Some see the 1980s as a Golden Age, a "Morning in America" when Ronald Reagan revived America's economy, reoriented American politics, and restored Americans' faith in their country and in themselves. Others see the 1980s as a new "Gilded Age," an era that was selfish, superficial, glitzy, greedy, divisive, and destructive. This multifaceted exploration of the 1980s brings together a variety of voices from different political persuasions, generations, and vantage points. The volume features work by Reagan critics and Reagan fans (including one of President Reagan's closest aides, Ed Meese), by historians who think the 1980s were a disastrous time, those who think it was a glorious time, and those who see both the blessings and the curses of the decade. Their essays examine everything from multiculturalism, Southern conservatism, and Reaganomics, to music culture, religion, crime, AIDS, and the city. A complex, thoughtful account of a watershed in our recent history, this volume will engage anyone interested in this pivotal decade.

The complex man at the center of America's most self-destructive presidency In this provocative and revelatory assessment of the only president ever forced out of office, the legendary Washington journalist Elizabeth Drew explains how Richard M. Nixon's troubled inner life offers the key to understanding his presidency. She shows how Nixon was surprisingly indecisive on domestic issues and often wasn't interested in them. Turning to international affairs, she reveals the inner workings of Nixon's complex relationship with Henry Kissinger, and their mutual rivalry and distrust. The Watergate scandal that ended his presidency was at once an overreach of executive power and the inevitable result of his paranoia and passion for vengeance.
Even Nixon's post-presidential rehabilitation was motivated by a consuming desire for respectability, and he succeeded through his remarkable resilience. Through this book we finally understand this complicated man. While giving him credit for his achievements, Drew questions whether such a man--beleaguered, suspicious, and motivated by resentment and paranoia--was fit to hold America's highest office, and raises large doubts that he was.

As Mississippi's attorney general from 1956 to 1969, Joe T. Patterson led the legal defense for Jim Crow in the state. He was inaugurated for his first term two months before the launch of the Sovereignty Commission--charged ""to protect the sovereignty of Mississippi from encroachment thereon by the federal government""--which made manifest a century-old states' rights ideology couched in the rhetoric of massive resistance. Despite the dubious legal foundations of that agenda, Patterson supported the organization's mission from the start and served as an ex-officio leader on its board for the rest of his life. Patterson was also a card-carrying member of the segregationist Citizens' Council and, in his own words, had ""spent many hours and driven many miles advocating the basic principles for which the Citizens' Councils were originally organized."" Few ever doubted his Jim Crow credentials. That is until September 1962 and the integration of the University of Mississippi by James Meredith. That fall Patterson stepped out of his entrenchment by defying a circle of white power brokers, but only to a point. His seeming acquiescence came at the height of the biggest crisis for Mississippi's racist order. Yet even after the Supreme Court decreed that Meredith must enter the university, Patterson opposed any further desegregation and despised the federal intervention at Ole Miss. Still he faced a dilemma that confronted all white southerners: how to maintain an artificially elevated position for whites in southern society without resorting to violence or intimidation. Once the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Meredith v. Fair, the state attorney general walked a strategic tightrope, looking to temper the ruling's impact without inciting the mob and without retreating any further. Patterson and others sought pragmatic answers to the dilemma of white southerners, not in the name of civil rights but to offer a more durable version of white power. His finesse paved the way for future tactics employing duplicity and barely yielding social change while deferring many dreams.

In "Selling Air Power," Steve Call provides the first comprehensive study of the efforts of post-war air power advocates to harness popular culture in support of their agenda. In the 1940s and much of the 1950s, hardly a month went by without at least one blatantly pro-air power article appearing in general interest magazines. Public fascination with flight helped create and sustain exaggerated expectations for air power in the minds of both its official proponents and the American public. Articles in the "Saturday Evening Post," "Reader's Digest," and "Life" trumpeted the secure future assured by American air superiority. Military figures like Henry H. "Hap" Arnold and Curtis E. LeMay, radio-television personalities such as Arthur Godfrey, cartoon figures like "Steve Canyon," and actors like Jimmy Stewart played key roles in the unfolding campaign. Movies like "Twelve O'Clock High ," "The Court-Martial of Billy Mitchell," and "A Gathering of Eagles" projected onto the public imagination vivid images confirming what was coming to be the accepted wisdom: that America's safety against the Soviet threat could best be guaranteed by air power, coupled with nuclear capability. But as the Cold War continued and the specter of the mushroom cloud grew more prominent in American minds, another, more sinister interpretation began to take hold. Call chronicles the shift away from the heroic, patriotic posture of the years just after World War II, toward the threatening, even bizarre imagery of books and movies like "Catch-22," "On the Beach," and "Dr. Strangelove." Call's careful analysis goes beyond the public relations campaigns to probe the intellectual climate that shaped them and gave them power. "Selling Air Power" adds a critical layer of understanding to studies in military and aviation history, as well as American popular culture.

The quantity of journalism produced during World War I was unlike anything the then-budding mass media had ever seen. Correspondents at the front were dispatching voluminous reports on a daily basis, and though much of it was subject to censorship, it all eventually became available. It remains the most extraordinary firsthand look at the war that we have. Published immediately after the cessation of hostilities and compiled from those original journalistic sources-American, British, French, German, and others-this is an astonishing contemporary perspective on the Great War. This replica of the first 1919 edition includes all the original maps, photos, and illustrations, lending an even greater immediacy to readers a century later. Volume IV covers December 1916 through March 1918, from the entrance of the United States into the conflict through the last of the zeppelin raids on the Western Front. American journalist and historian FRANCIS WHITING HALSEY (1851-1919) was literary editor of The New York Times from 1892 through 1896. He wrote and lectured extensively on history; his works include, as editor, the two-volume Great Epochs in American History Described by Famous Writers, From Columbus to Roosevelt (1912), and, as writer, the 10-volume Seeing Europe with Famous Authors (1914).

What really caused the failure of the Soviet Union's ambitious plans to modernize and industrialize its agricultural system? This book is the first to investigate the gap between the plans and the reality of the Soviet Union's mid-twentieth-century project to industrialize and modernize its agricultural system. Historians agree that the project failed badly: agriculture was inefficient, unpredictable, and environmentally devastating for the entire Soviet period. Yet assigning the blame exclusively to Soviet planners would be off the mark. The real story is much more complicated and interesting, Jenny Leigh Smith reveals in this deeply researched book. Using case studies from five Soviet regions, she acknowledges hubris and shortsightedness where it occurred but also gives fair consideration to the difficulties encountered and the successes-however modest-that were achieved.

The period 1902-1914 was one of great change for the British army. The experience of the South African War (1899-1902) had been a profound shock and it led to a period of intense introspection in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the force. As a result of a series of investigations and government-led reorganisation, the army embarked on a series of reforms to improve its recruitment, standards of professionalism, training, and preparation for war. Until now many of the studies covering this period have tended to look at the army in a top-down manner, and have often concluded that the reform process was extremely beneficial to the army leading it to be the most efficient force in Europe by the outbreak of war in 1914. Bowman and Connelly take a different approach. The Edwardian Army takes a bottom-up perspective and examines the many difficulties the army experienced trying to incorporate the reforms demanded by government and the army's high command. It reveals that although many good ideas were devised, the severely overstretched army was never in a position to act on them and that few regimental officers had the opportunity, or even the desire, to change their approach. Unable to shake-off the feeling that the army's primary purpose was to garrison and police the British Empire, it was by no means as well prepared for European continental warfare as many have presumed.

J. A. Hobson's critical treatise on the practice of imperialism - whereby countries acquire territories for economic gain - is a classic in its field. This edition includes all of the author's original charts and illustrations. Published at the opening of the 20th century, while colonial imperialism still held decisive sway as a political and social practice, Hobson's treatise caused shockwaves in economics for its condemnation of a procedure long considered irreproachable. While Hobson acknowledges that imperialism is often supported by a sense of nationalistic pride and achievement - as with the British Empire's colonial imperialism - he identifies capitalist oligarchy as the true motivation behind imperialistic ventures. Owners of productive capital, such as factories, generate a large surplus which they desire to reinvest in further factories; this prompts imperialist expansion into foreign lands.

Translated into English as the Winner of the Geisteswissenschaften International Translation Prize for Work in the Humanities and Social Sciences 2015. During the Great War, mass killing took place on an unprecedented scale. Violence and the German Soldier in the Great War explores the practice of violence in the German army and demonstrates how he killing of enemy troops, the deaths of German soldiers and their survival were entwined. As the war reached its climax in 1918, German soldiers refused to continue killing in their droves, and thus made an active contribution to the German defeat and ensuing revolution. Examining the postwar period, the chapters of this book also discuss the contested issue of a 'brutalization' of German society as a prerequisite of the Nazi mass movement. Biographical case studies on key figures such as Ernst Junger demonstrate how the killing of enemy troops by German soldiers followed a complex set of rules. Benjamin Ziemann makes a wealth of extensive archival work available to an Anglophone audience for the first time, enhancing our understanding of the German army and its practices of violence during the First World War as well as the implications of this brutalization in post-war Germany. This book provides new insights into a crucial topic for students of twentieth-century German history and the First World War.

World War II saw the first generation of young men that had grown up comfortable with modern industrial technology go into combat. As kids, the GIs had built jalopies in their garage and poured over glossy, full-color issues of Popular Mechanics; they had read Buck Rogers in the Twenty Fifth Century comic books, listened to his adventures on the radio, and watched him pilot rocket ships in the Saturday morning serials at the Bijou. Tinkerers, problem-solvers, risk-takers, and day-dreamers, they were curious and outspoken--a generation well prepared to improvise, innovate, and adapt technology on the battlefield. Since they were also a generation which had unprecedented technology available to them, their ability to innovate with technology proved an immeasurable edge on the field of combat. This book tells their story through the experience of the battle of Normandy, bringing together three disparate brands of history: (1) military history; (2) the history of science and technology; and (3) social, economic, cultural, and intellectual history. All three historical narratives combine to tell the tale of GI genius and the process by which GI ingenuity became an enduring feature of the American citizen-soldier. GI Ingenuity is in large part an old-fashioned combat history, with mayhem and mass slaughter at center stage. It tells the story of death and destruction on the killing fields of Normandy, as well as the battlegrounds that provide the prologue and postscript to the transformation of war that occurred in France in 1944. This story of GI ingenuity, moreover, puts the battles in the context of the immense social, economic, scientific, and technological changes that accompanied theevolution of combat in the twentieth century. GI Ingenuity illustrates the great transition of the American genius in battle from an industrial-age army to a postmodern military. And it does it by looking at the place where the transition happened--on the battlefield.

This title presents new research highlighting the invention of new weaponry and its front-line combat use. No army went to war in 1914 ready to conduct trench warfare operations. All the armies of the First World War discovered that prolonged trench warfare required new types of munitions alongside the conventional howitzers, large-calibre guns and explosive shells. This volume examines how the British went about inventing and manufacturing new weaponry such as hand grenades, rifle grenades and trench mortars when no body of knowledge about trench warfare munitions existed. It also examines how tactics were developed for these new munitions. Based on new research, this is the first book to discuss the complexity of invention and manufacture of novel weapons such as the Mills grenade and the Stokes mortar, and to consider the relationship between technical design and operational tactics on the ground. In so doing the book presents a different model of the trench warfare conducted by the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front, and also provides a blueprint to understanding the relationship between technology and tactics applicable to all types of weapons and warfare. "Continuum Studies in Military History" offers up-to-date, scholarly accounts of war and military history. Unrestricted by period or geography, the series aims to provide free-standing works that are attuned to conceptual and historiographical developments in the field while being based on original scholarship.

Second World War British Military Camouflage offers an original approach to the cultures and geographies of military conflict, through a study of the history of camouflage. Isla Forsyth narrates the scientific biography of Dr Hugh Cott (1900-1987), eminent zoologist and artist turned camoufleur, and entwines this with the lives of other camouflage practitioners, to trace the sites of camouflage's developments. Moving through the scientists' fieldsite, the committee boardroom, the military training site and the soldiers' battlefield, this book uncovers the history of this ambiguous military invention, and subverts a long-dominant narrative of camouflage as solely a protective technology. This study demonstrates that, as camouflage transformed battlefields into unsettling theatres of war, there were lasting consequences not only for military technology and knowledge, but also for the ethics of battle and the individuals enrolled in this process.

This book argues that Franklin D. Roosevelt's work-of which the New Deal was a prime example-was rooted in a definitive political ideology tied to the ideals of the Progressive movement and the social gospel of the late 19th century. Roosevelt's New Deal resulted in such dramatic changes within the United States that it merits the label "revolutionary" and ranks with the work of Washington and Lincoln in its influence on the American nation. The New Deal was not simply the response to a severe economic crisis; it was also an expression of FDR's well-developed political ideology stemming from his religious ideas and his experience in the Progressive movement of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Third American Revolution describes the unfolding of his New Deal response to the crisis of the Depression and chronicles the bitter conservative opposition that resisted every step in the Roosevelt revolution. The author's analysis of Roosevelt's political thought is supported by FDR's own words contained in the key documents and various speeches of his political career. This book also documents FDR's recognition of the dangers to democracy from unresponsive government and identifies his specific motivations to provide for the general welfare. Provides a chronology of FDR's career Contains photographs of FDR and New Deal moments as well as edited versions of FDR's documents and speeches Includes a bibliography of works and documents cited

The battles in Russia played the decisive part in Hitler's defeat. Gigantic, prolonged, and bloody, they contrasted with the general nature of the fighting on other fronts. The Russians fought on their own in "their" theater of war and with an indepedent strategy. Stalinist Russia was a country radically different from its liberal democratic allies. Hitler and the German high command, for their part, conceived and carried out the Russian campaign as a singular "war of annihilation." This riveting new book is a penetrating, broad-ranging, yet concise overview of this vast conflict. It investigates the Wehrmacht and the Red Army and the command and production systems that organized and sustained them. It considers a range of further themes concerning this most political of wars. Benefiting from a post-Communist, post-Cold War perspective, the book takes advantage of a wealth of new studies and source material that have become available over the last decade. Readers from history buffs to scholars will find something new in this exciting new book.