Are Americans in denial about the costs of the War on Terror? In The Real Price of War, Joshua S. Goldstein argues that we need to face up to what the war costs the average American--both in taxes and in changes to our way of life. Goldstein contends that in order to protect the United States from future attacks, we must fight--and win--the War on Terror. Yet even as President Bush campaigns on promises of national security, his administration is cutting taxes and increasing deficit spending, resulting in too little money to eradicate terrorism and a crippling burden of national debt for future generations to pay.

The Real Price of War breaks down billion-dollar government expenditures into the prices individual Americans are paying through their taxes. Goldstein estimates that the average American household currently pays $500 each month to finance war. Beyond the dollars and cents that finance military operations and increased security within the U.S., the War on Terror also costs America in less tangible ways, including lost lives, reduced revenue from international travelers, and budget pressures on local governments. The longer the war continues, the greater these costs. In order to win the war faster, Goldstein argues for an increase in war funding, at a cost of about $100 per household per month, to better fund military spending, homeland security, and foreign aid and diplomacy.

Americans have been told that the War on Terror is a war without sacrifice. But as Goldstein emphatically states: "These truths should be self-evident: The nation is at war. The war is expensive. Someone has to pay for it."

The China-Burma-India campaign of the Asian/Pacific war of World War II was the most complex, if not the most controversial, theater of the entire war. Guerrilla warfare, commando and special intelligence operations, and air tactics originated here. The literature is extensive and this book provides an evaluative survey of that vast literature. A comprehensive compilation of some 1,500 titles, the work includes a narrative historiographical overview and an annotated bibliography of the titles covered in the historiographical section. Following an introductory historical essay and a chronology, the historiographical narrative covers land, water, underwater, air, and combined operations, intelligence matters, diplomacy, and logistics and supply. It also examines the memoirs, diaries, autobiographies, and biographies of the personnel involved. Such cultural topics as journalism, fiction, film, and art are analyzed, and existing gaps in the literature are looked at. The bibliography provides both descriptive and evaluative annotations.

"War, Chaos, and History" considers the implications of the emerging field of research in chaos-complexity-non-linearity for the study of war. This study examines the special dependence of military professionals on history in their shaping of doctrines, style, and attitudes in spite of the wide gap between the portrayal of war in military history and the far greater intricacy of its reality. Special foci in the analysis include: the fragility of doctrine; the chronic confounding of plans and expectations in actual operations; the congruences of chaos and creativity theoretics; effects of war on the environment; and problems of evidence and reportage. Three cases--battle cruisers, tank destroyers, and heavy fighter aircraft--are presented to illustrate paradoxes, especially the gap between vision and realization, and the tension between the urge to control and the impulse to create chaos in war.

This well-researched study explores a virtually unknown and largely enigmatic aspect of World War II--the nature of amphibious operations in the Aegean Sea in 1943. More than an historical account, it is designed to interpret and reassess the crucial decisions which influenced the outcome of what has become known as the "Dodecanese Disaster." The British operations in the Aegean at that time present many parallels with the recent conflict in the Falklands in terms of scale and order of battle, the critical difference being that operations in the Aegean resulted in tragic failure. The author leads the reader through a web of intrigue, incompetence, fantasy, and cover-up to find the truth. He vividly portrays the tensions between American and British perspectives in the strategy for the war against Germany.

This examination of the history of the 20th century and the place of war in its unfolding presents a radical, unorthodox interpretation of both. With provision for seeing 1945 as the proper starting point for the 20th century and 1968 as the year that marked the end of the Age of Reason, this provocative study portrays the First World War as the first war of the 20th century and the Second World War as the last war of the 19th. It also provides a counterview of the Second World War as merely one part of a series of conflicts that lasted between 1931 and 1975 and the Cold War as the time when real hatreds were suspended. Moving through various insurgency campaigns, Willmott subjects the Gulf campaign of 1991 to skeptical analysis that is certain to be contentious.

Challenging the view that the 20th century will be viewed by future historians as ranging from approximately 1914 to 1992, Willmott offers this volume as a counter to modern historiography which, he contends, is obsessed with micro-analysis and has lost vital context and perspective. Arguing that war is not the preserve of the intellect, and that it is neither intrinsically rational nor scientific, Willmott depicts war as a manmade phenomenon, complete with all the elements of human failure, misjudgment, and incompetence. He concludes with a consideration of modern doctrine and predictions for the future of war.

Poseidon and the PC documents the adventures of Lt. Paul W. Neidhardt (USNR) through one hundred and fifteen of his letters written to his wife during World War II. Long before 'PC' became equated with a "personal computer" or "politically correct," the two letters were associated with "Patrol Craft." These World War II ships had the mission of performing convoy escort duty and antisubmarine warfare. The PCs were meant to relieve the larger, far more valuable ships from the often monotonous duties of sailing at the speed of the slowest ship in a convoy. The 174 foot long PCs were so small that they were considered safe duty as more worthy targets were always available. In high seas PCs floated as light as a cork in a bottle and as rough as riding a bull. A PC could entirely disappear from view in the trough of a large wave. The seasickness that resulted from the pitching and rolling of the PC was truly gut wrenching. If you didn't get sick on a PC, you were seaworthy on any other Navy ship in the fleet. Had the war not ended when it did, Poseidon's typhoons might have substantially prolonged the war in the Pacific. A great typhoon sunk, beached or damaged more than two hundred American ships at Okinawa after the war had ended that were to be used for the invasion of Japan. Paul was the executive officer on one of the many PCs destroyed by this great storm, which struck on October 9, 1945. When Poseidon showed his power, Paul knew his PC needed all the help and good fortune there was to be found if they were to survive the fury of what Americans came to call Typhoon Louise.

In this book, Daniel Kliman argues that the years following September 11, 2001, have marked a turning point in Japan's defense strategy. Utilizing poll data from Japanese newspapers as well as extensive interview material, Kliman chronicles the erosion of normative and legal restraints on Tokyo's security policy. In particular, he notes that both Japanese elites and the general public increasingly view national security from a realpolitik perspective. Japan's more realpolitik orientation has coincided with a series of precedent-breaking defense initiatives. Tokyo deployed the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean, decided to introduce missile defense, and contributed troops to Iraq's post-conflict reconstruction. Kliman explains these initiatives as the product of four mutually interactive factors. In the period after September 11, the impact of foreign threats on Tokyo's security calculus became ever more pronounced; internalized U.S. expectations exerted a profound influence over Japanese defense behavior; prime ministerial leadership played an instrumental role in deciding high profile security debates; and public opinion appeared to overtake generational change as a motivator of realpolitik defense policies. This book rebuts those who exaggerate the nature of Japan's strategic transition. By evaluating potential amendments to Article 9, Kliman demonstrates that Tokyo's defense posture will remain constrained even after constitutional revision.

The march to Baghdad, Iraq in 2003 was a military operation like no other. High tech weapons and old fashioned Marine infantry combined to lead coalition forces to victory in twenty-one days. Returning Son is the story of Private Sean Cassedy, a cyberspace generation warrior, coming from a tiny Kentucky town with the unlikely name of Bagdad. Son is war from the eyes of a grunt as well as the emotional war for loved ones back home. Sean left for Marine boot camp one week to the day after the tragedy of September 11th. He survived boot camp's ultimate test--the Crucible--only to be tested in the crucible of his own court-martial. During Operation Iraqi Freedom both of Sean's legs were crushed in a fog of war accident within a hundred miles of Baghdad. As one of Kentucky's first injured veterans, Sean's homecoming was as inspirational as his father's homecoming from Vietnam was depressing.

For more than 40 years, U.S. defense policy and the design of military capabilities were driven by the threat to national security posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. As the Soviet Union collapsed, analysts wondered what effect this dramatic change would have upon defense policy and the military capabilities designed to support it. Strangely enough, this development would ultimately have little effect on our defense policy. Over a decade later, American forces are a smaller, but similar version of their Cold War predecessors. The author argues that, despite many suggestions for significant change, the bureaucratic inertia of comfortable military elites has dominated the defense policy debate and preserved the status quo with only minor exceptions.

This inertia raises the danger that American military capabilities will be inadequate for future warfare in the information age. In addition, such legacy forces are inefficient and inappropriately designed for the demands of frequent and important antiterrorist and peace operations. Lacquement offers extensive analysis concerning the defense policymaking process from 1989 to 2001, including in particular the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This important study also provides a set of targeted policy recommendations that can help solve the identified problems in preparing for future wars and in better training for peace operations.

An examination of the Nien rebellion in China, including a survey of the background and analysis of the causes of the Nien movement, as well as the history of their guerrilla tactics.

This work is a doctrinal examination of war termination strategy and conflict resolution as a dependent pair, requiring a plan to achieve both in unison in advance of a fight. The necessity of a plan for conflict resolution should be intuitively obvious for policymakers, yet a survey of recent conflicts, including Afghanistan and Iraq, shows that not to be the case. Beyond Guns and Steel: A War Termination Strategy provides a practical approach to establishing a plan for war termination and conflict resolution before the bullets fly. In explaining the difference between strategy and policy, Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo clarifies the most important, and often the most constraining, element of a nation's power-its resources. He posits that termination strategy and conflict resolution are interdependent and need to be included in conflict plans from the outset. Caraccilo's book fills a void in current strategy for the development of long-term plans that bring conflicts to timely and acceptable conclusions, providing a methodology that allows interagency requirements and resources for war termination to be defined, allocated, and employed effectively. Examples taken from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with models of war termination successes and failures to enhance the understanding of scenarios for possible resolution A full array of definitions offering clarity for the reader seeking to grasp the book's methodology for war termination Primary source documentation related to the author's seven combat deployments to the Middle East and over five years of personal involvement in combat and its aftermath. Vignettes from history dating from the Revolutionary War to the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Sidebars offering relevant charts, graphs, and newspaper articles Examples of conflict resolution to enhance an understanding of war termination outcomes Firsthand accounts from various military officers in the form of Staff College manuscripts A robust listing of books, interviews, documents, and articles on war termination and conflict resolution theories

The information in this history of the 7th Bombardment Group, United States Air Force, is based on official records and on the diaries and memories of former members of the Group who submitted accounts of their experiences to the author for inclusion in the book. Generally unknown and unrecognized is the fact that the 7th Bombardment Group has a rich history which is closely related to the Air Service of World War I and to the powerful United States Air Force into which the Air Service evolved. The history of a military unit is composed of the activities and accomplishments of the people and the subordinate components that, at one time or another, are assigned to it. The history of the 7th Bombardment Group dates back to World War I. Many of the men assigned to or associated with the Group were air pioneers whose activities contributed to the formation of an organization which one day would become the world''s strongest and most modern air force. While "Four Decades of Courage" focuses primarily on the history of the Seventh Bombardment Group from the beginning of World War I until 1945, the author recognizes that the history of the Group closely parallels and has played an important part, not just in the history of the United States Air Force, but also in the development of flight itself. For that reason, wherever it is practical to do so, the author has included a history of flight from its very beginning.

This volume, based on extensive research in formerly secret archives, examines the progress of Soviet industrialisation against the background of the rising threat of aggression from Germany, Japan and Italy, and the consolidation of Stalin's power. The iron and steel industry expanded rapidly, new non-ferrous and rare metals were introduced, and the foundations were laid of a modern armaments industry. Following the disastrous famine of 1932-33, agriculture recovered, and sufficient grain stocks were accumulated to cope with the shortages after the bad weather of 1936. These successes were achieved, after the abolition of rationing by combining central planning and mobilisation campaigns with the use of economic incentives and experimentation with markets. Although the Soviet system ultimately failed, its success in these years was a crucial stage in the spread of the economic and social transformation which began in England in the eighteenth century to the rest of the world.