While typically the victims of war, civilians are not necessarily passive recipients of violence. What options are available to civilians in times of war? This book suggests three broad strategies - flight, support, and voice. It focuses on three conflicts: Aceh, Indonesia; Patani, southern Thailand; and Mindanao, southern Philippines.

Italy emerged from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 with the feeling that it had been denied its just rewards by ungrateful allies and that its victory was thus mutilated. Integrating this vengefulness into his diplomacy in the 1920s, Mussolini undertook a policy of selected treaty revision aimed at the breakup of the newly created state of Yugoslavia through covert operations. These stratagems proved futile. Ignoring the threat posed by Nazi Germany's obvious determination to annex Austria, whose continued independence was key to Italy's security in Europe, Mussolini successfully invaded Ethiopia in October 1935, with only lukewarm opposition from France and Britain. Subsequently, in July 1936, he unwisely intervened on the side of the insurgent general Francisco Franco against the Republican government in Madrid. Instead of the expected speedy victory, Italy got bogged down in a prolonged civil war, which rendered Mussolini even more dependent on Nazi Germany. To preserve his standing in Berlin, he did not lift a finger when the Third Reich marched into Austria in 1938. Convinced of the growing decadence of the Western democracies, Mussolini turned to forge the Rome-Berlin Axis. But given Italy's military weakness, Mussolini was bound to be Hitler's junior partner. When the Duce talked of turning the Mediterranean Sea into an Italian lake in February 1939, he found himself trapped in Hitler's military iron cage. Parity in the Axis was the Duce's own peculiar myth. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Mussolini declared nonbelligerency since he was in no position to wage war. He intended to bide his time in order to see who would win or, in the event of a stalemate, to step in as a mediator. But when the Nazi steamroller crushed France, Mussolini felt he had only one option—war on the side of Germany. By tying himself to Hitler's war chariot, Mussolini sacrificed the national interests of his country and doomed his Fascist regime to ultimate destruction.

Artillery proved to be the greatest killer on the Western front in World War I, and the use and misuse of artillery was certainly a determining factor in the war DEGREESD's outcome. While many books explore the artillery forces and employment of the European powers, this is the first study to examine artillery employment in the American Expeditionary Force. Grotelueschen follows one AEF division through its entire World War I experience, from preliminary training to each of its battles in France. This approach allows for great investigative depth and an opportunity to explore the implementation of doctrinal changes throughout the war.

While accounts of the AEF written in the immediate aftermath of the war praised it as a great fighting machine, most scholars have concluded that the AEF was a flawed combat force. This study demonstrates that despite significant flaws and weaknesses, especially in artillery doctrine and employment, at least some AEF divisions did attain effective fighting ability. American divisions were most successful when carrying out limited, set-piece attacks, efforts that ran counter to approved US Army and AEF doctrine at the time. Historians will find this unique approach to the study of division level strengths and weaknesses to be useful in making more accurate and complete comparisons among the great armies of the Western Front.

Today's News Headlines: Military suicides rise to a record 349, topping number of troops killed in combat By Washington Post, January 14, 2013 Suicide Crisis Mounts For US Soldiers And Veterans, July 16, 2012 Home Headline News Topics in Brief: Substance Abuse among the Military, Veterans, and their Families National Institute on Drug Abuse, April 2011 One U.S. veteran attempts suicide every 80 minutes: Hidden tragedy of Afghanistan and Iraq wars Daily Mail Reporter 3 Nov. 2011 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The above headlines caught the attention of the media in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Since that time the suicide rate in the military continues to increase. A-bout-FACE. A TRUE story about Stephen Paul Campos. At the age of 19 he enlisted in the US Army as a combat infantry rifleman. From April 1968 to April 1969 he served one year tour of combat duty with the 199th. Light Infantry Brigade. Within just two weeks he and his platoon experience a "horrific" friendly-fire tragedy that shakes him to his core. Along with many other veterans he returned home with Post-traumatic stress syndrome unable to integrate fully back into society. Two decades later, on the verge of suicide, he was able to turn his life around. Mr. Campos shares his experiences in combat and struggles with PTSD while trying to transition back into civilian life. This story will bring to light the effects of post-war stress, drugs and alcohol abuse. Also, included are his personal Steps to Recovery. "You CAN Heal from the Demons of War" Gerald M. Korson - award winning journalist and editor

This account of the 1965 Dominican intervention is a case study in U.S. crisis management. Herbert Schoonmaker analyzes the role and management of U.S. military forces in the Dominican crisis. Like other Cold War interventions, the Dominican intervention demonstrated the use of rapidly reacting, joint military forces to achieve limited political objectives. It also represents a good vehicle for analyzing U.S. civilian-military relationships during this kind of military operation. At the same time the civil strife continued in Santo Domingo, U.S. military forces engaged in a variety of duties, both combat and peacekeeping, and did so while the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and U.S. government teams attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Such a complex environment, Schoonmaker argues, necessitated tight civilian control of the engaged armed forces and required restraint in carrying out their combat duties. In addition to the political-military factors, Schoonmaker also focuses on the joint army-navy-air aspects of the operation. He concentrates on the uniqueness of the intervention which makes the lessons learned from it applicable in some circumstances, but not in others. A study of the Dominican intervention is important because of its implications for defense needs and structure in a time of tight military budgets. The author also outlines the problems associated with quick-reacting forces and indicates the necessity for efficient intelligence, communications, logistics, and command and control. This book is must reading for military theoreticians and strategists, historians, and political scientists.

In the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire restored direct rule over Yemen, the resulting turmoil came to threaten the security of the entire Arabian Peninsula. This book describes the various military campaigns to regain control over Yemen, surveying the increased foreign encroachments by the British in the south and the Italians through the Red Sea, and the revolts of the Zaidi Imams and Isma'ili tribes. Using previously unknown archival material, this history of political rivalries and challenges confronting Ottoman Yemen in the 19th century should prove useful for scholars and students.

Julian Corbett wrote this treatise in 1911, but the principles upon which it is founded, notably that naval strategy should be seen as a means to an end, & that this end should be the effective use of sea lines of communication & the denial of same to the enemy, remain sound today.

Detailing the life and legacy of one of America's highest profile military commanders, this biography looks at how Ridgway maintained his corporatist ideals through the critical days of World War II and the Cold War. The qualities that Ridgway honed on the battlefields of Europe and Korea were the same that he would draw upon in more politicized jobs as NATO commander and US Army Chief of Staff, and in retirement as the leading military critic of American intervention in Vietnam. The global scope of Ridgway's involvement, in wartime and peacetime, from Europe to Latin American to the Far East, provides a unique opportunity to examine the policy and ideological issues of the day. Early chapters chronicle Ridgway's younger life and early postings from West Point to China to Sandino's Nicaragua, and his participation in various campaigns during World War II, from Sicily to Normandy to the Battle of the Bulge and on into Germany. Later chapters cover his work as a military diplomat under President Truman, including his work on arms control and the Inter-American Cooperation Act. Soffer then examines Ridgway's key role in the Korean War and his ability as a theater commander, and then considers his actions under President Eisenhower and beyond, as well as Ridgway's active support for Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. This work will prove valuable to students of military history and the Cold War.