In a period that began with Britain controlling a world-wide empire and included two world wars, followed by the Cold War and massive expenditure on nuclear armaments, the relationship between the politicians and the generals has been central to British history. While it is correctly assumed that the Armed Forces have never threatened British political stability in modern times, the relationship between the military and their political masters is a major, if under-emphasised, theme of British history. While in theory the politicians decided strategy and the military implemented it, in practice decisions often depended on the personalities and experience of those involved. Asquith, the epitome of the civilian, left major strategic decisions in the hands of the military; while Churchill, an ex-soldier and ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, rode roughshod over professional military advice. In a period when arms before ever more technologically sophisticated, there was also the problem of how far politicians could decide on strategies proposed by the military other than by the crude yardstick of cost. The essays in Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856--1990 provide a coherent account not only of the major decision-making of warfare but also of the changes in the organisation and control of the Armed Forces.

This book provides a detailed analysis on the history and development of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the coordination and cooperation between these two fora. Furthermore, it discusses the future challenges that these fora will have to deal with and conclude in which way the current system can change to cope with the evolution of space matters. This is necessary for the proper discussion of space matters because these matters cannot simply be divided between military and non-military, but are interrelated.

Ideal for student research, this book provides a reference guide to the war as well as seven essays analyzing a variety of aspects of the war and its consequences. The essays address questions such as: How did Saddam Hussein become such a major threat and how has he survived the war? How critical was George Bush in driving U.S. and global foreign policy during the crisis? How were key decisions made? Did the war fail or succeed in retrospect? What were its long-run political, economic, strategic and cultural effects? Can collective security work? Is the United Nations likely to be effective in future crises? What lessons can be learned from the crisis? Yetiv draws on primary documents and extensive interviews with many key players such as Colin Powell, James Baker, and Brent Scowcroft, and Arab and European leaders which cast new light on the event.

Following a list of key players and a complete chronology of events, seven essays offer a contemporary perspective on the war: Drama in the Desert; War Erupts in a Storm: The Continuation of Diplomacy by Air and on the Ground; From Truman to Desert Storm: The Rising Eagle in the Persian Gulf; President Bush and Saddam Hussein: A Classic Case of Individuals Driving History; The West Arms a Brutal Dictator: Can Proliferation Be Controlled in the Post-Cold War World?; The United Nations and Collective Security: Was the Gulf War a Model for the Future?; The Impact of the Persian Gulf War. Reference components include a narrative historical overview of the war and biographical profiles of each of the major players in the war. Twelve primary documents include speeches and UN resolutions. A glossary of terms particular to the war and an annotated bibliography complete the work. A selection of photos complements the text. This readable guide is a one-stop source for reference material and in-depth analysis of the key foreign policy event of the 1990s, and should appeal to a broad readership.

This book makes the case for a standing UN Emergency Peace Service. With this one development - effectively a UN first responder for complex emergencies - the organization would finally have a rapid, reliable capacity to help fulfill its tougher assigned tasks. To date, the UNEPS initiative has encountered an unreceptive political, fiscal, and security environment. Yet overlapping crises are now inevitable as are profound shifts. This book presents an insightful review of the worrisome security challenges ahead and analysis of two recent high-level UN reports. It addresses the primary roles, core principles, and requirements of a UNEPS, as well as the arguments for and against such a dedicated UN service. Further, it reveals that the primary impediments and lessons learned also help demonstrate what may work and, equally important, what won't. With modest support, the book shows, the next steps are feasible, although it's important to recall that ideas, even good ideas, don't work unless we do.

Holy war ideas appear among Muslims during the earliest manifestations of the religion. This work locates the origin of Jihad and traces its evolution as an idea with the intellectual history of the concept of Jihad in Islam as well as how it has been misapplied by modern Islamic terrorists and suicide bombers.

This book explores how transnational politics, modern communications, and access to weapons give political movements the ability to wage global war. Transnational politics, modern communications, and access to the tools of warfare have combined to give political movements the ability to wage global war to promote their own agendas, a development that has changed the face of both politics and warfare. Fowler examines current aspects of conducting war, including mobilization, funding, training, fighting, and intelligence to demonstrate how they are accessible to anyone and are well-suited to waging insurgency efforts in many places around the world. Such efforts force governments to deal with unforeseen enemies who violently advance their agendas in a quest for increased power and authority. Because global insurgents, such as Al-Qaeda, build more direct connections between politics and the use of force, confronting them requires solutions that emphasize politics as much as the use of force. National governments must unite to seek cooperative solutions to issues that affect them. agendas will undoubtedly change foreign policy planning for decades to come. Published under the new Praeger Security International imprint, it explores what allows insurgency to be accessible and effective and deals with more than just terrorism, but insurgency strategy as part of a global war. It argues that solutions require use of politics, not just the use of force

This book applies cutting-edge methods from cognitive and evolutionary theories to develop models of conflict between hierarchically-structured cognitive entities under circumstances of imprecision, uncertainty and stress. Characterized as friction and the fog-of-war by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, such conditions impair institutional cognition in real-time conflict and pose a real and continuing threat to organizations, such as the US military. In a linked collection of formal essays and a mathematical appendix, the book explores different aspects of cognitive and evolutionary process as conducted under the direction of doctrine that acts as a kind of genome for retention of what is learned through Lamarckian evolutionary selection pressures: armies and corporate entities learn from conflict, and incorporate that learning into their ongoing procedures. The book proposes models and policy solutions for strategic competence. A central feature of the book is a formal description of the famous OODA loop of the US military theorist John Boyd in terms of the Data Rate Theorem that links control and information theories. That description is expanded to cover more fully the impact of stochastic fog-of-war effects on tactical and operational scales of conflict. Subsequent chapters examine in more detail the role of doctrine, and the particular effect of embedding culture on cognitive and Lamarckian evolutionary processes associated with conflict on tactical, operational, and strategic scales and levels of organization. A scientifically sophisticated exercise in applied mathematics, history, evolutionary theory, and ecosystem theory, this book will be appropriate for researchers and students interested in defense, security, and international relations, as well as non-academic career professionals in government and industry.

This is an interdisciplinary study of how power, security, polarity and the primacy of sovereign states play out in an international context that has witnessed the rise of non-state actors. It provides an updated analysis of the complex relationship of anarchy, power and politics by addressing issues of self-defense in a unipolar order.

A study of operational warfare in the Habsburg old regime, 1683-1740, which recreates everyday warfare and the lives of the generals conducting it, this book goes beyond the battlefield to examine the practical skills of war needed in an agricultural landscape of pastures, woods, and water. Although sieges, forages, marches, and raids are universally considered crucial aspects of old regime warfare, no study of operational or maneuver warfare in this period has ever been published. Early modern warfare had an operational component which required that soldiers possess or learn many skills grounded in the agricultural economy, and this requirement led to an "economy of knowledge" in which the civil and military sectors exchanged skilled labor. Many features of "scientific warfare" thought to be initiated by Enlightenment reformers were actually implicit in the informal structures of armies of the late 1680-1740 period. In this period, the Habsburg dynasty maintained an army of more than 100,000 men, and hundreds of generals. This book might be called a "labor history" of these generals, revealing their regional, social, and educational backgrounds. It also details the careerist dimensions of another neglected aspect of the early modern general's work, the creation of "military theory." Theory arose naturally from staff work and commanded wide interest among both high-ranking officers for professional reasons, and for its significant impact on service politics.

"Often crosses paths with Kenneth Roberts's historical novels "Arundel" and "Rabble in Arms" and it makes a fine successor to those splendid books."
--Allen D. Boyer
"New York Times Book Review"

"Both a biography and an extended meditation on the ironies of the Revolution, "Benedict Arnold, Revolutionary Hero" is in many ways a remarkable example of the historian's craft. . . . .[an] indispensable guide."
--"Los Angeles Times"

"Restores Arnold to the pantheon of American war heroes."
--"New England Quarterly

"Martin discloses a new and entirely credible Benedict Arnold."
--"The William and Mary Quarterly"

"Martin's thorough primary-source research--the best in any biography of Arnold to date--underpins convincing explanations for both Arnold's intense revolutionary zeal and his subsequent betrayal. The book offers essential lessons to modern military officers."
--"Journal of Military History"

Benedict Arnold stands as one of the most vilified figures in American history. Stories of his treason have so come to define him that his name, like that of Judas, is virtually synonymous with treason.

Yet Arnold was one of the most heroic and remarkable men of his time, indeed in all of American history. A brilliant military leader of uncommon bravery, Arnold dedicated himself to the Revolutionary cause, sacrificing family life, health, and financial well-being for a conflict that left him physically crippled, sullied by false accusations, and profoundly alienated from the American cause of liberty. By viewing Arnold's life backward through the prism of his treason, we invariably succumb to the demonizations that arose only after his abandonment of the rebelforces. We thereby overlook his critical role as one of the influential actors in the American Revolution.

Distinguished historian James Kirby Martin's landmark biography, the result of a decade's labor, stands as an invaluable antidote to this historical distortion. Careful not to endow the Revolutionary generation with mythical proportions of virtue, Martin shows how self-serving, venal behavior was just as common in the Revolutionary era as in our own time. Arnold, a deeply committed patriot, suffered acutely because of his lack of political savvy in dealing with those who attacked his honor and reputation. Tracing Arnold's life, from his difficult childhood through his grueling winter trek across the howling Maine wilderness, his valiant defense of Lake Champlain, and his crucial role in the Quebec and Saratoga campaigns, Martin has given us an entirely new perspective on this dramatic and exceptional life, set against the tumultuous background of the American Revolution.

The existence of a national style of warfare, an American Way of War, has been used to characterize fundamental elements of American military strategy. During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell became the proponent for a strategic framework to guide the consideration of how military forces should be used to support national policy objectives. His framework was reflected in the Chairman's National Military Strategy published in early 1992 after Desert Storm under a concept titled Decisive Force. This book traces the development and evaluates the merits of a New American Way of War embodied in the Decisive Force concept. Military attitudes and lessons about the utility of force are drawn from four recent conflicts.

The rapid and energetic resurgence of the Islamic religion and the expanded international role played by Islamic nations and political movements provided the impetus for a collaborative examination by scholars of religion and culture intent on bridging the gap of knowledge and understanding between the study of the West and the study of Islam. This book, together with its companion volume, Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (Greenwood Press, forthcoming 1991), examines the topics of the relationship between Western and Islamic religious and cultural traditions on war, peace, and the conduct of statecraft. The ten essays contained here provide scholarly analyses and interpretations of Islamic traditions and of areas of relationship and commonality between these traditions and those of the West. The difficulties inherent in such analysis are compounded by the lack of correspondence between the two religious and cultural traditions, particularly those concerned with defining when war is justified and what limits ought to be observed in justified warfare. The volume is divided into three parts: "When is War Justified? What are Its Limits?," "Irregular Warfare and Terrorism," and "Combatancy, Noncombatancy, and Noncombatant Immunity." Within each of these perspectives two groups of scholars, one whose field of work is the just war tradition of Western culture and one whose area of study is Islamic religion and culture, examine issues that relate to the justification and limitation of war. The first four essays assess justifications for war and restraints on its conduct, including a discussion of the concept of jihad.Two additional groups of essays address specific questions that are especially pressing in the current historical context. The nine chapters range broadly over the historical development of the two traditions, seeking individually and collectively to open up the unfamiliar and to bring elements of the two traditions to bear on contemporary moral problems of armed violence and war. For students of Western and Islamic religion and culture, the volume provides a beginning for cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural dialogue as well as for intensive and systematic study. Scholars of both Western and Islamic traditions will find their understandings of the tradition of jihad and the constellation of ideas and attitudes on war, peace, and politics that are normative in Islamic religion enhanced by Cross, Crescent and Sword, which also provides a means to assess how these ideas and attitudes should be placed in relationship to those of Western culture.

NL ARMS 2016 offers a collection of studies on the interrelatedness of safety and security in military organizations so as to anticipate or even prepare for dire situations. The volume contains a wide spectrum of contributions on organizing for safety and security in a military context that are theoretically as well as empirically relevant. Theoretically, the contributions draw upon international security studies, safety science and organizational studies. Empirically, case studies address the reality of safety and security in national crisis management, logistics and unconventional warfare, focusing, amongst others, on rule of law during missions in which expeditionary military forces are involved in policing tasks to restore and reinforce safety and security and on the impact of rule of law on societal security. The result is a truly unique volume that may serve practitioners, policymakers and academics in gaining a better understanding of organizing for the security-safety nexus.