The War of the Triple Alliance was one of the longest, least remembered, and, for one of its participants, most catastrophic conflicts of the 19th century. The decision of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay to go to war against Paraguay in May 1965 has generally been regarded as a response to the raids by the headstrong and tyrannical dictator, Francisco Solano Lopez. While there is some truth to this view, as Lopez had attacked towns in Argentina and Brazil, the terms of the Triple Alliance signed that same month reveal that the motivation of these two nations, at least, was to redraw the map in their favor, at the expense of Paraguay. That the resulting conflict lasted five years before Lopez was defeated and his country fully at the mercy of its neighbors was a tribute to the heroic resistance of his people, as well as to the inadequacies of the allied command.

The military campaigns, which took place on land and on the rivers, often in appalling conditions of both climate and terrain, are examined from a strategic perspective, as well as through the experiences of ordinary soldiers. Leuchars looks in detail at the political causes, the course of the conflict as viewed from both sides, and the tragic aftermath. He brings to light an episode that, for all its subsequent obscurity, marked a turning point in the development of South American international relations.

We are all acutely aware of the devastation and upheaval that result from war. Less obvious is the extent to which the military and war impact on the gender order. This book is the first to explore the intersections of the military, war and gender in twentieth-century Germany from a variety of different perspectives. Its authors investigate the relevance of the military and war for the formation of gender relations and their representation as well as for the construction of individual and social agency for both genders in civil society and the military. They inquire about the origins and development of gendered images as they were shaped by war. They expound on the multifarious mechanisms that served to reconstruct or newly form gender relations in the postwar periods. They analyze the participation of women and men in the creation of wars as well as the gender-specific meaning of their respective roles. Finally, they investigate the different ways of remembering and coming to terms with the two great military conflicts of the very violent twentieth century. The book focuses on the period before, during and after the two World Wars, closely linked 'total wars' that mobilized both the 'front' and the 'home-front' and increasingly blurred the boundaries between them. Drawing on sources ranging from forces newspapers to German pilot literature, police reports on women's food riots to oral history interviews with soldiers' wives, the richly documented case studies of Home/Front add the long-overdue gender dimension to the cultural and historical debates that surround these two great military conflicts.

This collection of essays by Israeli, Palestinian, and American scholars and activists examines the impact of the June 1967 War on Palestinians and Israelis alike in the thirty years following the war. Israel became an occupying power in 1967, ruling more than one million Palestinians in territories it had captured. Using military strength, with the tacit agreement and support of the United States and other Western democracies, Israel exploited and oppressed the Palestinians, brutally suppressing their civil, human, and political rights. This book evaluates and examines the injustices done to the Palestinians during this period.

In this first attempt to look back at those thirty years and assess what has happened to Israeli and Palestinian society, the contributing scholars provide a critique of the prevailing "Realpolitik" in the Middle East and, indeed, the world today. Bound to be controversial, the collection will be of great interest to scholars and policy makers, as well as concerned citizens interested in the contemporary Middle East.

The only previous war to match the world wars of the twentieth century in scale and impact was the French War of 1793-1815. This book is the first book to compare these conflicts, which together shaped the history of the modern world. A.D. Harvey relates the causes, conduct and outcome of these wars to the fundamental nature of the societies which fought them. Political decisions, economic power and social attitudes interfaced with the demands of military technology to determine the outcome of each case. Britain is the centre of focus, but is seen against a background of the other combatants. Harvey's ability to make large-scale generalisations is backed up by a wealth of fascinating and carefully documented detail, making this outstanding and exceptionally well-written book a pleasure to read. The author has tackled a huge subject and has not been afraid to face up to either its complexities or its implications. By asking new questions and using a range of unfamiliar sources this book provides an unusually profound analysis not only of these wars but also of the nature of modern society and of our understanding of the past.

The China-Burma-India campaign of the Asian/Pacific war of World War II was the most complex, if not the most controversial, theater of the entire war. Guerrilla warfare, commando and special intelligence operations, and air tactics originated here. The literature is extensive and this book provides an evaluative survey of that vast literature. A comprehensive compilation of some 1,500 titles, the work includes a narrative historiographical overview and an annotated bibliography of the titles covered in the historiographical section. Following an introductory historical essay and a chronology, the historiographical narrative covers land, water, underwater, air, and combined operations, intelligence matters, diplomacy, and logistics and supply. It also examines the memoirs, diaries, autobiographies, and biographies of the personnel involved. Such cultural topics as journalism, fiction, film, and art are analyzed, and existing gaps in the literature are looked at. The bibliography provides both descriptive and evaluative annotations.

This examination of the history of the 20th century and the place of war in its unfolding presents a radical, unorthodox interpretation of both. With provision for seeing 1945 as the proper starting point for the 20th century and 1968 as the year that marked the end of the Age of Reason, this provocative study portrays the First World War as the first war of the 20th century and the Second World War as the last war of the 19th. It also provides a counterview of the Second World War as merely one part of a series of conflicts that lasted between 1931 and 1975 and the Cold War as the time when real hatreds were suspended. Moving through various insurgency campaigns, Willmott subjects the Gulf campaign of 1991 to skeptical analysis that is certain to be contentious.

Challenging the view that the 20th century will be viewed by future historians as ranging from approximately 1914 to 1992, Willmott offers this volume as a counter to modern historiography which, he contends, is obsessed with micro-analysis and has lost vital context and perspective. Arguing that war is not the preserve of the intellect, and that it is neither intrinsically rational nor scientific, Willmott depicts war as a manmade phenomenon, complete with all the elements of human failure, misjudgment, and incompetence. He concludes with a consideration of modern doctrine and predictions for the future of war.

In this book, Daniel Kliman argues that the years following September 11, 2001, have marked a turning point in Japan's defense strategy. Utilizing poll data from Japanese newspapers as well as extensive interview material, Kliman chronicles the erosion of normative and legal restraints on Tokyo's security policy. In particular, he notes that both Japanese elites and the general public increasingly view national security from a realpolitik perspective. Japan's more realpolitik orientation has coincided with a series of precedent-breaking defense initiatives. Tokyo deployed the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean, decided to introduce missile defense, and contributed troops to Iraq's post-conflict reconstruction. Kliman explains these initiatives as the product of four mutually interactive factors. In the period after September 11, the impact of foreign threats on Tokyo's security calculus became ever more pronounced; internalized U.S. expectations exerted a profound influence over Japanese defense behavior; prime ministerial leadership played an instrumental role in deciding high profile security debates; and public opinion appeared to overtake generational change as a motivator of realpolitik defense policies. This book rebuts those who exaggerate the nature of Japan's strategic transition. By evaluating potential amendments to Article 9, Kliman demonstrates that Tokyo's defense posture will remain constrained even after constitutional revision.

Are Americans in denial about the costs of the War on Terror? In The Real Price of War, Joshua S. Goldstein argues that we need to face up to what the war costs the average American--both in taxes and in changes to our way of life. Goldstein contends that in order to protect the United States from future attacks, we must fight--and win--the War on Terror. Yet even as President Bush campaigns on promises of national security, his administration is cutting taxes and increasing deficit spending, resulting in too little money to eradicate terrorism and a crippling burden of national debt for future generations to pay.

The Real Price of War breaks down billion-dollar government expenditures into the prices individual Americans are paying through their taxes. Goldstein estimates that the average American household currently pays $500 each month to finance war. Beyond the dollars and cents that finance military operations and increased security within the U.S., the War on Terror also costs America in less tangible ways, including lost lives, reduced revenue from international travelers, and budget pressures on local governments. The longer the war continues, the greater these costs. In order to win the war faster, Goldstein argues for an increase in war funding, at a cost of about $100 per household per month, to better fund military spending, homeland security, and foreign aid and diplomacy.

Americans have been told that the War on Terror is a war without sacrifice. But as Goldstein emphatically states: "These truths should be self-evident: The nation is at war. The war is expensive. Someone has to pay for it."

Games of Chicken proposes basing nuclear weapons policies on both historical and analytical arguments. Schwartzman analyzes the trade-off between the aggression risk, which U.S. policy has sought to minimize, and the pre-emption risk, which has been ignored. This analysis is then applied to policy developments under each of the post-war U.S. presidents. The historical analysis also demonstrates the importance of the role of myths in the development of policy, most notably: the myth of the nuclear strategy expert; the evil empire myth; and the economic necessity myth. Finally, the author proposes a viable solution to the increasing build-up of nuclear weapons, one which would minimize the preemption risk.

For more than 40 years, U.S. defense policy and the design of military capabilities were driven by the threat to national security posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. As the Soviet Union collapsed, analysts wondered what effect this dramatic change would have upon defense policy and the military capabilities designed to support it. Strangely enough, this development would ultimately have little effect on our defense policy. Over a decade later, American forces are a smaller, but similar version of their Cold War predecessors. The author argues that, despite many suggestions for significant change, the bureaucratic inertia of comfortable military elites has dominated the defense policy debate and preserved the status quo with only minor exceptions.

This inertia raises the danger that American military capabilities will be inadequate for future warfare in the information age. In addition, such legacy forces are inefficient and inappropriately designed for the demands of frequent and important antiterrorist and peace operations. Lacquement offers extensive analysis concerning the defense policymaking process from 1989 to 2001, including in particular the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This important study also provides a set of targeted policy recommendations that can help solve the identified problems in preparing for future wars and in better training for peace operations.

This well-researched study explores a virtually unknown and largely enigmatic aspect of World War II--the nature of amphibious operations in the Aegean Sea in 1943. More than an historical account, it is designed to interpret and reassess the crucial decisions which influenced the outcome of what has become known as the "Dodecanese Disaster." The British operations in the Aegean at that time present many parallels with the recent conflict in the Falklands in terms of scale and order of battle, the critical difference being that operations in the Aegean resulted in tragic failure. The author leads the reader through a web of intrigue, incompetence, fantasy, and cover-up to find the truth. He vividly portrays the tensions between American and British perspectives in the strategy for the war against Germany.