Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question of why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the US in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite the presence of hundreds, then thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads in the nation's stockpile, the greatest military weapon in history became politically impossible to use. And yet overwhelming nuclear superiority did serve its ultimate purpose in the Cold War. When American vital interests were threatened - over Berlin and Cuba - the Soviets backed down from confrontation. Despite errors in strategic judgement brought on by fear of Communist expansion, and in some cases outright incompetence, the ace in the hole proved decisive.

Wallach provides a pioneering study of coalition warfare. Using World War I as a case study, Wallach examines such important aspects as Allied pre-war planning; the particularistic interests of coalition partners; human relations; the framework for coordination mechanisms within coalitions; the application of such concepts as a general reserve, unified command, and amalgamation of forces; logistical problems; war finance; and the transition from war to peace.

In the process, Wallach shows that coalition warfare is among the most difficult forms to develop and maintain successfully. Unfortunately, as recent post-Cold War experiences illustrate, coalition warfare is an ongoing military issue. As such, this book will be of great interest to military planners as well as students of the history of World War I.

This is the first full-length work to be published about the spectacular failure of the German intelligence services in Persia (Iran) during WWII. Based on archival research it analyzes a compelling history of Nazi planning, operations, personalities, and intrigues, and follows the protagonists from Hitler's rise to power into the postwar era.

This is the most important book ever written about warfare and conflict. Lionel Giles' translation is the definitive edition. The Art of War can be used and adapted in every facet of your life. This book explains when and how to go to war, as well as when not to. Learn how to win any conflict whether it be on the battlefield or in the boardroom. This deluxe edition contains two versions of The Art of War. The first has no commentary so that you can immerse yourself directly in Sun Tzu's work. The second version includes Lionel Giles' indispensable commentary.

From grassroots terrorism to the nuclear ambitions of hostile nations, the United States faces increasingly complex threats to its national security, and combating these threats continues to demand a reshaping of the nation's security structure, military forces and defense expenditures. In this study, Anthony Cordesman offers a detailed analysis of critical challenges affecting U.S. national security and how failures in adapting to these challenges have exacerbated the strains on available resources. He systematically identifies the most glaring obstacles to successful national security planning and proposes constructive and practical ways to proceed in the future. Cordesman focuses on ten specific challenges, and each is addressed within the context of the Iraq War, Afghan War, War on Terrorism, and the risk of conflict over the Taiwan Straits. Out of the lessons drawn from these experiences, he examines the future of international coalitions, asymmetric warfare, nation building, and stability operations, and concludes that perhaps the most pressing area for change is the need for accountability among civilian and military policymakers.

From the end of the Cold War to the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the NATO Alliance has changed profoundly. This book explores the multifaceted consequences of NATO's adjustment to new international and domestic political and security realities. Internal Alliance politics and matters of relative power within the membership have strongly influenced recent NATO developments. Several major issues challenging the Alliance are examined, including how the impact of efforts to develop an enhanced common European security and defense policy have affected NATO: whether missile defense is driving the United States and its European allies closer or further apart; how the experience of NATO in the Balkans and elsewhere brought alliance members together or made MATO cohesion more difficult to maintain; and in what way the changing role of NATO has influenced American and Canadian participation in the Alliance. An important guidepost to pivotal changes and likely NATO developments, scholars and policymakers of Atlantic and international politics will find these meditations indispensable.

A number of authors also speculate on the likely changes for the alliance that will ensue in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the possibility that NATO will soon modify its mission and responsibilities in reaction to the threat of international terrorism. Indeed many of the same strategies and strains that affected NATO cohesion over the past decade are likely to complicate efforts to maintain Alliance unity as part of the anti-terrorist coalition.

Since the buildup of U.S. armed forces peaked under Reagan in 1987, many changes have occurred in all four services, including reductions in both human and material resources. This study traces these trends and details the government's vision of how the military will look in the year 2015. Changes in the global security environment and pressure to decrease federal spending have resulted in force restructuring, eliminating major units, and displacing military and civilian personnel. Other consequences include base closures and reduced major weapon system inventories. Brasher discusses the implications of these new policies and assesses their current and future impact on American defense capabilities. The media has focussed considerable attention on the downsizing of U.S. forces. It predicted that base closures would have catastrophic effects on local communities, and it warned that women and minorities would see fewer opportunities for advancement within the military. Brasher chronicles the effects of base closures on many communities and determines that original fears were exaggerated. Women and minorities have also fared better than initially anticipated. In fact, especially in terms of relative combat power, the new military is even stronger than it was in 1987.

This edited volume argues that producers of analysis need to shift from producing static, narrative products to much more dynamic, digitally-based platforms in order to remain competitive and relevant.

This book is based on a conference addressing the relationship between the environment and security in the post-Cold War world. It brings together scholars and practitioners from a variety of different disciplines and perspectives in an effort to both explore the complexities of the relationship between environmental variables and security conditions, and re-focus the debate within the environmental community. The book combines analytical frameworks and case study material with proposals for addressing environmental challenges and enhancing the security and welfare of peoples, states and regions.

Rhetoric, Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Windt argue, is central to shaping both political consciousness and political culture. In this important new contribution to Praeger's Series in Political Communication, they examine how the rhetoric of the early Cold War years was used to create and develop a national and international reality. The pervasive political view of events, motives, actions, and policy was largely created in the years between 1945 and 1950 and grew from a pre-existing set of rhetorical beliefs as well as from the political speeches and pronouncements of the time. Hinds and Windt focus their study on American rhetoric applied to Soviet-American relations, centering essentially on Europe. They offer a brief outline of the theoretical principles used in their analysis, and follow with a look at certain images of the USSR selected for use by American politicians. In subsequent chapters, the authors trace developments from the end of World War II to Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, thoroughly explore the British leader's address and its effect in dividing the world into two warring camps, analyze the writing and presentation of the 1947 Truman Doctrine and its suggestion of two ways of life, and detail the Truman Loyalty Program and the 1947 House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings in Hollywood. The remaining chapters discuss George Marshall's address originating the European Recovery Act, George Kennan's Sources of Soviet Conduct, contemporary critics, and such proofs as the Korean War, which showed the rhetoric to be correct. This work will be an important reference tool for courses in political communication, American history, political science, and presidential studies, and a useful addition to library collections.

In an earlier study, "Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901-1950," Powaski described the events, factors, and personalities that contributed to the American decision to abandon a century-and-a-half-old isolationist tradition and join an entangling alliance with European nations. This study is a continuation of the story of America's involvement in Europe's security affairs since 1950. In it, Powaski explains why America expanded its military commitment to Europe--including the stationing of U.S. combat forces, both nuclear and conventional, on the continent--and why the U.S. military presence in Europe is now declining. In addition, Powaski describes the issues and personalities that have divided, as well as united, the United States and its European allies, and why, despite these disagreements, America's involvement in the entangling alliance is likely to endure.

A generation after the First Gulf War, and in the wake of a decade of counterinsurgency operations and irregular warfare, this book explores how the concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs continues to shape the way modern militaries across the globe think about, plan and fight wars.

"Strategic Intelligence Management" introduces both academic researchers and law enforcement professionals to contemporary issues of national security and information management and analysis. This contributed volume draws on state-of-the-art expertise from academics and law enforcement practitioners across the globe. The chapter authors provide background, analysis, and insight on specific topics and case studies. "Strategic Intelligent Management "explores the technological and social aspects of managing information for contemporary national security imperatives.

Academic researchers and graduate students in computer science, information studies, social science, law, terrorism studies, and politics, as well as professionals in the police, law enforcement, security agencies, and government policy organizations will welcome this authoritative and wide-ranging discussion of emerging threats.
Hot topics like cyber terrorism, Big Data, and Somali pirates, addressed in terms the layperson can understand, with solid research groundingFills a gap in existing literature on intelligence, technology, and national security

The AWACS debate represents one of the most critical and controversial events in the history of American diplomacy and legislative politics. It locked the Reagan administration and opponents of the AWACS sale in a fierce and pitched battle over American policy in the most economically and strategically vital region in the world: the Middle East.

Accordingly, Laham finds there are at least five political lessons to be drawn from the debate. First, contrary to the arguments of its critics in Congress, the pro-Israel lobby does not control American policy in the Middle East. Second, the Senate tends to defer to the authority of the president on matters of foreign policy and national security. Third, while remaining a passive president overall, Reagan was among the most active of chief executives on issues involving the economy and national security. Fourth, given the enormous contribution the AWACS sale made to the vital economic and national security interests of the United States, Reagan's masterful handling of this politically explosive issue provides evidence that he displayed attributes of presidential greatness, but much further study of the other major foreign and domestic policy issues Reagan confronted during his tenure in office will be required before any definitve judgment can be rendered concerning where he stands in the ranking of America's 42 presidents. Fifth, the AWACS debate shows that the United States need not sacrifice its special relationship with Israel in order to forge stronger ties with Saudi Arabia. This analysis will be of particular interest to scholars, students, and policy makers involved with national security issues, presidential politics, interest groups, and Middle East studies.

High-ranking government officials, defense analysts, and scholars focus on the geopolitics and security of the Nordic region at a time when East-West relations in Europe are undergoing momentous changes. Experts from Scandinavia, Europe, and the United States examine the impact of the United States and the Soviet Union on Scandinavian security in terms of defense doctrines and deployment and the evolving technologies of defense, paying particular attention to neutral Finland and Sweden. This strategic analysis, edited by Ciro Zoppo, is intended for academicians and policymakers in the fields of military studies, political science, Nordic and European affairs, and East-West relations. This survey of key problems and prospects in the Northern cap of the globe offers the historical background necessary for understanding the foreign policies and domestic politics of Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark. The study is unique in its detailed examination of military policy and emerging technologies alongside a discussion about their economic consequences for the countries in the region. The cross-national team of experts also considers the significance of the changing politicial and technological environment for the future of Swedish and Finnish defense and neutrality.

Andidora tells the story of four men who successfully commanded battlefleets in the 20th century: Japan's Heihachiro Togo, England's John Jellicoe, and America's William Halsey and Raymond Spruance. This study provides personality profiles and detailed accounts of their major battles. Analyzing their command decisions based on what each commander knew or could have reasonably inferred at the time decisions were made, Andidora compares their accomplishments to those of Horatio Nelson, who delivered stunning naval victories for England during the Napoleonic Wars. However, he concludes that the Nelsonian standard is inappropriate in the modern naval environment due to the increased size and technological complexity of modern fleets and the political imperative to preserve costly and strategically significant naval assets. Trained in England and acquiring the skill and spirit of Nelson's heirs, Togo annihilated his Russian opponents at the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War and, therefore, produced the 20th century's only facsimile of Nelson's Trafalgar. Despite heavy losses against a numerically inferior German Navy at Jutland, Jellicoe's single-minded adherence to an unpopular strategy would prove instrumental in achieving final victory in the First World War. Although strikingly different in personality and leadership style, Halsey and Spruance would both do their part in the naval battles of the Second World War. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Spruance would deal Japanese naval aviation a blow from which it would never recover; while at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Halsey would essentially eliminate the Japanese navy as an effective fighting force.

As potential targets, such as military facilities, symbols of democracy, government buildings, and infrastructure are 'hardened' against possible terrorist attack, terrorists will shift to softer targets: churches, schools, malls, mass entertainment centers, high-rise apartments, transportation centers, and energy facilities. Their goal will be to disrupt or destroy our economy, impose fear and uncertainty, break our national will, and deflect our attention and support from the Middle East. We could wait for it to happen, or we can prepare now. This new book empowers Americans by providing them with the knowledge and skills needed to understand terrorist strategies, which, in turn, allow each of us to contribute to disrupting the terrorists' intended goals through observing and reporting suspicious activity, reducing target vulnerabilities, and minimizing casualties through education and preparation. The authors define terrorism and its origins and describe present-day organizations: where they operate, what their philosophies entail, and what their motivation and objectives are. They review different terrorist tactics and their desired effects, providing readers with guidelines and checklists for surviving them. Knowing how to prepare for, and how to survive, an attack is a step toward marginalizing intended casualty rates, psychological impacts, and propaganda values. At the same time, the lifesaving skills presented in this book may also be used in naturally occurring catastrophic events such as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, or earthquakes.

Knowing how to end war and to prevent the escalation of conflict is of paramount importance today when weapons of mass destruction have spread beyond the control of major powers and democratically accountable governments, and when regional and global stability have become more precarious. Stephen Cimbala and Sidney Waldman have drawn together prominent analysts with different perspectives to discuss key issues before and after the Cold War. This authoritative and provocative study assesses military and political strategies of serious concern to military historians and professionals, political scientists, academics, and policymakers. The book covers all the major aspects of conflict termination before and after the Cold War and defines the basic concepts and principles involved. Noted contributors offer insights into how military and political strategies to end and limit various types of conflict must adapt to political change, to nationalism, irredentism, and boundary disputes. Chapters deal with deterrence, Soviet military doctrine, an American-Soviet war, the changing role of nuclear weapons, behavioral and institutional factors, the maritime component, civil wars, coalition war, nuclear deterrence and political hostility. The book ends with new determinations about the major issues and points to future research agendas.

Presenting alternative methods of conflict resolution, this examination of the philosophy of peace presents nonlethal weaponry as a solution to the destructiveness of war. Conventional lethal weapons and weapons of mass destruction evolved into an unprecedented 900 billion dollar a year defense industry. This industry and its war makers have taken the lives of an estimated 170 million human beings in this century. A new approach appropriate to the new world order must be found. This study provides a historical analysis of weapons and forces in this century and traces the development of nonlethal technologies and weapons. It is the first work to present nonlethal weaponry in the framework of recognizable scenarios based on current world events that show the applicability of current available nonlethal weapons and technology to serve as a force to be reckoned with in a highly politicized world. Morehouse argues that nonlethal weapons and technology could and should become forces for peace in the 21st century.

'Soft' Counterinsurgency reviews the promise and actual achievement of Human Terrain Teams, the small groups of social scientists that were eventually embedded in every combat brigade in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book, based on interviews with both HTT personnel and their military commanders, examines the military's need for sociocultural information, the ethical issues surrounding research carried out in combat zones, and the tensions between military and social science organizational cultures. The account provides a close, detailed account of HTT activities, a critical reflection on the possibilities of creating a 'softer, ' less violent counterinsurgency, and the difficulty of attempting to make war more 'intelligent' and discriminating.

Three policy actions taken during the Revolutionary War period helped form the military supply and acquisition structure still in place today. These include the formation of a management structure; the choice of management methods; and debates related to ancillary issues such as R&D, fostering of expertise, encouraging innovation, and the role of the federal government in the development of an industrial base. To provide valuable context, Horgan looks not only at decisions made by the Continental Congress, but also at the environment in which these plans were made. Of the wide range of methods used to procure the supplies needed for war, many were harsh measures taken by beleaguered policy makers, forced to desperate steps by the demands of war.

The organizational structure created to manage the supply effort was, Horgan reveals, in constant flux, characterized by the abandoning of one failed experiment in favor of another that would soon be exposed as equally unsuccessful. The two major weapons of the period, the big guns of Army artillery and navel ordnance and Navy ships, are examined within this framework. Horgan explores how the Congress managed their acquisition, including procedures related to the manufacture of artillery in private sector founders and government facilities, as well as the construction projects for Navy ships. She demonstrates how policy decisions made during these early years relate to the present policy environment for the acquisition of major weapon systems.