The I-Thou controversy between these two thinkers is a significant but often overlooked issue in philosophy and theology. In one of the first books to truly address the subject, Haim Gordon explores the arguments of both Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber regarding the The I-Thou relationship and its significance for human existence. Gordon's work illuminates Heidegger's complex and enlightening ontology--one that describes the everyday life of the human in such a way that there is no place for the I-Thou relationship. Buber, on the other hand, argues for the significance of the I-Thou relationship within human existence, and highlights the ways in which Heidegger's philosophy fails to grasp this important point. After examining the fundamental ontology of Heidegger, set beside the ontological insights of Buber concerning this relationship, Gordon concludes that each of these important twentieth-century philosophers was guilty of ignoring the contributions made by the other to the study of ontology and being.

By exploring the complicated dynamic between Heidegger and Buber, Gordon presents the reader with valuable insights and a deeper understanding of human existence and relationships. The implications of both this controversy and its resolution are far reaching for many other philosophical disciplines, including social and political philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics.

Although this book is a translation from Dutch, the chief obstacle to be overcome was Husser!'s (German) technical terminology. As I sought English equivalents for German phenomenological terms, I made thankful use of Dorion Cairns' Guidefor Translating Husserl as well as existing translations of Husser!'s works, especially J. N. Findlay's rendering of Logische Untersuchungen. Since the technical terminology in the various translations and English studies of Husser! is far from uniform, I had to devise my own system of equivalents for key Husserlian terms. As I translated the quotations from Husserl's works into English, I did consult the available translations and draw on them, but I endeavored to keep the technical vocabulary uniform -sometimes by fresh translations of the passages quoted and sometimes by slight alterations in the existing translations. I made these changes not so much out of any basic disagreement with other translators as out of a desire to keep the terminology uniform throughout the book. 1 For the benefit of German and French readers not entirely at home with the English phenomeno logical vocabulary, I have included a small translation table in which my English equivalents for some central German terms are listed. Words with cognates or well-established phenomenological terms as their English equivalents have not been included. Finally, I should like to express my thanks to Prof.

This book presents a unique real-world-centred approach to economic life from a phenomenological approach. It offers a much-needed alternative to conventional economic thinking, giving a transdisciplinary depiction of the economic process's social, cultural, technological, political, and ecological dimensions. Doing so appeals to students and researchers in economics aiming to get an alternative to the reductionist model-based approach. Written in a jargon-free and non-technical way, it appeals to non-economists alike and those seeking a more profound and living understanding of the economic process. What is the role of nature in the economic process? Is there more to economics than we have been told? Do we have infinite needs? What are these needs? Can we keep on growing forever? Does economic growth improve our wellbeing? Why is the income gap widening? What is the role of financial capital in our current world? Are there other forms of producing, distributing, and consuming wealth beyond markets? What are the functions of markets, and how do they work in the real world? These and many other aspects are discussed in living and holistic ways in this book. It is a must-read for all those interested in gaining a more profound and genuine understanding of our current reality and those looking for ways out of our current crises.

Dass Edmund Husserl am Problem der IntersubjektivitAt gescheitert ist, gilt als ausgemacht - und ebenso, welche Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen sind. Entgegen dem allenthalben pauschal erklArten Abschied vom Subjekt' spricht aber vieles dafA1/4r, dass es in der gegenwArtigen Sozialtheorie eher um eine Reformulierung transzendentaler SubjektivitAt geht. Diese Interpretationsthese wirft ein neues Licht auf den sozialtheoretischen Diskurs, der im deutschen Sprachraum in den vergangenen dreissig Jahren vom Gegensatz von JA1/4rgen Habermas' und Niklas Luhmanns Theorien bestimmt war: Diskurs' und System' erscheinen als gegensAtzliche Versuche, SubjektivitAt' und InteritAt' in ein theoretisch befriedigendes VerhAltnis zu setzen. Wenn aber - so die kritische These dieses Buches - weder die Reformulierung von SubjektivitAt als InteritAt' noch die Reformulierung von SubjektivitAt ohne InteritAt' das Problem der IntersubjektivitAt A1/4berzeugend lAst, ist dies ein Grund, neuerlich in eine direkte Auseinandersetzung mit Husserls Theorie transzendentaler SubjektivitAt einzutreten. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass Husserls vielkritisierter und -skandalisierter Versuch, den Sinn Anderer' im Eigenen' zu fundieren, in der transzendentalphAnomenologischen Subjekttheorie durch ein umgekehrtes BegrA1/4ndungsverhAltnis konterkariert wird. Bei aller Problematik dieser Theorieanlage - welche nur in Gegenwendung zu den Gewohnheiten der Husserl-Interpretation, vor allem aber auch zu Husserls Selbstinterpretation in den Blick kommt - zeigt sich, dass der phAnomenologische Begriff des transzendentalen Subjekts seinen Reformulierungen als Diskurs und als System in mancher Hinsicht A1/4berlegen ist.

This book shows how phenomenology of the social sciences differs from positivistic approaches, and presents Schutz's theory of relevances--a key feature of his own phenomenology of the social world. It begins with Schutz's appraisal of how Husserl influenced him, and continues with exchanges between Schutz and Eric Voegelin, Felix Kaufmann, Aron Gurwitsch, and Talcott Parsons. This book presents, for the first time, Schutz's incisive criticisms of T.S. Eliot's theory of culture.

Age and aging are pressing social-political issues. Yet, philosophers still have not paid sufficient attention to one of the major explorations of this topic, Simone de Beauvoir's seminal work The Coming of Age (1970). For much too long, it has been overshadowed by her other groundbreaking work, The Second Sex (1949). Now, for the first time, this volume focuses on Beauvoir's essay on old age and critically explores its significance from a phenomenological and feminist perspective. International Beauvoir scholars and renowned feminist phenomenologists from Europe and North America offer a unique look at one of the 20th century's most outstanding existential-philosophical studies on age and aging. Thematically, the articles and short comments collected in this volume cover three main issues which are crucial with respect to an investigation of Beauvoir's study on age: gender, ethics, and time. The volume essentially contributes to Beauvoir studies, aging studies, cultural and gender studies, feminist theory, phenomenology, and existential philosophy.

In this book, Shay Welch expands on the contemporary cognitive thinking-in-movement framework, which has its roots in the work of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone but extends and develops within contemporary embodied cognition theory. Welch believes that dance can be used to ask questions, and this book offers a method of how critical inquiry can be embodied. First, she presents the theoretical underpinnings of what this process is and how it can work; second, she introduces the empirical method as a tool that can be used by movers for the purpose of doing embodied inquiry. Exploring the role of embodied cognition and embodied metaphors in mining the body for questions, Welch demonstrates how to utilize movement to explore embodied practices of knowing. She argues that our creative embodied movements facilitate our ability to bodily engage in critical analysis about the world.

Edmund Husserl occupied himself with the analysis of time-consciousness throughout his life. In this book, the three stages that may be distinguished in Husserl's occupation with this theme are discussed in their interrelationship. The first stage consists of a lecture manuscript from 1905; the second stage consists of the so-called Bernau manuscripts, research manuscripts that were written in 1917 and 1918; and the final stage consists of the so-called C-manuscripts, research manuscripts that were written in the late 1920s and the early 1930s.
Central themes in the discussion of Husserl's phenomenology of time in this book are: the connection between the analysis of time-consciousness and the analysis of phantasy-consciousness and image-consciousness; Husserl's position in the debate between A. Meinong and W. Stern concerning the possibility of the perception of time; the self-constitution of absolute time-consciousness; the influence of Husserl's development of genetic phenomenology on his analysis of time-consciousness; and the question of the intentional character of time-consciousness.

Western thought is surging, on the rebound from centuries of a merely background interest. Life is presenting crucial challenges to the human mind in science, technology, culture and social existence; challenges which reach the core of existence, human destiny, and the very meaningfulness - the human significance of life itself. The compartementalized sciences fall short of responding to this challenge, and present day philosophy by and large renounced its vocation of carrying the torch of reason. In this post-modern darkness, the Phenomenology of Life and of the Human Condition excavate and bring to light the Logos of Life in its entire harmonizing interplay. In the present collection, which continues the long and winding itinerary of our previous probings, we first uncover the new field of the ontopoiesis of life by means of the self-individualisation of life, the key to its labyrinth (Tymieniecka). A network of the ontopoietic itineraries manifest life in its innumerable perspectives: the constructive scanning (chronos and Kairos) are treated specifically by Eva Syristova, M. Bielawka, F. Bosio, and M.A. Cecilia. Individualising dynamisms of passions and the tying of the communal order by G. Bucher, R. Sweeney, A. Polis, A. Zvie Bar-On and others. The life-struggle for the light of the spirit by L. Sundararajan, I.R. Owen etc. The deep springs of mundaneity in human existence (moral sense, empathy, communication) by A. Luse, A. Ales Bello, J. Cibulka, J. Sivak, etc. The life of the spirit (historicity) by M. Sancipriano, M. Cekic, H. RodrA-guez PiAeiro, S. Rinofner-Kreidl and others.

The volume begins with what is in common to contemporary phenomenological historians and historiographers. That is the understandings that temporality is the core of human judgment conditioning in its forms how we consciously attend and judge phenomena. For every phenomenological historian or historiographer, all history is an event, a span of time. This time span is not external to the individual, rather forms the content and structure of every judgment of the person. It is the logic used by the individual to structure the phenomenon attended. Rather than the phenomenon being seen as something solely external, it is understood by phenomenologists as also of our immediate awareness and thought. Thus, the phenomenological method discerns all judgment as based upon one's span of attention of inner or outer phenomena.. There is an intentionality to attention. One intends one's own foci. Attention is the temporal duration of that intending. The volume offers a text that enables contemporary historians, graduate students, and even undergraduates who are well taught, to understand both the history of phenomenology as a method of inquiry, and the contemporary practice of phenomenological historical and historiographical thought.

This Ingardenia volume is the second in the Analecta Husserliana series that is entirely devoted to the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden. The first was volume IV (1976). Twenty years after Ingarden's death, this volume demonstrates that the Polish phenomenologist's contribution to philosophy and literary scholarship has received world-wide attention. His ideas have proven especially fruitful for the definition of the structure of the literary work of art and the subsequent recognition of its characteristic features. Of all the early phenomenologists who were students of Husserl, it is Ingarden whose work has faithfully pursued the original tenet that language "holds" the essence of the life-world "in readiness" (bereit halten). To investigate this premise with the rigor of a science, as Husserl had envisioned for phenomenology, was Ingarden's life work. That Ingarden did not quite reach his ambitious goal does not diminish his unquestionable achievement. The understanding of the nature of the literary work of art has increased enormously because of his analyses and aesthetics. The Polish phenomenologist investigated above all the work of art as a structure of necessary components which define and determine its nature. That the artistic ingredient was shortchanged under those conditions should not be surprising, particu larly since Ingarden usually kept a purist's philosophical distance from the concrete detail of the material under consideration. He was not concerned with individual works of art but with the principle that was shared by all of them as the defining feature of their being."

Taking the term "phenomenologist" in a fairly broad sense, Early Phenomenology focuses on those early exponents of the intellectual discipline, such as Buber, Ortega and Scheler rather than those thinkers that would later eclipse them; indeed the volume precisely means to bring into question what it means to be a phenomenologist, a category that becomes increasingly more fluid the more we distance ourselves from the gravitational pull of philosophical giants Husserl and Heidegger. In focusing on early phenomenology this volume seeks to examine the movement before orthodoxies solidified. More than merely adding to the story of phenomenology by looking closer at thinkers without the same fame as Husserl or Heidegger and the representatives of their legacy, the essays relate to one of the earlier thinkers with figures that are either more contemporary or more widely read, or both. Beyond merely filling in the historical record and reviving names, the chapters of this book will also give contemporary readers reasons to take these figures seriously as phenomenologists, radically reordering of our understanding of the lineage of this major philosophical movement.

Temporality has been a central issue in phenomenology since its inception. Husserl's groundbreaking investigations of the consciousness of internal time early in the century inaugurated a phenomenological tradition enriched by such figures as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Eugen Fink. The authors of the essays collected in this volume continue that tradition, challenging, expanding, and deepening it. Many of the essays explore topics involving the deepest levels of temporal constitution, including the relationship of temporality to the self and to the world; the ways in which temporalizing consciousness and what it temporalizes present themselves; and the roles and nature of present, past, and future. Other essays develop original positions concerning history, tradition, narrative, the time of generations, the coherence of one's life, and the place of time in the visual arts. In every instance, the authors show how invaluable phenomenology is for the investigation of time's many faces.

16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the beginning of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. He was a contemporary of Husserl, Frege, Mach, and Russell who were either originally or physicists, except Meinong. Meinong was a historian mathematicians and always a philosopher who became increasingly interested in experi mental psychology, under the influence of Franz Brentano. He, as each of his contemporaries, developed his own philosophy. It grew, in a profound fashion, into a very rich realism which was, curiously enoug- based on a staunch empirical attitude. Of all these philosophers, Meinong and Husserl were most closely associated: both of them were students of Brentano and dealt, each. with his own philosophical tools, with the same subject matter, presentations and their objects. Meinong concerned himself, in short critical notes, with Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the first volume of Ideas . . . which was trans 1 lated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The last section of this Introduction will be devoted to Meinong's criticism of Husserl. It is done in the last section because some of Meinong's theory is presupposed for the understanding of his critique of Husserl."

This book, combining integratively-revised previously-published papers with entirely new chapters, challenges and treats some major problems in Kant's philosophy not by means of new interpretations but by suggesting some variations on Kantian themes. Such variations are, in fact, reconstructions made according to Kantian ideas and principles and yet cannot be extracted as such directly from his writings. The book also analyses Kant's philosophy from a new metaphysical angle, based on the original metaphysics of the author, called panenmentalism. It reconstructs some missing links in Kant's philosophy, such as the idea of teleological time, which is vital for Kant's moral theory. Although these variations cannot be found literally in Kant's works, they can be legitimately explicated, developed, and implied from them. Such is the case because these variations are strictly compatible with the details of the texts and the texts as wholes, and because they are systematically integrated. Their coherence supports their validation. The target audiences are graduate and PhD students as well as specialist researchers of Kant's philosophy.

Das Husserlbild der Gegenwart ist noch weitgehend gepragt von den erkenntnistheoretischen "Logischen Untersuchungen", durch die Husserl in weitem MaBe als Begriinder einer neuen objektiven Logik gilt. Mitunter wird er sogar als einseitig orien- tierter Rationalist und Aufklarer des 20. J ahrhunderts, als der "Cartesius unserer Tage" 1 angesehen. Dieses Bild Husserls kann wohl jederzeit durch seine Veroffent- lichungen gerechtfertigt werden. Dennoch ist es einseitig und recht vordergriindig, da dabei voll und ganz iibersehen wird, daB auch der Bereich des Emotionalen flir HusserI ein entscheiden- gut wie nichts des Interessengebiet darstellt, wovon bislang so veroffentlicht worden ist. Wohl werden in seinen Schriften gclegentlich Fragen der Wertlehre, der Asthetik und Ethik angeschnitten 2, aber eine eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit derartigen Fragen liegt in keinem der veroffentlichten Werke vor. In Wirklichkeit aber war ihm die Begriindung einer echten wissenschaftlichen Ethik immer ein ernstes philosophisches An- liegen. Bereits vor den "Logischen Untersuchungen" beschaf- tigte sich Husserl mit ethischen Grundproblemen 3. Welche 1 Vgl. Briick, Maria, Dr. phil, Ubey das Verhiiltnis Hllsserls zu Franz Brentano, vor- nehmlich mit Rucksicht auf Brentanos Psychologie, 1933, S. 7. Husserl selbst hat die Phiinomenologie in den "Cartesianischen Meditationen" (Husscrliana, Bd. I, 1950, S.

"Does the World exist?" There would be no reason to resurrect this question of modernity from its historical oblivion were it not for the fact that recent evolution in science and technology, impregnating culture, makes us wonder about the nature of reality, of the world we are living in, and of our status as living beings within it. Thus great metaphysical subjacent queries are forcefully revived, calling for new investigations to proceed in the light of the innumerable novel insights of science.

This collection presents a wealth of material toward an elaboration of a new metaphysical groundwork of the ontopoiesis/ phenomenology of life sought to effect such investigations. The classic postulates of the metaphysics of reality, those of necessity and certainty here find a new formulation. Away from sclerotized ontological and cognitive assumptions and congenial with the views of contemporary science, the understanding of reality, of our world of life, and of ourselves within it is to be sought in the existential/ontopoietic ciphering of life (Tymieniecka).

What follows attempts to synthesize Husserl's social ethics and to integrate the themes of this topic into his larger philosophical concerns. Chapter I proceeds with the hypothesis that Husser! believed that all of life could be examined and lived by the transcendental phenomenologist, and therefore action was not something which one did isolated from one's commitment to being philosophical within the noetic-noematic field. Therefore besides attempting to be clear about the meaning of the reduction it relates the reduction to ethical life. Chapter II shows that the agent, properly understood, i. e. , the person, is a moral theme, indeed, reflection on the person involves an ethical reduction which leads into the essentials of moral categoriality, the topic of Chapter IV. Chapter III mediates the transcendental ego, individual person, and the social matrix by showing how the common life comes about and what the constitutive processes and ingredients of this life are. It also shows how the foundations of this life are imbued with themes which adumbrate moral categoriality discussed in Chapter IV. The final Chapters, V and VI, articulate the communitarian ideal, "the godly person of a higher order," emergent in Chapters II, III and IV, in terms of social-political and theological specifications of what this "godly" life looks like.

Pragmatic Perspectives in Phenomenology offers a complex analysis of the pragmatic theses that are present in the works of leading phenomenological authors, including not only Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as it is often the case within Hubert Dreyfus' tradition, but also Husserl, Levinas, Scheler, and Patocka. Starting from a critical reassessment of existing pragmatic readings which draw especially on Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world, the volume's chapters explore the following themes as possible justifications for speaking about the pragmatic turn in phenomenology: the primacy of the practical over theoretical understanding, criticism of the representationalist account of perception and consciousness, and the analysis of language and truth within the context of social and cultural practices. Having thus analyzed the pragmatic readings of key phenomenological concepts, the book situates these readings in a larger historical and thematic context and introduces themes that until now have been overlooked in debates, including freedom, alterity, transcendence, normativity, distance, and self-knowledge. This volume seeks to refresh the debate about the phenomenological legacy and its relevance for contemporary thought by enlarging the thematic scope of pragmatic motives in phenomenology in new and revealing ways. It will be of interest to advanced students and scholars of phenomenology who are interested in moving beyond the analytic-continental divide to explore the relationship between practice and theory.

Toward the beginning of 2013, I received reports of passages in the Black Notebooks that offered observations on Jewry, or as the case may be, world Jewry. It immediately became clear to me that the publication of the Black Notebooks would call forth a wide-spread international debate. Already in the Spring of 2013, I had asked Professor Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, last private assistant - and in the words of my grandfather, the "chief co-worker of the complete edition", - if he might review the Notebooks as a whole, based on his profound insight into the thought of Martin Heidegger, and in particular, review those Jewish-related passages that were the focus of the public eye. Publications about the Black Notebooks quickly came to propagate catchy expressions such as "being-historical anti-Semitism" and "metaphysical anti-Semitism". The first question that obviously arises is: Does the thought of Martin Heidegger exhibit any kind of anti-Semitism at all? In this book Professor von Herrmann now advances his hermeneutic explication. With Professor Francesco Alfieri of the Pontificia Universita Lateranense he has found a colleague who has drawn up a comprehensive philological analysis of volumes GA 94 through GA 97 of the Complete Edition. The fact that Heidegger designated the hitherto published "black notebooks" as Ponderings (UEberlegungen) and as Observations (Anmerkungen) has been given little consideration. He intentionally placed them at the conclusion of the Complete Edition because without acquaintance with the lectures, and above all, with the being-historical treatises that would come to be published in the framework of the Complete Edition, they would not be comprehensible. (Arnulf Heidegger)

This is the first monograph to deal with medicine as a form of hermeneutics, now in a thoroughly revised and updated edition, including a whole new chapter on medical ethics. The book offers a comprehensive philosophical argument why good medical practice cannot be curtailed to scientific investigations of the body but is a form of clinical hermeneutics performed by health-care professionals in dialogue with their patients. Medical hermeneutics is rooted in a phenomenology of illness which acknowledges and proceeds from the ill party's bodily feelings, everyday life-world circumstances and self-understanding in aiming to restore health. The author shows how the works of classical phenomenologists and hermeneuticians - Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur - may be employed to understand how medical diagnosis is enveloped by professional empathy and clinical judgement and developed by scientific investigations of the patient's bodily condition. Health and illness are ultimately considered to be ways of feeling at home or not at home in the world, and such experiences are the starting point of medical hermeneutics when aiming to make best use of scientific knowledge. The book is aimed at researchers and teachers in philosophy of medicine and medical ethics, and at physicians, nurses and other health-care professionals meeting with patients in ethically complex and challenging situations. Phenomenology and hermeneutics, most often considered as methods belonging to the humanities, are shown to be of vital importance for the understanding of medical practice and ethical dilemmas of health care.

This book explores the lived experience of being at home as well as being homeless. Being at home or not is typically a matter of being at a place or not, where such a place is carved out of space and designated as such. It is a place that is both empirical and trans-empirical. When one is at home or not at home, one typically has in mind an inhabited place. To inhabit or not to inhabit it is to find oneself in a place that has an affective presence or absence. In either case, affectivity points to a lived place where lived experience is constituted and displayed. Thus, in this context, affectivity becomes more than the subject of empirical psychology. If psychology were to have access, it would be in the context of phenomenological or existential psychology - a psychology that has its roots in the sensible world and, hence, a psychology that expresses an aesthetic dimension. Each of the contributors in this book extends an invitation to the readers to participate in constituting, extending, and sharing with others the sense of either being at home or of being homeless. This book appeals to students, researchers as well as general interest readers.

This is the first book to offer a systematic comparison of the philosophies of Albert Camus and Frantz Fanon. It shows how the ethical, political, and psychological outlooks of these two influential thinkers can further our understandings of how to bring about justice in the face of deep power imbalances. The author foregrounds the bloody Algerian War of Independence in his analysis of the philosophies of Camus and Fanon. Although neither supported French colonial occupation of Algeria, they held radically different views of the conflict. Fanon supported emancipation through violence, which the author argues has been uncritically romanticized. Camus, on the other hand, supported an ethics of moderation that shunned indiscriminate violence. The author argues that Camus has been unfairly accused of being an apologist for colonialism. Finally, the author draws out the common endorsement of humanist values that drive both Camus' and Fanon's thought. Camus and Fanon on the Algerian Question will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in twentieth-century Continental philosophy, postcolonialism, existentialism, and African philosophy.

Generative Worlds. New Phenomenological Perspectives on Space and Time accounts for the phenomenological concept of generativity. In doing so, this book brings together several recent phenomenological studies on space and time. Generative studies in phenomenology propose new ways of conceiving space, time, and the relation between them. Edited by Luz Ascarate and Quentin Gailhac, the collection reveals new dimensions to topics such as the generation of life, birth, historicity, intersubjectivity, narrativity, institution, touching, and places, and in some cases, the contributors invert the classical definitions of space and time. These transformative readings are fruitful for the interdisciplinary exchange between philosophy and fields such as cosmology, psychology, and the social sciences. The contributors ask if phenomenology reaches its own concreteness through the study of generation and whether it manages to redefine certain dimensions of space and time which, in other orientations of the Husserlian method, remain too abstract and detached from the constitutive becoming of experience.