The United States faces a small number of rogue states that either have or are working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These NASTIs, or NBC-Arming Sponsors of Terrorism and Intervention, include such states as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria. U.S. nonproliferation programs and policies have helped to keep this number small, but U.S. and allied counterproliferation programs are essential to reduce the danger. It is up to deterrence, active defenses, passive defenses, decontamination, and counterforce to turn enemy weapons of mass destruction into instruments of limited destructive effect. Warfighters will also have to adopt a different strategy and concept of operations in fighting an adversary that is so heavily armed. This strategy will feature a combination of deception, dispersion, mobility and maneuver, diffused logistics, remote engagement, missile defense bubbles, non-combatant evacuation operations, and large area decontamination. It will also involve upgrades to NBC passive defense measures and equipment, as well as a counterforce capability that can find and destroy a variety of adversary targets, including mobile launchers and deeply buried and hardened underground structures.

This book examines changes in the Persian Gulf security complex following the United States (US) invasion of Iraq in 2003, focusing on threats to the collective identities of two religious sects - Shia and Sunni. Although there is a growing body of literature examining security in the Persian Gulf, little focus has been given to the theoretical and methodological aspects of the problem. In this volume, Shayan analyses the causes behind the security changes which occurred in the region since 2003 and demonstrates how regional security dynamics are interlinked to perceived sectarian threats on the Shia and Sunni religious identities. This text is essential reading for political scientists, policy makers and scholars of international relations.

In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize these countries as allies and integrate them into the Western defense system. Throughout the 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959 it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus. The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank's structure and function and relative value in NATO's overall policy, and the alliance's response to the challenges in the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank, but also the more controversial political aspects: the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia during 1953-55 and the effects of the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. Thus, it considers how the United States and the U.K. viewed the power balance between the three Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of U.S. bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The book also assesses the threat posed to the Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East. More generally, the book illuminates the complexities of intra-alliance dynamics in a region full of Cold War tensions. However, in its Middle Eastern/Eastern Mediterranean neighborhood, it was not only the Cold War that provided tensions, since the Arab-Israeli dispute and the tensions of decolonization further complicated the picture. Thus, the study of the Southern Flank is a test case of a Cold War theater which was subjected to additional historical pressures, creating a nexus of problems which the Western Alliance needed to address within its effort to respond to the various challenges of the Cold War.

As the sole remaining superpower, shouldn't the United States be able to call the tune on establishing a secure world to our liking? While most international strategists conjure up history and theory of international relations from the past to examine such a question, Sy Deitchman, in "On Being a Superpower, " focuses on today's changing conditions and attitudes. He starts by addressing hypothetical situations that keep US international security experts awake at night. What would the United States do, he asks, if, in Saudi Arabia, an armed rebellion by Islamic fundamentalists were about to topple the House of Saud while demanding that the US get out of the Middle East? Would the United States go to war to try stop China's invasion of a democratic Taiwan that declares its independence? Could the US really win such a war against a determined country that has over a billion people and nuclear weapons? If a Central American drug cartel gained de facto control of the Panama canal and turned it into a smuggling lynchpin, what would the United States do?Deitchman examines these and other scenarios and then pictures how the US would likely respond, based on our society's current moral concerns, political rhetoric, and overall world view. After reviewing the challenges the world will present to us and examining the current state of our nation and its armed forces, Deitchman describes the strategy for preserving US security that appears to be emerging without explicit planning. He shows how trends in the armed forces parallel the trends in society, and how our argumentative political system is affecting our ability to build and use military power to support our strategy. Deitchman's synthesis of all these themes shows that the existing trends in the nation and the world are not favorable for our future security. Can they be changed? And if so, how? That's the conundrum readers of this book are invited to ponder.

In the interwar period, Red Army commanders headed by Tukhachevskii developed a new doctrine of mobile warfare and "deep operations". The military requirements of armaments and industrial production in the event of war was a central parameter in Stalinist industrialization. Based on recently opened Russian archives, the book analyzes military dimensions of Soviet long term economic and military reconstruction plans from the mid 1920s until 1941. It presents a new framework for estimating the Soviet war economic preparations, drastically underestimated by contemporaries.

Andrew A. Michta examines the security of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the aftermath of the 1989 collapse of communism and the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. He reviews the old geopolitical dilemmas in the region as well as the new conditions in Europe as it approaches the remainder of the decade, and offers a country-by-country discussion of security policies and military reforms underway in the region. The analysis is set against a background discussion of the region's history as well as a review of the key events leading to the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, including the reformulation of Soviet security policy in the late 1980s. Michta concludes with an assessment of security challenges facing the Triangle states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as they work to join Western Europe by the end of the decade. He argues that the Triangle will remain in a gray security zone in Europe for the foreseeable future, with an implicit security commitment from NATO, but without explicit formal security guarantees.

These essays, written by a multinational and interdisciplinary group of contributors, seek to provide a profile of the strategic cultures of the states of the Asia Pacific region. Strategic culture consists of the traditional cultural, historical, political and societal factors that help shape the defence policies and strategic behaviour of countries. As such, it is a necessary element in understanding the security issues of this changing and increasingly significant region in world politics. In addition to contributing to a better understanding of the security problems and prospects of the Asia Pacific, the book also aims to give additional empirical weight to the developing concept of strategic culture and also relates it to the prospects for conflict management in the region, as well as military strategy.

Examining the evolving nature of national and international security in the post-Cold War era, this work focuses on non-military threat potentials and how these may best be countered. Six specific issues are discussed: terrorism, the heroin and cocaine trade, piracy, environmental degradation, the spread of disease and uncontrolled migration. The book concludes that greater national co-ordination, inter-agency co-operation and international collaboration is needed if these problems are going to be dealt with effectively.

" The Encyclopedia of Security Management " is a valuable guide for all security professionals, and an essential resource for those who need a reference work to support their continuing education. In keeping with the excellent standard set by the First Edition, the Second Edition is completely updated.
The Second Edition also emphasizes topics not covered in the First Edition, particularly those relating to homeland security, terrorism, threats to national infrastructures (e.g., transportation, energy and agriculture) risk assessment, disaster mitigation and remediation, and weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives). Fay also maintains a strong focus on security measures required at special sites such as electric power, nuclear, gas and chemical plants; petroleum production and refining facilities; oil and gas pipelines; water treatment and distribution systems; bulk storage facilities; entertainment venues; apartment complexes and hotels; schools; hospitals; government buildings; and financial centers. The articles included in this edition also address protection of air, marine, rail, trucking and metropolitan transit systems.
* Completely updated to include new information concerning homeland security and disaster management
* Convenient new organization groups related articles for ease of use
* Brings together the work of more than sixty of the world's top security experts

This timely handbook traces the development of cyber capabilities from their roots in information warfare and cryptology to their potential military application in combat. Cyber warfare is gaining prominence as a serious tactic in military conflicts throughout the world. And, as the most network-dependent nation on earth, the United States is the most vulnerable. Military expert and author Paul J. Springer examines the many facets of cyber combat-from the threats of information exposure that American civilians encounter on a daily basis, to the concern of keeping up with the capabilities of China and Russia, to the inherent dangers in ignoring cyber threats. This essential reference-the only of its kind to include an overview of other cyber warfare literature-emphasizes the importance of cyber operations in modern conflicts, detailing the efforts that have been made by government agencies to create networks that are secure. Noted experts in the field weigh in on the problems of attribution during a cyber attack, the detection of cyber intrusions, and the possible solutions for preventing data breaches. The book features profiles of theorists, commanders, and inventors; as well as organizations dedicated to cyber attacks, including government and military operations, industrial cyber security companies, and academic centers. Incorporates expertise from diverse viewpoints from the military, government agencies, industry, and academia Provides an informative timeline of key events in the development of cyber warfare capabilities Highlights the most prominent and effective cyber attacks in history as well as legal attempts to curb them

The proverbial Soviet enigma has never seemed more elusive to Western analysts than now. General Secretary GorbacheV's demonstrated willingness to reallocate resources, the upheavals in the internal Soviet system wrought by perestroika and glasnost, and a new strategic reliance on defensive sufficiency may all have profound implications for U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. In this volume, distinguished academics, researchers, and government and military strategists look ahead to the 1990s and examine probable trends in the superpower relationship over the course of the next decade. An excellent source of readings for courses in international relations, national security, and foreign policy, the book focuses particularly on the strategic and military aspects of the relationship.

The book is divided into four parts and begins by addressing concepts of strategy. The contributors outline U.S. strategic practice and Soviet global objectives in the context of nuclear deterrence and major conventional wars. In Part II, three chapters discuss the U.S. response to the Soviet threat in terms of U.S. strategy for war in Europe, strategic defense policies, and technology and policy choices. Low intensity conflicts, both unconventional conflicts and Third World involvements, are the subject of Part III. Finally, the contributors assess Soviet military power and U.S. defense resources, examining the question of which nation is currently better prepared to outlast the other in a protracted conflict. A concluding chapter ties the readings together by examining whether the Soviet challenge of the 1990s can best be characterized as peacefully offensive or as operational entrapment.

Based upon consideration of United Nation missions to the Congo (1960-64), Somalia (1992-95), and the former Yugoslavia (1992-95) and examination of counterinsurgency campaigns, Mockaitis develops a new model for intervening in intrastate conflicts and commends the British approach to civil strife as the basis for a new approach to peace operations. Both contemporary and historic examples demonstrate that military intervention to end civil conflict differs radically from traditional peacekeeping. Ending a civil war requires the selective and limited use of force to stop the fighting, safeguard humanitarian aid work, and restore law and order. Since intrastate conflict resembles insurgency far more than it does any other type of war, counterinsurgency principles should form the basis of a new intervention model.

A comprehensive approach to resolve intrastate conflict requires that peace forces, NGOs, and local authorities cooperate in rebuilding a war-torn country. Only the British have enjoyed much success in counterinsurgency campaigns. Starting from the three broad principles of minimum force, civil-military cooperation, and flexibility, the British approach in responding to insurgency has combined the limited use of force with political and civil development. Carefully considered and correctly applied, these principles could produce a more effective model for peace operations to end intrastate conflict.

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Sun Tzu's ideas on survival and success have been read across the world for centuries. Today they can still be applied to business, politics and life. The Art of War demonstrates how to win without conflict. It shows that with enough intelligence and planning, it is possible to conquer with a minimum of force and little destruction.

This luxury hardback edition includes an introduction by Tom Butler-Bowdon that draws out lessons for managers and business leaders, and highlights the power of Sun Tzu's thinking in everyday life.

One of the most controversial aspects of United States foreign policy centers about its response to unconventional conflict--that is, revolutions, counterrevolutions, and terrorism--in and from a number of Third World countries. Examining the current U.S. political-military posture, this critical study assesses the challenges posed to open systems by these conflicts and proposes guidelines for creating a more effective U.S. response. The author first explores the nature of unconventional conflicts, then turns to the U.S. response to the challenges unconditional conflicts present. Urging the need for a "new realism" based on a more accurate picture of present political conditions and U.S. interests, he concludes with a series of suggested guidelines for designing U.S. policy, strategy, doctrine and organizational strategies as a means of developing a more viable approach to the challenges of contemporary military and political conflict.

This work is a critical examination of the dangers which confront the United States in the current era of global instability with historical examples of past crises and prescriptive suggestions for the future. America enters the post-Cold War world as a superpower, but one whose future security, and perhaps even survival, cannot be taken for granted. Only three times in modern history has the world seen such potential instability; in two of those instances, the result was total war. In the coming millennium, major crises and wars are inevitable. Whether or not the United States successfully negotiates such conflicts will depend upon decisions made today.

Only careful analysis and planning can help to assure that the United States will preserve its independence and prosperity. This study includes historical examples which illustrate why the current global situation is exceptionally dangerous and how America should prepare to avoid and survive crises, maintain freedom of action, and improve strategic decision-making. The author reviews the most dangerous strategic shortcomings and makes twenty-six recommendations for the future on such topics as military force structure, foreign policy goals, and domestic policy.

Noted scholars and practitioners describe how America's military strategy is being developed in a post-Cold War eolitical environment to meet future needs confronting the sole surviving world superpower. In defining the domestic constraints and the intense political process that is tied into the formulation of military strategy, they show how difficult it is to build a consensus for American military leadership in a multipolar world. This evaluation of strategic concepts and their application to issues about conventional and nuclear deterrence, technological requirements, and collective security should be required reading for staff officers, civilians in national security bureaucracies, policymakers, and students and scholars concerned with military and security policy.

Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question of why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the US in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite the presence of hundreds, then thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads in the nation's stockpile, the greatest military weapon in history became politically impossible to use. And yet overwhelming nuclear superiority did serve its ultimate purpose in the Cold War. When American vital interests were threatened - over Berlin and Cuba - the Soviets backed down from confrontation. Despite errors in strategic judgement brought on by fear of Communist expansion, and in some cases outright incompetence, the ace in the hole proved decisive.

This is the first full-length work to be published about the spectacular failure of the German intelligence services in Persia (Iran) during WWII. Based on archival research it analyzes a compelling history of Nazi planning, operations, personalities, and intrigues, and follows the protagonists from Hitler's rise to power into the postwar era.

Wallach provides a pioneering study of coalition warfare. Using World War I as a case study, Wallach examines such important aspects as Allied pre-war planning; the particularistic interests of coalition partners; human relations; the framework for coordination mechanisms within coalitions; the application of such concepts as a general reserve, unified command, and amalgamation of forces; logistical problems; war finance; and the transition from war to peace.

In the process, Wallach shows that coalition warfare is among the most difficult forms to develop and maintain successfully. Unfortunately, as recent post-Cold War experiences illustrate, coalition warfare is an ongoing military issue. As such, this book will be of great interest to military planners as well as students of the history of World War I.

From grassroots terrorism to the nuclear ambitions of hostile nations, the United States faces increasingly complex threats to its national security, and combating these threats continues to demand a reshaping of the nation's security structure, military forces and defense expenditures. In this study, Anthony Cordesman offers a detailed analysis of critical challenges affecting U.S. national security and how failures in adapting to these challenges have exacerbated the strains on available resources. He systematically identifies the most glaring obstacles to successful national security planning and proposes constructive and practical ways to proceed in the future. Cordesman focuses on ten specific challenges, and each is addressed within the context of the Iraq War, Afghan War, War on Terrorism, and the risk of conflict over the Taiwan Straits. Out of the lessons drawn from these experiences, he examines the future of international coalitions, asymmetric warfare, nation building, and stability operations, and concludes that perhaps the most pressing area for change is the need for accountability among civilian and military policymakers.

Many studies have covered aspects of military intelligence available to Britain and her allies during the Second World War. This distinguished book provides a succinct and authoritative survey of the vital role Ultra played in achieving final victory., When war began Britain was as ill-prepared in intelligence as armaments. Civilian scientists had discovered the principle of radar in the mid-1930s, but everything had to be learned from scratch in the heat of emergency. First signs of improvement came in mid-1941, when Ultra targeted naval vessels and bomber aircraft onto so many of Rommel's supply ships that the Africa Corps almost withered on the vine. From then on intelligence played an increasingly indispensable part in final victory. Ultra won the Battle of the Atlantic, driving U-boats back to coastal waters by June 1943. Ultra confirmed the whereabouts of the German tanks as Montgomery planned the breakthrough to Alamein. Only 'Bomber' Harris refused to give intelligence the credit it deserved; on the basis of new evidence this fascinating book strongly reinforces criticism this costly mistake.