Written by a team of leading international scholars, this crucial period of philosophy is examined from the novel perspective of themes and lines of thought which cut across authors, disciplines and national boundaries. This fresh approach will open up new ways for specialists and students to conceptualise the history of medieval and Renaissance thought within philosophy, politics, religious studies and literature. The essays cover concepts and topics that have become central in the continental tradition. They also bring major philosophers - Thomas Aquinas, Averroes, Maimonides and Duns Scotus - into conversation with those not usually considered canonical - Nicholas of Cusa, Marsilius of Padua, Gersonides and Moses Almosnino. Medieval and Renaissance thought is approached with contemporary continental philosophy in view, highlighting the continued richness and relevance of the work from this period.

Der vorliegende Husserliana-Band enthalt Texte zu "Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit" aus den Jahren von etwa 1893 bis 1912. Als erster Text kommen Teile aus Husserls Vorlesung des Wintersemesters 1904/05 "Hauptstucke aus der Phanomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis" zur Veroffentlichung, in denen Husserl gegenuber den Logischen Untersuchungen zu einer eigenstandigeren und wesentlich differenzierteren Untersuchung der Wahrnehmung ansetzt, die im Sinne einer Theorie bzw. Phanomenologie der Erfahrung - sozusagen einer Phanomenologie von unten - zunachst ganz unter Absehung von bedeutungstheoretischen oder logischen Fragestellungen entwickelt wird. Zur Vorbereitung dieser Vorlesung hat Husserl auf Abhandlungen zuruckgegriffen, die aus dem Jahr 1898 stammen und die vermutlich ursprunglich fur eine Fortsetzung der Logischen Untersuchungen vorgesehen waren. Diese Texte, in denen die Auseinandersetzung mit Franz Brentano und Carl Stumpf eine grosse Rolle spielt, werden in den Beilagen zur Vorlesung veroffentlicht. Des weiteren wird ein umfangreiches Forschungsmanuskript aus dem Jahr 1909 veroffentlicht, das Husserls Weg zu einem noematisch orientierten Wahrnehmungsbegriff dokumentiert. Aus dem Jahr 1912 stammt ein Text, der von Husserl als Ausarbeitung zu einer "Schrift uber Wahrnehmung" gedacht war. In einem aus dem gleichen Jahr stammenden Forschungsmanuskript setzt sich Husserl mit der Aufmerksamkeitsthematik unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Stellungnahme und ihrer moglichen Modifikation auseinander."

Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics has been a central part of the utilitarian canon since its publication in 1874. This book, part of the Oxford Guides to Philosophy series, is a concise companion to Sidgwick's masterpiece, written primarily to aid advanced undergraduate students and interested general readers in navigating and interpreting the original text. Author David Phillips connects Sidgwick's work to work in contemporary moral philosophy and in the history of moral philosophy, paying particular attention to his relationships with key predecessors, including Kant and Mill, and with Moore and Ross, his most influential successors in the British intuitionist tradition. The book's first eight chapters end with brief suggestions for further reading. At the end of the final three chapters there are more substantial overviews of the secondary literature on the aspects of Sidgwick's work that have generated the most interest among his commentators: metaethics and moral epistemology; consequentialism versus deontology; and egoism and the dualism of practical reason. The result is an Oxford Guide that will be a helpful resource for both students and scholars.A

This is an introduction the thought of Robert Holcot, a great and influential but often underappreciated medieval thinker. Holcot was a Dominican friar who flourished in the 1330s and produced a diverse body of work including scholastic treatises, biblical commentaries, and sermons. By viewing the whole of Holcot's corpus, this book provides a comprehensive account of his thought. Challenging established characterizations of him as a skeptic or radical, this book shows Holcot to be primarily concerned with affirming and supporting the faith of the pious believer. At times, this manifests itself as a cautious attitude toward absolutists' claims about the power of natural reason. At other times, Holcot reaffirms, in Anselmian fashion, the importance of rational effort in the attempt to understand and live out one's faith. Over the course of this introduction the authors unpack Holcot's views on faith and heresy, the divine nature and divine foreknowledge, the sacraments, Christ, and political philosophy. Likewise, they examine Holcot's approach to several important medieval literary genres, including the development of his unique "picture method," biblical commentaries, and sermons. In so doing, John Slotemaker and Jeffrey Witt restore Holcot to his rightful place as one of the most important thinkers of his time.

A milestone in the study of value in human life and thought, written by one of the world's preeminent living philosophers The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature is a philosophical investigation of the moral potentialities and sensibilities of human beings, of the meaning of human life, and of the place of death in life. It is an essay in philosophical anthropology: the study of the conceptual framework in terms of which we think about, speak about, and investigate homo sapiens as a social and cultural animal. This volume examines the diversity of values in human life and the place of moral value within the varieties of values. Its subject is the nature of good and evil and our propensity to virtue and vice. Acting as the culmination of five decades of reflection on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, and human nature, this volume: Concludes Hacker's acclaimed Human Nature tetralogy: Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature, and The Passions: A Study of Human Nature Discusses traditional ideas about ethical value and addresses misconceptions held by philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature is required reading philosophers of mind, ethicists, psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, and any general reader wanting to understand the nature of value and the place of ethics in human lives.

Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of inner sense. The thesis of intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy of mind, with special reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. Dorothea Frede suggests that this faculty is an 'embarrassment' for Aquinas; to the contrary, the analysis offered in this book argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas's philosophy of mind would be an embarrassment. By means of this faculty of inner sense, Aquinas offers an account of a direct awareness of individuals of natural kinds-referred to by Aquinas as incidental objects of sense-which comprise the principal ontological categories in Aquinas's metaphysics. By using this awareness of individuals of a natural kind, Aquinas can make better sense out of the process of abstraction using the active intellect (intellectus agens). Were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics.

Peter Adamson explores the rich intellectual history of the Byzantine Empire and the Italian Renaissance. Peter Adamson presents an engaging and wide-ranging introduction to the thinkers and movements of two great intellectual cultures: Byzantium and the Italian Renaissance. First he traces the development of philosophy in the Eastern Christian world, from such early figures as John of Damascus in the eighth century to the late Byzantine scholars of the fifteenth century. He introduces major figures like Michael Psellos, Anna Komnene, and Gregory Palamas, and examines the philosophical significance of such cultural phenomena as iconoclasm and conceptions of gender. We discover the little-known traditions of philosophy in Syriac, Armenian, and Georgian. These chapters also explore the scientific, political, and historical literature of Byzantium. There is a close connection to the second half of the book, since thinkers of the Greek East helped to spark the humanist movement in Italy. Adamson tells the story of the rebirth of philosophy in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. We encounter such famous names as Christine de Pizan, Niccolo Machiavelli, Giordano Bruno, and Galileo, but as always in this book series such major figures are read alongside contemporaries who are not so well known, including such fascinating figures as Lorenzo Valla, Girolamo Savonarola, and Bernardino Telesio. Major historical themes include the humanist engagement with ancient literature, the emergence of women humanists, the flowering of Republican government in Renaissance Italy, the continuation of Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy alongside humanism, and breakthroughs in science. All areas of philosophy, from theories of economics and aesthetics to accounts of the human mind, are featured. This is the sixth volume of Adamson's History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps, taking us to the threshold of the early modern era.

Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression addresses the impact of social conditions, especially subordinating conditions, on personal autonomy. The essays in this volume are concerned with the philosophical concept of autonomy or self-governance and with the impact on relational autonomy of the oppressive circumstances persons must navigate. They address on the one hand questions of the theoretical structure of personal autonomy given various kinds of social oppression, and on the other, how contexts of social oppression make autonomy difficult or impossible.

Peter Adamson presents a lively introduction to six hundred years of European philosophy, from the beginning of the ninth century to the end of the fourteenth century. The medieval period is one of the richest in the history of philosophy, yet one of the least widely known. Adamson introduces us to some of the greatest thinkers of the Western intellectual tradition, including Peter Abelard, Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Roger Bacon. And the medieval period was notable for the emergence of great women thinkers, including Hildegard of Bingen, Marguerite Porete, and Julian of Norwich. Original ideas and arguments were developed in every branch of philosophy during this period - not just philosophy of religion and theology, but metaphysics, philosophy of logic and language, moral and political theory, psychology, and the foundations of mathematics and natural science.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests that a moral principle 'does not immediately appear to the man who has been corrupted by pleasure or pain'. Phantasia in Aristotle's Ethics investigates his claim and its reception in ancient and medieval Aristotelian traditions, including Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin. While contemporary commentators on the Ethics have overlooked Aristotle's remark, his ancient and medieval interpreters made substantial contributions towards a clarification of the claim's meaning and relevance. Even when the hazards of transmission have left no explicit comments on this particular passage, as is the case in the Arabic tradition, medieval responders still offer valuable interpretations of phantasia (appearance) and its role in ethical deliberation and action. This volume casts light on these readings, showing how the distant voices from the medieval Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Aristotelian traditions still contribute to contemporary debate concerning phantasia, motivation and deliberation in Aristotle's Ethics.

Augustine's Confessions is one of the most significant works of Western culture. Cast as a long, impassioned conversation with God, it is intertwined with passages of life-narrative and with key theological and philosophical insights. It is enduringly popular, and justly so. The Routledge Guidebook to Augustine's Confessions is an engaging introduction to this spiritually creative and intellectually original work. This guidebook is organized by themes: the importance of language creation and the sensible world memory, time and the self the afterlife of the Confessions. Written for readers approaching the Confessions for the first time, this guidebook addresses the literary, philosophical, historical and theological complexities of the work in a clear and accessible way. Excerpts in both Latin and English from this seminal work are included throughout the book to provide a close examination of both the autobiographical and theoretical content within the Confessions.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy showcases the best scholarly research in this flourishing field. The series covers all aspects of medieval philosophy, including the Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew traditions, and runs from the end of antiquity into the Renaissance. It publishes new work by leading scholars in the field, and combines historical scholarship with philosophical acuteness. The papers will address a wide range of topics, from political philosophy to ethics, and logic to metaphysics. OSMP is an essential resource for anyone working in the area.

In seventeenth-century philosophy the mind-body problem and the nature of personal immortality were two of the most controversial and sensitive issues. Nicholas Jolley seeks to show that these issues are more prominent in Locke's philosophy than has been realized. He argues further that Locke takes up unorthodox positions in both cases. Although Locke's official stance on the mind-body problem is agnostic, in places he presents arguments that, taken together, amount to a significant case for a weak form of materialism. Locke also seeks to show that the solution to the mind-body problem is irrelevant to the issue of personal immortality: for Locke, such immortality is conceptually possible even if the same body is not resurrected at the Day of Judgment. Jolley throws new light on such central topics in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding as substance and personal identity: he also pays close attention to such neglected topics as his account of the status of animals and his polemic against the thesis that the mind always thinks. Throughout, the book examines Locke's arguments against the background of Descartes' views. Jolley argues that Locke's criticisms of Descartes are no mere defences of common sense against dogmatism; rather, they are controversial responses to some of the most challenging metaphysical and theological issues of his time.

Graciela De Pierris presents a novel interpretation of the relationship between skepticism and naturalism in Hume's epistemology, and a new appraisal of Hume's place within early modern thought. Whereas a dominant trend in recent Hume scholarship maintains that there are no skeptical arguments concerning causation and induction in Book I, Part III of the Treatise, Graciela De Pierris presents a detailed reading of the skeptical argument she finds there and how this argument initiates a train of skeptical reasoning that begins in Part III and culminates in Part IV. This reasoning is framed by Hume's version of the modern theory of ideas developed by Descartes and Locke. The skeptical implications of this theory, however, do not arise, as in traditional interpretations of Hume's skepticism, from the 'veil of perception.' They arise from Hume's elaboration of a presentational-phenomenological model of ultimate evidence, according to which there is always a justificatory gap between what is or has been immediately presented to the mind and any ideas that go beyond it. This happens, paradigmatically, in the causal-inductive inference, and, as De Pierris argues, in demonstrative inference as well. Yet, in spite of his firm commitment to radical skepticism, Hume also accepts the naturalistic standpoint of science and common life, and he does so, on the novel interpretation presented here, because of an equally firm commitment to Newtonian science in general and the Newtonian inductive method in particular. Hume defends the Newtonian method (against the mechanical philosophy) while simultaneously rejecting all attempts (including those of the Newtonians) to find a place for the supernatural within our understanding of nature.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy showcases the best scholarly research in this flourishing field. The series covers all aspects of medieval philosophy, including the Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew traditions, and runs from the end of antiquity into the Renaissance. It publishes new work by leading scholars in the field, and combines historical scholarship with philosophical acuteness. The papers will address a wide range of topics, from political philosophy to ethics, and logic to metaphysics. OSMP is an essential resource for anyone working in the area.

Thomas Aquinas is widely recognized as one of history's most significant Christian theologians and one of the most powerful philosophical minds of the western tradition. But what has often not been sufficiently attended to is the fact that he carried out his theological and philosophical labours as a part of his vocation as a Dominican friar, dedicated to a life of preaching and the care of souls. Fererick Christian Bauerschmidt places Aquinas's thought within the context of that vocation, and argues that his views on issues of God, creation, Christology, soteriology, and the Christian life are both shaped by and in service to the distinctive goals of the Dominicans. What Aquinas says concerning both matters of faith and matters of reason, as well as his understanding of the relationship between the two, are illuminated by the particular Dominican call to serve God through handing on to others through preaching and teaching the fruits of one's own theological reflection.

For nearly four centuries, when logic was the heart of what we now call the 'undergraduate curriculum', Peter of Spain's Summaries of Logic (c. 1230) was the basis for teaching that subject. Because Peter's students were teenagers, he wrote simply and organized his book carefully. Since no book about logic was read by more people until the twentieth century, the Summaries has extensively and profoundly influenced the distinctly Western way of speaking formally and writing formal prose by constructing well-formed sentences, making valid arguments, and refuting and defending arguments in debate. Some books, like the Authorized Version of the English Bible and the collected plays of Shakespeare, have been more influential in the Anglophone world than Peter's Summaries-but not many. This new English translation, based on an update of the Latin text of Lambertus De Rijk, comes with an extensive introduction that deals with authorship, dating, and the place of the Summaries in the development of logic, before providing a chapter-by-chapter analysis of Peter's book, followed by an analysis of his system from the point of view of modern logic. The Latin text is presented on facing pages with the English translation, accompanied by notes, and the book includes a full bibliography.

Descartes and the First Cartesians adopts the perspective that we should not approach Rene Descartes as a solitary thinker, but as a philosopher who constructs a dialogue with his contemporaries, so as to engage them and elements of his society into his philosophical enterprise. Roger Ariew argues that an important aspect of this engagement concerns the endeavor to establish Cartesian philosophy in the Schools, that is, to replace Aristotle as the authority there. Descartes wrote the Principles of Philosophy as something of a rival to Scholastic textbooks, initially conceiving the project as a comparison of his philosophy and that of the Scholastics. Still, what Descartes produced was inadequate for the task. The topics of Scholastic textbooks ranged more broadly than those of Descartes; they usually had quadripartite arrangements mirroring the structure of the collegiate curriculum, divided as they typically were into logic, ethics, physics, and metaphysics. But Descartes produced at best only what could be called a general metaphysics and a partial physics. These deficiencies in the Cartesian program and in its aspiration to replace Scholastic philosophy in the schools caused the Cartesians to rush in to fill the voids. The attempt to publish a Cartesian textbook that would mirror what was taught in the schools began in the 1650s with Jacques Du Roure and culminated in the 1690s with Pierre-Sylvain Regis and Antoine Le Grand. Ariew's original account thus considers the reception of Descartes' work, and establishes the significance of his philosophical enterprise in relation to the textbooks of the first Cartesians and in contrast with late Scholastic textbooks.

Richard Cross provides the first complete and detailed account of Duns Scotus's theory of cognition, tracing the processes involved in cognition from sensation, through intuition and abstraction, to conceptual thought. He provides an analysis of the ontological status of the various mental items (acts and dispositions) involved in cognition, and a new account of Scotus on nature of conceptual content. Cross goes on to offer a novel, reductionist, interpretation of Scotus's view of the ontological status of representational content, as well as new accounts of Scotus's opinions on intuitive cognition, intelligible species, and the varieties of consciousness. Scotus was a perceptive but highly critical reader of his intellectual forebears, and this volume places his thought clearly within the context of thirteenth-century reflections on cognitive psychology, influenced as they were by Aristotle, Augustine, and Avicenna. As far as possible, Duns Scotus's Theory of Cognition traces developments in Scotus's thought during the ten or so highly productive years that formed the bulk of his intellectual life.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy showcases the best scholarly research in this flourishing field. The series covers all aspects of medieval philosophy, including the Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew traditions, and runs from the end of antiquity into the Renaissance. It publishes new work by leading scholars in the field, and combines historical scholarship with philosophical acuteness. The papers will address a wide range of topics, from political philosophy to ethics, and logic to metaphysics. OSMP is an essential resource for anyone working in the area.

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy showcases the best scholarly research in this flourishing field. The series covers all aspects of medieval philosophy, including the Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew traditions, and runs from the end of antiquity into the Renaissance. It publishes new work by leading scholars in the field, and combines historical scholarship with philosophical acuteness. The papers will address a wide range of topics, from political philosophy to ethics, and logic to metaphysics. OSMP is an essential resource for anyone working in the area.

Was man in der alteuropaischen Metaphysik "das Wesen" des Menschen genannt hat, ist historisch zugrunde gegangen. Die Spezifik des Menschen wurde in seiner dualistischen Aufspaltung, entweder Seele oder Korper zu sein, und in seiner monistischen Auflosung, ganz Natur oder Geist zu sein, verfehlt. Gleichwohl sind wir alle in unserem Common sense praktisch der Frage ausgesetzt, wie wir die naturlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Aspekte unserer Existenz in der Fuhrung eines menschlichen Lebens sinnvoll berucksichtigen konnen. Die neuen Reproduktions-, Umwelt-, Kommunikations- und Sozialtechnologien werfen taglich die Frage auf, was es heisst, als vergleichbare Person und als Individuum ein menschliches Leben zu fuhren. Die "Philosophische Anthropologie" (Helmuth Plessner) hat die Spezifik menschlicher Phanomene naturphilosophisch als eine Besonderheit im Spielverhalten hoherer Saugetiere erschlossen. Im Spielen kann Verhalten von seinem ursprunglichen Antrieb abgelost und an einen neuen Antrieb gebunden werden. Dies gelingt seitens des Organismus um so besser, je ruckbezuglicher seine zentrische Form (Gehirn) der Selbstreproduktion wird. Dadurch entsteht aber eine Ambivalenz in den Zentrierungsrichtungen des Verhaltens, namlich spontan aus der leiblichen Funktionsmitte des Organismus heraus oder von den korperlich moglichen Funktionsmitten der Umwelt her. Diese Ambivalenz bedarf zur Stutzung entsprechender soziokultureller Losungsformen, in denen sie lebbar verschrankt werden kann. Wer wie z. B. Kinder spielt, lebt in der Differenz, sein Verhalten verkorpern (von einem Zentrum ausserhalb des eigenen Leibes her koordinieren) und verleiblichen (auf seinen eigenen unvertretbaren Leib hin zentrieren) konnen zu mussen. Die (kategorische) Not solcher Lebewesen, ihre beiden Zentrierungsrichtungen ausbalancieren zu mussen, kann aber auf kontingente Weise (konjunktivisch) befriedigt werden. Dieser "Kategorische Konjunktiv" (Plessner) der Lebensfuhrung macht Menschen einer geschichtlich zu erringenden soziokulturellen Natur bedurftig. Im ersten des auf zwei Bande konzipierten Werks wird Plessners "Kategorischer Konjunktiv" als ein Spektrum menschlicher Phanomene vorgefuhrt, in denen sich unsere verschiedenen leiblichen und korperlichen Sinne zu einer Funktionseinheit verschranken. Der Zusammenhang unserer Sinne ergibt sich daraus, dass jeder Mensch lebensgeschichtlich eine soziokulturelle Elementarrolle spielt. Dank dieser kann man sich personalisieren (vergleichbar werden) und im Unterschied zu ihr individualisieren. Das Schauspielen der Rolle gerinnt in Ausdrucks-, Handlungs- und Sprachformen, unter denen die westliche Modernisierung hochst einseitig solche der Selbstbeherrschung durch Selbstbewusstsein ausgezeichnet hat. Das Ausspielen der Rolle findet aber seine Verhaltensgrenzen in Phanomenen ungespielten Lachens und Weinens, in denen die Zuordnung zwischen Individuum und Person nicht mehr gelingt. Das Eingespieltsein zwischen sich als Person und Individuum kann im ungespielten Lachen zu mehrsinnig oder im ungespielten Weinen sinnlos werden. Die soziolkulturell zu bestimmter Zeit anerkannten Rollen werden aber individuell durch Suchte und Leidenschaften und geschichtlich durch kulturelle Entfremdung der Nachwachsenden und gesellschaftliche Offnung der Gemeinschaftsformen wieder aus der Balance gebracht. Daraus resultiert das Problem der geschichtlichen Selbstermachtigung von Individuen und Generationen. Plessners neue Konzeption souveraner Formen von Macht, die aus der Relation zur eigenen Unbestimmtheit zu gewinnen sind, und im Hinblick auf die moderne Emanzipation der Macht fur plurale Gesellschaften als Minima moralia erortert. In den Verhaltensgrenzen des angespielten Lachen und Weinens werden wir uns unbestimmt. Wer diese Grenzen uberschreitet, begeht der Moglichkeit nach Unmenschliches."