as some have argued, Eisenhower's decision to stay the strategic course probably averted a military disaster.