Polls show that a sizeable portion of the American population believes that troops found WMD in Iraq and that Saddam Hussein was somehow responsible for the attacks of September 11. Even after the 9/11 Commission Report and numerous other reports have concluded that our intelligence was flawed, people in the freest nation on earth continue to be misinformed about something that could not be more vital to understand—the reasons for sending troops into harm's way. This insightful analysis argues that the media should have done a better job of performing its traditional role of skeptic and watchdog, and it examines what went wrong. There are, of course, many people whose support for going to war in Iraq was not contingent on the existence of WMD or a connection to al-Qaeda. But many others based their support for the war on misinformation. Dadge explores why the media did not aggressively investigate the claims made by the administration and intelligence agencies; in short, why they did not do their job: to fully inform the citizenry to the best of their ability. He examines pressures from the Bush administration, pressures from corporate consolidation of media ownership, patriotism and self-censorship, and other factors. He concludes with recommendations for ways in which the media can improve their reporting on government.

This is the compelling story of a. man who learned to fly before WWII. He soon joined the regular army air corps as a private. As war became inevitable he completed flight training as a staff sergeant and had the wings of a military pilot. He flew bombers, fighters and transport aircraft before being sent to the Pacific area. Flying i54's loaded with priority cargo and personnel in and the wounded out. It was one bloody island after another from the East Indies to Tokyo Not flying as a group but as a single sitting duck for the enemy and friendly fire. As a single plane he landed at Atsugi airport to bring out the first loads of decimated allied prisoners. This was followed by flying "the hump" to help Chang Kia-chek against the communists. Discharged as a captain, he flew for up-start airlines that went bankrupt one after another. Two major carriers did no better. He was called to active duty during the Korean War to drop a weather station in northeast Greenland. Again a civilian, he was a chief pilot, operations director, a student of design and aeronautical engineering while running an aircraft conversion shop. From Peru to the Artic wastelands and places around the world were his work area. This was followed by being a personal pilot and aviation consultant for powerful executives.

This book investigates the extent to which research has influenced and interacted with SSR policies, programmes and activities implemented by the UK in conflict-affected Sierra Leone. Varisco uses concepts and notions from the literature on the policy process and research utilisation to explore the ways in which research has influenced UK-led SSR policy. Here, the author analyses the evolution of the network of policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats, and researchers working on SSR in Sierra Leone, and argues that two main variables - an increased stability in the country and a progressive evolution of SSR in policy and research - contributed to the expansion of the policy network over time and to a better use of research by street-level bureaucrats on the ground. This title derives from the Sierra Leone case study a series of recommendations to improve the use of research by international organisations and bilateral donors working in fragile states

The colourful career of a member of Napoleon's staff
This is the autobiography of the man who became Count Philippe de Segur, general of Division, Peer of France. Born in 1780, Segur was a child of the revolution. He was a private in 1800, an aide de camp to Napoleon and a general by 1812. His is the story of the Revolution, Consulate and First Empire of France. Segur saw campaigns throughout the epoch and the titles of the chapters of his memoir give clear indications as to the colour of its detail. Here are Austerlitz, Ulm, Vienna, Jena, Berlin and the war in the Iberian Peninsula. For those who are interested in the Napoleonic Wars this book, written by one who was intimate with the strategies and machinations of the Emperor, will be an essential addition to their library.

This book brings together an impressive range of academic and intelligence professional perspectives to interrogate the social, ethical and security upheavals in a world increasingly driven by data. Written in a clear and accessible style, it offers fresh insights to the deep reaching implications of Big Data for communication, privacy and organisational decision-making. It seeks to demystify developments around Big Data before evaluating their current and likely future implications for areas as diverse as corporate innovation, law enforcement, data science, journalism, and food security. The contributors call for a rethinking of the legal, ethical and philosophical frameworks that inform the responsibilities and behaviours of state, corporate, institutional and individual actors in a more networked, data-centric society. In doing so, the book addresses the real world risks, opportunities and potentialities of Big Data.

An important contribution to the international relations and military studies literature, this study considers the problem of conflict termination in Europe--an area of immense strategic importance to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The author argues that a well-thought-out policy for conflict termination is lacking within the NATO alliance, which currently relies almost exclusively on policies that emphasize the prevention of war. This lack of a conflict termination strategy, Cimbala asserts, leaves nations open to the danger of a quickly escalating nuclear conflict, should prevention policies fail and a war in Europe actually occur. In developing his arguments, Cimbala considers the relationship between war and politics as perceived by Soviet and Western planners; compares the superpowers' likely views on the process of escalation; and assesses the command, control, and communications perspectives implicit in Soviet and American writings and deployments and their implications for war termination.

Cimbala begins with an overview of the problems and choices involved in ending war in Europe under contemporary conditions. Subsequent chapters examine such topics as the philosophical and practical issues related to the problem of preemption; the problem of military stability and its specific applications to modern Europe; and Western and Soviet approaches to the escalation and limitation of war. Soviet perspectives on command and control as well as the Soviet view of war termination receive extended treatment in two chapters. Finally, Cimbala contrasts the orthodox view of mutual assured destruction with the strategic revisionism of defense dominance or mutual assured survival. He concludes that policymakers and military planners must recognize that nuclear weapons will almost certainly be a part of any war in Europe and that termination must focus on limiting the use of these weapons before the pressures of in the field escalation tendencies begin to work against the early conclusion of a conflict. Students and scholars of military policy will find Cimbala's work enlightening and provocative reading.

What are the causes of war? Wars are generally begun by a revisionist state seeking to take territory. The psychological root of revisionism is the yearning for glory, honor and power. Human nature is the primary cause of war, but political regimes can temper or intensify these passions. This book examines the effects of six types of regime on foreign policy: monarchy, republic and sultanistic, charismatic, and military and totalitarian dictatorship. Dictatorships encourage and unleash human ambition, and are thus the governments most likely to begin ill-considered wars. Classical realism, modified to incorporate the impact of regimes and beliefs, provides a more convincing explanation of war than neo-realism.

This book offers a fresh perspective on the impact of the US intervention in Lebanon in 1982 and the decision-making drivers that led the Reagan Administration into the Lebanese Civil War. Based on newly released archival materials from high level Washington officials such as President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, it argues that the failure of the Reagan Administration to accurately understand the complex political landscape of the Lebanese Civil War resulted in the US-led Multinational Force becoming militarily intertwined in the conflict. This book challenges the notion that Reagan deployed US Marines under the ideals of international peacekeeping, asserting that the US Administration hoped that the Multinational Force would create the political capital that Reagan needed to strengthen the US' position both in the Middle East and globally. Ultimately, the peacemakers were forced to withdraw as they evolved into antagonists. A case study in the foreign policy doctrines of key Washington decision-makers throughout the 1980s, this project is perfect for any International Relations scholar or interested reader seeking to understand the links between the mistakes of the Reagan Administration and contemporary US interventions in the Middle East.

During the Gulf war, news of the conflict was virtually harnessed by the American-led alliance. Yet, when U.S. soldiers moved on Somalia without resistance, their landing was lent a surreal quality by hordes of journalists filming their every maneuver. In this age of instant communication, wars are often defined by their coverage, as with Vietnam; yet the symbiosis between warriors and journalists has a long history.

War and the Media provides a sweeping overview of how the media has covered international conflicts in this century. Devoting each of the book's twelve chapters to a particular conflict, from the world wars to Vietnam, the Falklands, the Gulf War, and the Balkans, Miles Hudson and John Stanier here trace the evolution of the often contentious and always dramatic role of the media in twentieth-century military campaigns.

Lieutenant Henry O. Flipper was a former slave who rose to become the first African American graduate of West Point. While serving as commissary officer at Fort Davis, Texas, in 1881, he was charged with embezzlement and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. A court-martial board acquitted Flipper of the embezzlement charge but convicted him of conduct unbecoming. He was then dismissed from the service of the United States. The Flipper case became known as something of an American Dreyfus Affair, emblematic of racism in the frontier army. Because of Flipper's efforts to clear his name, many assumed that he had been railroaded because he was black.In The Fall of a Black Army Officer, Charles M. Robinson III challenges that assumption. In this complete revision of his earlier work, The Court-Martial of Lieutenant Henry Flipper, Robinson finds that Flipper was the author of his own problems. The taint of racism on the Flipper affair became so widely accepted that in 1999 President Bill Clinton issued a posthumous pardon for Flipper. The Fall of a Black Army Officer boldly moves the arguments regarding racism--in both Lt. Flipper's case and the frontier army in general--beyond political correctness. Solidly grounded in archival research, it is a thorough and provocative reassessment of the Flipper affair, at last revealing the truth.