France and Germany were among the major powers that abruptly lost that status as a consequence of World War II. In the 1950s and 1960s, the governments of both nations sought ways to recover their great-power standing. Each saw the cooperation of the other as crucial for its own foreign policy aspirations and tried repeatedly to engage the other in commitments that would underwrite its own ambitions. But neither succeeded. In the 1970s, France and Germany began to reconcile themselves to the permanent loss of their great-power status. The process of accepting a diminished international role has been underway for more than two decades, and, in Kocs's judgment, is very likely to continue in the future. Far from opening the door to a stronger world military role for Western Europe, the end of the Cold War is likely to serve merely to consolidate the existing situation.

With a foreword by Major-General Nico Geerts, Commander Netherlands Defence Academy, Breda, The Netherlands International conflict resolution increasingly involves the use of non-military power and non-kinetic capabilities alongside military capabilities in the face of hybrid threats. In this book, counter-measures to those threats are addressed by academics with both practical and theoretical experience and knowledge, providing strategic and operational insights into non-kinetic conflict resolution and on the use of power to influence, affect, deter or coerce states and non-state actors. This volume in the NL ARMS series deals with the non-kinetic capabilities to address international crises and conflicts and as always views matters from a global perspective. Included are chapters on the promise, practice and challenges of non-kinetic instruments of power, the instrumentality of soft power, information as a power instrument and manoeuvring in the information environment, Russia's use of deception and misinformation in conflict, applying counter-marketing techniques to fight ISIL, using statistics to profile terrorists, and employing tools such as Actor and Audience Analysis. Such diverse subjects as lawfare, the Law of Armed Conflict rules for non-kinetic cyber attacks, navigation warfare, GPS-spoofing, maritime interception operations, and finally, as a prerequisite, innovative ways for intelligence collection in UN Peacekeeping in Mali come up for discussion.The book will provide both professionals such as (foreign) policy makers and those active in the military services, academics at a master level and those with an interest in military law and the law of armed conflict with useful and up-to-date insights into the wide range of subjects that are contained within it. Paul A.L. Ducheine and Frans P.B. Osinga are General Officers and full professors at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda, The Netherlands. Specific to this volume in the Series: * Written by academics with both practical and theoretical experience* Addresses counter measures to hybrid crises* Offers both strategic and operational insights to non-kinetic conflict resolution

This handbook provides a straightforward account of how women have served in combat roles and explains the ongoing controversy surrounding efforts to legalize combat assignments for female service members. Women have been excluded from combat roles for most of American history. During conflicts such as the American Civil War, a few women enlisted as men; in some cases, their identities as women were not discovered until after their deaths. Today, the nontraditional battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan have no clearly defined front lines, and many female soldiers have found themselves face-to-face with the enemy. Yet despite the realities of modern warfare, the subject of women serving in combat roles remains highly controversial. Women in Combat: A Reference Handbook examines the historical background, current dilemmas, and global context of this contentious issue. The author explores both sides of the argument, presenting information from leading sources and gleaned from personal interviews. Statistical data, primary source documents, a directory of organizations, and print and electronic resources offer additional insight. Offers insights obtained from exclusive interviews with distinguished long-time female military officers, international scholars, and religious leaders Contains relevant materials such as the 1988 Risk Rule, Soldier's Creed, Department of Defense ground combat policy, and USC 6015 Includes biographical information on more than 25 women who have served or are serving in combat positions, as well as advocates and opponents of combat roles for women Presents a chronology of significant events related to women in the military from 1775 to 2010 Contains a bibliography of important materials to assist readers in further study of this controversial subject Provides a glossary defining key military acronyms and terms

Borawski and Young provide a serious analysis of the major issues confronting European-North American relations. They draw detailed attention to the fundamental political and military issues before the Atlantic Alliance.

They illustrate that NATO remains essential to Euro-Atlantic security. Only the Atlantic Alliance can bring to bear well-tested military capability under US leadership to promote its members security, interests, and democratic values. However, to remain vital, the Alliance must undertake a serious review of its major purposes: enlargement to the former Warsaw Pact nations, a strategic partnership with Russia, defense against weapons of mass destruction, and a more mature transatlantic relationship drawing on the lessons of the former Yugoslavia. This is an important assessment for policymakers, military planners, scholars, students, and others concerned with current European-American relations.

There is no necessary relationship between fame and power, and great influence is often wielded in willful obscurity. So it was with the irascible, indomitable Eugene Fubini. A physics prodigy who fled Italy when the fascists came to power, his searing intelligence and relentless determination lifted him from obscurity to the highest levels of the Pentagon. Indifferent to anything but results, Fubini worked behind the scenes to shape the strategy and substance of his adopted country's post-World War II defense. Along the way he exerted enormous influence over the development of radar, the rise of the military-industrial complex, the Space Race, and many of the other signature events and movements of mid-twentieth-century American geopolitics. But even as his unbending determination to do things his way earned him the admiration of his colleagues, it left him feared and isolated within his own family. "Let Me Explain" is a portrait of a man whose unwillingness and inability to compromise paid enormous rewards, and extracted a heavy emotional price. David G. Fubini is a director of McKinsey & Company, Inc. in Boston, Massachusetts. For more than a decade he was the managing director of the Boston office, and led the firm's activities in New England. Prior to joining McKinsey, David was an initial member of a small group that became the McNeil Consumer Products Company of Johnson & Johnson. David received a degree in business administration with honors from the University of Massachusetts, and a master's degree in business administration, with distinction, from Harvard University. He lives in Brookline, Massachusetts with his wife, Bertha Rivera, and their four children.

A penetrating history of how the Japanese army, once admired for its chivalry, became a legion of brutality and atrocity.

During World War II, many of Japan's soldiers committed such crimes against humanity that the world recoiled in horror. During the notorious six-week-long "rape of Nanking" in 1937, Japanese forces murdered at least 200,000 men, women, and children. Throughout the Pacific War, Allied prisoners were often starved, tortured, beheaded, even cannibalized. Although Japan's military men fought bravely and with resolve against overwhelming numbers again and again, their astonishing brutality made them a loathsome, unforgivable enemy.

While this chapter of Japanese history is well known, few realize that earlier in this century the Japanese were celebrated throughout the West for chivalry in warfare. During the Boxer Rebellion in China and the savage Russo-Japanese War of 1904­5, the Western press lauded the Japanese for their kindness to the enemy wounded and imprisoned.

Warriors of the Rising Sun chronicles the Japanese military's transformation from honorable "knights of Bushido" into men of historic cruelty.

Author of over twenty books on sociology and anthropology, Robert Edgerton teaches at the UCLA School of Medicine. He lives in Los Angeles, California.

"Mr. Prime Minister, to achieve order in the casbah I have to act brutally toward people free of crime, too. I feel humiliated by this behavior. The situation has become a catastrophe. It's breaking us." So spoke an Israeli soldier when Prime Minister Shamir visited troops in the West Bank. Until Not Shooting and Not Crying, few have addressed, from a psychological perspective, the coping strategies and unconventional resolutions constructed by the Israeli soldier in the face of overwhelming moral dilemmas, which he traditionally solved by unselfishly risking his life, but not by refusing to fight. In Israel, refusing to fight for one's country is considered deviant behavior, but in the war in Lebanon individuals adopted this unconventional mode of moral resolution for the first time. Linn assesses the nature of the decision-making process involved in this mode of selective conscientious objection and attempts to define the moral meaning of such behavior, both to the dedicated Israeli soldier and his society. This volume investigates how and why the phenomenon of selective conscientious objection emerged so dramatically during the war in Lebanon, identifies the psychological characteristics of the soldiers who chose this course of action, and considers the impact and future consequences of this action on Israeli society. Linn summarizes the military history of Israel from the 1967 Six-Day War to the undeclared war currently being waged in the occupied territories. The nine chapters, followed by references, tables, and appendixes, address such areas as: the individual conscience at war--a search for a theoretical framework; why the Lebanon war precipitated the phenomenon of conscientious objection; the objectors' claims for moral superiority and consistency; refusing soldiers compared to striking physicians; and others. Scholars and students of military affairs, psychologists, and those concerned with contemporary ethical/moral issues will find Linn's work indispensable.

This book is the first about military-media relations to argue for a fundamental restructuring of national journalism and the first to document the failure of American journalism in the national security field for the past thirty years. Press complaints of excessive control by the military during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 were the inevitable result of the failure of American journalism to train competent specialists in military reporting and to provide an organizational structure that would assure continuing, comprehensive coverage of national defense in peace and war. This, in turn, is the result of retaining the "city-room" concept as the basic organizational feature of the press, with continuing reliance on the generalist in an age that demands increasingly well-trained specialists. So long as the press fails to modernize its basic methods of training to assure well-trained defense specialists, the military will be required to closely control reporters, as in the Persian Gulf War, as a basic requirement of security for armed forces members and the national interests. Permitting the military to control how the military itself is reported is a grave danger to the democratic process. Yet, so long as the press refuses to accept responsibility for large-scale reform, the public will continue to support close military control as an essential element of safety for its sons and daughters in the armed forces, and out of concern for the success of U.S. military operations. This book will be of interest to students of the press, of the military, and of the media at large.

Volume one of Ney's early career
Antoine Bulos was commissioned by Marshal Ney's family to write a comprehensive memoir of his life. All students of the Napoleonic age have visions of Ney at his most iconic-standing with a small rearguard in the snow fighting off Cossacks during the disastrous retreat from Moscow or charging bareheaded, his red hair a rallying point for all, up slopes crowned with red-coated infantry at Waterloo. These two volumes paint an entirely different portrait, concentrating as they do on Ney's early career. In volume one-Ney: General of Cavalry-we see Ney in his formative years as the consummate commander of light cavalry. This volume, culminating in 1799, reveals how the soldier won his deserved reputation for courage. Perhaps more surprisingly it shows how Ney was far from the headstrong but shallow thinker many have portrayed him to be. Here is a man of both principle and no small capacity for administration. These essential volumes for those interested in the Napoleonic epoch are available in soft back and hard cover with dust jacket for collectors.

Garret deals with the issue of humanitarian intervention, of which the recent Kosovo conflict provides a prime example. Even though the writing of this book was completed before NATO began its intervention on behalf of the Kosovars, the book provides a valuable background for assessing the Kosovo issue--it lays out the history of previous humanitarian interventions and analyzes the controversies surrounding them. Garret provides a sophisticated framework by which such interventions can be evaluated both morally and pragmatically. His book offers some particularly relevant material on the American role in humanitarian interventions. This book is valuable for those who wish to make sense of the pros and cons of humanitarian efforts in international hot spots, like Kosovo.

After an analysis of the legal and philosophical issues bearing on the idea of humanitarian intervention, defined as the use of force by one or more states to remedy severe human rights abuses in a particular country--this study focuses upon the moral duties that individual members of the international community have toward the welfare of others. Recent events have indicated that humanitarian intervention will likely play a larger role in international relations in the future. Examples in the contemporary period include Kosovo Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, the Kurds in Iraq, Uganda, and East Pakistan. This book emphasizes the role of the United States in humanitarian intervention and argues that increased American involvement is essential.

Garrett suggests that the American people as a whole may be more prepared to see the United States take an active role in humanitarian intervention than are certain media and government elites. Strong national leadership that stresses the moral duty of the United States will be necessary to tap this latent altruism in order to contribute to higher standards of international human rights. Individual topics include assessment criteria for the moral legitimacy of intervention, unilateral versus multilateral efforts, and factors that appear to persuade or dissuade states from participating in such intervention. This volume focuses on certain themes and patterns in humanitarian intervention, which are then illustrated by using historical data taken from a variety of different examples.

Perhaps the most famous and admired soldier to fight in World War II was Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who achieved immortality as the Desert Fox. Rommel's first field command during the war was the 7th Panzer Division-also known as the Ghost Division-which he led in France in 1940. During this campaign, the 7th Panzer suffered more casualties than any other division in the German Army. During the process, it inflicted a disporoportionate amount of casualties upon the enemy. It took 97,486 prisoners, captured 458 tanks and armored vehicles, 277 field guns, 64 anti-tank guns and 4,000 to 5,000 trucks. It captured or destroyed hundreds of tons of other military equipment, shot down 52 aircraft, destroyed 15 more aircraft on the ground, and captured 12 additional planes. It destroyed the French 1st Armored Division and the 4th North African Division, punched through the Maginot Line extension near sSivry, and checked the largest Allied counteroffensive of the campaign at Arras. When France surrendered, the Ghost Division was within 200 miles of the Spanish border. No doubt about it-Rommel had proven himself a great military leader who was capable of greater things. His next command, in fact, would be the Afrika Korps, where the legend of the Desert Fox was born. Rommel had a great deal of help in France-and much more than his published papers suggest. His staff officers and company, battalion and regimental commanders were an extremely capable collection of military leaders, which included 12 future generals (two of them SS), and two colonels who briefly commanded panzer divisions but never reached general rank. They also included Colonel Erich von Unger, who would no doubt have become a general had he not been killed in action while commanding a motorized rifle brigade on the Eastern Front in 1941, as well as Kark Hanke, a Nazi gauleiter who later succeeded Heinrich Himmler as the last Reichsfuehrer-SS. No historian has ever recognized the talented cast of characters who supported the Desert Fox in 1940. No one has ever attempted to tell their stories. This book remedies this deficiency. In the weeks prior to D-Day, Rommel analyzed Allied bombing patterns and concluded that they were trying to make Normandy a strategic island in order to isolate the battlefield. Rommel also noticed that the Allies had mined the entire Channel coast, while the naval approaches to Normandy were clear. Realizing that Normandy would be the likely site of the invasion, he replaced the poorly-equipped 716th Infantry Division with the battle-hardened 352nd Infantry Division on the coastal sector. But his request for additional troops was denied by Hitler. Mitcham offers a remarkable theory of why Allied intelligence failed to learn of this critical troop movement, and why they were not prepared for the heavier resistance they met on Omaha Beach. He uses a number of little-known primary sources which contradict previously published accounts of Rommel, his officers, and the last days of the Third Reich. These sources provide amazing insight into the invasion of Normandy from the German point of view. They include German personnel records, unpublished papers, and the manuscripts of top German officers like general of Panzer Troops Baron Leo Geys von Schweppenburg, the commander of Panzer Group West. This book also contains a thorough examination of the virtually ignored battles of the Luftwaffe in France in 1944.