This book is a comparative study of the evolution of the German navy in the second half of the nineteenth century. It examines the development of strategy, especially commerce-raiding, in comparison to what other navies were doing in this era of rapid technological change. It is not an insular history, merely listing ship rosters or specific events; it is a history of the German navy in relation to its potential foes. It is also a look at a new military institution involved in an inter-service rivalry for funds, technology and manpower with the prestigious and well-established army.

Cunningham was the best-known and most celebrated British admiral of the Second World War. He held one of the two major fleet commands between 1939 and 1942, and in 1942-43, he was Allied naval commander for the great amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. From 1943 to 1946, he was the First Sea Lord and a participant in the wartime conferences with Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt and the US Chiefs of Staff, deliberating the global strategy for Allied victory.
He also led a very active public life for almost twenty years after his retirement in 1946. Cunningham's papers are abundant for the period 1939-63 and are supplemented here by Cabinet and Admiralty records, papers of his service contemporaries and of Churchill, and by memories of his family and friends, as well as extensive US archives and private papers.

Occasionally, during times of peace, military forces achieve major warfighting innovations. Terry Pierce terms these developments 'disruptive innovations' and shows how senior leaders have often disguised them in order to ensure their innovations survived. He shows how more common innovations however, have been those of integrating new technologies to help perform existing missions better and not change them radically. The author calls these 'sustaining innovations'. The recent innovation history suggests two interesting questions. First, how can senior military leaders achieve a disruptive innovation when they are heavily engaged around the world and they are managing sustaining innovations? Second, what have been the external sources of disruptive (and sustaining) innovations? This book is essential reading for professionals and students interested in national security, military history and strategic issues.

New developments in the Asia Pacific are forcing regional officials to rethink the way they manage security issues. The contributors to this work explore why some forms of security cooperation and institutionalisation in the region have proven more feasible than others. This work describes the emergence of the professions in late tsarist Russia and their struggle for autonomy from the aristocratic state. It also examines the ways in which the Russian professions both resembled and differed from their Western counterparts.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

This book is the first full-length study of a key security issue confronting the west in the twenty-first century, urban military operations - as currently being undertaken by US and UK forces in Iraq. It relates military operations in cities to the wider study of conflict and security in an era of urbanization, expeditionary warfare and new power conflicts; its central process is urban operations, but its context is the changing security environment, whose features are revealed in conflicts within cities.
Within a framework analyzing conventional operations, the author identifies the contextual factors that affect operations in urban environments. She advances an explanation as to why questions of theoretical understanding and policy response are as important as tactical concerns, and why cities will represent a politically significant area in the future. In doing so, Alice Hills demonstrates that urban operations present a unique set of political and moral challenges to both policy-makers and military commanders. "Future War in Cities" offers a rethinking of the liberal dilemma associated with the use of force across the spectrum of conflict, from terrorist attacks to major conventional operations.

There has been a great deal of speculation recently concerning the likely impact of the 'Information Age' on warfare. In this vein, much of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature subscribes to the idea that the Information Age will witness a transformation in the very nature of war. In this book, David Lonsdale puts that notion to the test.
Using a range of contexts, the book sets out to look at whether the classical Clausewitzian theory of the nature of war will retain its validity in this new age. The analysis covers the character of the future battlespace, the function of command, and the much-hyped concept of Strategic Information Warfare. Finally, the book broadens its perspective to examine the nature of 'Information Power' and its implications for geopolitics. Through an assessment of both historical and contemporary case studies (including the events following September 11 and the recent war in Iraq), the author concludes that although the future will see many changes to the conduct of warfare, the nature of war, as given theoretical form by Clausewitz, will remain essentially unchanged.

HarperCollins is proud to present its incredible range of best-loved, essential classics. The ancient Chinese art of warfare written by military strategist Sun Tzu in the 5th century BC.

In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.

Presenting the views of leading experts on strategic considerations in Eurasia, this volume shows that the 11 September attacks and subsequent developments have affected the way in which international relations are evaluated. In addition, these developments have turned the concept of asymmetric threats, including large-scale international terrorist attacks, into genuine realistic dangers threatening our security. As a result, the conventional mindset over issues of war and peace, of existing alliances and partnerships, even of the character of the international system has to be re-evaulated. This volume sheds light on the aspects of change that have taken place in the post-11 September evolution of international relations in Eurasia.

This book assesses the evolution of the Soviet approach toward European security policy since the mid-1980s, as seen from the prism of assessments of and policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany, examining basic Soviet analyses of West Germany in the period prior to unification.

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

This collection of essays examines the strategic dimensions of contemporary terrorist threats. It evaluates the changing nature of modern terrorism in the light of the events of September 11 2001. The collection argues that terrorism now promises to enter the terrain of global "grand strategy."

Carter and Ehteshami consider the significant geopolitical, economic and security links between the Middle East and the wider Asian world - links which are often overlooked when the Middle East is considered in isolation or in terms of its relations with the West, but which are of growing importance. Topics covered include Asia's overall geostrategic realities and the Middle East's place within them; relations between the Middle East and China, Russia, central Asia, southeast Asia and south Asia; Islam in central Asia and southeast Asia and the connections with the Middle East; and the important links between the Middle East and India and Pakistan's military and security establishments.

On September 11, 2001, AT&T's traffic was 40 percent greater than its previous busiest day. Wireless calls were made from the besieged airplanes and buildings, with the human voice having a calming influence. E-mail was used to overcome distance and time zones. And storytelling played an important role both in conveying information and in coping with the disaster. Building on such events and lessons, Crisis Communications features an international cast of top contributors exploring emergency communications during crisis. Together, they evaluate the use, performance, and effects of traditional mass media (radio, TV, print), newer media (Internet, email), conventional telecommunications (telephones, cell phones), and interpersonal communication in emergency situations. Applying what has been learned from the behavior of the mass media in past crises, the authors clearly show the central role of communications on September 11. They establish how people learned of the tragedy and how they responded; examine the effects of media globalization on terrorism; and, in many cases, give specific advice for the future.

On September 11, 2001, AT&T's traffic was 40 percent greater than its previous busiest day. Wireless calls were made from the besieged airplanes and buildings, with the human voice having a calming influence. E-mail was used to overcome distance and time zones. And storytelling played an important role both in conveying information and in coping with the disaster. Building on such events and lessons, Crisis Communications features an international cast of top contributors exploring emergency communications during crisis. Together, they evaluate the use, performance, and effects of traditional mass media (radio, TV, print), newer media (Internet, email), conventional telecommunications (telephones, cell phones), and interpersonal communication in emergency situations. Applying what has been learned from the behavior of the mass media in past crises, the authors clearly show the central role of communications on September 11. They establish how people learned of the tragedy and how they responded; examine the effects of media globalization on terrorism; and, in many cases, give specific advice for the future.

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Warfare and History

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy. This book brings together a range of experts from the West and from Taiwan itself who examine the key issues connected with Taiwan's air power, which is a key aspect of the China-Taiwan military balance. During the 1990s, Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly re-equipping its air force with modern air defence and strike aircraft equipped with modern missiles, thereby denying China command of the air in any conflict in the short- to medium-term. In the longer-term, air power will remain a crucial influence on the overall balance, as China's efforts to upgrade its own air force's capabilities begin to undermine Taiwan's current advantages.

During the late 1940s the newly created CIA, in a loose alliance with anti-communist intellectuals and trade unionists, launched a massive, clandestine effort to win the Cold War allegiance of the European left. Drawing on numerous personal interviews and document collections on both sides of the Atlantic, this book examines in detail the origins of the CIA's covert campaign and assesses it's impact on the US's principal Cold War ally, Britain, focusing particularly on attempts to combat communist penetration of British trade unions, stimulate support within the Labour party for key American strategic aims, such as European union, and influence the politics of Bloomsbury literati. The results of this secret intervention were complex and far-reaching. CIA support for such ventures as the Congress for Cultural Freedom and its London-based magazine, Encounter, subtly transformed the political culture of the British left, making it more Atlanticist and less socialist. In other ways, however, the hidden hand of American intelligence failed to control its British assets, whose behaviour often frustrated their secretive patrons in Washington. For that matter, not even the CIA's agen

The New Kingdom of Egypt marks the apogee of military organisation and preparedness. Beginning the era under foreign occupation, the Egyptians built up an army to challenge the invaders and liberate their land. Using the newest battlefield technologies (bows, chariots and hand weapons) the new pharaohs pushed the frontiers of the New Kingdom into Syria and Ethiopia. This is the era of Set I, Ramses II and Thuthmoses III, the greatest military pharaohs in Egyptian history. This book narrates this incredible rise to power and then describes in detail the way in which the Egyptian war machine was structured, how it was supplied, and how it fought. It considers all aspects, some often neglected, such as campaign tents, logistics and rations, as well as the design of hand weapons and bows. Many pieces of kit have been reconstructed for the book, giving the reader a very immediate sense of what an Egyptian warrior's equipment looked like. --

The optimism that arrived at the end of the cold war and marked the turn of the Millennium was shattered by September 11. In the aftermath of that event it is not unwarranted pessimism that lines the pages of "Grave New World," it is unavoidable reality. Terrorism is but one aspect of many other wider concerns for national and international security, and the contributors to this volume not only warn us, but reward us as well with the clarity of their views into -- and possible solutions for -- a difficult, complicated future. They speak convincingly of the numerous military and non-military challenges that create security problems -- whether those are interstate, intrastate, or transnational -- many of which are being dangerously overlooked in public policy debates.

The challenges and complexities might seem insurmountable but the first step in solving problems is recognizing that they exist. "Grave New World" provides an eye-opening assessment of the prospects for peace and security in the 21st century.

Michael E. Brown frames these issues in his Introduction, "Security Challenges in the 21st Century;" and in his summation, "Security Problems and Security Policy in a Grave New World."

Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability, 1919-1939 is the first unified study of the development of Britain's anti-submarine capability between the armistice in 1919 and the onset of the second world German submarine attack on Britain's maritime trade in 1939. Well researched and yet accessibly written, this book challenges the widespread belief that the Royal Navy failed to anticipate the threat of the U-boat in the Second World War.

An explosive expose of how British military intelligence really works-from the inside. This book presents the stories of two undercover agents: Brian Nelson, who worked for the Force Research Unit (FRU), aiding loyalist terrorists and murderers in their bloody work; and the man known as Stakeknife, deputy head of the IRA's infamous "Nutting Squad," the internal security force that tortured and killed suspected informers.
This book is copublished with O'Brien Press, Dublin and is for sale only in the United States, it's territories and dependencies, Canada, and the Philippines.

On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defenses against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941. Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly-released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup_it was not precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilization was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack_Hitler simply beat him to the punch.