'Callaghan's portrayal of a city under siege is many-layered and brilliantly told' Sunday Times Iraq, 2014As ISIS laid terrible siege to Mosul, a zoo on the eastern edge of the Tigris was kept open against all odds. Under the stern hand of the zookeeper Abu Laith, whose name - loosely translated - means Father of Lions, its animals faced not only years of occupation, but starvation and bombardment by the liberating forces. Father of Lions is the story of Mosul Zoo: of resilience and human decency in the midst of barbarism. 'Father of Lions captures, with heartbreaking poignancy, the human cost of these conflicts' Josie Ensor, Middle East Correspondent for the Daily Telegraphy 'Through the story of a man who loves both lions and life, Louise Callaghan shows how humour and defiance can counter cruelty' Lindsey Hilsum, author of In Extremis

Accounts of the relationships between states and terrorist organizations in the Cold War era have long been shaped by speculation, a lack of primary sources and even conspiracy theories. In the last few years, however, things have evolved rapidly. Using a wide range of case studies including the KGB's Abduction Program, Polish Military Intelligence and North Korea's 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism', this book sheds new light on the relations between state and terrorist actors, allowing for a fresh and much more insightful assessment of the contacts, dealings, agreements and collusion with terrorist organizations undertaken by state actors on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This book presents the current state of research and provides an assessment of the nature, motives, effects, and major historical shifts of the relations between individual states and terrorist organizations. The articles collected demonstrate that these state-terrorism relationships were not only much more ambiguous than much of the older literature had suggested but are, in fact, crucial for the understanding of global political history in the Cold War era.

Over the past 25 years, the United States government has developed, through trial and error, both an understanding of terrorism and the means to deal with it. Using information collected in interviews with key decisionmakers from the Nixon to the Clinton administrations, David Tucker draws both strategic and tactical lessons from the United States' encounters with various terrorist groups. These lessons can be usefully applied to future counterterrorism efforts, as well as to other aspects of national security policy in a post-Cold War world where major conflicts will continue to be played out in numerous small struggles. This study will be must-reading for scholars and professionals in international relations, foreign policy, and military/political affairs.

A primer to terrorist financing and resourcing, this book examines what terrorist organizations must acquire in order to survive and operate, and describes the various means used to meet these needs. It observes how terrorism financing and resourcing has evolved since the beginning of the Age of Modern Terrorism and develops a seven category typology of terrorist resourcing based on how each selected strategy affects a group's operational autonomy. To illustrate this typology, case studies for each category are provided, based on actual examples drawn from the history of terrorism.

During the past decade, we have witnessed a dramatic transformation in the nature and uses of terrorism. In the 70s, it was often repeated that terrorists "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead"; today, it is more accurate to say that terrorists want a lot of people dead, and even more people crippled by fear and grief. A major strategic intent of modern terrorists is to use larger scale physical attacks to cause stress in the general population. These changes in terrorist strategy have made it clear that we need better psychological and social responses to terrorism and man-made disasters. The psychological science needed to provide proper and effective treatment for victims of horrendous events, such as September 11th, and future potential terrorist acts, simply does not exist, so military, medical, and psychological experts must work together to improve their understanding of mass casualty terrorism.
In Psychology of Terrorism leading national and international experts present the first results of this effort, including the newest findings on treatment of and clinical responses to terrorism along with their respective underlying theories. They address the history of terrorism; types and effects of weapons of mass destruction or disruption; the role of the military, government agencies, and volunteer groups in responding to terrorist threats; psychological consequences of terrorism; and treatment of special populations such as children and older adults.
This volume will be an ideal text for both academic and professional courses as well as a comprehensive resource for mental health clinicians and researchers, medical care providers, educators, public healthspecialists, government employees, police and fire departments, and non-profit agencies that provide services and craft policy.

This comparative study of terrorism and counter-measures and their effect upon democratic practices and traditions is published under the auspices of the University of New Brunswick Centre for Conflict Studies in Canada. David A. Charters, Editor, has brought together a team of well-known experts to assess the nature of international terrorism in recent years and the possible effect of anti-terrorist policies and counter-measures upon democratic processes and civil liberties in Britain, Germany, Israel, Italy, France, and the United States. Their findings challenge current notions about terrorism and its consequences. A selected bibliography points to some of the most important sources of information on terrorism today.

Wittig presents the first unified, coherent framework for the systematic analysis of terrorist finance. With empirical examples from around the globe, he dispels several popular myths about these activities to make an important step forward in our understanding of not only terrorist finance, but also the place of terrorism in the contemporary world.

This book is about the role of negotiation in resolving terrorist barricade hostage crises. What lessons can be learned from past deadly incidents so that crisis negotiators and decision makers can act with greater effectiveness in the future? What are the lessons the terrorists are learning and how will they affect the dynamics of future incidents? What can we learn about the terrorist threat, and about preventing the escalation of future terrorist hostage-taking situations? While there are many trained crisis negotiators around the world, almost none of them has ever had contact with a terrorist hostage-taking incident. Further, the entire training program of most hostage negotiators focuses on resolving crises that do not take into consideration issues such as ideology, religion, or the differing sets of strategic objectives and mindsets of ideological hostage takers. This is especially true with regard to the terrorists of the "new" breed, who have become less discriminate, more lethal, and more willing to execute hostages and die during the incident. Further, many of the paradigms and presumptions upon which the contemporary practice of crisis negotiation is based do not reflect the reality of the "new terrorists." The main focus of this book is on the detailed reconstruction and analysis of the two most high-profile cases in recent years, the Moscow theater and the Beslan school hostage crises, with a clear purpose of drawing lessons for hostage negotiation strategies in the future. This is an issue of top priority. Terrorist manuals from countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq reveal that terrorist organizations are very closely observing and analyzing the lessons learned fromthese two incidents, suggesting that we are likely to see this type of "new" terrorist hostage taking involving large numbers of suicide fighters and executions of hostages at some point in the future. This raises a wide array of questions about appropriate responses and negotiation strategies. From the first glance, it is clear that we are not prepared.

Why was there a deliberate plan to fight the war in Iraq but none to win the peace? This question, which has caused such confusion and consternation among the American public and been the subject of much political wrangling over the past two years, is the focus of Lt. Col. Isaiah Wilson's investigation. Director of the American politics, policy, and strategy program at West Point, Wilson points to a flaw in the government's definition of when, how, and for what reasons the United States intervenes abroad. It is a paradox in the American way of peace and war, he explains, that harkens back to America's war loss in Vietnam. The dilemma we face today in Iraq, the author says, is the result of a flaw in how we have viewed the war from its inception, and Wilson reminds us that Iraq is just the latest, albeit the most poignant and tragic, case in point. His exploration of this paradox calls for new organizational and operational approaches to America's intervention policy. In challenging current western societal military lexicon and doctrine, Wilson offers new hope and practical solutions to overcome the paradox once and for all.

First published in 1977 in the US and Britain to universal critical acclaim, Hitler's Children quickly became a world-wide best seller, translated into many other languages, including Japanese.

It tells the story of the West German terrorists who emerged out of the 'New Left' student protest movement of the late 1960s. With bombs and bullets they started killing in the name of 'peace'. Almost all of them came from prosperous, educated families. They were 'Hitler's children' not only in that they had been born in or immediately after the Nazi period - some of their parents having been members of the Nazi party - but also because they were as fiercely against individual freedom as the Nazis were. Their declared ideology was Communism. They were beneficiaries of both American aid and the West German economic miracle. Despising their immeasurable gifts of prosperity and freedom, they 'identified' themselves with Third World victims of wars, poverty and oppression, whose plight they blamed on 'Western imperialism'. In reality, their terrorist activity was for no better cause than self-expression.

Their dreams of leading a revolution were ended when one after another of them died in shoot-outs with the police, or was blown up with his own bomb, or was arrested, tried, and condemned to long terms of imprisonment. All four leaders of the Red Army Faction (dubbed 'the Baader-Meinhof gang' by journalists) committed suicide in prison.

'Gripping ... A terrific action narrative' Max Hastings 'Reads like a Tom Clancy thriller, yet every word is true ... This is modern warfare close-up and raw' Andrew Roberts Bestselling and Orwell Prize-winning author Toby Harnden tells the gripping and incredible story of the six-day battle that began the War in Afghanistan and how it set the scene for twenty years of conflict. The West is in shock. Al-Qaeda has struck the US on 9/11 and thousands are dead. Within weeks, UK Special Forces enter the fray in Afghanistan alongside the CIA's Team Alpha and US troops. Victory is swift, but fragile. Hundreds of jihadists surrender and two operatives from Team Alpha enter Qala-i Jangi - the 'Fort of War' - to interrogate them. The prisoners revolt, one CIA man falls, and the other is trapped inside the fort. Seven members of the SBS - elite British Special Forces - volunteer for the rescue force and race into danger and the unknown. The six-day battle that follows proves to be one of the bloodiest of the Afghanistan war as the SBS and their American comrades face an enemy determined to die in the mud citadel. Superbly researched, First Casualty is based on unprecedented access to the CIA, SBS, and US Special Forces. Orwell Prize-winning author Toby Harnden recounts the gripping story of that first battle in Afghanistan and how the haunting foretelling it contained - unreliable allies, ethnic rivalries, suicide attacks, and errant bombs - was ignored, fueling the twenty-year conflict to come.

In An introduction to political crime, Jeffrey Ian Ross provides the most comprehensive and contemporary analysis of political crime addressing both violent and nonviolent crimes committed by and against the state (e.g. political corruption, illegal domestic surveillance, and human rights violations) in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and other advanced industrialized democracies since the 1960s. Written by a respected social scientist, this book reviews appropriate theories of political crime and explains numerous definitional and conceptual issues, causes of political crimes, ways to control it, and effects of different types of political crime. Ross integrates new scholarship on state crime, and post 9/11 developments in both scholarship and current affairs and uses numerous examples to help readers understand the issues. The book is supported by a companion website, containing additional materials for both students and lecturers, which is available from the link above.

After 9/11, the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has intruded into an already complex security environment in the Malay archipelago, home to the world's largest population of Muslims, with the potential to catalyze or unleash further dynamics that could destabilize the region. This book argues that, given the existence of a discrete Malay archipelago security complex, with its security linkages and interactive dynamics, it is a fallacy for the United States to approach this region primarily through the prism of global counter-terrorism. Instead, any strategic policy towards the region needs to be founded upon a deep appreciation of the existing Malay archipelago security complex.

Marianne Wade and Almir Maljevi? Although the worries about terrorism paled in comparison to the economic crisis as a topic during the last US election, one can find plenty of grounds to assume that they remain issue number one in the minds of politicians in Europe. As the German houses of Parliament prepare to call in the mediation committee in the discussion of legislation which would provide the Federal Police - thus far mandated purely with the post-facto investigation of crime - with powers to act to prevent acts of terrorism, Spain's struggle with ETA and the British Government licks its wounds after a resounding defeat of its latest anti-terrorist proposals by the House of Lords, one cannot but wonder whether post 9/11, the Europeans are not even more concerned with terrorism than their US counterparts. A look at media reports, legislative and judicial activities in either Britain or Germany clearly underlines that those two countries are deeply embroiled in anti-terrorist activity. Can it be that Europe is embroiled in the "War on Terror"; constantly providing for new arms in this conflict? Or is it a refusal to participate in the "War on Terror" that fuels a constant need for Parliaments to grapple with the subject; begrudgingly conceding one increasingly draconian measure after the other? The question as to where Europe stands in the "War on Terror" is a fascinating one, but one, which is difficult to answer.

Religious terrorism has become the scourge of the modern world. What causes a person to kill innocent strangers in the name of religion? As both a clinical psychologist and an authority on comparative religion, James W. Jones is uniquely qualified to address this increasingly urgent question. Research on the psychology of violence shows that several factors work to make ordinary people turn "evil." These include feelings of humiliation or shame, a tendency to see the world in black and white, and demonization or dehumanization of other people. Authoritarian religion or "fundamentalism," Jones shows, is a particularly rich source of such ideas and feelings, which he finds throughout the writings of Islamic jihadists, such as the 9/11 conspirators.
Jones goes on to apply this model to two very different religious groups that have engaged in violence: Aum Shinrikyo, the Buddhist splinter group behind the sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system, and members of the extreme religious right in the U.S. who have advocated and committed violence against abortion providers. Jones notes that not every adherent of an authoritarian group will turn to violence, and he shows how theories of personality development can explain why certain individuals are easily recruited to perform terrorist acts.

Nuclear Insecurity is an insider's account of official American efforts to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear and radiological weapons that could be used by rogue nations or terrorist groups. This perspective draws heavily from the author's work on the White House National Security Council Staff (1996-2000), where he was directly responsible to President Clinton for the development of U.S. nuclear material security policies and, subsequently, at the U.S. Department of Energy, where he directed the department's largest international nuclear security program, focused primarily on Russia. In Caravelli's assessment, despite exceptional bipartisan political support and very high funding levels that have reached over $9 billion, a series of policy mistakes and programmatic bureaucratic missteps have badly compromised the United States government's efforts to protect against the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. The most striking example of the current situation is that the U.S. government, some 12 years after the start of these programs, still has failed to enhance the security of more than 300 metric tons of nuclear materials in Russia alone, enough to make hundreds of nuclear devices. The book concludes with recommendations and policy prescriptions for addressing some of these problems.

From wiretapping American citizens to waterboarding foreign prisoners, the Bush administration has triggered an uproar over its tactics in the War on Terror-and over its justifications for using them. Through a close study of the legal advice provided to President Bush, former Justice Department attorney Harold Bruff provides an incisive and scathing critique of those justifications, which he finds at odds with both American law and moral authority.

Bruff rigorously examines legal opinions regarding NSA surveillance, the indefinite detention of terror suspects, the denial of Geneva Convention protection, trial by military commissions, and suspect interrogation techniques. He shows that Bush's claims of executive power exceed anything found in U.S. history or judicial precedent, that clear statutory limitations were treated with contempt, and that Bush and his lawyers strove to exclude both congressional and judicial participation in setting antiterrorist policy.

Bruff dissects the legal underpinnings employed by John Yoo, David Addington, Alberto Gonzales, and others to defend an inflated view of presidential power, showing how they combined ideology, policy advocacy, and selective readings of legal precedent to bolster executive actions. Most important, he brings into sharp focus legitimate counterarguments from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Office of Legal Counsel that challenged or refuted these legally suspect views and yet were largely ignored or even ridiculed by the president's advisers. Offering contrasts with the legal advice provided previous presidents, he also reviews the fundamental constitutional limits on executive action and the principles of professional responsibility that govern lawyers when they counsel government clients.

As Bruff observes, bad advice to presidents is never in short supply, but legal advice should be objective and reliable. His book points up the urgent need for advisers to serve both the president and the nation by finding a middle ground between limiting presidential power and allowing it the flexibility it needs to respond to crises. Both highly readable and authoritative, it is a must for legal scholars and an eye-opener for every citizen concerned with preserving our nation's commitment to the rule of law.

Since 2001, the United States has created or reorganized more than two counterterrorism organizations for every terrorist arrest or apprehension it has made of people plotting to do damage within the country. Central to this massive enterprise is 'ghost-chasing,' as less than one alarm in 10,000 is an actual threat-the rest all point to ghosts. And the vast majority of the leads deemed to be productive have led to terrorist enterprises that were either trivial or at most aspirational. As John Mueller and Mark Stewart suggest in Chasing Ghosts, this is often an exercise in dueling delusions: a Muslim hothead has delusions about changing the world by blowing something up, and the authorities have delusions that he might actually be able to overcome his patent inadequacies to do so. Mueller and Stewart systematically examine this expensive, exhausting, bewildering, chaotic, and paranoia-inducing process. They evaluate the counterterrorism efforts of the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, and local policing agencies. In addition, applying a new set of case studies, they appraise the capacities of the terrorist 'adversary' and discuss what they calls 'the myth of the mastermind.' They also assess public opinion, a key driving force for counterterrorism efforts. The yearly chance an American will be killed by a terrorist within the country is about one in four million under present conditions. However, polling data suggest that, although over a trillion dollars has been spent on domestic counterterrorism since 2001, Americans continue to be alarmed and say they do not feel safer. No defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly effective as long as officials and the population at large continue to believe that the threat from terrorism is massive, even existential. Mueller and Stewart do not argue that there is nothing for the ghost-chasers to find-the terrorist 'adversary' is real and does exist. The question that is central to the exercise, but one the ghost-chasers never really probe, is an important and rather straight-forward one to which standard evaluative procedures can be applied: is the chase worth the effort? Or is it excessive given a serious consideration of the danger that terrorism actually presents?

This book provides a concise introduction to the increasingly important field of forensic mental health. It aims to set out both the key concepts in forensic mental health as well as the way the discipline operates in the broader context of criminal justice and mental health care systems. It will provide an ideal introduction to the subject for students taking courses in universities and elsewhere, for mental health practitioners in the early stages of their careers, and for professionals from other agencies needing an informed and up-to-date account of forensic mental health.

According to a British intelligence report leaked to the press in 2007, al Qaeda operatives are planning a large-scale attack "on par with Hiroshima and Nagasaki." How likely is it that terrorists will develop the capability of such an attack? No one understands the nature of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism better than Brian Michael Jenkins--one of the world's most renowned experts on terrorism. For more than thirty years, he has been advising the military, government, and prestigious think tanks on the dangers of escalating terrorism.
Jenkins goes beyond what the experts know about terrorists' efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear black markets, "suitcase bombs," and mysterious substances like red mercury to examine how terrorists themselves think about such weapons. He offers many insights into such vital questions as:
- Do terrorists see nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion or of pure destruction? - Are those we label religious fanatics constrained by political and strategic calculations?
- If a nuclear attack took place on American soil, what life-and-death decisions would the president be forced to make? He puts the reader in the position of the president to convey the immediacy of making decisions--and the perilous repercussions of each critical decision.
Jenkins notes that terrorists have become increasingly adept at creating an atmosphere of nuclear terror. In fact, al Qaeda may have succeeded in becoming the world's first terrorist nuclear power without possessing a single nuclear weapon. The psychological effects of nuclear terror are fueled by American culture, which churns out novels and movies in which every conceivable horror scenario is played out. Political factions on both the right and the left also view nuclear terrorism as fodder to support their own arguments. In such an atmosphere, it is difficult for the average citizen to separate real from imagined dangers. Jenkins's informed and seasoned analysis will give all Americans a levelheaded understanding of the real situation and teach us how not to yield to nuclear terror.

Northern Ireland's Belfast Agreement has faced continual crises of implementation over a variety of security related issues. Too frequently analyses have neglected to study the wider changes that have occurred inside and outside Northern Ireland. These have had profound effects in changing attitudes towards violence, paramilitaries, the position of women and ideas of nationalism and sovereignty. This book places the implementation of the Belfast Agreement in a wider context to provide an analysis of why implementation has been so difficult.

Suicide bombers are often compared to "smart bombs." From the point of view of their dispatchers, they are highly effective, inexpensive forms of weaponry, and there is no need to invest in their technological development. Suicide bombers are in fact smarter than smart bombs because they can choose their own target--and they can react to circumstances on the ground, changing their target, or their timing, in an instant, to ensure the maximum damage, destruction, and death. Of course, unlike smart bombs, suicide bombers think and feel, they have histories, stories, beliefs, desires--in short, they have an inner world. Exploring the inner world of suicide bombers has been the focus of Anat Berko's research for years. She has worked to understand the thought processes of a people who can choose to place explosives on their bodies and kill themselves, taking as many other people with them as they can. Do male bombers really believe that death will transport them to a paradise where they will be greeted by virgins? Are they victims of unbearable pressure to commit this act of terror? What are female bombers promised in the hereafter? Is there something that links all suicide bombers? Berko also explores the world of those who "drop the smart bomb"--the dispatchers: who are these people who persuade others to go calmly to their horrific deaths? To learn about the inner world of suicide bombers and their dispatchers, Berko entered Israel's most heavily secured prison cells and conducted intensive and extensive interviews with male and female suicide bombers who had failed their missions, as well as with their dispatchers--including former Hamas spiritual and operative leader Sheikh AhmedYassin (later assassinated by Israel).

Women and Terrorism analyses a new phenomenon of international concern: the participation of women in subversive terrorist movements. The book deals with four main issues: 1) women's participation in violent terrorist movements to discover the key to the psychological and sociological interpretation of their involvement in a life experience they are not traditionally associated with; 2) the different responses to 'penitentism' between men and women; 3) the psychological and social interpretation of women's support of armed struggle and an inquiry - through the personal experience of the women terrorists interviewed - into the reasons for women's greater resistance to repentance; 4) the use of the leads this inquiry has furnished for prognostic purposes and to predict and create conditions that facilitate repentance.