The British Navy's failed attempt to capture Constantinople and secure a sea route to Russia in 1915 marked a turning point of World War I. Acclaimed naval military historian Dan van der Vat argues that the disaster at the Dardanelles not only prolonged the war for two years and brought Britain to the brink of starvation, but also led to the Russian Revolution and contributed to the rapid destabilisation of the Middle East. With a narrative rich in human drama, 'The Dardanelles Disaster' highlights the diplomatic clashes from Whitehall to the Hellespont, Berlin to Constantinople, and St Petersburg to the Bosporus. Van der Vat analyzes then-First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill's response to the obstacles he faced and describes the fateful actions of the Turkish, German, and British governments throughout the Gallipoli Campaign. With detailed analysis of the battle's events and never-before-published information on the German navy's mine laying operations, 'The Dardanelles Disaster' tells a forgotten story from a fresh viewpoint, shedding light on one of World War I's most pivotal moments - and in particular on one avoidable and monumental blunder.

This is the first comprehensive account of how intelligence influenced and sustained British naval power from the mid nineteenth century, when the Admiralty first created a dedicated intelligence department, through to the end of the Cold War. It brings a critical new dimension to our understanding of British naval history in this period while setting naval intelligence in a wider context and emphasising the many parts of the British state that contributed to naval requirements. It is also a fascinating study of how naval needs and personalities shaped the British intelligence community that exists today and the concepts and values that underpin it. The author explains why and how intelligence was collected and assesses its real impact on policy and operations. It confirms that naval intelligence was critical to Britain's survival and ultimate victory in the two World Wars but significantly reappraises its role, highlighting the importance of communications intelligence to an effective blockade in the First, and according Ultra less dominance compared to other sources in the Second. It reveals that coverage of Germany before 1914 and of the three Axis powers in the interwar period was more comprehensive and effective than previously suggested; and while British power declined rapidly after 1945, the book shows how intelligence helped the Royal Navy to remain a significant global force for the rest of the twentieth century, and in submarine warfare, especially in the second half of the Cold War, to achieve influence and impact for Britain far exceeding resources expended. This compelling new history will have wide appeal to all readers interested in intelligence and its crucial impact on naval policy and operations.

Economic Warfare and the Sea examines the relationship between trade, maritime warfare, and strategic thought between the early modern period and the late-twentieth century. Featuring contributions from renown historians and rising scholars, this volume forwards an international perspective upon the intersection of maritime history, strategy, and diplomacy. Core themes include the role of 'economic warfare' in maritime strategic thought, prevalence of economic competition below the threshold of open conflict, and the role non-state actors have played in the prosecution of economic warfare. Using unique material from 18 different archives across six countries, this volume explores critical moments in the development of economic warfare, naval technology, and international law, including the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the First World War, and the Second World War. Distinct chapters also analyse the role of economic warfare in theories of maritime strategy, and what the future holds for the changing role of navies in the floating global economy of the twenty-first century.

Original designed in 1934 for anti-submarine training, by the end of the war seventy-two U-Class subs had been commissioned. Seventeen were lost to the enemy and three in accidents. Manned by crews from seven nations' navies, they served world-wide and never more successfully than in the Med, where they made a major contribution to the defeat of Rommel's Afrika Corps. The quality of their service is born out by the 375 gallantry medals awarded to crewmen including Lt Cdr David Wanklyn's VC.