The Dictionary of Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers covers the 200-year period of the Dutch Republic, when its people experienced a Golden Age in the arts, in sea trade and in philosophy that left a lasting impression on European culture. The Dutch witnessed nothing less than a philosophical revolution, driven to a large extent by the migres from France, Finland, Portugal, Britain, Switzerland, Germany and elsewhere, who provided the Golden Age with its thinkers. As a result of the unique position held by the Netherlands during the period, this dictionary constitutes an anthology of European thought at large. Included are all foreign thinkers (such as Rene Descartes and Pierre Bayle) who exercised a major influence on the philosophical life of the Dutch Republic and who developed their ideas through interaction with other philosophers residing there. Among these resident philosophers, as well as all the well-known figures such as Benedict Spinoza, many lesser-known ones are included. Each entry includes a bibliography listing the subject's major and minor philosophical writings and giving guidance to further reading. A system of cross-references makes it easy for the reader to pursue connections and influences. In addition, the dictionary features entries on Dutch universities, city academies, publishing houses and journals. This work will be of interest to all students and scholars of the period.

Peter C. Hodgson explores Hegel's bold vision of history as the progress of the consciousness of freedom. Following an introductory chapter on the textual sources, the key categories, and the modes of writing history that Hegel distinguishes, Hodgson presents a new interpretation of Hegel's conception of freedom. Freedom is not simply a human production, but takes shape through the interweaving of the divine idea and human passions, and such freedom defines the purpose of historical events in the midst of apparent chaos. Freedom is also a process that unfolds through stages of historical/cultural development and is oriented to an end that occurs within history (the 'kingdom of freedom'). The purpose and the process of history are tragic, however, because history is also a 'slaughterhouse' that shatters even the finest human creations and requires a constant rebuilding. Hegel's God is not a supreme being or 'large entity' but the 'true infinite' that encompasses the finite. History manifests the rule of God ('providence'), and it functions as the justification of God ('theodicy'). But the God who rules in and is justified by history is a crucified God who takes the suffering, anguish, and evil of the world into and upon godself, accomplishing reconciliation in the midst of ongoing estrangement and inescapable death. Shapes of Freedom addresses these themes in the context of present-day questions about what they mean and whether they still have validity.

The early modern philosopher Anne Conway offers a remarkable synthesis of ideas from differing philosophical traditions that deserve our attention today. Exploring all of the major aspects of Conway’s thought, this book presents a valuable guide to her contribution to the history of philosophy. Through a close reading of her central text, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1690), it considers her intellectual context and addresses some of the outstanding interpretive issues concerning her philosophy. Contrasting her position with that of contemporaries such as Henry More, Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont and George Keith, it examines her critique of the prominent philosophical schools of the time, including Cartesian dualism and Hobbesian materialism. From her accounts of dualism, time and God to the often overlooked elements of her work such as her theory of freedom and salvation, The Philosophy of Anne Conway illuminates the ideas and legacy of an important early-modern woman philosopher.

This volume offers a much needed shift of focus in the study of emotion in the history of philosophy. Discussion has tended to focus on the moral relevance of emotions, and (except in ancient philosophy) the role of emotions in cognitive life has received little attention. Thirteen new essays investigate the continuities between medieval and early modern thinking about the emotions, and open up a contemporary debate on the relationship between emotions, cognition, and reason, and the way emotions figure in our own cognitive lives. A team of leading philosophers of the medieval, renaissance, and early modern periods explore these ideas from the point of view of four key themes: the situation of emotions within the human mind; the intentionality of emotions and their role in cognition; emotions and action; the role of emotion in self-understanding and the social situation of individuals.

Gilles Deleuze is considered one of the most important French philosophers of the twentieth century. Eleanor Kaufman situates Deleuze in relation to others of his generation, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Pierre Klossowski, Maurice Blanchot, and Claude Levi-Strauss, and she engages the provocative readings of Deleuze by Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek.

"Deleuze, The Dark Precursor" is organized around three themes that critically overlap: dialectic, structure, and being. Kaufman argues that Deleuze's work is deeply concerned with these concepts, even when he advocates for the seemingly opposite notions of univocity, nonsense, and becoming. By drawing on scholastic thought and reading somewhat against the grain, Kaufman suggests that these often-maligned themes allow for a nuanced, even positive reflection on apparently negative states of being, such as extreme inertia. This attention to the negative or minor category has implications that extend beyond philosophy and into feminist theory, film, American studies, anthropology, and architecture.

The International Kierkegaard Commentary-For the first time in English the world community of scholars systematically assembled and presented the results of recent research in the vast literature of Soren Kierkegaard. Based on the definitive English edition of Kierkegaard's works by Princeton University Press, this series of commentaries addresses all the published texts of the influential Danish philosopher and theologian. This is volume 7 in a series of commentaries based upon the definitive translations of Kierkegaard's writings published by Princeton University Press, 1980ff.

The Kantian Aesthetic explains the kind of perceptual knowledge involved in aesthetic judgments. It does so by linking Kant's aesthetics to a critically upgraded account of his theory of knowledge. This upgraded theory emphasizes those conceptual and imaginative structures which Kant terms, respectively, "categories" and "schemata." By describing examples of aesthetic judgment, it is shown that these judgments must involve categories and fundamental schemata (even though Kant himself, and most commentators after him, have not fully appreciated the fact). It is argued, in turn, that this shows the aesthetic to be not just one kind of pleasurable experience amongst others, but one based on factors necessary to objective knowledge and personal identity, and which, indeed, itself plays a role in how these capacities develop.
In order to explain how individual aesthetic judgments are justified, and the aesthetic basis of art, however, the Kantian position just outlined has to be developed further. This is done by exploring some of his other ideas concerning how critical comparisons inform our cultivation of taste, and art's relation to genius. By linking the points made earlier to a more developed account of this horizon of critical comparisons, a Kantian approach can be shown to be both a satisfying and comprehensive explanation of the cognitive basis of aesthetic experiences. It is shown also that the approach can even cover some of the kinds of avant-garde works which were thought previously to limit its relevance.

On the Binding Biases of Time and Other Essays on General Semantics and Media Ecology consists of a series of explorations into our use of symbols, language, and media to relate to our environment, and how our different modes of perception and communication influence human consciousness, culture, and social organization. These essays draw upon and integrate the perspectives of general semantics, systems theory, and media ecology, bringing them to bear upon a diversity of topics that include the future of consciousness, identity and meaning, the Ten Commandments, media literacy, The Lord of the Rings, and our relationship to time. Throughout this volume, Strate grapples with the question of what it means to be human, and what the prospects may be for humanity's continued survival. As he concludes in the title essay of this book: "As a species, we are binders of time, bound up by our biases of time; we are moved by our consciousness of time, as we tell time, and as we tell ourselves that only time will tell; as we play for time, and as we pray, as we pray for time."

Primitive Man as Philosopher by Paul Radin, Ph. D. Research Fellow of Yale University and sometime Lecturer in Ethnology in Cambridge University editor of Crashing Thunder, the Autobiography of an American Indian with a foreword by John Dewcy Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University New York and London D, Appleton and Company 1927 COPYRIGHT, 1927, D. APPLETON AND COMPANY PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO MY WIFE PREFACE When a modern historian desires to study the civilization of any people, he regards it as a necessary preliminary that he divest himself, so far as possible, of all prejudice and bias. He realizes that differences between cultures exist, but he does not feel that it is necessarily a sign of inferiority that a people differs in customs from his own. There seems, how ever, to be a limit to what an historian treats as legitimate difference, a limit not always easy to determine. On the whole it may be said that he very naturally passes the same judgments that the majority of his fellow countrymen do. Hence, if some of the differences between admittedly civil ized peoples often call forth unfavorable judgments or even provoke outbursts of horror, how much more must we expect this to be the case where the differences are of so funda mental a nature as those separating us from people whom we have been accustomed to call uncivilized. The term uncivilized is a very vague one, and it is spread over a vast medley of peoples, some of whom have comparatively simple customs and others extremely com plex ones. Indeed, there can be said to be but two charac teristics possessed in common by all these peoples, the absence of a written language and the fact of originalposses sion of the soil when the various civilized European and Asiatic nations came into contact with them. But among all aboriginal races appeared a number of customs which undoubtedly seemed exceedingly strange to their European and Asiatic conquerors. Some of these customs they had never heard of others they recognized as similar to observ vli viii PREFACE ances and beliefs existing among the more backward mem bers of their own communities. Yet the judgments civilized peoples have passed on the aborigines, we may be sure, were not initially based on any calm evaluation of facts. If the aborigines were regarded as innately inferior, this was due in part to the tremendous gulf in custom and belief separating them from the con querors, in part to the apparent simplicity of their ways, and in no small degree to the fact that they were unable to offer any effective resistance. Romance soon threw its distorting screen over the whole primitive picture. Within one hundred years of the dis covery of America it had already become an ineradicably established tradition that all the aborigines encountered by Europeans were simple, untutored savages from whom little more could be expected than from uncontrolled children, individuals who were at all times the slaves of their passions, of which the dominant one was hatred. Much of this tradi tion, in various forms, disguised and otherwise, has persisted to the present day. The evolutionary theory, during its heyday in the iSyos and Sos, still further complicated and misrepresented the situation, and from the great classic that created modern ethnology Tylors Primitive Culture, published in 1870 future ethnologists were to imbibe the cardinal andfunda mentally misleading doctrine that primitive peoples represent an early stage in the history of the evolution of culture. What was, perhaps, even more dangerous was the strange and uncritical manner in which all primitive peoples were lumped together in ethnological discussion simple Fuegians with the highly advanced Aztecs and Mayans, Bushmen with the peoples of the Nigerian coast, Australians with Poly nesians, and so on. PREFACE ix For a number of years scholars were apparently content with the picture drawn by Tylor and his successors...

The problem of the unity of the proposition is almost as old as philosophy itself, and was one of the central themes of early analytical philosophy, greatly exercising the minds of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey. The problem is how propositions or meanings can be simultaneously unities (single things) and complexes, made up of parts that are autonomous of the positions they happen to fill in any given proposition. The problem has been associated with numerous paradoxes and has motivated general theories of thought and meaning, but has eluded any consensual resolution; indeed, the problem is sometimes thought to be wholly erroneous, a result of atomistic assumptions we should reject. In short, the problem has been thought to be of merely historical interest. Collins argues that the problem is very real and poses a challenge to any theory of linguistic meaning. He seeks to resolve the problem by laying down some minimal desiderata on a solution and presenting a uniquely satisfying account. The first part of the book surveys and rejects extant 'solutions' and dismissals of the problem from (especially) Frege and Russell, and a host of more contemporary thinkers, including Davidson and Dummett. The book's second part offers a novel solution based upon the properties of a basic syntactic principle called 'Merge', which may be said to create objects inside objects, thus showing how unities can be both single things but also made up of proper parts. The solution is defended from both philosophical and linguistic perspectives. The overarching ambition of the book, therefore, is to strengthen the ties between current linguistics and contemporary philosophy of language in a way that is genuinely sensitive to the history of both fields.