Intelligence is now acknowledged as the hidden dimension to international diplomacy and national security. It is the hidden piece of the jigsaw puzzle of global relations that cements relationships, undermines alliances and topples tyrants, and after many decades of being deliberately overlooked or avoided, it is now regarded as a subject of legitimate study by academics and historians. This second edition of Historical Dictionary of International Intelligence covers its history through a chronology, an introductory essay, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 500 cross-referenced entries on espionage techniques, categories of agents, crucial operations spies, defectors, moles, double and triple agents, and the tradecraft they apply. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the international intelligence.

In modern times, ten Americans rose to five-star rank: Pershing (who chose to wear only four stars), Leahy, Marshall, King, Arnold, MacArthur, Nimitz, Halsey, Eisenhower, and Bradley. In concert with the Roosevelts, Wilson, Truman, and Sir Winston Churchill, they were at the helm as the world transformed from the machinations of regional despots to an era of global war. With few exceptions, these men exercised their responsibilities with remarkable integrity and ability. The first part of this book reviews the biography and military highlights of each five-star; the second analyzes and compares the ten to identify common features of the elements of command and leadership.

While studying the careers of these distinguished men, Hall also provides an insight into the analysis of war. He explains that war operates on five levels of perspective: heroism, tactics, operations, theaters, and national purpose. When these levels conflict, even the best leaders are fortunate to escape with their reputations intact. This volume details how these commanders achieved success by understanding and properly maintaining these different perspectives almost unfailingly. Consequently, they reached the pinnacle of power in the military profession.

Ever since the publication in 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Report, the U.S. intelligence community has been in the throes of a convulsive movement for reform. In Preventing Surprise Attacks (2005), Richard A. Posner carried the story of the reform movement up to the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which produced a defective plan for reorganizing the intelligence system, partly as result of the failure of the 9/11 Commission and Congress to bring historical, comparative, and scholarly perspectives to bear issues. At that time, however, the new structure had not yet been built. Posner's new book brings the story up to date. He argues that the decisions about structure that the Administration has made in implementation of the Act are creating too top-heavy, too centralized, an intelligence system. The book * exposes fallacies in criticisms of the performance of the U.S. intelligence services; * analyzes structures and priorities for directing and coordinating U.S. intelligence in the era of global terrorism; * presents new evidence for the need to create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the FBI, and a detailed blueprint for such an agency; * incorporates a wealth of material based on developments since the first book, including the report of the presidential commission on weapons of mass destruction and the botched response to Hurricane Katrina; * exposes the inadequacy of the national security computer networks; * critically examines Congress's performance in the intelligence field, and raises constitutional issues concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President; * emphasizes the importance of reforms that do not require questionable organizational changes. The book is published in cooperation with the Hoover Institution

This book examines how legal, political, and rights discourses, security policies and practices migrate and translate across the North Atlantic. The complex relationship between liberty and security has been fundamentally recast and contested in liberal democracies since the start of the 'global war on terror'. In addition to recognizing new agencies, political pressures, and new sensitivities to difference, it is important that not to over-state the novelty of the post-9/11 era: the war on terror simply made possible the intensification, expansion, or strengthening of policies already in existence, or simply enabled the shutting down of debate. Working from a common theoretical frame, if different disciplines, these chapters present policy-oriented analyses of the actual practices of security, policing, and law in the European Union and Canada. They focus on questions of risk and exception, state sovereignty and governance, liberty and rights, law and transparency, policing and security. In particular, the essays are concerned with charting how policies, practices, and ideas migrate between Canada, the EU and its member states. By taking 'field' approach to the study of security practices, the volume is not constrained by national case study or the solipsistic debates within subfields and bridges legal, political, and sociological analysis. It will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, sociology, law, global governance and IR in general. Mark B. Salter is Associate Professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa.

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy, in how Taiwan perceives threats to itself, and in how the Taiwanese military are reacting to these perceived threats. This book, which includes contributions by leading Taiwanese military thinkers, explores current military strategy in Taiwan and how it is evolving. It discusses Taiwan's military modernisation, and the implications of the recent defeat after fifty years in power of the Kuomintang Party, implications which include a move away from an authoritarian garrison state culture, and the beginnings of a more open debate about defence. The book concludes with an overall appraisal of Taiwan's defence vision and makes recommendations on how Taiwan's defence might be enhanced.

Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability, 1919-1939 is the first unified study of the development of Britain's anti-submarine capability between the armistice in 1919 and the onset of the second world German submarine attack on Britain's maritime trade in 1939. Well researched and yet accessibly written, this book challenges the widespread belief that the Royal Navy failed to anticipate the threat of the U-boat in the Second World War.

This is a study of the British military intelligence operations during the Crimean War. It details the beginnings of the intelligence operations as a result of the British Commander, Lord Raglan's, need for information on the enemy, and traces the subsequent development of the system.

This volume brings together scholars from different fields to explore the power, consequences and everyday practices of security expertise. Expertise mediates between different forms of knowledge: scientific and technological, legal, economic and political knowledge. This book offers the first systematic study of security expertise and opens up a productive dialogue between science and technology studies and security studies to investigate the character and consequences of this expertise. In security theory, the study of expertise is crucial to understanding whose knowledge informs security making and to reflect on the impact and responsibility of security analysis. In science and technology studies, the study of security politics adds a challenging new case to the agenda of research on expertise and policy. The contributors investigate cases such as academic security studies, security think tanks, the collaboration between science, anthropology and the military, transnational terrorism, and the ethical consequences of security expertise. Together they challenge our understanding of how expertise works and what consequences it has for security politics and international relations. This book will be of particular interest to students of critical security studies, sociology, science and technology studies, and IR/security studies in general.

When does the legitimate application of military technology to the problem of national defence become needlessly provocative? What obstacles must developing countries overcome if they hope to use military technology effectively? And when might military technology itself become a cause of conflict? Eric Arnett addresses these questions in the context of four particularly important Asian states - China, India, Pakistan, and Iran - from the perspectives of regional specialists and experts in technology and military affairs. The resulting analyses demonstrate the link between military technology and conflict, which is more palpable in southern Asia than elsewhere, while suggesting that it must be approached in a more nuanced way than has been the case so far in discussions of the region.

Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

This book analyses the American way of war within the context of Clausewitzian theory. In doing so, it draws conclusions about the origins, viability, and technical feasibility of America's current strategic approach. The author argues that the situation in which America has found itself in Iraq is the direct result of a culturally predisposed inclination to substitute technology for strategy. This habit manifests most extremely in the form of the Network-Centric Warfare/Effects-Based Operations (NCW/EBO) construct, which by and large has failed to deliver on its many promises. This book argues that the fundamental problem with the NCW/EBO - and with US defence transformation, generally - is that it centres on technology at the expense of other dynamics, notably the human one. Taking a fresh perspective on US strategic cultural predispositions in an era of persistent military conflict, the author argues for the necessity of America's revising its strategic paradigm in favour of a more holistic brand of strategy. This book will be of much interest to students of Clausewitz, Strategic Studies, International Security and US foreign policy.

A richly detailed account of the hard-fought campaign that led to Antietam Creek and changed the course of the Civil War. In early September 1862 thousands of Union soldiers huddled within the defenses of Washington, disorganized and discouraged from their recent defeat at Second Manassas. Confederate General Robert E. Lee then led his tough and confident Army of Northern Virginia into Maryland in a bold gamble to force a showdown that could win Southern independence. The future of the Union hung in the balance. The campaign that followed lasted only two weeks, but it changed the course of the Civil War. D. Scott Hartwig delivers a riveting first installment of a two-volume study of the campaign and climactic battle. It takes the reader from the controversial return of George B. McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac through the Confederate invasion, the siege and capture of Harpers Ferry, the daylong Battle of South Mountain, and, ultimately, to the eve of the great and terrible Battle of Antietam.

What should military warriors do in peacetime? Such was the theme of an international conference at the Inter-American Defense College in 1992 which brought together diplomats, military officials and distinguished academics to discuss the purpose of military institutions in Latin America in the new world order. The most important message of this book is that the order has by no means eliminated the need for armed forces.

This book scrutinises how political actors in the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) have articulated the security-democracy nexus in their discourses. Security crises expose political leaders to an uncomfortable dilemma: guaranteeing the safety of citizens while at the same time preserving democratic principles, basic rights and liberties. In this respect, Israel represents an archetypical case. Defining itself as a democracy, the state of Israel has been in quasi-constant conflict with its neighbouring countries while facing terror attacks repeatedly. This situation has resulted in the upholding of the state of emergency since the establishment of the state in 1948 and in the enactment of security measures that are often in conflict with democratic values. The tension between security and democracy is not a new question: it has been at the centre of political thought from Rousseau and Locke to Lasswell and Dahl and stood at the core of political debates after 9/11 and the 2005 terror attacks in London. Many studies have questioned how political actors manage this tension or how they could - properly - balance security and democracy. Yet, in spite of the abundant literature on the issue, the manner in which political actors conceptualise and frame this tension has been rarely explored. Even less has been said on the effects of this conceptualisation on the democratic regime. Drawing on discourse theory and on an innovative narrative analysis, the book examines 40 debates held in the Knesset on security-oriented laws enacted in two different contexts: the period of relative calm preceding the first Palestinian intifada (1987) and the period following the eruption of the second intifada (2000). More specifically, three types of laws and discussions are examined: laws establishing a relation between freedom of expression and security; laws linking the category of 'the enemy' to democracy; and finally those connecting the right to family unification and residence of Palestinians with terrorism. Through a comparative analysis of the political actors' discourses in 1985 and between 2000 and 2011, the study demonstrates that two main narratives have constantly competed: on the one hand a marginal narrative anchored in basic rights and on the other a defensive democracy narrative, which has become dominant. The latter has legitimised the restriction of freedom of expression, freedom to participate in elections, freedom of movement or the right to citizenship. The book shows how the increasing dominance of the defensive democracy narrative has had a fundamental impact in reshaping the polity and the identity of Israel's democratic regime. The analysis ultimately opens the possibility to rethink the conventional approach of the security-democracy dilemma and to reflect on processes in other states, such as the United Kingdom or the United States during different security crises. This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, Israeli politics, democracy studies, political theory and IR in general.

The Warsaw Pact is generally regarded as a mere instrument of Soviet power. In the 1960s the alliance nevertheless evolved into a multilateral alliance, in which the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members gained considerable scope for manoeuvre. This book examines to what extent the Warsaw Pact inadvertently provided its members with an opportunity to assert their own interests, emancipate themselves from the Soviet grip, and influence Soviet bloc policy. Laurien Crump traces this development through six thematic case studies, which deal with such well known events as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Sino-Soviet Split, the Vietnam War, the nuclear question, and the Prague Spring. By interpreting hitherto neglected archival evidence from archives in Berlin, Bucharest, and Rome, and approaching the Soviet alliance from a radically novel perspective, the book offers unexpected insights into international relations in Eastern Europe, while shedding new light on a pivotal period in the Cold War.

This book uses cross-cultural analysis across Eurasia and Afro-Asia to trace the roots of contemporary border disputes and insurgencies in South Asia. It discusses the way frontiers of British India, and consequently the modern states of India and Pakistan, were drafted through negotiations backed up by organized violence, showing how this concept found its fruition in present-day counter-insurgency measures.

Taking its inspiration from Michel Foucault, this volume of essays integrates the analysis of security into the study of modern political and cultural theory. Explaining how both politics and security are differently problematised by changing accounts of time, the work shows how, during the course of the 17th century, the problematisation of government and rule became newly enframed by a novel account of time and human finitude, which it calls 'factical finitude'. The correlate of factical finitude is the infinite, and the book explains how the problematisation of politics and security became that of securing the infinite government of finite things. It then explains how concrete political form was given to factical finitude by a combination of geopolitics and biopolitics. Modern sovereignty required the services of biopolitics from the very beginning. The essays explain how these politics of security arose at the same time, changed together, and have remained closely allied ever since. In particular, the book explains how biopolitics of security changed in response to the molecularisation and digitalisation of Life, and demonstrates how this has given rise to the dangers and contradictions of 21st century security politics. This book will be of much interest to students of political and cultural theory, critical security studies and International Relations.

Taking its inspiration from Michel Foucault, this volume of essays integrates the analysis of security into the study of modern political and cultural theory. Explaining how both politics and security are differently problematised by changing accounts of time, the work shows how, during the course of the 17th century, the problematisation of government and rule became newly enframed by a novel account of time and human finitude, which it calls 'factical finitude'. The correlate of factical finitude is the infinite, and the book explains how the problematisation of politics and security became that of securing the infinite government of finite things. It then explains how concrete political form was given to factical finitude by a combination of geopolitics and biopolitics. Modern sovereignty required the services of biopolitics from the very beginning. The essays explain how these politics of security arose at the same time, changed together, and have remained closely allied ever since. In particular, the book explains how biopolitics of security changed in response to the molecularisation and digitalisation of Life, and demonstrates how this has given rise to the dangers and contradictions of 21st century security politics. This book will be of much interest to students of political and cultural theory, critical security studies and International Relations.

This book reconnects critical security studies approaches with traditional IR concerns about interstate relations, contributing an original understanding of the interplay between security politics and foreign affairs.

Whether the object of concern is migrants, climate change, or the financial system, it has become popular practice in Europe to sketch a complete range of policy themes in terms of security. By the same token, many such novel security associations have also been used to describe a world composed of transnational dangers. In many places, it is often claimed that migration, climate change, financial instability, and other contemporary insecurities represent collective global - or at least regional European - policy challenges. Critical approaches to security in particular have played a vanguard role in analysing the association of policy themes with security logics, as well as the attendant effects of such conceptual linking.

It is surprising, then, that these same critical approaches have not addressed the interplay between the formulation of security discourses and foreign affairs in more detail. While European policymakers are in strong agreement when it comes to the association of new dangers with collective insecurity, which supposedly calls for collaborative security strategies across borders, critical approaches to security tend to focus ever more closely on domestic aspects of the politics of security, be they distinct security assemblages such as body-scanners or the more general effects of securitization on political decision-making or public-private relations. Irrespective of critical scholarship s pioneering work on the politics of security discourses, it fails to provide conceptual tools to analyse the bearing that security politics has on the international. This book addresses this gap and formulates a distinct analytical framework focusing on the linkages and associations at play between the politics of security on the one hand and foreign affairs on the other. Essentially, this framework rests on the argument that when political communities recognise security concerns, they effectively endanger, order, and condition international relations. It is argued that in defining who threatens whom and how, notions of insecurity codify authoritative systematisations of the world in and for a political community, and that in doing so, they condition foreign politics. By developing security into a relational world-ordering concept, the book hence proposes a novel perspective on the politics of security, a critical perspective that squarely addresses the local making of the international.

This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, European politics, foreign policy and IR, in general."

This report is the first regional study in the CSIS Federated Defense series. The Federated Defense Project aims to shift the paradigm with key allies and partners from capacity building to a federated approach that would expand regional security and prosperity by joining regional allies and partners together in the pursuit of shared security objectives across the conflict spectrum. Federated defense should include forward-thinking strategies for how to develop and share capabilities and capacity, thereby more deeply integrating the US military with its allies and partners. In this report, the CSIS project team highlights six potential federated initiatives in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, information and intelligence sharing, maritime security, undersea warfare, missile defense, and cyber security. Federated approaches such as these are vital to developing and integrating Asian security capabilities to manage emerging security challenges.

This report tracks and analyzes trends in Chinese military strategy, force structure, and regional activity. Open source material is used to detail how each branch of the People's Liberation Army has pursued modernization. Chinese perspectives on their military's role and development are featured, as well as the views of other relevant regional actors. The purpose of this report is to provide the basis for an unclassified dialogue on the military developments in China. By presenting data on the regional military balance alongside perspectives on China's military development, the Burke Chair hopes that readers can better understand how China's strategic goals, military development, and regional views interact with each other.

This report focuses on the ways that a federated defense approach can strengthen strategic partnerships and deliver more innovative defense technologies at a lower cost-by better harnessing global supply chain networks to expand the military supplier base and increase the net capability available to the network of partners and allies.

Technology and its proper use constitute key components in the strength of any armed forces. However, battlefield technologies constantly evolve in the quest for competitive advantage, with the rate at which new concepts and devices appear steadily increasing. In the world of technological intelligence, militaries worldwide not only seek to advance their technologies but to gather information about the latest technological and scientific developments of present and future adversaries, evaluate their possible impacts, and prevent as much as possible, the advantages gained by technological surprise-that sudden appearance of novel weapon systems that can tilt the success of an operation, battle, or even war. While ample documentation circulates on operational intelligence-defined as information about an enemy's order of battle and intentions-and "operational surprise," technological intelligence (and consequently technological surprise) receives far less attention than today's military reality merits. In Ready for Battle: Technological Intelligence on the Battlefield, Azriel Lorber rectifies this slant towards operational intelligence, engaging through historical example and policy prescription technology's role in modern warfare, and the dangers presented by technological inferiority on the one hand, and technological surprise on the other. Throughout, he offers examples of well-kept technological secrets that turned the tides of battle-as well as less well-hidden efforts that failed in their effect. Ready for Battle analyzes the challenges presented and possible methods for addressing questions of technological surprise, drawing on historical examples of failure and success and offering insights into the intricacies of technological deception. This work will interest military historians and officers, security analysts, and defense industry professionals.

Why has U.S. security policy scarcely changed from the Bush to the Obama administrations? The theory of "double government" posed by the 19th century English scholar Walter Bagehot suggests a disquieting answer that is extensively discussed in National Security and Double Government. Michael J. Glennon challenges the myth that U.S. security policy is made through the visible, "Madisonian institutions"-the President, Congress, and the courts, proposing that their roles are largely illusory. Presidential control is nominal, congressional oversight is dysfunctional, and judicial review is negligible. He argues that security policy is really made by the managers of the military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement agencies- a concealed "Trumanite network" of several hundred members who are responsible for protecting the nation, and who are primarily immune from constitutional restraints. As such, this new system of "double government" will not correct itself, as to do so would require those branches to exercise the very power that they lack. Glennon suggests that the main problem is political ignorance, which is becoming more acute as public influence on security policy declines. This book aims to inform and enlighten the reader about the Trumanite network, and highlight the restraints on the Constitution, which operates primarily upon the hollowed-out Madisonian institutions, and poses a grave threat to democratic accountability.