"An eye-opening account of our intelligence establishment."
--"Library Journal"

"An outstanding book, clearly the best recent, up-to-date survey of the American intelligence community, ranking with the top half-dozen ever."
"--H. Bradford Westerfield, Yale University"

Recent years have seen numerous books about the looming threat posed to Western society by biological and chemical terrorism, by narcoterrorists, and by the unpredictable leaders of rogue nations. Some of these works have been alarmist. Some have been sensible and measured. But none has been by Loch Johnson.

Johnson, author of the acclaimed "Secret Agencies "and "an experienced overseer of intelligence" ("Foreign Affairs"), here examines the present state and future challenges of American strategic intelligence. Written in his trademark style--dubbed "highly readable" by "Publishers Weekly"--and drawing on dozens of personal interviews and contacts, Johnson takes advantage of his insider access to explore how America today aspires to achieve nothing less than "global transparency," ferreting out information on potential dangers in every corner of the world.

And yet the American security establishment, for all its formidable resources, technology, and networks, currently remains a loose federation of individual fortresses, rather than a well integrated "community" of agencies working together to provide the President with accurate information on foreign threats and opportunities. Intelligence failure, like the misidentified Chinese embassy in Belgrade accidentally bombed by a NATO pilot, is the inevitable outcome when the nation's thirteen secret agencies steadfastly resist the need for centralcoordination.

Ranging widely and boldly over such controversial topics as the intelligence role of the United Nations (which Johnson believes should be expanded) and whether assassination should be a part of America's foreign policy (an option he rejects for fear that the U.S. would then be cast not only as global policeman but also as global godfather), Loch K. Johnson here maps out a critical "and" prescriptive vision of the future of American intelligence.

This book critically analyses the concept of the intelligence cycle, highlighting the nature and extent of its limitations and proposing alternative ways of conceptualising the intelligence process. The concept of the intelligence cycle has been central to the study of intelligence. As Intelligence Studies has established itself as a distinctive branch of Political Science, it has generated its own foundational literature, within which the intelligence cycle has constituted a vital thread - one running through all social-science approaches to the study of intelligence and constituting a staple of professional training courses. However, there is a growing acceptance that the concept neither accurately reflects the intelligence process nor accommodates important elements of it, such as covert action, counter-intelligence and oversight. Bringing together key authors in the field, the book considers these questions across a number of contexts: in relation to intelligence as a general concept, military intelligence, corporate/private sector intelligence and policing and criminal intelligence. A number of the contributions also go beyond discussion of the limitations of the cycle concept to propose alternative conceptualisations of the intelligence process. What emerges is a plurality of approaches that seek to advance the debate and, as a consequence, Intelligence Studies itself. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, criminology and policing, security studies and IR in general, as well as to practitioners in the field.

This small book by C. R. M. F. Cruttwell contains several lectures delivered in 1936 for the Lees-Knowles Foundation, at Trinity College, Cambridge. Divided into five chapters, the volume examines the role of British strategy in the First World War, considering such themes as the British tradition in continental coalitions, lost opportunities and the war of attrition, and significant points of struggle and achievement during the last phase of the war.

This book comprises the Lees Knowles Lectures for 1946, originally delivered by A. H. Burne at the University of Cambridge. Burne begins by introducing the principles of military strategy, and then applies those principles to examples of land operations in Poland, Dunkirk and Russia, Africa and Italy, and Japan and north-west Europe during the Second World War.

While the deterrence of cyber attacks is one of the most important issues facing the United States and other nations, the application of deterrence theory to the cyber realm is problematic. This study introduces cyber warfare and reviews the challenges associated with deterring cyber attacks, offering key recommendations to aid the deterrence of major cyber attacks.

This book highlights recent advances in the development of effective modeling and solution approaches to enhance the performance of military logistics. It seeks to further research in global defense-related topics, including military operations, governmental operations and security, as well as nation support. Additionally its purpose is to promote the global exchange of information and ideas amongst developers and users of military operations research tools and techniques. Over the course of its nine chapters, this edited volume addresses significant issues in military logistics including: a) Restructuring processes via OR methods aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the military logistics, b) Sense-and-Respond logistics prediction and coordination techniques that provide competitive advantage, spanning the full range of military operations across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, c) Procurement and auctioning, d) Inventory and stock control theories and applications, e) Military transport and logistical equipment, and, f) Maintenance, repair and overhaul on operational capability in general and equipment availability. The book aims to bridge the gap between the abundant literature on commercial logistics and its scarce defense & combat counterpart. This collection of useful insights into new trends and research will offer an ideal reference for practitioners and army related personnel interested in integrating scientific rigor to improve logistics management within defense organizations & agencies. Ultimately this book should provide a relevant platform for the latest contributions of operations management, operations research, and computational intelligence towards the enhancement of military logistics.

Since the end of the Cold War the number of interstate wars has remained relatively low, although whilst states may be more secure than ever this does not mean that individual human beings are too. This has led to a growing recognition of the importance of human security, in contrast to the traditional realist focus on state security. This book explores human security in East Asia, focusing in particular on the challenges to collaboration among actors involved in the process of human security promotion. It examines the theoretical complexities of conceptual arguments about human security, drawing on the ideas of scholars from Asia and the West, to provide a global perspective on what causes human insecurity and how security can best be achieved. It considers in detail case studies of military interventions in East Asia, in particular East Timor, and assesses how successful collaborative efforts have been in providing human security. It also explores case studies of non-military intervention, including international criminal justice in Cambodia and East Timor. It discusses the relationship of regional great powers such as China and Japan to human security promotion, arguing that it will be better served if these powers engage less in the traditional game of geopolitics and if human security objectives do not work against actors' interests. It shows how interventions to uphold human security have not always succeeded to the extent that was hoped, despite the best of intentions, and considers how improved collaboration can be achieved, so that future interventions enjoy more consistent success.

This original and detailed collection explores how regional actors deal with uncertainties that are inherent to the current geopolitical situation in East Asia. The contributors collectively demonstrate that strategic uncertainty has become a major factor in the shaping of the security order in East Asia.

Governing Military Technologies in the 21st Century is one of the first books to tackle the big five technological threats all in one place: nanotech, robotics, cyberwar, human enhancement, and, non-lethal weapons, weaving a historical, legal, and sociopolitical fabric into a discussion of their development, deployment, and, potential regulation.

The first study to examine psychological warfare in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this book presents a rational analysis of the Arab and Israeli struggles to gain the world's sympathy and support, tracing these struggles from the British Mandate to the more recent HAMAS abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

The proliferation of advanced militarily relevant technologies in the Asia-Pacific over the past few decades has been a significant, and perhaps even alarming, development. This volume addresses how such technologies may affect military capabilities and military advantage in the region.

In the aftermath of the Edward Snowden leaks, the Obama administration has been hard pressed to yield to greater transparency and openness to constructive change. This book provides a catalyst toward greater transparency, increased public awareness of the urgent need for constructive change, and the insight into what such change would require.

Military Adaptation in War addresses one of the most persistent, yet rarely examined, problems that military organizations confront: namely, the problem of how to adapt under the trying, terrifying conditions of war. This work builds on the volume that Professor Williamson Murray edited with Allan Millett on military innovation (a quite different problem, though similar in some respects). In Clausewitzian terms, war is a contest, an interactive duel, which is of indeterminate length and presents a series of intractable problems at every level, from policy and strategy down to the tactical. Moreover, the fact that the enemy is adapting at the same time presents military organizations with an ever-changing set of conundrums that offer up no easy solutions. As the British general, James Wolfe, suggested before Quebec: War is an option of difficulties. Dr. Murray provides an in-depth analysis of the problems that military forces confront in adapting to these difficulties.

This book examines US recourse to military force in the post-9/11 era. In particular, it evaluates the extent to which the Bush and Obama administrations viewed legitimizing the greater use-of-force as a necessary solution to thwart the security threat presented by global terrorist networks and WMD proliferation.

This collection of articles represents Professor Williamson Murray's efforts to elucidate the role that history should play in thinking about both the present and the future. They reflect three disparate themes in Professor Murray's work: his deep fascination with history and those who have acted in the past; his fascination with the similarities in human behavior between the past and the present; and his belief that the study of military and strategic history can be of real use to those who will confront the daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century. The first group of essays addresses the relevance of history to an understanding of the present and to an understanding of the possibilities of the future. The second addresses the possible direct uses of history to think through the problems involved in the creation of effective military institutions. The final group represents historical case studies that serve to illuminate the present.

Home-grown terrorists equipped by a foreign power are not a new phenomenon. During the Second World War, Hitler's Germany made sustained efforts to inflict a terror campaign on the streets of Britain through the use of secret agents and agents provocateurs. The aim was to blow up military, industrial, transport and telecommunication targets, to lower morale among the civilian population and disrupt the war effort. Even before the outbreak of war, the Nazis provided the IRA with assistance for their plan to sabotage the British mainland. Prior to their planned invasion in the summer of 1940, the Nazis were also keen to recruit members of the Welsh and Scottish Nationalist Parties to engage in sabotaging British targets and, over the course of the war, infiltrated dozens of trained agents from countries including Norway, Denmark, Holland, France and Cuba. What happened to the myriad plots to blow up Britain? We know that intelligence obtained from decrypted enemy messages via Bletchley Park and double agents like ZIGZAG, SUMMER and TATE alerted MI5 to some of these spies' arrivals, but what about the others? And how successful were MI5's efforts to fake acts of sabotage and arrange media coverage to fool the enemy into thinking their agents were still at large and on task? In this book, Bernard O'Connor, a noted wartime espionage historian, tells the complete story of the successes and failures of the Nazi terror offensive on mainland Britain during 1938-1944.

This collection is the first book-length study of NATO's bureaucracy and decision-making after the Cold War and its analytical framework of 'internationalization' draws largely on neo-institutionalist insights.

This is the first full-length work to be published about the spectacular failure of the German intelligence services in Persia (Iran) during WWII. Based on archival research it analyzes a compelling history of Nazi planning, operations, personalities, and intrigues, and follows the protagonists from Hitler's rise to power into the postwar era.

The sixth edition of "American National Security" has been extensively rewritten to take into account the significant changes in national security policy in the past decade. Thorough revisions reflect a new strategic context and the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the early twenty-first century. Highlights include:

- An examination of the current international environment and new factors affecting U.S. national security policy making- A discussion of the Department of Homeland Security and changes in the intelligence community- A survey of intelligence and national security, with special focus on security needs post-9/11- A review of economic security, diplomacy, terrorism, conventional warfare, counterinsurgency, military intervention, and nuclear deterrence in the changed international setting- An update of security issues in East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean- New material on globalization, transnational actors, and human security

Previous editions have been widely used in undergraduate and graduate courses.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

This book is a history of the complex relations between scientific advisors, primarily physicists, and U.S. presidents in their role as decision makers about nuclear weapons and military strategy. The story, unsurprisingly, is one of considerable tension between the "experts" and the politicians, as scientists seek to influence policy and presidents alternate between accepting their advice and resisting or even ignoring it. First published in 1992, the book has been brought up to date to include the experiences of science advisors to President Clinton. In addition, the texts of eleven crucial documents, from the Einstein-Szilard letter to President Roosevelt (1939) to the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative by President Reagan (1983), have been added as appendixes.

In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.