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Books > Philosophy > Western philosophy > General
Charting a genealogy of the modern idea of the self, Felix O
Murchadha explores the accounts of self-identity expounded by key
Early Modern philosophers, Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza,
Hume and Kant. The question of the self as we would discuss it
today only came to the forefront of philosophical concern with
Modernity, beginning with an appeal to the inherited models of the
self found in Stoicism, Scepticism, Augustinianism and Pelagianism,
before continuing to develop as a subject of philosophical debate.
Exploring this trajectory, The Formation of the Modern Self pursues
a number of themes central to the Early Modern development of
selfhood, including, amongst others, grace and passion. It examines
on the one hand the deep-rooted dependence on the divine and the
longing for happiness and salvation and, on the other hand, the
distancing from the Stoic ideal of apatheia, as philosophers from
Descartes to Spinoza recognised the passions as essential to human
agency. Fundamental to the new question of the self was the
relation of faith and reason. Uncovering commonalities and
differences amongst Early Modern philosophers, O Murchadha traces
how the voluntarism of Modernity led to the sceptical approach to
the self in Montaigne and Hume and how this sceptical strand, in
turn, culminated in Kant's rational faith. More than a history of
the self in philosophy, The Formation of the Modern Self inspires a
fresh look at self-identity, uncovering not only how our modern
idea of selfhood developed but just how embedded the concept of
self is in external considerations: from ethics, to reason, to
religion.
The Dictionary of Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Dutch
Philosophers covers the 200-year period of the Dutch Republic, when
its people experienced a Golden Age in the arts, in sea trade and
in philosophy that left a lasting impression on European culture.
The Dutch witnessed nothing less than a philosophical revolution,
driven to a large extent by the migres from France, Finland,
Portugal, Britain, Switzerland, Germany and elsewhere, who provided
the Golden Age with its thinkers. As a result of the unique
position held by the Netherlands during the period, this dictionary
constitutes an anthology of European thought at large. Included are
all foreign thinkers (such as Rene Descartes and Pierre Bayle) who
exercised a major influence on the philosophical life of the Dutch
Republic and who developed their ideas through interaction with
other philosophers residing there. Among these resident
philosophers, as well as all the well-known figures such as
Benedict Spinoza, many lesser-known ones are included. Each entry
includes a bibliography listing the subject's major and minor
philosophical writings and giving guidance to further reading. A
system of cross-references makes it easy for the reader to pursue
connections and influences. In addition, the dictionary features
entries on Dutch universities, city academies, publishing houses
and journals. This work will be of interest to all students and
scholars of the period.
Peter C. Hodgson explores Hegel's bold vision of history as the
progress of the consciousness of freedom. Following an introductory
chapter on the textual sources, the key categories, and the modes
of writing history that Hegel distinguishes, Hodgson presents a new
interpretation of Hegel's conception of freedom. Freedom is not
simply a human production, but takes shape through the interweaving
of the divine idea and human passions, and such freedom defines the
purpose of historical events in the midst of apparent chaos.
Freedom is also a process that unfolds through stages of
historical/cultural development and is oriented to an end that
occurs within history (the 'kingdom of freedom'). The purpose and
the process of history are tragic, however, because history is also
a 'slaughterhouse' that shatters even the finest human creations
and requires a constant rebuilding. Hegel's God is not a supreme
being or 'large entity' but the 'true infinite' that encompasses
the finite. History manifests the rule of God ('providence'), and
it functions as the justification of God ('theodicy'). But the God
who rules in and is justified by history is a crucified God who
takes the suffering, anguish, and evil of the world into and upon
godself, accomplishing reconciliation in the midst of ongoing
estrangement and inescapable death. Shapes of Freedom addresses
these themes in the context of present-day questions about what
they mean and whether they still have validity.
The early modern philosopher Anne Conway offers a remarkable
synthesis of ideas from differing philosophical traditions that
deserve our attention today. Exploring all of the major aspects of
Conway’s thought, this book presents a valuable guide to her
contribution to the history of philosophy. Through a close reading
of her central text, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern
Philosophy (1690), it considers her intellectual context and
addresses some of the outstanding interpretive issues concerning
her philosophy. Contrasting her position with that of
contemporaries such as Henry More, Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont
and George Keith, it examines her critique of the prominent
philosophical schools of the time, including Cartesian dualism and
Hobbesian materialism. From her accounts of dualism, time and God
to the often overlooked elements of her work such as her theory of
freedom and salvation, The Philosophy of Anne Conway illuminates
the ideas and legacy of an important early-modern woman
philosopher.
This volume offers a much needed shift of focus in the study of
emotion in the history of philosophy. Discussion has tended to
focus on the moral relevance of emotions, and (except in ancient
philosophy) the role of emotions in cognitive life has received
little attention. Thirteen new essays investigate the continuities
between medieval and early modern thinking about the emotions, and
open up a contemporary debate on the relationship between emotions,
cognition, and reason, and the way emotions figure in our own
cognitive lives. A team of leading philosophers of the medieval,
renaissance, and early modern periods explore these ideas from the
point of view of four key themes: the situation of emotions within
the human mind; the intentionality of emotions and their role in
cognition; emotions and action; the role of emotion in
self-understanding and the social situation of individuals.
The present volume has grown out of the conference held at
Princeton University on November 12-14, 2009. Its essays explore a
coherent, interrelated nexus of topics that illuminate our
understanding of the cultural transactions (social, political,
economic, religious and artistic) of the Greek East and Latin West:
unexpected cultural appropriations and forms of resistance,
continuity and change, the construction and hybridization of
traditions in a wide expanse of the eastern Mediterranean. Areas
that the volume addresses include the benefits and liabilities of
periodization, philosophical and political exchanges, monastic
syncretism between the Orthodox and Catholic faiths, issues of
romance composition, and economic currency and the currency of
fashion as East and West interact. Contributors are Roderick
Beaton, Peter Brown, Marina S. Brownlee, Giles Constable, Maria
Evangelatou, Dimitri Gondicas, Judith Herrin, Elizabeth Jeffreys,
Marc D. Lauxtermann, Stuart M. McManus, John Monfasani, Maria G.
Parani, Linda Safran, Teresa Shawcross and Alan M. Stahl.
Gilles Deleuze is considered one of the most important French
philosophers of the twentieth century. Eleanor Kaufman situates
Deleuze in relation to others of his generation, such as Jean-Paul
Sartre, Pierre Klossowski, Maurice Blanchot, and Claude
Levi-Strauss, and she engages the provocative readings of Deleuze
by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek.
"Deleuze, The Dark Precursor" is organized around three themes
that critically overlap: dialectic, structure, and being. Kaufman
argues that Deleuze's work is deeply concerned with these concepts,
even when he advocates for the seemingly opposite notions of
univocity, nonsense, and becoming. By drawing on scholastic thought
and reading somewhat against the grain, Kaufman suggests that these
often-maligned themes allow for a nuanced, even positive reflection
on apparently negative states of being, such as extreme inertia.
This attention to the negative or minor category has implications
that extend beyond philosophy and into feminist theory, film,
American studies, anthropology, and architecture.
The Kantian Aesthetic explains the kind of perceptual knowledge
involved in aesthetic judgments. It does so by linking Kant's
aesthetics to a critically upgraded account of his theory of
knowledge. This upgraded theory emphasizes those conceptual and
imaginative structures which Kant terms, respectively, "categories"
and "schemata." By describing examples of aesthetic judgment, it is
shown that these judgments must involve categories and fundamental
schemata (even though Kant himself, and most commentators after
him, have not fully appreciated the fact). It is argued, in turn,
that this shows the aesthetic to be not just one kind of
pleasurable experience amongst others, but one based on factors
necessary to objective knowledge and personal identity, and which,
indeed, itself plays a role in how these capacities develop.
In order to explain how individual aesthetic judgments are
justified, and the aesthetic basis of art, however, the Kantian
position just outlined has to be developed further. This is done by
exploring some of his other ideas concerning how critical
comparisons inform our cultivation of taste, and art's relation to
genius. By linking the points made earlier to a more developed
account of this horizon of critical comparisons, a Kantian approach
can be shown to be both a satisfying and comprehensive explanation
of the cognitive basis of aesthetic experiences. It is shown also
that the approach can even cover some of the kinds of avant-garde
works which were thought previously to limit its relevance.
Primitive Man as Philosopher by Paul Radin, Ph. D. Research Fellow
of Yale University and sometime Lecturer in Ethnology in Cambridge
University editor of Crashing Thunder, the Autobiography of an
American Indian with a foreword by John Dewcy Professor of
Philosophy in Columbia University New York and London D, Appleton
and Company 1927 COPYRIGHT, 1927, D. APPLETON AND COMPANY PRINTED
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO MY WIFE PREFACE When a modern
historian desires to study the civilization of any people, he
regards it as a necessary preliminary that he divest himself, so
far as possible, of all prejudice and bias. He realizes that
differences between cultures exist, but he does not feel that it is
necessarily a sign of inferiority that a people differs in customs
from his own. There seems, how ever, to be a limit to what an
historian treats as legitimate difference, a limit not always easy
to determine. On the whole it may be said that he very naturally
passes the same judgments that the majority of his fellow
countrymen do. Hence, if some of the differences between admittedly
civil ized peoples often call forth unfavorable judgments or even
provoke outbursts of horror, how much more must we expect this to
be the case where the differences are of so funda mental a nature
as those separating us from people whom we have been accustomed to
call uncivilized. The term uncivilized is a very vague one, and it
is spread over a vast medley of peoples, some of whom have
comparatively simple customs and others extremely com plex ones.
Indeed, there can be said to be but two charac teristics possessed
in common by all these peoples, the absence of a written language
and the fact of originalposses sion of the soil when the various
civilized European and Asiatic nations came into contact with them.
But among all aboriginal races appeared a number of customs which
undoubtedly seemed exceedingly strange to their European and
Asiatic conquerors. Some of these customs they had never heard of
others they recognized as similar to observ vli viii PREFACE ances
and beliefs existing among the more backward mem bers of their own
communities. Yet the judgments civilized peoples have passed on the
aborigines, we may be sure, were not initially based on any calm
evaluation of facts. If the aborigines were regarded as innately
inferior, this was due in part to the tremendous gulf in custom and
belief separating them from the con querors, in part to the
apparent simplicity of their ways, and in no small degree to the
fact that they were unable to offer any effective resistance.
Romance soon threw its distorting screen over the whole primitive
picture. Within one hundred years of the dis covery of America it
had already become an ineradicably established tradition that all
the aborigines encountered by Europeans were simple, untutored
savages from whom little more could be expected than from
uncontrolled children, individuals who were at all times the slaves
of their passions, of which the dominant one was hatred. Much of
this tradi tion, in various forms, disguised and otherwise, has
persisted to the present day. The evolutionary theory, during its
heyday in the iSyos and Sos, still further complicated and
misrepresented the situation, and from the great classic that
created modern ethnology Tylors Primitive Culture, published in
1870 future ethnologists were to imbibe the cardinal andfunda
mentally misleading doctrine that primitive peoples represent an
early stage in the history of the evolution of culture. What was,
perhaps, even more dangerous was the strange and uncritical manner
in which all primitive peoples were lumped together in ethnological
discussion simple Fuegians with the highly advanced Aztecs and
Mayans, Bushmen with the peoples of the Nigerian coast, Australians
with Poly nesians, and so on. PREFACE ix For a number of years
scholars were apparently content with the picture drawn by Tylor
and his successors...
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