In this work I have tried to present HusserI's Philosophy of thinking and meaning in as clear a manner as I can. In doing this, I had in mind a two-fold purpose. I wanted on the one hand to disentangle what I have come to regard as the central line of thought from the vast mass of details of the Logische Unter suchungen and the Formale und transzendentale Logik. On the other hand, I tried to take into consideration the immense developments in logic and semantics that have taken place since HusserI's major logical studies were published. It is my belief that no one to day can look back upon the philosophers of the past except in the light of the admirable progress achieved and consolidated in the fields of logic and semantics in recent times. Fortunately enough, from this point of view HusserI fares remarkably well. He certainly anticipated many of those recent investigations. What is more, a true understanding and appraisal of his logical studies is not possible except in the light of the corresponding modern investigations. This last consider ation may provide us with some explanation of the rather puzzling fact that orthodox HusserIian scholarship both within and outside Germany has not accorded to his logical studies the central importance that they, from all points of view, unmis takeably deserve."

Ever since the beginning of the modern phenomenological movement disciplined attention has been paid to various patterns of human experi- ence as they are actually lived through in the concrete. This has brought forth many attempts to tind a general philosophical position which can do justice to these experiences without reduction or distQrtion. In France, the best known of these recent attempts have been made by Sartre in his Being and Nothingness and by Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenol- ogy of Perception and certain later fragments. Sartre has a keen sense for life as it is lived, and his work is marked by many penetrating descrip- tions. But his dualistic ontology of the en-soi versus the pour-soi has seemed over-simple and inadequate to many critics, and has been seriously qualitied by the author himself in his latest Marxist work, The Critique of Dialetical Reason. Merleau-Ponty's major work is a lasting contri- but ion to the phenomenology of the pre-objective world of perception. But asi de from a few brief hints and sketches, he was unable, before his unfortunate death in 1961, to work out carefully his ultimate philosophi- cal point of view. This leaves us then with the German philosopher, Heidegger, as the only contemporary thinker who has formulated a total ontology which claims to do justice to the stable results of phenomenology and to the liv- ing existential thought of our time.

The essays in this volume constitute a portion of the research program being carried out by the International Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. Established as an affiliate society of the World Institute for Ad vanced Phenomenological Research and Learning in 1976, in Arezzo, Italy, by the president of the Institute, Dr Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, this particular society is devoted to an exploration of the relevance of phenomenological methods and insights for an understanding of the origins and goals of the specialised human sciences. The essays printed in the first part of the book were originally presented at the Second Congress of this society held at Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, 12-14 July 1979. The second part of the volume consists of selected essays from the third convention (the Eleventh International Congress of Phenomenology of the World Phenomen ology Institute) held in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1981. With the third part of this book we pass into the "Human Rights" issue as treated by the World Phenomenology Institute at the Interamerican Philosophy Congress held in Tallahassee, Florida, also in 1981. The volume opens with a mono graph by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka on the foundations of ethics in the moral practice within the life-world and the social world shown as clearly distinct. The main ideas of this work had been presented by Tymieniecka as lead lectures to the three conferences giving them a tight research-project con sistency."

QUESTIONS DE METHODE I. Au contraire de Sartre qui, a partir de quelques elements cueillis dans les ecrits de HusserI concernant la conscience ima- geante, a bllti sa propre doctrine de !'imagination, nous nous proposons de reconstituer, a partir de ces m~mes elements, ce qu'on pourrait appeler la theort:e husserlienne de l'imagination, c'est-a-dire la theorie que HusserI eut lui-m~me construite, s'il avait reuni en une synthese les elements qu'il a laisses epars. Une entreprise de ce genre est toujours delicate et souleve des prob!emes difficiles - a commencer par celui de sa legitimite. N ous ecartons d'emblee l'objection d'ordre general qui contesterait Ie droit de systematiser dans l'reuvre d'un auteur ce que lui-m~me a laisse disperse et eventuellement inacheve. Par un tel scrupule, on sacrifie sans doute a la rigueur historique mais on est beaucoup moins soucieux de penetrer une pensee dans son dynamisme in- terne et profond et, en derniere analyse, on protege les droits de l'archeologie mais non pas ceux de la culture et de son progreso Nous pensons a une difficulte beaucoup plus serieuse; de sa so- lution depend l'attitude a adopter en face des textes dont nous devons nous servir dans notre etude. Nous utilisons des ouvrages qui couvrent la totalite de la car- riere philosophique de HusserIl.

Phenomenology represents a mainstream in the philosophy of subjectivity as well as a rich tradition of inquiry in psychiatry. The conceptual and empirical study of language has become increasingly relevant for psychiatric research and practice. Schizophrenia is still the most enigmatic and most relevant mental disorder. This volume represents an attempt to bring specialists from different fields together in order to integrate various conceptual and empirical approaches for the benefit of schizophrenic research. We hope that it will facilitate discussions among members of such diverse fields as psychiatry, psychology, and philosophy.

Die Absicht vorliegender Studie ist zunachst eine kritische Priifung der philosophischen Anthropologie Max Schelers. Die Zeit von vierzig Jahren seit Schelers Tod, wahrend der die Ent- wicklung der philosophischen Bemiihung urn Wesen und Wirk- Abstand lichkeit des Menschen nicht stillstand, diirfte geniigend bieten fUr eine niichterne, person- und sachgerechte Bewaltigung dieser Aufgabe. Leitender Gesichtspunkt sind dabei die christ- lichen bzw. theologischen Implikationen im Schelerschen Men- schenbild. N ach der philosophischen Gotteslehre ist die philo- sophische Anthropologie wohl am meisten aus der stet en Aus- einandersetzung mit christlichem Gedankengut gewachsen. "Seitdem das Christentum in die Welt getreten ist, hat es im Abendland kein Nachdenken iiber Wesen und Wert des mensch- lichen Daseins gegeben, das von dem EinfluB der christlichen Gedankenwelt v611ig unberiihrt geblieben ware."l Kaum ein anderer anthropologisch orientierter Denker un seres J ahrhun- derts entspricht mehr dieser Diagnose als Max Scheler, mit dessen Namen die "philosophische Anthropologie" im engeren Sinn un- 16sbar verbunden bleibt. Die Tatsache der starken christlich-theologischen Beeinflus- sung Schelers machte es notwendig, daB in unserer Arbeit immer wieder auch theologische Fragestellungen mitberiicksichtigt wer- den muBten. Dies geschah, sooft die Sache es erforderte, jedoch unbeschadet der philosophischen Grundabsicht vorliegender Ab- handlung. Wenn von "christlichen" bzw. "theologischen" Implikationen in Schelers Menschdeutung die Rede ist, dann werden darunter 1 Th. Litt, Mensch u. Welt. Grundlinien einer Philosophie d. Geistes; Heidelberg 2 61, II.

he radical viewpoint of phenomenology is presented by T 3 Edmund Husser! in his Ideas. This viewpoint seems quite simple at first, but becomes exceedingly complex and involves intricate distinctions when attempts are made to apply it to actual problems. Therefore, it may be well to attempt a short statement of this position in order to note the general problems with which it is dealing as well as the method of solution which it proposes. I shall emphasize the elements of phenomenology which seem most relevant to E. Stein's work. Husser! deals with two traditional philosophical questions, and in answering them, develops the method of phenomenological reduction which he maintains is the basis of all science. These questions are, "What is it that can be known without doubt?" and "How is this knowledge possible in the most general sense?" In the tradition of idealism he takes consciousness as the area to be investigated. He posits nothing about the natural world. He puts it in "brackets," as a portion of an algebraic formula is put in brackets, and makes no use of the material within these brackets. This does not mean that the "real" wor!d does not exist, he says emphatically; it only means that this existence is a presupposition must be suspended to achieve pure description.

Kurt Goldstein starb am 19. September 1965. Bis kurz vor seinem Tode arbeitete er an dem Plan, eine Auswahl seiner wichtigsten ktir- zeren Sehriften zu ver6ffentliehen; ein verbindender Text sollte die ungebrochene Entwieklung seiner Ideen von ihren anfangIiehen Keimen bis zur spateren vollen Entfaltung darlegen. Der Plan kam nieht mehr zur Vollendung; aber die vorliegende Zusammenstellung der flir Kurt Goldstein's Lebenswerk bedeutsamsten Aufsatze mag dessen innere Einheit erhellen. Seine posthum ver6ffentliehte Auto- biographie (s. unten S. 1 ff.) gibt eine knappe Zusammenfassung seiner grundlegenden wissenschaftlichen Ziele und Ergebnisse. Auskunft tiber seine hinterlassenen wissenschaftlichen Papiere ist durch mich erhaltlieh. Herm Professor Aron Gurwitsch, dem langjahrigen Freunde Kurt Goldstein's und intimen Kenner seiner Ideen, der die Einleitung zu diesem Band gesehrieben und an seiner Vorbereitung intensiv tei!- genommen hat, spreehe ich aueh hier meine Dankbarkeit aus. DesgIeichen danke ich den Verlagshausem, mit deren Erlaubnis die hier enthaltenen Sehriften Kurt Goldstein's wieder abgedruekt werden konnten. ELSE M. GOLDSTEIN HAUDEK 1080 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10028 EINLEITUNG Die Aufnahme in die Serie Phaenomenoiogica der im vorgelegten Bande vereinigten Arbeiten rechtfertigt sich voIIauf durch die philo. sophische Bedeutsamkeit sowohl dieser Aufsatze wie des gesamten Werkes von Kurt Goldstein - ungeachtet ihres weitgehend neuro* logischen InhaIts und ihrer urspriinglichen Herkunft aus neurolo* gischer Forschung und Praxis. Genauer genommen besteht diese phi.

To introduce this collection of research studies, which stem from the pro grams conducted by The World Phenomenology Institute, we need say a few words about our aims and work. This will bring to light the significance of the present volume. The phenomenological philosophy is an unprejudiced study of experience in its entire range: experience being understood as yielding objects. Experi ence, moreover, is approached in a specific way, such a way that it legitima tizes itself naturally in immediate evidence. As such it offers a unique ground for philosophical inquiry. Its basic condition, however, is to legitimize its validity. In this way it allows a dialogue to unfold among various philosophies of different methodologies and persuasions, so that their basic assumptions and conceptions may be investigated in an objective fashion. That is, instead of comparing concepts, we may go below their differences to seek together what they are meant to grasp. We may in this way come to the things them selves, which are the common objective of all philosophy, or what the great Chinese philosopher Wang Yang Ming called "the investigation of things." It is in this spirit that the Institute's programs include a "cross-cultural" dialogue meant to bring about a profound communication among philosophers in their deepest concerns. Rising above artificial cultural confinements, such dialogues bring scholars, thinkers and human beings together toward a truly human community of minds. Our Institute unfolds one consistent academic program."

The following bibliography, arranged chronologically, permits the reader to follow the development of phenomenological studies in Italy in parallel with other, contemporary, cultural currents. From this list it can be seen that knowledge of Hussed's work begins in 1923 with the studies of A. Banfi. Phenomenology, however, did not immediately receive a warm welcome. It contrasted with the then dominant neo-idealism (as has been made clear by G. De Ruggiero), but for this very reason it also found adherents among the opponents of idealism. These were either distant heirs of positivism, who accepted Hussed on account of his scientific approach and rigor, or Christian oriented thinkers, who, following an initial period of diffidence toward the antimetaphysical attitude of phenomenological analysis, gradually began to use this method as an antiidealist instrument - even though the problem remained of Hussed's own transcendental idealism and the value to be attributed to it. Despite the difficulties encountered on the way, the numerous studies carried out in Italy prior to Wodd War II make it clear that the better known philosophers who have left a mark on Italian culture already had begun to take a discreet interest in phenomenology."

Alfred Schutz devoted his life to a clarification of the foun dations of the social sciences. His first formulation of the perti nent problems is contained in DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAU DER SOZIALEN WELT, EINE EINLEITUNG IN DIE VERSTEHENDE SOZIOLOGIE, now available in a second unrevised German edition with an English translation in preparation. Since I932, the date of this work, Alfred Schutz pursued painstaking and detailed investigations of issues which arose in connection with his early endeavors. These investigations were originally published as a series of essays and monographs over a period of about twenty years and are now assembled in the COLLECTED PAPERS of which this is the third and final volume. They form a unitary whole insofar as a common core of problems and theoretical ideas is presented from varying perspectives. Together DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAu DER SOZIALEN WELT and the three volumes of COL LECTED PAPERS set forth a comprehensive and consistent theory of the world of everyday life as the reality with which the social sciences are essentially concerned. Alfred Schutz was preparing a systematic presentation of his theory and of the results of his investigations into the struc tures of the world of everyday life when death overtook him. The manuscript containing the final statement of his philosophical and sociological thinking was not completely ready for publi cation at the time of his death. It is now being brought into book form by Professor Thomas Luckmann, one of his former students.

Depuis la vigoureuse monographie que, en 1951, Alphonse de Waelhens consacra, sous le Ie titre de "Vne "Une philosophie philosophie de de l'Ambi- l'Ambi- guite" guite" a la pensee de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, la reflexion et les etudes sur les divers aspects de eette cette pensee pensee se se multiplierent multiplierent en en Franee France et dans le Ie monde. monde. La mort prematuree du philosophe en 1961, n'a pas diminue l'inMret l'interet qu'avaient suscite ses eerits ecrits et son enseignement. Des notes et des resumes de cours, des manuscrits manuserits inedits pieusement reunis par des disciples, diseiples, furent publies depuis lors. "Le Visible et l'Invisible, suivi de notes de travail", paru en 1964, revela les perspeetives perspectives nouvelles d'une oeuvre qui apparaU ainsi eomme comme la plus riehe riche en possibilites, possibilit6s, parmi toutes eelles celles que, que, meme meme sur sur sa terre natale, inspira la phenomenologie de Husserl et de Heidegger. La philosophie de Merleau-Ponty ne se limite ee- ce- pendant a aucune ecole. Elle reste ouverte sur les problemes de son temps et notamment sur eeux ceux que, que, des des avant la penetration de la phenomenologie en France, posaient, en Allemagne et en Amerique, les sciences humaines: la psychologie dite de la Gestalt, le Ie behaviourisme, behaviourisme, la psychanalyse. psyehanalyse.

16. The General Subject Matter of Husserl's Phenomenology 45 17. General Thesis and Epoche 46 18. Doubt 47 19. Hyle and Noema 48 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY TRANSLATION OF SELECI'ED TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE FOOTNOTES 51 INTRODUCTION SECTION I PREFACE Meinong was one of the great philosophers who stand at the beginning of Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology. He was a contemporary of Husserl, Frege, Mach, and Russell who were either originally or physicists, except Meinong. Meinong was a historian mathematicians and always a philosopher who became increasingly interested in experi mental psychology, under the influence of Franz Brentano. He, as each of his contemporaries, developed his own philosophy. It grew, in a profound fashion, into a very rich realism which was, curiously enoug- based on a staunch empirical attitude. Of all these philosophers, Meinong and Husserl were most closely associated: both of them were students of Brentano and dealt, each. with his own philosophical tools, with the same subject matter, presentations and their objects. Meinong concerned himself, in short critical notes, with Husserl's phenomenology, that is, the first volume of Ideas . . . which was trans 1 lated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. The last section of this Introduction will be devoted to Meinong's criticism of Husserl. It is done in the last section because some of Meinong's theory is presupposed for the understanding of his critique of Husserl."

This book sets out an extensive argument against the foundationalist theories of justification, and advocates new life for philosophy of science. The author brings together aspects of an ontology of the interpretative constitution of research objects and a holistic picture of science 's cognitive structures. The book is a contribution to a wide range of discussion concerning the post-Gadamerian extension of philosophical hermeneutics beyond the scope of the traditional humanistic culture.

6 werden kann, musste die Einsicht erwecken, dass das Quantitative gar nicht zum allgemeinsten Wesen des Mathematischen oder "Formalen" und der in ihm grundenden kalkulatorischen Me- thode gehore. Als ich dann in der "mathematisierenden Logik" 5 eine in der Tat quantitatslose Mathematik kennenlemte, und zwar als eine unanfechtbare Disziplin von mathematischer Form und Methode, welche teils die alten Syllogismen, teils neue, der Uberlieferung fremd gebliebene Schlussformen behandelte, gestalteten sich mir die wichtigen Probleme nach dem allgemei- 10 nen Wesen des Mathematischen uberhaupt, nach den naturlichen Zusammenhangen oder etwaigen Grenzen zwischen den Systemen der quantitativen und nichtquantitativen Mathematik, und spe- ziell z. B. nach dem Verhaltnis zwischen dem Formalen der Arithmetik und dem Formalen der Logik. Naturgemass musste 15 ich von hier aus weiter fortschreiten zu den fundamentaleren Fragen nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnisform im Unterschiede von der Erkenntnismaterie und nach dem Sinn des Unter- schiedes zwischen formalen (reinen) und materialen Bestimmun- gen, Wahrheiten, Gesetzen. 20 Aber noch in einer ganz anderen Richtung fand ich mich in Probleme der allgemeinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie ver- wickelt. Ich war von der herrschenden Uberzeugung ausgegangen, dass es die Psychologie sei, von der, wie die Logik uberhaupt, so die Logik der deduktiven Wissenschaften ihre philosophische 25 Aufklarung erhoffen musse. Demgemass nehmen psychologische Untersuchungen in dem ersten (und allein veroffentlichten) B- de meiner Philosophie der Arithmetik einen sehr breiten Raum ein. {[A VII] Diese psychologische Fundierung wollte 11 mir in gewissen Zu- [B VII] sammenhangen nie recht genugen.

The following is neither exclusively the study of a philosopher nor a problem, and yet is both as well. Alfred Schutz is now recogniz ed to have been a profoundly insightful philosopher who explor ed the nature of social reality and the social sciences. His works are exercising a great influence in a wide range of problems and disciplines, the latter including the social sciences themselves. All of this is testimony to the sagacity and penetrating character of his analyses as well as the fruitfulness and soundness of his con cepts. Philosophy proceeds, however, by not merely accepting the work of great philosophers, but by engaging them in critical philosophic dialogue. It is time for this interchange to begin with respect to Schutz's work. To some extent, then, this work is di rected to that task. It does not undertake a systematic treat ment of the whole of Schutz's philosophy, for much more work in many aspects of his thought is yet to be done before such a pro ject can reasonably be undertaken. Yet, the issue of concern in this study is, I now believe, the philosophic center of the whole of Schutz's work."