The early modern philosopher Anne Conway offers a remarkable synthesis of ideas from differing philosophical traditions that deserve our attention today. Exploring all of the major aspects of Conway’s thought, this book presents a valuable guide to her contribution to the history of philosophy. Through a close reading of her central text, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1690), it considers her intellectual context and addresses some of the outstanding interpretive issues concerning her philosophy. Contrasting her position with that of contemporaries such as Henry More, Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont and George Keith, it examines her critique of the prominent philosophical schools of the time, including Cartesian dualism and Hobbesian materialism. From her accounts of dualism, time and God to the often overlooked elements of her work such as her theory of freedom and salvation, The Philosophy of Anne Conway illuminates the ideas and legacy of an important early-modern woman philosopher.

Charting a genealogy of the modern idea of the self, Felix O Murchadha explores the accounts of self-identity expounded by key Early Modern philosophers, Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Hume and Kant. The question of the self as we would discuss it today only came to the forefront of philosophical concern with Modernity, beginning with an appeal to the inherited models of the self found in Stoicism, Scepticism, Augustinianism and Pelagianism, before continuing to develop as a subject of philosophical debate. Exploring this trajectory, The Formation of the Modern Self pursues a number of themes central to the Early Modern development of selfhood, including, amongst others, grace and passion. It examines on the one hand the deep-rooted dependence on the divine and the longing for happiness and salvation and, on the other hand, the distancing from the Stoic ideal of apatheia, as philosophers from Descartes to Spinoza recognised the passions as essential to human agency. Fundamental to the new question of the self was the relation of faith and reason. Uncovering commonalities and differences amongst Early Modern philosophers, O Murchadha traces how the voluntarism of Modernity led to the sceptical approach to the self in Montaigne and Hume and how this sceptical strand, in turn, culminated in Kant's rational faith. More than a history of the self in philosophy, The Formation of the Modern Self inspires a fresh look at self-identity, uncovering not only how our modern idea of selfhood developed but just how embedded the concept of self is in external considerations: from ethics, to reason, to religion.

Stefania Tutino shows that the hermeneutical and epistemological anxieties that characterize our current intellectual climate are rooted in the early modern world. Showing that post-Reformation Catholicism did not simply usher in modernity, but indeed postmodernity as well, her study complicates the well-established scholarly view concerning the context of the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic response to it. Shadows of Doubt provides a collection of case-studies centered on the relationship between language, the truth of men, and the Truth of theology. Most of these case-studies illuminate little-known figures in the history of early modern Catholicism. The militant aspects of post-Tridentine Catholicism can be appreciated through study of figures such as Robert Bellarmine or Cesare Baronio, the solid pillars of the intellectual and theological structure of the Church of Rome; however, an understanding of the more enigmatic aspects of early modernity requires exploration of the demimonde of post-Reformation Catholicism. Tutino examines the thinkers whom few scholars mention and fewer read, demonstrating that post-Reformation Catholicism was not simply a world of solid certainties to be opposed to the Protestant falsehoods, but also a world in which the stable Truth of theology existed alongside and contributed to a number of far less stable truths concerning the world of men. Post-Reformation Catholic culture was not only concerned with articulating and affirming absolute truths, but also with exploring and negotiating the complex links between certainty and uncertainty. By bringing to light this fascinating and hitherto largely unexamined side of post-Tridentine Catholicism, Tutino reveals that post-Reformation Catholic culture was a vibrant laboratory for many of the issues that we face today: it was a world of fractures and fractured truths which we, with a heightened sensitivity to discrepancies and discontinuities, are now well-suited to understand.

Research on Rousseau's innovative last work is changing direction. Long situated in a context of autobiographical writing, its moral and philosophical content is now a major critical preoccupation. The Nature of Rousseau's 'Reveries': physical, human, aesthetic brings together the work of international specialists to explore new approaches to the defining feature - the 'nature' - of the Reveries. In essays which range from studies of botany or landscape painting to thematic or stylistic readings, authors re-examine Rousseau's intellectual understanding of and personal relationship with different conceptions of nature. Drawing connections between this text and earlier theoretical writings, authors analyse not only the philosophical and personal implications of Rousseau's reflections on the outer world but also and his attempts to examine and validate both his own nature and that of 'l'homme naturel'. In The Nature of Rousseau's 'Reveries': physical, human, aesthetic the contributors offer new insights into the character of Rousseau's last major work and suggest above all its experimental, elusive quality, hovering between inner and outer worlds, escape and fulfilment, experience and writing. They underline the unique richness of the Reveries, a work to be situated not simply at the end of Rousseau's life, but at the very centre of his thought.

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. In Part I (History), he explores the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hagerstroem, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson. He argues that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like J. L. Mackie's arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Olson identifies four queerness arguments, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity, and goes on to establish that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that there are moral properties and facts when in fact there are none. One conclusion of Part II is that a plausible error theory takes the form of an error theory about irreducible normativity. In Part III (Defence), Olson considers challenges according to which that kind of error theory has problematic ramifications regarding hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. He ends his discussion with a consideration of the implications of moral error theory for ordinary moral thought and talk, and for normative theorizing.