After briefly dealing with arguments for and against NATO's enlargement as far as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, the author shows why the enlargement process must be carried forward to include, in the near future, the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Ukraine. Inclusion of the Baltic States and of Ukraine in NATO would stabilize the region by helping the Russian democrats to concentrate on building a genuinely democratic, market-oriented Russian national state, instead of succumbing to the temptation to restore the Soviet Union. Ukraine could also contribute to NATO a sizable conventional military force and a prime strategic area; the Baltic States offer a prime location and an indomitable spirit. The Balts and Ukraine will help NATO when finally admitted as full members.

Using polling data, printed material, and interviews with Lithuanian and Ukrainian diplomats, the book convincingly shows the soundness of the Baltic and Ukrainian security goals without glossing over some difficulties, both internal and external.

As a small nation in a hostile region, Israel has made defense a top priority. Tzalel takes a critical look at the naval branch of Israel's defense forces to consider its history, its performance, and its overall importance to maintaining national security. From a motley collection of illegal immigrant ships operated prior to the birth of the state, the Israelis have since the 1960s established a modern navy. However, Tzalel argues, the modernization and expansion of the Israeli navy has been driven more by an excess of funds and the lack of clearly defined priorities than by any real necessity. Like most small countries, Israel has no need to command the sea during peace or in wartime. The author examines each step of naval development by direct correlation to the perceived need for each new phase and the circumstances that led naval and military leaders to make specific choices, and he discusses the benefits of these choices on the field of battle. He hopes to map the complex relationship between the navy men, the Israeli government, and public sentiment. Although the nation has managed to create a new and impressive class of warship, the Sa'ar FAC(M) and its larger derivatives, Tzalel contends that the military logic behind such naval construction was faulty and that the nation's submarine flotilla constitutes a sheer waste of monetary and human resources.

Startling changes are taking place in Western Europe; this study argues that the U.S. strategic response should be no less dramatic. Michael J. Collins describes a creation of a new type of political organization--a new way for nations to integrate themselves politically in Western Europe--and contends that this new model is dynamic enough to rival older historical paradigms. Western Europeans are making massive changes in their international arrangements, with each other and the outside world, to permit a natural evolution of national cultures along with the development of an intra-European culture. This changing political and economic situation in Europe has already affected the way the United States looks at the world diplomatically, and it may soon alter the general thrust of U.S. military strategy with regard to NATO. Europeans and Americans alike are questioning how much longer a united Europe can expect American troops to defend them against the Soviet Union, now that the Cold War era has ended. U.S. military strategy must change because the world is changing, and the increasing power of Western Europe is a major factor in the equation.

Collins concludes that the Common Market Countries can no longer be understood as a simple collection of nation-states joined in a cartel or economic alliance, calling for a change in U.S. foreign policy and strategy. Chapter 1 describes the developments in Western Europe since World War II. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss how the new Western European alliance interacts along both military and political lines. Chapter Four describes the character of Western Europe and the replacement of the nation-state concept with a new flexibility in dealing with each other and the surrender of sovereignty by the constituent states in limited but decisive areas. The final two chapters suggest possible policy and strategic responses by the United States. A chapter on strategic implications is bound to be controversial, particularly to traditional military strategists. These thought-provoking analyses and policy implementations will interest scholars and students of European History and Politics, Comparative Politics, United States Foreign Policy and Defense, as well as government policy makers and decision makers in international business.

Most studies of ancient warfare focus only on the Greeks and the Romans, but this sweeping study covers the whole of the ancient world from Greece and Rome to the Near East, then eastward to Parthia, India, and China. Bradford transports the reader into the midst of ancient battles behind such great leaders as Thutmose III, Ashurbanipal, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, and the First Emperor of China. He details the rise and fall of empires, the role of leadership, and the development of tactics and strategy. One sees the clash of peoples: nomads against agricultural societies, infantry against cavalry, as well as the greatest technological change in history--the combination of the composite bow and the chariot. This readable account analyzes ancient armies in terms of modern military doctrine, allowing the reader to make comparisons between the combatants. Recruitment, for example, varied tremendously with Romans drawing from a limited pool of recruits for service terms of twenty to thirty years and Chinese planners preferring a large pool with short-term service. While various types of governments prepared for and waged war in significantly different ways, Bradford finds that better organization led to success on the battlefield and that, for the most part, societal innovation was more important than technological innovation. The ongoing discussion of the lessons of ancient warfare around the globe will provide valuable insights for interested general readers and military professionals alike.

Responding to Catastrophic Events brings together the leading scholars and practitioners of consequence management to instruct a new generation in how to respond to both natural disasters and manmade events. Focusing on the relationship of disaster management to national security and the Department of Defense, the contributors cover a range of potential scenarios and address the distinct responsibilities of first responders, the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and State, and the military. They also point to the importance of having a plan for the media and knowing the legal obstacles and issues that may arise in a disaster situation. Using recent case studies to provide lessons learned for future responses to disasters, Responding to Catastrophic Events is a comprehensive and vital reader for any scholar of public policy, emergency management, or strategic studies.

This book will appeal to persons interested in national security issues and, more specifically, to those who may want to know more about the manpower and recruiting problems facing the military of the future. The authors come from a wide variety of backgrounds and academic disciplines--including economics, political science, psychology, sociology, operations research, education, and public administration. This book will also appeal to persons interested in human resource issues beyond the military, as well as those interested in tracking trends in the labor force, public opinion, education, youth attitudes, or society in general.

This study offers a new perspective on the origins of the Second World War by comparing and contrasting military planning in seven nations in the two decades before 1939 (and, in the case of the United States and Soviet Russia, before 1941). Developing themes over time and across military cultures allows the authors to provide a comparative framework in which to survey how military planning and foreign policy were interwoven and how these connections produced divergent national strategies in the context of differing nationalities, military organizations, and societies. The contributors to this volume have consciously employed a wide interpretation of military history by emphasizing the interplay of social, political, diplomatic, and economic factors with military concerns, as well as the relationship between war and society.

For example, the German army developed its concept of "blitzkrieg" by examining military theory generated within the General Staff before 1918, and by considering the new political circumstances in which the Weimar state and its Nazi successor found themselves as a result of the Versailles Treaty. Despite its ultimate success, the German concept was merely abstract and theoretical until the combined use of armor and air power was employed effectively in Poland in the autumn of 1939 and in Western Europe during the spring of 1940. In contrast, the French defensive strategy built around the use of the Maginot Line was illustrative of a mainly defensive foreign policy, while British appeasement policy reflected the diminished level of military preparedness that was possible throughout the 1930s.

With many scholars and analysts questioning the relevance of deterrence as a valid strategic concept, this volume moves beyond Cold War nuclear deterrence to show the many ways in which deterrence is applicable to contemporary security. It examines the possibility of applying deterrence theory and practice to space, to cyberspace, and against non-state actors. It also examines the role of nuclear deterrence in the twenty-first century and reaches surprising conclusions.

Based upon exhaustive research in numerous archival sources, including the personal papers of the major British military and political leaders of the day, this is a comprehensive study of British military planning during a period in which long-successful defense and military strategies had to be reappraised in light of new technological advances. As Michael Partridge notes, Britain emerged victorious in 1814 after twenty-two years of war with revolutionary and Napoleonic France; however various technical and international developments--particularly the invention of the steam engine--gravely undermined Britain's security between 1814 and 1870. Because steam power enabled ships to maneuver independently of wind and tide, Britain was now vulnerable to attack from all sides, forcing her to devise new defensive strategies to repel invasion. Partridge thoroughly examines Britain's response to the advent of steam power as well as the special military defense problems faced by the country as a result of its geographical position and contemporary political realities. Following a brief introduction, Partridge offers an overview of Britain's strategic position in the years following the war with France. Subsequent chapters examine each aspect of the country's military planning in detail, beginning with an exploration of the decline of the Royal Navy--at one time the unchallenged mistress of the seas and far larger than any rival's naval force. Partridge then addresses the internal machinery of defense planning, the political constraints placed upon defense planners, the effects of popular aversion to a standing army, and the new awareness of Britain's strategic vulnerability. Individual chapters are devoted to the three major prongs of Britain's land defenses: the regular army, fortifications, and the militia, yeomanry, and volunteers. A bibliography is included for those who wish to pursue further research in this area. Indispensable for students of military history, this study offers important new insights into Britain's ability to adapt to the new military and technological realities of the early Nineteenth-Century.

In October 1962, the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This study provides an archive based account of the Cuban missile crisis, providing the first detailed and authoritative account from the British perspective. The book draws upon British and US archival material and scholarship in the west and the former USSR. The diplomatic, military and intelligence dimensions of British policy are scrutinized. Material is presented and existing interpretations of UK US relations at this crucial moment are reassessed. The book contributes a fresh aspect to the literature on the Cuban missile crisis, by exploring where the views of Washington and its closest ally converged and diverged.

An engaging assessment of the theoretical debates on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The contributions to this volume bring together sophisticated theoretical frameworks and extensive empirical research. Pluralistic in its approach, the volume emphasizes the role of conceptual diversity for better explaining the EU's CSDP.

Since the Revolution, Americans have debated what action the military should take toward civilians suspected of espionage, treason, or revolutionary activity. This important book-the first to present a comprehensive history of military surveillance in the United States-traces the evolution of America's internal security policy during the past two hundred years. Joan M. Jensen discusses how the federal government has used the army to intervene in domestic crises and how Americans have protested the violation of civil liberties and applied political pressure to limit military intervention in civil disputes. Although movements to expand and to constrain the military have each dominated during different periods in American history, says Jensen, the involvement of the army in internal security has increased steadily. Jensen describes a wide range of events and individuals connected to this process. These include Benedict Arnold's betrayal of West Point; the colonial wars in Cuba, where Lt. Andrew Rowan, the nation's first officer spy, won a medal for carrying a "Message for Garcia"; the development of "War Plans White" in the 1920s to guide the army's response in the event of domestic rebellion; the activities of J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI in the 1950s and 1960s; the use of the National Guard in the South at the height of the civil rights movement; and the surveillance of and violence against protesters during the Vietnam War. Scrutinizing the historic workings of the American government at closer range than has ever been done before, Jensen creates a vivid picture of the growing invisible intelligence empire within the United States government and of the men who created it.

The New European Security Disorder presents a clear and comprehensive overview of the main actors, institutions and changes in European security since the end of the Cold War. Special emphasis is put on the assessment of threats to Europe's security, the lack of coherent leadershop in Bosnia and elsewhere, and the need for pan-European security institutions.

Why did the British government declare war on Germany in August 1914? Was it because Germany posed a threat to British national security? Today many prominent historians would argue that this was not the case and that a million British citizens died needlessly for a misguided cause.
This book counters such revisionist arguments. Matthew Seligmann disputes the suggestion that the British government either got its facts wrong about the German threat or even, as some have claimed, deliberately 'invented' it in order to justify an otherwise unnecessary alignment with France and Russia. By examining the military and naval intelligence assessments forwarded from Germany to London by Britain's service attaches in Berlin, its 'men on the spot', Spying on the Kaiser clearly demonstrates that the British authorities had every reason to be alarmed. From these crucial intelligence documents, previously thought to have been lost, Dr Seligmann shows that in the decade before the First World War, the British government was kept well informed about military and naval developments in the Reich. In particular, the attaches consistently warned that German ambitions to challenge Britain posed a real and imminent danger to national security. As a result, the book concludes that the British government's perception of a German threat before 1914, far from being mistaken or invented, was rooted in hard and credible intelligence.

There is more continuity than discontinuity in US national security policy under President Obama, despite widespread expectations for change and misperceptions of fundamental changes having been wrought. This project brings together US and non-US experts to assess continuities and changes in US national security policy in the Obama era.

In this surprising reinterpretation of Hitler's impact on the outcome of World War II, James Duffy reveals that the war was not won through American strength and ingenuity alone. Rather, it was lost due to Hitler's phenomenal military blunders. Challenging popular American views, the author shows how Nazi Germany at first substantially won the war in Europe. Yet Hitler proceeded to lose it even before the United States had entered the conflict. "Hitler Slept Late" sets the stage for each of Hitler's major errors, uncovering why each was made, what happened as a result, and how the outcome of the war might have been different had Hitler followed the advice of others. Duffy shows how Hitler's conquest of Europe ultimately failed due to two glaring faults--his inability to develop a concrete long-range plan and his maniacal belief in the strength of his own will. Offering new insight into Hitler as a military leader, this provocative study provides a clear view of Hitler's strengths and weaknesses and looks at what might have happened had he not blundered so often at vital times during the war.

Duffy begins with a look at Hitler's early victories in the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. These victories, achieved through swift surprise attacks, worked because of the indecisiveness and reluctance to act exhibited by the British and French. Hitler's most egregious errors included his belief in his own infallibility as a military leader, his failure to heed the warnings of advisers, and his ultimate decision to surround himself with yes men. Fatal strategic errors include allowing the British army to escape from Dunkirk, failing to invade Great Britain immediately after Dunkirk, and not recognizing the primary importance of Moscow as a target in the Soviet invasion. These character flaws and leadership foibles, as described and analyzed in "Hitler Slept Late," vividly illustrate the words of Sir Christopher Foxley Norris, retired Air Chief Marshal of the Royal Air Force: Had it not been for Hitler, the Germans] would have won.

Handbook of Warning Intelligence: Assessing the Threat to National Security was written during the cold war and was classified for 40 years. The majority of this manual, however, is now finally available to the general public. An abridged version, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, was published, but this original document goes into much greater detail about the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and forecasting. It discusses military analysis, as well as the difficulties in understanding political, civil, and economic analysis and assessing what it means for analysts to have "warning judgment." Much of what Grabo writes in her book seems to appear in many of the numerous commission reports that emerged after the 9/11 attacks. However, this book was written in response to the "surprise attack" of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to the author, that event was no surprise. And while analysts have to take some of the blame for their failure to strenuously present their case that the threat was real and imminent, what occurred was a failure by policymakers to listen to the warning intelligence reports that were written at the time.

Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. They reveal that it is a misconception that overall strategies radiate solely from political leaders. Instead, military officers at an operational level can achieve change as General McChrystal did for Afghanistan in 2009. The authors conclude that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations without the political support for these bottom-up initiatives.

Friedrich Beck was the single most important figure in the transformation of the inept Habsburg military into the modern military state that would wage World War I. He correctly perceived that only an elite body of officers responsible for war planning and preparation could provide lasting security for the Austro-Hungarian empire. After firmly establishing the general staff as an institution, Beck led war planning to counter threats from Russia, Italy, and the Balkans; and spearheaded a vast rebuilding of the rail network. While his rise to power marked a return to the favorite system of military administration of the early Franz Joseph period, Beck proved himself a man with real military ability that revolutionized an army.

Why do Britain, France, and Italy provide or refuse military support for U.S.-led uses of force? This book provides a unique, multiple-case study analysis of transatlantic burden-sharing. Sixty original interviews with top policymakers and analysts provide insight into allies' decisions regarding the Kosovo War (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003). The cases show that neoclassical realist factors--alliance value, threat, prestige, and electoral politics--explain allies' decisions better than constructivist factors--identity and norms. The book briefly covers additional cases (Vietnam, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia) and concludes with recommendations for increasing future allied military support.

How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S. intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies, and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both at within the United States and abroad. The U.S. government's progress in establishing a system for homeland security is considerable, yet, besides shifts in alert status, most U.S. residents are unaware of the work being done to keep them safe. Describing the system already in place, Hulnick adds further ideas about what more is needed to protect Americans in the ever-changing world of intelligence. To create a truly valuable program, it is suggested the the United States consider not only new strategies and tactics, but also the need to break down the barriers between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.