Many of the contributions to this volume are based on research originally presented at the historic first meeting in the United States of Japanese and American phenomenologists that took place at Seattle University in the Summer of 1991. In addition, other contributions have been added in order to supplement and complement the themes of the work presented at this meeting. Owing both to the vagaries of fate and the finitude of time, the publication of these essays has taken much longer than was originally intended. Nevertheless, this delay is more than offset by the inclusion in one volume of both phenomenological thematics and phenomenological authors who do not usually appear together.

"All life upon the stage"; the Theatrum Mundi. In this volume, a seventeenth century metaphor is revisited and is seen as applying to all art in all times. In the "magic mirror of art" the human being discerns the hidden spheres of human life and commemorates and celebrates its glorious victories and mourns its ignominious defeats. Let us rediscover Art as a witness to the human predicament as well as a celebrant of humanity's most sublime moments. This is the invitation of this collection of studies by A-T. Tymieniecka, Hanna Scolnicov, Muella Erkilic, Matt Landrus, Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Monika Bakke, David Brubaker, Tammy Knipp, Howard Pearce, Ellen J. Burns, G. Backhaus, Ethan J. Leib, Lawrence Kimmel, Ingrid Scheibler, Gottfried Scholz, L.F. Werth, A. Carillo, M. Statkiewicz, K. O'Rourke, B. Meyler, H. Meltzer, Jiuan Heng, W.V. Davies. Art as mirror of life, human life as participating in a stage play, corresponds to the fervent search human being of the causes, reasons, puzzles of our existence which elude us in the concrete life. This XVII c. conception of Theatrum Mundi opens as this volume shows a fascinating field of investigation for our times.

Intended for scholars in the fields of philosophy, history of science and music, this book examines the legacy of the historical coincidence of the emergence of science and opera in the early modern period. But instead of regarding them as finished products or examining their genesis, or `common ground', or `parallel' ideas, opera and science are explored by a phenomenology of the formulations of consciousness (Gurwitsch) as compossible tasks to be accomplished in common (Schutz) which share an ideal possibility or `essence' (Husserl). Although the ideas of Galileo and Monteverdi form the parameters of the domain of phenomenological clarification, the scope of discussion extends from Classical ideas of science and music down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, but always with reference to the experience of sharing the sociality of a common world from which they are drawn (Plessner) and to which those ideas have given shape, meaning and even substance. At the same time, this approach provides a non-historicist alternative to understanding the arts and science of the modern period by critically clarifying the idea of whether their compossibility can rest on any other formulation of consciousness.

Contemporaryphilosophyseems a great swirling almost chaos. Every situation must seem so at the time, probably because philosophy itself resists structura tion and because personal and political factors within as well as without the discipline must fade in order for the genuinely philosophical merits of performances to be assessed. Nevertheless, some remarks can still be made to situate the present volume. For example, at least half of philosophy on planet Earth is today pursued in North America (which is not to say that this portion is any less internally incoherent than the whole of which it thus becomes the largest part) and the present volume is North American. (Incidentally, the recognition of culturally geographic traditions and tendencies nowise implies that striving for cross-culturalif not trans-cultural philosophical validity has failed or ceased. Rather, it merely recognizes a significant aspect relevant from the historical point of view.) Episte- Aesthetics Ethics Etc. mology Analytic Philosophy Marxism Existentialism Etc. Figure 1. There are two main ways in which philosophical developments are classified. One is in terms of tendencies, movements, and schools of thought and the other is in terms of traditional sub-disciplines. When there is little contention among schools, the predominant way is in terms of sub-disciplines, such as aesthetics, ethics, politics, etc. Today this mode of classification can be seen to intersect with that in terms of movements and tendencies, both of which are represented in the above chart."

The central contribution of Str\u00f6ker's investigations is a careful and strict analysis of the relationship between experienced space, Euclidean space, and non-Euclidean spaces. Her study begins with the question of experienced space, inclusive of mood space, space of action and perception, of practical activities and bodily orientations, and ends with the controversies of the proponents of geometric and mathematical understanding of space. Within the context of experienced space, Str\u00f6ker includes historical discussions of place, topology, depth, perspectivity, homogeneity, orientation, and the questions of empty and full spaces. Her investigation concludes that any strict analysis of space must be founded upon an unavoidable ontology. Philosophical Investigations of Space addresses a number of methodological controversies. It tests the limitations of a variety of scientific, phenomenological, geometric, and logical methods in order to demonstrate limitations of both methodology and underlying assumption. In addition to the richness of her historical and systematic discussion, Str\u00f6ker's work is a model of thoroughly documented philosophical scholarship and conceptual precision.

Es ist nicht abzusehen, wozu Husserl-Studien dienen sollen, wenn nicht von der Phanomenologie im Sinne Husserls eine Hilfe zu erwarten ist, einen Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist. Ein Ver- such, Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist: so jedenfalls wird die erste berechtigte Antwort auf die Frage "Was ist Phanomenolo- gie?" lauten mussen, wenn die Beschaftigung mit Phanomenolo- gie und insbesondere mit Husserl-Studien nicht eben eine blosse Beschaftigung sein soll. Ist die Phanomenologie nun ein Versuch, Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist, so heisst das: ein Versuch neben anderen mehr, unter diesen ein eigenartiger, gegenuber diesen ein neuer. Was ist das Eigentumliche dieses neuen Versuchs, des Versuchs, Einblick zu gewinnen in das, was ist, auf dem Wege einer Phanomenologie? Was ware der neue und eigentumliche Gesichtspunkt, von dem aus diese einen Einblick in das, was ist, zu gewinnen sucht? Husserl gibt die klare Auskunft: "Der Gesichtspunkt der Funktion ist der zentrale der Phanomenologie, die von ihm ausstrahlenden Untersuchungen umspannen so ziemlich die ganze phanomeno- logische Sphare, und schliesslich treten alle phanomenologischen Analysen irgendwie in ihren Dienst als Bestandstucke oder Unter- stufen";1 denn "die allergrossten Probleme sind die funktionellen Probleme, bzw. die der 'Konstitution der Bewusstseinsgegenstand- lichkeiten. '" 2 Der zentrale Gesichtspunkt der Phanomenologie, welcher ihr eigentumlich ist, ist derjenige, der die Probleme der Konstitution der Bewusstseinsgegenstandlichkeiten sichtbar macht. Was sind das fur Probleme? 1 Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie, I, 1913, s. 176. 2 Ebenda.

In this study of Hegel's philosophy, Brinkmann undertakes to defend Hegel's claim to objective knowledge by bringing out the transcendental strategy underlying Hegel's argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Logic. Hegel's metaphysical commitments are shown to become moot through this transcendental reading. Starting with a survey of current debates about the possibility of objective knowledge, the book next turns to the original formulation of the transcendental argument in favor of a priori knowledge in Kant's First Critique. Through a close reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction and Hegel's critique of it, Brinkmann tries to show that Hegel develops an immanent critique of Kant's position that informs his reformulation of the transcendental project in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit and the formulation of the position of 'objective thought' in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Brinkmann takes the reader through the strategic junctures of the argument of the Phenomenology that establishes the position of objective thinking with which the Logic begins. A critical examination of the Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy shows that Hegel's metaphysical doctrine of the self-externalization of spirit need not compromise the ontological project of the Logic and thus does not burden the position of objective thought with pre-critical metaphysical claims. Brinkmann's book is a remarkable achievement. He has given us what may be the definitive version of the transcendental, categorial interpretation of Hegel. He does this in a clear approachable style punctuated with a dry wit, and he fearlessly takes on the arguments and texts that are the most problematic for this interpretation. Throughout the book, he situates Hegel firmly in his own context and that of contemporary discussion." -Terry P. Pinkard, University Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, USA "Klaus Brinkmann's important Hegel study reads the Phenomenology and the Logic as aspects of a single sustained effort, in turning from categories to concepts, to carry Kant's Copernican turn beyond the critical philosophy in what constitutes a major challenge to contemporary Cartesianism." - Tom Rockmore, McAnulty College Distinguished Professor, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA "In this compelling reconstruction of the theme of objective thought, Klaus Brinkmann takes the reader through Hegel's dialectic with exceptional philosophical acumen.... Many aspects of this book are striking: the complete mastery of the central tenets of Kant's and Hegel's philosophy, the admirable clarity in treating obscure texts and very difficult problems, and how Brinkmann uses his expertise for a discussion of the problems of truth, objectivity and normativity relevant to the contemporary philosophical debate. This will prove to be a very important book, one that every serious student of Kant and Hegel will have to read." - Alfredo Ferrarin, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Husserl is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century and his contribution to the phenomenology movement is widely recognised. The Cartesian Meditations is his most famous, and most widely studied work. The book introduces and assesses: Husserl's life and background to the Cartesian Meditations, the ideas and text of the Cartesian Meditations and the continuing imporance of Husserl's work to Philosophy.

A great deal of work in philosophy today is concerned with some aspect of the complex tangle of problems and puzzles roughly labelled the mind-body problem. This book is an introduction to it. It is a readable, lucid and accessible guide that provides readers with authoritative exposition, and a solid and reliable framework which can be built on as needed. The first chapter briefly introduces the subject and moves on to discuss mechanism - the idea that minds are machines - focusing on Searle's Chinese Room argument. The next three chapters discuss dualism, physicalism, and some hard problems for physicalism, especially those concerning phenomenal consciousness. Chapters on behaviourism and functionalism follow. The central mind-body topics are then each given deeper consideration in separate chapters. Intentionality is investigated via Fodor's doctrine of the Language of Thought, taking account of connectionism. The main theories of consciousness are examined and the author's own approach outlined. The concluding chapter briefly resumes the theme of psychological explanation, linking it to further topics. Each chapter ends with a summary of the main points together with suggestions for further reading.

A great deal of work in philosophy today is concerned with some aspect of the complex tangle of problems and puzzles roughly labelled the mind-body problem. This book is an introduction to it. It is a readable, lucid and accessible guide that provides readers with authoritative exposition, and a solid and reliable framework which can be built on as needed. The first chapter briefly introduces the subject and moves on to discuss mechanism - the idea that minds are machines - focusing on Searle's Chinese Room argument. The next three chapters discuss dualism, physicalism, and some hard problems for physicalism, especially those concerning phenomenal consciousness. Chapters on behaviourism and functionalism follow. The central mind-body topics are then each given deeper consideration in separate chapters. Intentionality is investigated via Fodor's doctrine of the Language of Thought, taking account of connectionism. The main theories of consciousness are examined and the author's own approach outlined. The concluding chapter briefly resumes the theme of psychological explanation, linking it to further topics. Each chapter ends with a summary of the main points together with suggestions for further reading.

The ideas of the German philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer have had considerable influence both in their own right as the leading modern exposition of philosophical hermeneutics and interpreting the works of Heidegger, Plato and Hegel. This work covers the trail of Gadamer's thought. Taking 'Truth and Method' (1960, translated 1975) as the axis of the interpretation of Gadamer's thought, Jean Grondin lays out the key themes of the work - method, humanism, aesthetic judgement, truth, the work of history - with exemplary clarity. Gadamer's concerns are situated in the context of traditional philosophical issues, showing, for example, how Gadamer both continues, and significantly modifies, the philosophical problem as it begins with Descartes and advances rather than simply follows Heidegger's treatment of the relationship of thinking and language. In this way Grondin shows how the issues of philosophical hermeneutics are relevant for contemporary concerns in science and history.

Dieses Buch ist vielleicht nicht das Beste, aber vielleicht doch das Ausserste, was ich gegen Ende eines (gewiss nicht nur) philosophischen Lebens noch zu geben ver- mag: einen Hinweis auf die Frage, womit wir uns eigentlich befassen sollten; als eine Frage, die jedermann schon im alltaglichen Leben angeht, und zugleich als die Frage einer ,Philosophie'. Das Allerausserste ware dann ein Versuch, auch diese Frage selber noch zu be- antworten. Einen solchen Versuch habe ich aber langst schon zuvor unternommen: in meinem Entwurf einer Kritik der Grundlagen des Zeitalters (1974). (Die vorliegende Topik nennt nur die Frage, worauf jene ,Kritik' eine Antwort geben wollte.) In einer Abhandlung uber Okonomie und Metaphysik, an der ich noch arbeite, mache ich noch einen wiederholten Versuch, jene Frage nach Moglichkeit noch deutlicher zu beantworten. Bislang habe ich nur vier ,Werke' zustande gebracht: eines uber Das Grundle- gende und das Wesentliche (1965), von dem ich bis heute noch zehre, die erwahnte Kritik der Grundlagen des Zeitalters, eine Tragik (2001) und die vorliegende Topik. (Der Rest sind nur Aufsatzsammlungen, Vorlesungen, Editionen und Ubersetzun- gen.) Doch habe ich (nebst dem oben erwahnten noch in Arbeit befindlichen Ver- such uber ,Okonomie und Metaphysik') noch zwei weitere Werke anzubieten: eine Politik (fur die ich bis heute noch keinen Verleger gefunden habe) und eine in den siebziger Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts geschriebene und unvollendet gebliebene Dialektik (die wohl nur nach meinem Tode einer Veroffentlichung fahig ist).

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) is one of the truly great philosophers of the modernist period, and there is currently a major renaissance of interest in his unduly neglected texts and ideas amongst philosophers, literary theorists, and social theorists. Mind-Energy is a collection of essays and lectures from the period 1901-13 and has long been out of print. It features essays on life and consciousness, soul and body, mind and brain, and on dreams, memory and the phenomenon of false recognition; the insights Bergson develops in them remain highly pertinent to contemporary work in the philosophy of mind.

In this introduction to the life and thought of one of the most important French thinkers of the twentieth-century Eric Matthews shows how Merleau-Ponty has contributed to current debates in philosophy, such as the nature of consciousness, the relation between biology and personality, the historical understanding of human thought and society, and many others. Surveying the whole range of Merleau-Ponty's thinking, the author examines his views about the nature of phenomenology and the primacy of perception; his account of human embodiment, being-in-the-world, and his understanding of human behaviour; his conception of the self and its relation to other selves; and, his views on society, politics, and the arts. A final chapter considers his later thought, published posthumously. The ideas of Merleau-Ponty are shown to be of immense importance to the development of French philosophy and the author evaluates his distinctive contributions and relates his thought to that of his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, both in France and elsewhere. This unrivalled introduction will be welcomed by philosophers and cognitive scientists as well as students taking courses in contemporary continental philosophy.

In this introduction to the life and thought of one of the most important French thinkers of the twentieth-century Eric Matthews shows how Merleau-Ponty has contributed to current debates in philosophy, such as the nature of consciousness, the relation between biology and personality, the historical understanding of human thought and society, and many others. Surveying the whole range of Merleau-Ponty's thinking, the author examines his views about the nature of phenomenology and the primacy of perception; his account of human embodiment, being-in-the-world, and his understanding of human behaviour; his conception of the self and its relation to other selves; and, his views on society, politics, and the arts. A final chapter considers his later thought, published posthumously. The ideas of Merleau-Ponty are shown to be of immense importance to the development of French philosophy and the author evaluates his distinctive contributions and relates his thought to that of his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, both in France and elsewhere. This unrivalled introduction will be welcomed by philosophers and cognitive scientists as well as students taking courses in contemporary continental philosophy.

The first of its kind, this book applies existential principles to sexual problems, providing clinicians with the tools to understand male sexuality more deeply. Alighting from the existential psychotherapy tenets of Irvin D. Yalom, Watter introduces the notion that the penis is a conduit for male emotion, and hence regulates their ability to form and experience intimate relationships. Subsequent chapters explore an existential view of male sexual dysfunction, non-sexual trauma, hypersexuality, changing bodies through illness, age, and injury, and examines badly behaved men to understand the meaning of certain behaviors. This book will be an invaluable resource for sex therapists, marriage and family therapists, psychologists, and social workers in practice and in training, assisting them to develop the therapeutic skills that will improve their understanding of men's psychological experience.

lbis volume was occasioned by the desire of its contributors to honor Robert Sokolowski on his sixtieth birthday. The desire first took fonn on the streets of an American metropolis when several of us, while attending a philosophy conference, were bemoaning the lack of passion for doing philosophy as we all conceived it. In this expression of our discontent we all had a common exemplar in mind, someone for whom the passion for "the truthful" and "the good" is embodied in every sentence of his rich writings. Felicitously this very thinker was someone whom we an regard as manifesting in his person and life these same properties which his writings exhibit and pursue as luminous ideals. As a result, John Brough, John Drummond, and I came up with the idea that we hold our own conference and do philosophy as we envisage it and at the same time honor its foremost exemplary practitioner whose sixtieth birthday was the following year. Immediately the idea took wings among the handful ofus and the dreariness of that philosophy congress receded. The first task of thinking of possible speakers was easy. The issue of the venue for our symposium, what I like to call the "Sokofest," had to be decided, as well as the details of its realization.

Scholar, theologian and philosopher, Martin Buber is one of the twentieth century's most influential thinkers. He believed that the deepest reality of human life lies in the relationship between one being and another. Between Man and Man is the classic work where he puts this belief into practice, applying it to the concrete problems of contemporary society. Here he tackles subjects as varied as religious ethics, social philosophy, marriage, education, psychology and art. Including some of his most famous writings, such as the masterful 'What is Man?', this enlightening work challenges each reader to reassess their encounter with the world that surrounds them.

This volume takes up Heidegger's idea of a phenomenological chronology in an attempt to pose the question of the possibility of a phenomenological language that would be given over to the temporality of being and the finitude of existence. The book combines a discussion of approaches to language in the philosophical tradition with readings of Husserl on temporality and the early and late texts of Heidegger's on logic, truth and the nature of language. As well as Heidegger's deconstruction of logic and metaphysics Dastur's work is also informed by Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence and Nietzschean genealogy. Appealing a much to Humboldt's philosophy of language as to Holderin's poetic thought, the book illuminates the eminently dialectical structure of speech and its essential connection with mortality.

At the origin of this volume, a simple question: what to make of that surprisingly monotonous series of statements produced by our societies and our philosophers that all converge in one theme - the importance of difference?

To clarify the meaning of the difference at stake here, we have tried to rephrase it in terms of the two major and mutually competing paradigms provided by the history of phenomenology only to find both of them equally unable to accommodate this difference without violence. Neither the ethical nor the ontological approach can account for a subject that insists on playing a part of its own rather than following the script provided for it by either Being or the Good. What appears to be, from a Heideggerian or Levinasian perspective, an unwillingness to open up to what offers to deliver us from the condition of subjectivity is analysed in these pages as a structure in its own right. Far from being the wilful, indifferent and irresponsive being its critics have portrayed it to be, the so-called 'postmodern' subject is essentially finite, not even able to assume the transcendence to which it owes its singularity. This inability is not a lack - it points instead to a certain unthought shared by both Heidegger and Levinas which sets the terms for a discussion no longer our own. Instead of blaming Heidegger for underdeveloping 'being-with', we should rather stress that his account of mineness may be, in the light of contemporary philosophy, what stands most in need of revision. And, instead of hailing Levinas as the critic whose stress on the alterity of the Other corrects Heidegger's existential solipsism, the problems into which Levinas runs in defining that alterity call for a different diagnosis and a corresponding change in the course that phenomenology has taken since. Instead of preoccupying itself with the invisible, we should focus on the structures of visibility that protect us from its terror.

The result? An account of difference that is neither ontological nor ethical, but 'me-ontological', and that can help us understand some of the problems our societies have come to face (racism, sexism, multiculturalism, pluralism). And, in the wake of this, an unexpected defence of what is at stake in postmodernism and in the question it has refused to take lightly: who are we? Finally, an homage to Arendt and Lyotard who, if read through each other's lenses, give an exact articulation to the question with which our age struggles: how to think the 'human condition' once one realizes that there is an 'inhuman' side to it which, instead of being its mere negation, turns out to be that without which it would come to lose its humanity?"

Mossbauer Spectroscopy of Environmental Materials and their Industrial Utilization provides a description of the properties of materials formed on the earth's surface, their synthetic analogs where applicable, and the products of their modifications in the course of natural processes, such as weathering, or in industrial processing as reflected in their Mossbauer spectra. Particular emphasis is placed on the way in which these processes can be observed and elucidated through the use of Mossbauer spectroscopy.

The first chapter covers the basic theory of the Mossbauer effect and Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the nuts and bolts of experimental Mossbauer spectroscopy. The principles of these first three chapters, illustrated with many case studies, are applied to different areas of interest in Chapters 4 through 12.

The book is directed to a broad audience ranging from graduate students in environmental sciences or chemical engineering with little or no expertise in Mossbauer spectroscopy to researchers from other disciplines who are familiar with this technique but wish to learn more about possible applications to environmental materials and issues. "

" Unser ganzes Vorgehen ist, eine Selbstbesinnung vollziehen und auf das absolut wahrnehmungs massig Gegebene reduzieren. . . . Das ist Analyse der stromend urtumlichen Gegenwart. '' (Husserl, Ms. C 7 I, S. 34) Was ist eigentlich das transzendentale Ich, die absolute Sub jektivitat? Oder dieselbe Frage in Begriffen aus Husserls Spat zeit: Was ist die Lebendigkeit des welterfahrenden Lebens? Dieses Grundproblem ist eines der grossen Fragezeichen der transzendentalen Phanomenologie Edmund Husserls. Seine Ungelostheit oder zumindest unzureichende Beantwortung fuhrte unter anderem zur Umbildung der Phanomenologie bei Martin Heidegger; . Heideggers fundamentale Kritik durchzieht implizit Sein und Zeit, und sie findet sich ausgesprochen in seinen An merkungen zu Husserls Enzyklopaedia-Britannica-Artikell. Zu Beginn der dreissiger Jahre stellte sich Husserl die Aufgabe, die Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich mit den Mitteln seines Den kens endgultig aufzuklaren2. Zentralbegriff seiner Analysen wurde dabei der Begriff "lebendige Gegenwart"3. Diese Urgegenwart ist die Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich. Was dies heisst und wie sich diese Aussage in den Gesamtzusammenhang des husserlschen Denkens einfugt, will die folgende Abhandlung zeigen. Es ist des ofteren darauf hingewiesen worden4, dass im Problem der zeitlichen Selbstkonstitution der transzendentalen Subjekti vitat eine, wenn nicht sogar die Grundfrage der husserlschen Phanomenologie zu sehen ist. Der Sinn und die Tragweite dieser Frage ist noch immer umstritten. Unter diesen Umstanden 1 Vgl. Phanomenologische Psychologie, S. 237. ff. u. S. 6ox f., und W. Biemel, "Husserls Enzyklopaedia-Britannica-Artikel und Heideggers Anmerkungen dazu," in: Tijdschrift voor Philosophie Bd. xz, xgso; ferner vgl. M."

In this work I have tried to present HusserI's Philosophy of thinking and meaning in as clear a manner as I can. In doing this, I had in mind a two-fold purpose. I wanted on the one hand to disentangle what I have come to regard as the central line of thought from the vast mass of details of the Logische Unter suchungen and the Formale und transzendentale Logik. On the other hand, I tried to take into consideration the immense developments in logic and semantics that have taken place since HusserI's major logical studies were published. It is my belief that no one to day can look back upon the philosophers of the past except in the light of the admirable progress achieved and consolidated in the fields of logic and semantics in recent times. Fortunately enough, from this point of view HusserI fares remarkably well. He certainly anticipated many of those recent investigations. What is more, a true understanding and appraisal of his logical studies is not possible except in the light of the corresponding modern investigations. This last consider ation may provide us with some explanation of the rather puzzling fact that orthodox HusserIian scholarship both within and outside Germany has not accorded to his logical studies the central importance that they, from all points of view, unmis takeably deserve."