This book examines the major armed conflicts in South Asia. The articles study conflict management, look at the direction the armed conflict is likely to take and provide a set of alternative measures that could be pursued by the actors. Designed as an annual series, the articles provide a brief historical sketch of the emergence of armed conflict, outlining its various phases. This volume examines the various armed conflicts in South Asia in 2009 - in Afghanistan, FATA and NWFP, J&K, North-East India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, and sectarian and Naxalite violence in Pakistan and India respectively. The volume also includes an exclusive chapter on the continuing story of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This important collection discusses India's geo-strategic importance and its common borders with its neighbours; the psychological and economic costs of violence and the problem of refugee migrants; treaties, memorandums and ceasefire agreements signed over the past several years across countries; the role of the United Nations and other peacekeeping forces; and the future of failed and failing states.

Desertification in the Mediterranean Region: a Security Issue 1 2 William G. Kepner & Jose Luis Rubio 1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, P.O. Box 93478, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 89193-3478 ([email protected]) 2. Centro de Investigaciones sobre Desertificacion-CIDE, (CSIC, Universitat de Valencia, Generalitat Valenciana), Cami de la Marjal, s/n Apartado Oficial, 46470 Albal, Valencia, Spain ([email protected]) Security issues related to desertification in the Mediterranean Region were the subject of a special NATO workshop held on 2-5 December 2003 at the Museum of Sciences Principe Felipe in Valencia, Spain. This workshop was organized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA), Centre for Desertification Research (Valencia, Spain), and the Desert Research Institute (Reno, Nevada, USA) on behalf of the NATO Science Committee and the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (Public Diplomacy Division). Additionally, the European Society for Soil Conservation participated as a collaborating institution. Other participating institutions included the Spanish Ministry of Environment, Generalitat Valencia (Department of Territory and Housing), the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the City of Art & Sciences of Valencia which hosted the Meeting."

Sure to be found controversial by some, compelling by all, this is the only available book-length examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Of more immediate concern, it is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Adams argues, arose from the DoD's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts-whether they were appropriate or not. What we need to do, he maintains, is to fight the war we have, not the war we want. Over the last several decades, military theorists and others began to believe that new technologies were generating a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), capabilities so revolutionary that they would redefine warfare. Spurred by these beliefs, and led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense (DoD) set out to transform the U.S. armed forces by adopting RMA concepts-and spending billions to make the hypothetical capabilities real. The entire structure of the armed forces changed as a result. This vision, however, was totally dependent on a set of unproven suppositions and often nonexistent capabilities, especially a network of information technologies. Moreover, the services, the media, Congress, and industry each had its own agenda, all of which continue to come into play in the development of RMA strategies. The interplay of politics, technology and military reality offers a fascinating narrative.

Today the vast archipelago of Southeast Asia islands known as Indonesia is in the headlines because of political instability, religious tension, and violence in the streets. Forty years ago similar conditions led the Central Intelligence Agency to mount a top-secret covert action campaign designed to hold that nation's left-leaning President Sukarno's feet to the fire and prevent a strategic crossroad from falling into the communist camp. The Agency supported rebels with weapons, planes, and a memorable cast of bigger-than-life American agents. In a fast-paced, engrossing narrative evoking the novels of John LeCarré and Graham Greene, the authors provide the first unclassified, detailed case study of an operation that has escaped public scrutiny for decades. Their work adds significantly to our understanding of the CIA and American involvement in Asia. Drawing on declassified documents and an extraordinary number of interviews with CIA and Indonesian participants, Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison reconstruct the delicate, dangerous game played by American intelligence agents across the Indonesian archipelago. This is a story of ideologues and soldiers of fortune--historic CIA legends like Allen Dulles and Franklin Wisner, and notorious special operators like Tony ""Poe"" Poshepny, whose reputation reached mythic proportions later in Laos, and Allen Pope, an indefatigable B-26 pilot who was captured and sentenced to die. But it also includes the transfixing exploits of Montana smokejumpers, Polish aircrews, Muslim anti-communist guerrillas, U.S. Navy submarine crews, and Filipino mercenary pilots flying P-51 Mustangs. With the problems in today's Indonesia far from solved and the complex U.S.-Indonesian relationship coming under close scrutiny, this fascinating account of an American covert operation gone bad will play a significant role in shedding new light on the CIA's efforts in Southeast Asia.

Hurricane Katrina is the latest in a series of major disasters that were not well managed, but it is not likely to be the last. Category 4 and category 5 hurricanes will, according to most predictions, become both more frequent and more intense in the future due to global warming and/or natural weather cycles. In addition, it is often said that another terrorist attack on the United States is inevitable; that it is a question of when, not whether. Add to that the scare over a possible avian flu pandemic. As a result, the United States should expect that disaster response--to natural and other types of disasters--will continue to be of vital concern to the American public and the policymakers and officials who deal with disaster response and relief, including the military. The U.S. disaster relief program reflects a basic division of responsibility between federal, state, and local governments that has generally stood the test of time. At the federal level, a single agency, FEMA--now under the Department of Homeland Security--has been charged with the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the various federal agencies that have a role in disaster relief. A successful disaster response requires three things: timely and effective coordination between state and federal governments; effective coordination among the federal agencies; and effective coordination between and among state and local government agencies. Miskel examines the effects that operational failures after Hurricanes Agnes, Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina have had on the organizational design and operating principles of the disaster response system program. He also discusses the impact of 9/11 and the evolving role ofthe military, and he identifies reforms that should be implemented to improve the nation's ability to respond in the future.

When the Germans invaded her small Belgian village in 1914, Marthe Cnockaert's home was burned and her family separated. After getting a job at a German hospital, and winning the Iron Cross for her service to the Reich, she was approached by a neighbor and invited to become an intelligence agent for the British. Not without trepidation, Cnockaert embarked on a career as a spy, providing information and engaging in sabotage before her capture and imprisonment in 1916. After the war, she was paid and decorated by a grateful British government for her service. Cnockaert's is only one of the surprising and gripping stories that comprise Female Intelligence. This is the first history of the female spies who served Britain during World War I, focusing on both the powerful cultural images of these women and the realities, challenges, and contradictions of intelligence service. Between the founding of modern British intelligence organizations in 1909 and the demobilization of 1919, more than 6,000 women served the British government in either civil or military occupations as members of the intelligence community. These women performed a variety of services, and they represented an astonishing diversity of nationality, age, and class. From Aphra Behn, who spied for the British government in the seventeenth century, to the most well known example, Mata Hari, female spies have a long history, existing in juxtaposition to the folkloric notion of women as chatty, gossipy, and indiscreet. Using personal accounts, letters, official documents and newspaper reports, Female Intelligence interrogates different, and apparently contradictory, constructions of gender in the competing spheres of espionage activity.

The words of the ancient Chinese sages are as timeless as they are wise. The words of ancient Chinese philosophers have influenced other thinkers across the world for more than 2,000 years, and continue to shape our ideas today. The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy includes translations of Sun Tzu's Art of War, Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching, the teachings of the master sage Confucius, and the writings of Mencius. From insights on warfare and diplomacy to advice on how to deal with one's neighbors and colleagues, this collection of classical Eastern philosophy will provide readers with countless nuggets of wisdom. IBPA Benjamin Franklin Gold Award Winner 2017!

"Strategy and Intelligence," which brings together original essays by a number of leading authorities on various aspects of the First World War, aims both to summarise the latest literature on Britain's participation in that war and also to open up new lines of investigation. These include the role of intelligence in land and air battles; Anglo-American financial relations; Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Irish relations; the British Labour movement in the war; and the final campaigns of 1918, which led to the Allied victory. These essays are written not only for the specialist but also to be accessible to students and to the general reader.

In this timely work, James Giermanski describes the advent and development of security operations in the global supply chain, outlining the respective contributions of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders to this worldwide concern. Global Supply Chain Security explores the potential impact of port-related catastrophic events in the United States and their effects worldwide, concentrating, in particular, on the United States' contribution to global container security. Offering insights on deficiencies in U.S. policies, Giermanski underscores the vulnerabilities in the supply chain that U.S. government agencies have ignored, avoided, and even denied. Global Supply Chain Security treats both the terrestrial and maritime borders of the United States, reserving for special analysis the threat to the nation's southern border of hazardous materials or materials in transshipment or in-bond, as well as the questionable leadership exhibited by the Department of Homeland Security in its diagnosis and treatment of these threats. Finally, Giermanski covers the important role played by the private sector and the off-the-shelf, innovative products that have been introduced to supply chain management and security.

In 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in a mere six days. This remarkable military accomplishment would, however, have the ultimate effect of creating an albatross around the neck of the Israeli Army, as Israelis would now expect the next conventional war with the Arabs to achieve similar results: a quick, decisive victory with relatively few casualties. Although Egyptian forces were militarily inferior to those of Israel, President Anwar Sadat developed a successful limited war strategy designed to exploit this unrealistic expectation. Rather than aiming to achieve a military victory or to seize strategic terrain, Sadat merely sought to break a diplomatic stalemate with a major military operation designed to soften Israeli intransigence toward negotiations and to force a change in U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In support of these political aims, the Egyptian Armed Forces set out to discredit the Israeli Army's prowess by inflicting heavy casualties in a limited war. Sadat's success in regaining the entire Sinai without another armed struggle holds an important lesson for the United States. After its dramatic victory in Desert Storm, American armed forces feel compelled to win the next conventional war quickly, decisively, and with relatively few casualties, much like the challenge that faced Israel after the 1967 war.

This book provides a definitive overview of the relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. The secrecy surrounding intelligence means that publication of intelligence is highly restricted, barring occasional whistle-blowing and sanitised official leaks. These characteristics mean that intelligence, if publicised, can be highly manipulated by intelligence elites, while civil society's ability to assess and verify claims is compromised by absence of independent evidence. There are few studies on the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites, which makes it hard to form robust assessments or practical recommendations regarding public oversight of intelligence elites. Addressing that lacuna, this book analyses two case studies of global political significance. The intelligence practices they focus on (contemporary mass surveillance and Bush-era torture-intelligence policies) have been presented as vital in fighting the 'Global War on Terror', enmeshing governments of scores of nation-states, while challenging internationally established human rights to privacy and to freedom from torture and enforced disappearance. The book aims to synthesise what is known on relationships of influence between civil society and intelligence elites. It moves away from disciplinary silos, to make original recommendations for how a variety of academic disciplines most likely to study the relationship between civil society and intelligence elites (international relations, history, journalism and media) could productively cross-fertilise. Finally, it aims to create a practical benchmark to enable civil society to better hold intelligence elites publicly accountable. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, surveillance, media, journalism, civil society, democracy and IR in general.

This book is the first full-spectrum analysis of Russian and European norms of political action, ranging from international law, ethics, and strategy, to the specific norms for the use of force. It brings together leading scholars from these various fields, examining the differences in norm understanding between Russia and Europe. In light of the 2014 occupation and annexation of Crimea by Russia, and its subsequent covert participation in the internal affairs of Ukraine, including aggressive flying and major military exercises, Russia seems to be a classical revisionist power, intent on changing the balance of power in Europe in particular. It also reaches beyond Europe, inserting itself as the key actor in the Syrian war. The book therefore considers how we should understand Russia. It also questions whether or not the West, in particular Europe, responds adequately in this delicate and dangerous new situation. The book concludes that at present Russia acts strategically and with considerable success whereas Europe is reactive in its response.

This book explores the theory and practice of security conflict intervention by examining the experience of the Boko Haram security assault conflict. Through an examination of the realities of conflict it provides pragmatic approaches to strategic security and suggests ways to create practical security research, political controls, military and police mobilization, intelligence management, counterterrorism, and antiterrorism intervention procedures and practices to sustainably resolve conflict. The author argues that every intervention plan must be forged based on the particular security assault conflict dynamics and demands in a nation or region. In all cases, however, the key to securing and guaranteeing public protection and safety is regular inter-agency and multi-disciplinary collaboration. At the micro level, this book is about security strategies for public protection, but at the macro level it is about public domain violence prevention, response, mitigation, recovery, restoration, and protection of the public from the deleterious impacts of emergency events.

The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice is an original contribution to the general theory of strategy. While heavily indebted to Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and the very few other classic authors, this book presents the theory, rather than merely comments on the theory as developed by others. The author explains that the purpose of strategy is to connect purposefully politics and policy with the instruments they must use. The primary focus of attention is on military strategy, but this focus is well nested in discussion of grand strategy, for which military strategy is only one strand. The book presents the general theory of strategy comprehensively and explains the utility of this general theory for the particular strategies that strategists need to develop in order to meet their historically unique challenges. The book argues that strategy's general theory provides essential education for practicing strategists at all times and in all circumstances. As general theory, The Strategy Bridge is as relevant to understanding strategic behaviour in the Peloponnesian War as it is for the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book proceeds from exposition of general strategic theory, to address three basic issue areas that are not at all well explained, let alone understood with a view to advancing better practice, in the extant literature. Specifically, the book tackles the problems that harass and imperil strategic performance; it probes deeply into the hugely underexamined subject of just what it is that the strategist produces-strategic effect; and it 'joins up the dots' from theory through practice to consequences by means of a close examination of command performance. The author takes a holistic view of strategy, and it is rigorously attentive to the significance of the contexts within which and for which strategies are developed and applied. The book regards the strategist as a hero, charged with the feasible, but awesomely difficult, task of converting the threat and use of force (for military strategy) into desired political consequences. He seeks some control over the rival or enemy via strategic effect, the instrumental produce of his instrumental labours. In order to maximise his prospects for success, the practicing strategist requires all the educational assistance that strategic theory can provide.

The Practice of Strategy focuses on grand strategy and military strategy as practiced over an extended period of time and under very different circumstances, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies in present-day Afghanistan and Iraq. It presents strategy as it pertained not only to wars, campaigns, and battles, but also to times of peace that were over-shadowed by the threat of war. The book is intended to deepen understanding of the phenomena and logic of strategy by reconstructing the considerations and factors that shaped imperial and nation-state policies.
Through historical case studies, the book sheds light on a fundamental question: is there a unity to all strategic experience? Adopting the working definition of strategy as 'the art of winning by purposely matching ends, ways and means, ' these chapters deal with the intrinsic nature of war and strategy and the characteristics of a particular strategy in a given conflict. They show that a specific convergence of political objectives, operational schemes of manoeuvre, tactical moves and countermoves, technological innovations and limitations, geographic settings, transient emotions and more made each conflict studied unique. Yet, despite the extraordinary variety of the people, circumstances, and motives discussed in this book, there is a strong case for continuity in the application of strategy from the olden days to the present.
Together, these chapters reveal that grand strategy and military strategy have elements of continuity and change, art and science. They further suggest that the element of continuity lies in the essential nature of strategy and war, while the element of change lies in the character of individual strategies and wars.

The anthology discusses the formula of a "grand bargain" to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. Scholars from the US, South Korea, China, Russia and the former UK ambassador Everard review recent historical developments and political objectives and constraints of the DPRK regime. They also analyse the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia from the perspective of China, Russia and South Korea. The book offers a multifaceted analysis of a pressing policy issue. The proposal is to offer security guarantees and substantial financial support for opening North Korea's economy and taking verifiable steps towards denuclearization. Sanctions would be a last resort in case North Korea fails to denuclearize.

Military and defense organizations are a vital component to any nation. In order to maintain the standards of these sectors, new procedures and practices must be implemented. Emerging Strategies in Defense Acquisitions and Military Procurement is a pivotal reference source for the latest scholarly research on the present state of defense organizations, examining reforms and solutions necessary to overcome current limitations and make vast improvements to their infrastructure. Highlighting methodologies and theoretical foundations that promote more effective practices in defense acquisition, this book is ideally designed for academicians, practitioners, researchers, upper-level students, and professionals engaged in defense industries.

The book is a world-wide survey of the terms and conditions under which the United States has stationed her forces in independent sovereign states since 1945. The book analyses the constraints of the 'Pax Americana' country by country and contrasts this with the rights of conquest enjoyed by traditional colonial empires.

As tensions between China and Japan increase, including over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, Japan has adopted under Prime Minister Abe a new security posture. This involves, internally, adapting Japan's constitutional position on defence and, externally, building stronger international relationships in the Asia-Pacific region and more widely. This book presents a comprehensive analysis of these developments. It shows how trust and co-operation with the United States, the only partner with which Japan has a formal alliance, is being rebuilt, discusses how other relationships, both on security and on wider issues, are being formed, in the region and with European countries and the EU, with the relationships with India and Australia being of particular importance, and concludes by assessing the likely impact on the region of Japan's changing posture and new relationships.

This fourteenth volume of India's National Security Annual Review intensively analyses India's national security with respect to the changing internal and external dynamics. In the global environment, the situation is characterised by rising tensions between United States and Russia, intensified rivalry between United States (US) and China, and increasing cooperation between China and Russia. For India which seeks peaceful growth to emerge as a major power, this poses severe diplomatic challenges. This volume discusses the complexity of these challenges and the deftness with which India gets the best out of its strategic partnerships with the US and Russia while warding off the transgressions of a mighty adversary like China. It also studies the impact of internal convulsions and external intrusions on India's security from South Asian nations such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Examining the field of internal security, the essays carry rare insights into the causes of expansion of Naxalite violence in tribal areas and the dynamics of conflict resolution in the Northeast, as well as India's deep concern as a growing power with its economic slowdown in the recent past, and energy and cyber security. Bringing together contributions from eminent scholars and diplomats, the volume will be indispensable for policymakers, government think tanks, defence and strategic studies experts, as well as students and researchers of international relations, foreign policy and political science.

Trevor Findlay reveals the history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers from Sinai in the 1950s to Haiti in the 1990s. He untangles the arguments about the use of force in peace operations and sets these within the broader context of military doctrine and practice. Drawing on these insights the author examines proposals for future conduct of UN operations, including the formulation of UN peacekeeping doctrine and the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force.

India has the world's fourth largest military and one of the biggest defence budgets. It asserts its political and military profile in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The nation has been in the midst of an ambitious plan to modernize its largely Soviet-era arms since the late 1990s and has spent billions of dollars on latest high-tech military technology. This handbook: canvasses over 60 years of Indian defence policy and the major debates that have shaped it; discusses several key themes such as the origins of the modern armed forces in India; military doctrine and policy; internal and external challenges; and nuclearization and its consequences; includes contributions by well-known scholars, experts in the field and policymakers; and provides an annotated bibliography for further research. Presented in an accessible format, this lucidly written handbook will be an indispensable resource for scholars and researchers of security and defence studies, international relations and political science, as well as for government think tanks and policymakers.

This book provides a history of the South China Sea conflict and lays out the stakes for each of the bordering states and China's interaction with them - namely, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia; it also examines the U.S. government's role in the region. China's Naval Operations in the South China Sea is highly topical; it examines the evolving perception of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) of the South China Sea (SCS), and Beijing's accompanying maritime strategy to claim the islands and waters, particularly in the context of the strategies of the neighbouring stake-holding nations. In addition to long-standing territorial disputes over the islands and waters of the SCS, China and the other littoral states - Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia - have growing and often mutually exclusive interests in the offshore energy reserves and fishing grounds. Many other countries outside of the region worry about the protection of sea lines of communication for military and commercial traffic, oil tankers in particular. These differences have been expressed in the increasing frequency and intensity of maritime incidents, involving both naval and civilian vessels, sometimes working in coordination against naval or civilian targets. Each chapter on the littoral states closely examines that state's territorial claims to the islands and waters of the SCS, its primary economic and military interests in these areas, its views on the sovereignty disputes over the entire SCS, its strategy to achieve its objectives, and its views on the U.S. involvement in any and all of these issues.

This is the first academic study of India's emerging maritime strategy, and offers a systematic analysis of the interplay between Western military thought and Indian maritime traditions.

By a quirk of historical fate, Europe embarked on its Age of Discovery just as the main Asian powers were renouncing the sea, ushering in centuries of Western dominance. In the 21st century, however, Asian states are once again resuming a naval focus, with both China and India dedicating some of their new-found wealth to building powerful navies and coast guards, and drawing up maritime strategies to govern the use of these forces. The United States, like the British Empire before it, is attempting to manage these rising sea powers while preserving its maritime primacy.

This book probes how India looks at the sea, what kind of strategy and seagoing forces New Delhi may craft in the coming years, and how Indian leaders may use these forces. It examines the material dimension, but its major premise is that navies represent a physical expression of a society's history, philosophical traditions, and culture. This book, then, ventures a comprehensive appraisal of Indian maritime strategy.

This book will be of interest to students of sea power, strategic studies, Indian politics and Asian Studies in general.

James R. Holmes is an Associate Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer. Toshi Yoshihara is an Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College. Andrew C. Winner is Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College.