This second of two volumes on American landing craft of World War II focuses on the larger LCT, LSM, LCS(L)(3), and LST vessels that transported tanks and heavy equipment to the shores of North Africa and Normandy and throughout the Pacific. The need for massive numbers of landing craft capable of disgorging huge numbers of troops and equipment was predicted by the US Army in 1940. Later, the British army estimated that over 2,000 of such vessels would be required for the assault on Europe. The US launched a building campaign to produce these seagoing craft, turning primarily to shipyards and manufacturers located along the American rivers. Ultimately many of these continued to serve the nation's need through Vietnam. Some were even heavily laden with rocket launchers and used for close-in support for troops going ashore.

In 1898 the United States went to war with Spain over the future of Cuba. The American navy had, in the preceding decade, been revived after years of neglect, and was much stronger than anything that the Spanish could bring against it. In the Philippines, Admiral George Dewey easily destroyed a weak Spanish squadron. A military invasion of Cuba was supported by the rest of the US Navy, under the command of Admiral William T Sampson. An important part of this force was the Flying Squadron, led by Commodore Winfield Scott Schley. Meanwhile a Spanish squadron under Admiral Pascual Cervera sailed from Europe to the Caribbean and, after disappearing for some days, reached the port of Santiago de Cuba. Schley was the first on the scene; his movements were later to be severely criticised. When Sampson arrived with the rest of the fleet, a blockade of the port was instituted. In the end, Cervera was obliged to make an attempt to break out, but his squadron of four cruisers was overwhelmed and destroyed. During the battle on Sunday July 3, Schley was in effective command, as Sampson had gone ashore to confer with the army commander. Although the Americans had won another easy victory, a bitter dispute arose between the respective supporters of Schley and Sampson as to who was entitled to the credit. Fanned by the popular press, the issue split the U S Navy to the point where its morale was seriously affected. Matters came to a head with the publication of a book violently attacking Schley's conduct. He demanded a Court of Inquiry; this sat for forty days at the Washington Navy Yard, presided over by Admiral Dewey. It was one of the great trials of American history, as the lawyers refought the campaign in minute detail. In the end, the verdict went against Schley, though this was offset by a minority opinion from Dewey that he had indeed been in command and deserved the credit for the victory. This book explores the rights and wrongs of the conduct of those principally involved in a battle that marked the dawn of the American empire, and closely examines the dramatic proceedings of the Court of Inquiry.

'The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril,' wrote Winston Churchill in his history of the Second World War. 'I was even more anxious about this battle than I had been about the glorious air fight called the Battle of Britain." In reality, the Kriegsmarine had been woefully unprepared for the war into which it was thrown. The Command-in-Chief of submarines, Karl Donitz, himself a verteran U-boat captain from the First World War, felt that he could bring Britain to its knees with a fleet of 300 U-Boats. But when war broke out, he had just twenty-four available for operational use. Despite this, the U-Boat arm scored some incredible successes in the early part of the war, raising the status of the submarine commanders and crews to that of national heroes in the eyes of the German people. The 'Grey Wolves' had become super-stars. Small wonder then that the U-Boat war has fascinated students of military history ever since. This book, using a carefully selected range of both wartime images and colour images of surviving U-boat memorabilia from private collections, describes 100 iconic elements of the U-Boat service and its campaigns. The array of objects include important individuals and the major U-Boat types, through to the uniforms and insignias the men wore. The weapons, equipment and technology used are explored, as are the conditions in which the U-boat crews served, from cooking facilities and general hygiene down to the crude toilet facilities. Importantly, the enemy that they faced is also covered, examining the ship-borne and airborne anti-submarine weaponry utilised against the U-boats. The U-Boats began the war, though small in number, more than a match for the Allies and created carnage amongst merchant shipping as well as sinking several major warships. The pace of technological development, however, failed to match that of Allied anti-submarine warfare weaponry and the U-Bootwaffe was ultimately doomed to defeat but not before, at one point, coming close to bringing Britain to its knees.

In General Naval Tactics, Naval War College professor and renowned tactical expert Milan Vego describes and explains those aspects of naval tactics most closely related to the human factor. Specifically, he explains in some detail the objectives and methods/elements of tactical employment of naval forces, command and control, combat support, tactical design, decision-making and planning/execution, leadership, doctrine, and training. Vego derives certain commonalities of naval tactics that occurred in recent and distant wars at sea. Many parts of his theoretical constructs are based on works of a number of well-known and influential naval theoreticians such as Admirals Alfred T. Mahan, Bradley A. Fiske, Raoul Castex, and Ren?® Daveluy and influential naval theoreticians. Whenever possible, the author illustrates each aspect of theory by carefully selected examples from naval history--making the theory more understandable and interesting. Vego aims to present theory that is general in nature and therefore, more durable in its validity. The more general the theory, the greater the possibility of accommodating changes based on new interpretations of past events and as a result of gaining fresh insight from the lessons learned.

Watch Officer's Guide, 16th Edition, is a handbook for all deck and combat information center watch officers of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard afloat, in the air, under the sea, and ashore. Originally written more than one hundred years ago, and last revised in 2007, the book provides officers with guidance on the watch in general, communications, shiphandling, standard commands, safety, honors and ceremonies, engineering, and rules of the road - essential elements for success in standing any watch. It offers, in a single volume, a great deal of important information for aspiring officers seeking qualification, ensuring that they have the requisite knowledge and appreciation of the importance of what they are doing. For the more experienced watch officer, this 16th edition continues a long-standing tradition by providing a compendium of information handy for review and for the actual standing of a watch. The lessons and themes are shaped and geared towards the afloat watchstander; though they also provide a foundation for success in other areas of both military and personal life.

The attack on the British frigate Amethyst on the Yangtze River by Chinese Communists in 1949 made world headlines. There was even more publicity when the ship made a dramatic escape after being trapped for 101 days. Eulogised by the British as an example of outstanding courage and fortitude, the Yangtze Incident was even made into a feature film, which depicted the ship and her crew as innocent victims of Communist aggression. The truth was more complex, and so sensitive that the government intended that some of the files should be closed until 2030\. However, these have now been released and in making use of these documents this book is the first to tell the full story. What emerges is an intriguing tale of intelligence failure, military over-confidence and a flawed hero it is by no means as heroic as the well-publicised official version, but every bit as entertaining. While the reputations of diplomatic and naval top brass take a knock, the bravery and ingenuity of those actively involved shines even more brightly. Written with verve and including much new and surprising information, this book is both enjoyable and informative

The Royal Navy's Submarine Command Course, or 'Perisher', is a unique course, training, assessing and qualifying officers for submarine command which is, itself, unique, challenging and demanding; the epitome of mission command, with no succour, referral or support in a continuously threatening environment. It is therefore essential that those 'in command' are proven to be worthy and capable of their appointment. The evolution of 'Perisher' is in recognisable periods: the earliest days, following the submarine's introduction into the Royal Navy, was an autodidactic existence with COs learning from their peers and by experimentation. By 1917 circumstances had conflated to create the Periscope School and the Periscope Course to train and qualify COs whose characteristics were now fully formed. The interwar period was a difficult time, but it produced new submarines and technological innovations just in time for the Second World War and the most intense evolutionary period for 'Perisher'. Post-1945 to 1969 experienced two evolutions: Commander Sandy Woodward's codification of the art of attacking and a shift in emphasis from purely 'periscope eye' attacking toward the development of safety and tactical prowess in students. In the 1970s-1980s, two parallel courses satisfied the demand for COs from an expanding diesel-nuclear submarine fleet using SSKs and then in 1989, an SSN. The final period, 1990-2017 continues today with an all-nuclear Perisher and a curriculum to meet a changing battlespace, new weapons and tactics. Throughout its history, 'Perisher' has shaped the submarine commanding officer and he, in return, has shaped 'Perisher'.

Amphibious assault ships have been at the centre of nearly all of Britain's expeditionary campaigns since World War II, from the Suez crisis of 1956 to operations as far afield as Borneo (1963–66), the Falklands (1982), Sierra Leone (2000) and Iraq (2003).

In major operations such as Suez and the Falklands, the use of amphibious assault ships was essential to the military success of the campaigns. The Suez Crisis saw two of the Royal Navy's former light fleet carriers converted into 'commando carriers' to specialise in amphibious warfare. In the 1960s these were followed by the famous Fearless class ships – the first purpose-built amphibious assault ships in the Royal Navy. With an internal dock, headquarters capability, and multiple landing craft, these 'Landing Platform Docks' were built to project power around the world. When the Falklands were invaded, HMS Fearless was the key to the successful landing in San Carlos.

In the 1990s, a new generation was ordered: the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean and the Albion class LPDs. In recent years Ocean, Albion and Bulwark have been the largest fighting ships of the Royal Navy and have acted as the navy's flagships, as well as being perhaps the most versatile ships in the navy.

This title is an essential guide to British Amphibious Assault Ships across the decades, from the mighty Fearless to the modern Albion. Packed with full-colour illustrations, contemporary photography, and detailed analysis, this definitive work explores the history, development, and deployment of the Royal Navy's front line.

While a large number of books have dealt with the navies and war at sea during the World Wars, the immediate aftermaths have generally received only minimal coverage. However, the fates of defeated navies are of enormous interest from a number of perspectives. These include the relative priorities of the victorious powers, acquisition and testing of ex-enemy materiel and the intended future capabilities of those ex-enemy navies that were to be allowed to continue to exist. This new book traces the histories of navies and ships of the defeated powers from the months leading up to the relevant armistices or surrenders through to the final execution of the appropriate post-war settlements. In doing so, it discusses the way in which the victorious powers reached their final demands, how these were implemented, and to what effect. The later histories of ships that saw subsequent service, either in their original navies or in those navies which acquired them, are also described. In doing this, much use is made of material drawn from archival, and in some cases archaeological, sources, some of which has never previously been used. Through these, a wide range of long-standing myths are busted, and some badly distorted modern views and assessments of events in the wake of the conflicts put right. The fascinating narrative will be accompanied by tabulated lists of all major navy-built (and certain significant ex-mercantile) enemy ships in commission at the relevant date of the armistice or surrender, or whose hulks were specifically listed for attention in post-Second World War allied agreements. These will include key dates in their careers and their ultimate fates. This highly original book, drawing on archaeological evidence as well as archival sources, and including numerous photographs will become an essential reference tool for all those interested in the naval history of the two World Wars.