Security perceptions in Europe have changed drastically in the last decade due to the effects of globalization. As a result, the EU's relations with Turkey and the security policies of the EU and Turkey have become increasingly important. In light of recent developments -- not least the controversial issue of Turkey's EU candidacy -- this book attempts to answer two main questions: "Is there a gap between EU and Turkish security cultures?" and "To what extent is Turkey an advantage for Europe?." Cigdem Ustun here examines Turkey's crucial role with NATO and details its relations and priorities in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Black Sea regions, comparing these with EU relations and priorities. This comparison illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of including Turkey in European security policies and will be essential reading for all those involved in security studies and policy.

From the foreword: "The present volume, Vanguard of Valor II, offers six accounts of US Soldiers at the tip of the spear during the Afghan campaign. The Combat Studies Institute's Vanguard of Valor series is intended to document small unit actions in Afghanistan. These books play an equally important role by offering insights to Soldiers who may find themselves in the years ahead under similar conditions, whether in Afghanistan or in some other troubled land where they have been deployed to conduct the dangerous business of defending the national interest in a theater of war."

Addressing the interaction between military operations and the activities of civilian government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during and after conflict, this study traces the development of civil military operations from their origin during World War II as Civil Affairs and military government to the present array of civil military operations. In so doing, it looks closely at the recent cases of Panama, Kuwait and southern Iraq, the Kurdish rescue mission in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti. Of particular interest is the book's integration of national policy, strategy, and operations as it looks at the interplay between combat operations and their civil, military and political consequences. The outcome of the operations considered here suggests a need to look at the organization and planning of military forces in contemporary conflict as well as the integration of nonmilitary players into the game from the start of operations. The author concludes that the essence of modern conflict can be found in civil military operations.

This volume contains Kipling's collected of essays, poems, theories, and reminisciences on sea warfare, from submarines to destroyers, with the personal and philosophical touches that mark all of his best works. Includes "The Fringes of the Fleet," "Tales of 'the Trade'," and "Destroyers at Jutland."

This study examines what led the leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany to launch major military offensives at the beginning of the First World War. The focus is on understanding why these two countries adopted high-risk offensive strategies during an international confrontation rather than a defensive military stance. The decision to attack or defend did not occur in a political vacuum. The leaders of Austria-Hungary and Germany adopted offensive strategies as a way to achieve their political ambitions. The offensives undertaken by Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914 thus reflected their political goals as well as the strategic doctrines of war planners. The concluding chapter of this study explores why deterrence failed in 1914.

The gripping, behind-the scenes story of one of the most sophisticated surveillance weapons ever created – and an existential threat to democracy and human rights.

Pegasus is widely regarded as the most powerful cyber-surveillance system on the market – available to any government that can afford its multimillion-dollar price tag. The system’s creator, the NSO group, a private corporation headquartered in Israel, boasts about its ability to thwart terrorists and criminals.

But the Pegasus system doesn’t only catch terrorists and criminals.

Pegasus has been used by repressive regimes to spy on thousands of innocent people around the world: heads of state, diplomats, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, and journalists.

Virtually undetectable, the system can track a person’s daily movement in real time, gain control of the device’s microphones and cameras at will, and capture all videos, photos, emails, texts, and passwords – encrypted or not. Its full reach is not even known.

This is the gripping story of how Pegasus was uncovered, written by Laurent Richard and Sandrine Rigaud, the two intrepid reporters who revealed the scandal in collaboration with an international consortium of journalists. Their findings shook the world.

Tense and compelling, Pegasus reveals how thousands of lives have been turned upside down by this unprecedented threat, and exposes the chilling new ways governments and corporations are laying waste to human rights – and silencing innocent citizens.

This book examines the development of collective security by regional organizations particularly after the Cold War. It analyzes the various constitutional developments that have occurred within regional arrangements such as ECOWAS, African Union, SADC, OAS, and NATO, and critically analyzes how these developments have propelled regional organizations to depart from the normative framework of regional arrangement contained in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Through a comprehensive examination of practice, the book evaluates the impact of regional organizations newly asserted powers to authorize enforcement action and determine when situations within member states warrant their intervention. It inquires into the legal justifications for these developments both from within the UN Charter and regional treaties and practice and asks whether consensual intervention, that is the use of force by regional organizations on the basis of their members consent, impinges on, or constitutes an exception to, the prohibition of the use or threat of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter. The book also analyzes the regime of complimentarity between the UN and regional organizations.

This book compares the influence of the period leading up to World War II and of the war itself on the discipline of psychology in two major, but very different countries. During the 1930s, Soviet psychologists were formally isolated from developments in Western psychology by the ideological requirements of the Communist Party; in the United States, a vast variety of topics was being researched. When the war began, the discipline in the Soviet Union turned increasingly toward specialized topics, such as the rehabilitation of the wounded, ways to improve morale, and the psychological basis of color-camouflage. American psychologists, on the other hand, applied their psychometric and clinical skills to military needs. With the coming of "glasnost," American and Russian psychologists were able to collaborate to create the first thorough examinations of the state of wartime psychology in these countries. Of interest to all students and researchers of the history of psychology, psychological theory, and the history of World War II.

A staggering number of post-World War II White House and agency records pertaining to national security are stored in repositories nationwide, but researchers often find it impossible to locate and access these records. This book provides considerable detail on the quantity, nature, and public accessibility of the records at the National Archives, Federal records centers, the agencies themselves, presidential libraries, and smaller repositories. The author also discusses the critical importance of federal records management policies, classification and declassification policies, and the need for improved compliance with these policies.

The public has never had a comprehensive guide to assist in identifying, locating, and gaining access to agency and White House national security records. The author tells the reader where national security-related records are located, which ones are accessible to the public, and which ones are not. He also discusses the vital role of federal records management policies in determining the ultimate disposition of records and where the records are stored. In addition, he sets forth the policies governing the classification and declassification of records and the reasons the vast majority of records are still inaccessible to the public. Both beginning and experienced researchers will find this work to be of great assistance.

Leonard provides the first comprehensive history of the Red Army's Intelligence Directorate, known today as the GRU, from its inception during the Russian Civil War up to the rise of Nazi Germany in 1933. During these early years of Soviet Army intelligence, the GRU actively promoted Communism internationally through insurrection and partisan warfare. It became deeply involved in espionage in Western Europe, the United States, and Asia. Making extensive use of primary sources, many of which have only recently become available, Leonard completes a story that has until now been often inaccurate or simply confused.

The history of "strategic bombing" is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of "strategic" bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.

As the world moves further into the Information Age and the ensuing increased levels of globalization, the ability to harness all of the elements of national power in an integrated, coordinated, and synchronized manner will be even more critical for the United States to successfully defend itself. Gerstein argues that the United States as a nation is largely unprepared to reap the full benefits of the Information Age and unable to address an increasing threat level because its methods, procedures, and ways of thinking remain anchored to the Industrial Age that is rapidly being left behind. To understand and adapt to this emerging environment, the United States must re-examine the development and the implementation of national security strategy. Gerstein examines the history of U.S. national security strategy, and he analyzes the results and conclusions of several capstone documents, including the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Homeland Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Commission of National Security/21st Century, and the 9/11 Commission Report. After evaluating the execution of U.S. national security strategy, Gerstein maintains that U.S. efforts today are more heavily weighted to the use of "hard power"--political, military, and intelligence resources--for achieving strategic goals and objectives. A strategy that incorporates more fully the elements of national power, including "soft power" such as economic, social, cultural, and informational capabilities will better serve the interests of the nation. In addition, Gerstein proposes a new way of looking at strategy. Typically, strategy has been defined as the linking of ways and means toachieve ends while mitigating risk. In the future, we must factor environment into any discussion.

Using recently released French official documents and a variety of other sources, this study explains how the French Army, so recently defeated by the Viet Minh insurgents in Indochina, was able to successfully defeat the Algerian nationalist rebels on the battlefield, while nevertheless losing the war at the conference table. This French success, between 1954 and 1962, was due in large part to the superior logistical system of the French Army and the use of the helicopter to enhance French operational mobility. French counter-mobility measures, particularly the construction of heavily defended interdiction zones on the eastern and western borders of Algeria, proved highly effective against the rebels. Such methods essentially cut off the rebel forces from their bases and from sources of supply located outside Algeria, and consequently strangled and destroyed the rebel forces within Algeria.

No other work on the Algerian War focuses upon the role of logistics in the outcome of the conflict. The detailed statistical data and comprehensive description and analysis of the logistical organizations and methods of both the French and the nationalist rebels are supplemented by excellent maps. This study also provides useful insights into the nature of the wars of national liberation and counter-insurgency doctrines that dominated military affairs in the mid-20th century.

This book, written with unique access to official archives, tells the secret story of Britain's H-bomb - the scientific and strategic background, the government's policy decision, the work of the remarkable men who created the bomb, the four weapon trials at a remote Pacific atoll in 1957-58, and the historic consequences.

This work proposes the reorganization of America's ground forces on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Central to the proposal is the simple thesis that the U.S. Army must take control of its future by exploiting the emerging revolution in military affairs. The analysis argues that a new Army warfighting organization will not only be more deployable and effective in Joint operations; reorganized information age ground forces will be significantly less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize than the Army's current Cold War division-based organizations. And while ground forces must be equipped with the newest Institute weapons, new technology will not fulfill its promise of shaping the battlefield to American advantage if new devices are merely grafted on to old organizations that are not specifically designed to exploit them. It is not enough to rely on the infusion of new, expensive technology into the American defense establishment to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century. The work makes it clear that planes, ships, and missiles cannot do the job of defending America's global security issues alone. The United States must opt for reform and reorganization of the nation's ground forces and avoid repeating Britain's historic mistake of always fielding an effective army just in time to avoid defeat, but too late to deter an aggressor.

Planning by civil governments, businesses, and the military services has been considered separately in both theory and practice. Those concerned with each of these applications have had little contact with those in the others, despite the common concerns and characteristics of their respective practices.

A leading figure in the research and education in planning, Branch draws upon his experience in civil, corporate, and military planning to provide a comprehensive guide to the key aspects of planning. This text is invaluable to those engaged in governmental and business planning and to students working toward careers in urban and regional planning, public administration, business management, and other fields concerned with planning.

The relationship between Britain and Greece, situated at the opposite ends of Europe has been close and troubled, especially since the emergence of Greece as an independent state in the 1830s. The essays in this book, some previously unpublished, focus on aspects of British-Greek relations, military, diplomatic and academic, during the 20th century. A particular area of interest is the Second World War, when British involvement in Greek affairs reached it climax, just before she surrendered her role as Greece's principal external patron to the United States.