This book sets out an extensive argument against the foundationalist theories of justification, and advocates new life for philosophy of science. The author brings together aspects of an ontology of the interpretative constitution of research objects and a holistic picture of science 's cognitive structures. The book is a contribution to a wide range of discussion concerning the post-Gadamerian extension of philosophical hermeneutics beyond the scope of the traditional humanistic culture.

6 werden kann, musste die Einsicht erwecken, dass das Quantitative gar nicht zum allgemeinsten Wesen des Mathematischen oder "Formalen" und der in ihm grundenden kalkulatorischen Me- thode gehore. Als ich dann in der "mathematisierenden Logik" 5 eine in der Tat quantitatslose Mathematik kennenlemte, und zwar als eine unanfechtbare Disziplin von mathematischer Form und Methode, welche teils die alten Syllogismen, teils neue, der Uberlieferung fremd gebliebene Schlussformen behandelte, gestalteten sich mir die wichtigen Probleme nach dem allgemei- 10 nen Wesen des Mathematischen uberhaupt, nach den naturlichen Zusammenhangen oder etwaigen Grenzen zwischen den Systemen der quantitativen und nichtquantitativen Mathematik, und spe- ziell z. B. nach dem Verhaltnis zwischen dem Formalen der Arithmetik und dem Formalen der Logik. Naturgemass musste 15 ich von hier aus weiter fortschreiten zu den fundamentaleren Fragen nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnisform im Unterschiede von der Erkenntnismaterie und nach dem Sinn des Unter- schiedes zwischen formalen (reinen) und materialen Bestimmun- gen, Wahrheiten, Gesetzen. 20 Aber noch in einer ganz anderen Richtung fand ich mich in Probleme der allgemeinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie ver- wickelt. Ich war von der herrschenden Uberzeugung ausgegangen, dass es die Psychologie sei, von der, wie die Logik uberhaupt, so die Logik der deduktiven Wissenschaften ihre philosophische 25 Aufklarung erhoffen musse. Demgemass nehmen psychologische Untersuchungen in dem ersten (und allein veroffentlichten) B- de meiner Philosophie der Arithmetik einen sehr breiten Raum ein. {[A VII] Diese psychologische Fundierung wollte 11 mir in gewissen Zu- [B VII] sammenhangen nie recht genugen.

The following is neither exclusively the study of a philosopher nor a problem, and yet is both as well. Alfred Schutz is now recogniz ed to have been a profoundly insightful philosopher who explor ed the nature of social reality and the social sciences. His works are exercising a great influence in a wide range of problems and disciplines, the latter including the social sciences themselves. All of this is testimony to the sagacity and penetrating character of his analyses as well as the fruitfulness and soundness of his con cepts. Philosophy proceeds, however, by not merely accepting the work of great philosophers, but by engaging them in critical philosophic dialogue. It is time for this interchange to begin with respect to Schutz's work. To some extent, then, this work is di rected to that task. It does not undertake a systematic treat ment of the whole of Schutz's philosophy, for much more work in many aspects of his thought is yet to be done before such a pro ject can reasonably be undertaken. Yet, the issue of concern in this study is, I now believe, the philosophic center of the whole of Schutz's work."

Originally entitled Osoba i Czyn and published in Poland in 1969, TheActing Person is the official English translation and has been thoroughly edited and revised with the collaboration of the author.

The book stresses that Man must ceaselessly unravel his mysteries and strive for a new and more mature expression of his nature. The author sees this expression as an emphasis on the significance of the individual living in community and on the person in the process of performing an action. The author states in his preface that he has tried to face the major issues concerning life, nature, and the existence of Man directly as they present themselves to Man in his struggles to survive while maintaining the dignity of a human being, but who is torn apart between his all too limited condition and his highest aspirations to set himself free.

The author hopes that his book "contributes to this disentangling of the conflicting issues facing Man, which are crucial for Man s own clarification of his existence and direction of his conduct."

The author s analysis of the human being is a dynamic counter to the materialistic and positivistic tendencies in various schools of modern philosophy. Ever since Descartes, the knowledge of Man and his world has been identified through cognition. This book is a reversal of the post-Cartesian attitude toward Man in that it characterises him as the person in action.

Audience: The Acting Person will be of great interest to philosophers, anthropologists, and scholars specializing in phenomenology. It will also be of deep concern to theologians, priests, seminarians, and members of religious orders who wish to gain an insight into Pope John Paul II s philosophy of life. "

In releasing the text of this volume, originally set aside as a collec tion for possible posthumous publication, during my lifetime, I am acting in a sense as my own executor: I want to save my heirs and literary executors the decision whether these pieces should be print ed or reprinted in the present context, a decision which I wanted to postpone to the last possible moment. As to the reasons why I changed my mind I can refer to the Introduction. Here I merely want to make some acknowledgments, first to the copyright holders for the reprinted pieces and then to some personal friends who had an important influence on the premature birth of this brainchild. The copyright holders to whom I am indebted for.the permis sion to reprint here, in the original or in slightly amended form, the articles listed are, with their names in alphabetical order: Ablex Publishing Company: 'Putting Ourselves into the Place of Others' Atherton Press: 'Equality in Existentialism' and 'Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy' Friends Journal: 'Is There a Human Right to One's Native Soil?' Gordon Breach: 'Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy?' Humanities Press: 'Ethics for Fellows in the Fate of Existence' Journal of the History of Ideas: 'Accident of Birth: A Non-utili tarian Motif in Mill's Philosophy' Philosophical Review: 'A Defense of Human Equality' Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry: 'On the I-am me Experience in Childhood and Adolescence' The Monist: 'A Phenomenological Approach to the Ego'"

"Das Problem der verborgenen Vernunft" ist es, das auch dieser Aufhellung der Verantwortlichkeit den Horizont gibt, in welchem als Klarung der Einheit der Teleologie die phanomeno- logische Geduld sich entfalten kann. - Die hier vorgelegte Untersuchung wurde von der Philo so- phischen Fakultat der Universitat zu Koln im Sommer 1973 als Dissertation angenommen; sie wurde fur die Veroffentlichung durchgesehen. Danken mochte ich vor aHem Herrn Professor Dr. Ludwig Land- grebe. Seinem philosophischen Vorbild und seiner groBzugigen Forderung ist die vorliegende Arbeit entscheidend verpflichtet. Herrn Professor Dr. Lothar Eley sage ich Dank fUr seine stetige freundliche Hilfe. EbenfaHs danke ich Herrn Heinz Runi, der in zahlreichen Gesprachen durch seine Anregungen an der Entwick- lung dieser Arbeit teilgenommen und zu ihrem Gelingen beige- tragen hat. Die folgenden Untersuchungen stutzen sich hauptsachlich auf die veroffentlichten Werke Husserls; daruber hinaus war das Studium unveroffentlichter Manuskripte von groBem Nutzen, und fUr die Erlaubnis zu ihrer Verwendung gilt mein Dank dem ver- storbenen Direktor des Russerl-Archivs in Lowen, Rerrn Profes- sor Dr. Herman Leo van Breda. - Bedanken mochte ich mich auch :beim Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienst, der mir fur mein Studium in KOln ein Stipendium gewahrte.

Professor H. L. Van Breda had hoped to write this preface, but his recent, unexpected and untimely death has left that task in my hands. Although my remarks will not be as eloquent and insightful as his surely would have been, some few words are clearly in order here; for the phenomenological community has not only lost the leadership of Fr. Van Breda these last years, but also the scholarship and leadership of Aron Gurwitsch and Alden Fisher - both contributors to this volume - as well as that of Dorion Cairns and John Wild. Our leaders are fewer now but Herbert Spiegelberg is still very obviously one of them. This volume thus presents the work of some of the past and presently recognized leaders in phenomenology - e. g. Gurwitsch, Straus, and Fisher - but, more important perhaps, it also presents the work of some of those who are sure to be future leaders of our community of phenomenological philosophers, if in fact they have not already achieved this status. Most, if not all, of the contribu tors to this volume are in some way or another indebted to Herbert Spiegelberg and his work in phenomenology."

There is a remarkable unity to the work of Edmund Husserl, but there are also many difficulties in it. The unity is the result of a single personal and philo sophical quest working itself out in concrete phenomenological analyses; the difficulties are due to the inadequacy of initial conceptions which becomes felt as those analyses become progressively deeper and more extensive. ! Anyone who has followed the course of Husserl's work is struck by the constant reemergence of the same problems and by the insightfulness of the inquiries which press toward their solution. However one also becomes aware of Husserl's own dissatisfaction with his work, once so movingly expressed in a 2 personal note. It is the purpose of the present work to examine and revive one of the issues which gave Husserl difficulty, namely, the problem of an intro duction to phenomenology. Several of Husserl's writings published after Logical Investigations were either subtitled or referred to by him as "introductions to phenomenology. "3 These works serve to acquaint the reader with the specific character of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and with the problems to which it is to provide the solution. They include discussions and analyses which pertain to what has come to be known as "ways" into transcendental phenomenology. 4 The issue here is the proper access to transcendental phenomenology.

Elsewhere 1 we were concerned with fundamental aspects of the question how man can comprehend his fellow-men. We analyzed man's subjective experiences of the Other and found in them the basis for his understanding of the Other's subjective processes of consciousness. The very assumption of the existence of the Other, however, introduces the dimension of intersub jectivity. The world is experienced by the Self as being inhabited by other Selves, as being a world for others and of others. As we had occasion to point out, intersubjective reality is by no means homogeneous. The social world in which man finds himself exhibits a complex structure; fellow-men appear to the Self under different aspects, to which correspond different cognitive styles by which the Self perceives and apprehends the Other's thoughts, motives, and actions. In the present investigation it will be our main task to describe the origin of the differentiated structures of social reality as well as to reveal the principles underlying its unity and coherence. It must be stressed that careful description of the processes which enable one man to understand another's thoughts and actions is a prerequisite for the methodology of the empirical social sciences. The question how a scientific interpretation of human action is possible can be resolved only if an adequate * From: De, sinnha/te A II/ball tler sowuen WeU, Vienna, 1932; 2nd ed. 1960 (Sektion IV: Strukturanalyse der Sozialwelt, Soziale Umwelt, Mitwelt, Vorwelt, English adaptation by Professor Thomas Luckmann.

The articles included in this volume originate from contributions to the International Conference on Philosophy and Science in Phenomenologi cal Perspecllve, held in Buffalo in March 1982. The occasion had been to honor the late Professor Marvin Farber, a long time distinguished member of the Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Buffalo. and the Founding Editor of the journal, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Many of the papers were subsequently rewritten, expanded or other wise edited to be published in the series Phaenomenoiogica. The articles lIy Professor Frings and Professor Rotenstreich had not been presented at the conference, although they were originally invited papers. We regret that not all papers submitted to the conference, including com ments, could be accommodated in this volume. Nonetheless, our sincere gratitude is due to all participants who have made the conference a memorable and worthy event. nt of Philosophy, State University of New York at The Departme Buffalo, as the sponsor of the conference, wishes to acknowledge the grants from the Conferences in the Disciplines Program, Conversations in the Disciplines Program, and the International Studies of the State University of New York at Buffalo, as well as for a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The International Phenomenological Society, with Professor Roderick Chisholm succeeding Marvin Farber as its president, co-sponsored the conference.

This book has two parts. The first part is chiefly concerned with critically establishing the universally necessary order of the various steps of transcendental phenomenological method; the second part provides specific cases of phenomenological analysis that illustrate and test the method established in the first part. More than this, and perhaps even more important in the long run, the phenomeno logical analyses reported in the second part purport a foundation for drawing phenomenological-philosophical conclusions about prob lems of space perception, "other minds," and time perception. The non-analytical, that is, the literary, sources of this book are many. Principal among them are the writings of Husserl (which will be accorded a special methodological function) as well as the writings of his students of the Gottingen and Freiburg years. Of the latter especially important are the writings and, when memory serves, the lectures of Dorion Cairns and Aron Gurwitsch. Of the former especially significant are the writings of Heinrich Hofmann, Wilhelm Schapp, and Hedwig COlilrad-Martius."

How is society possible? In Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaflen und die transzendentale Phiinomenoiogie, I Edmund Husserl is found with a pathos send ing out pleas for belief ("Glauben") in his transcendental philosophy and tran scendental ego. The traditional idea of theoretical reflection instituted in ancient Greece as the suspension of all taken for granted worldly interests has, through a partial realization of itself, forsaken itself in the one-sided development of the objective mathematical-natural sciences as they themselves have become so taken for granted, with the method and validity of their results held as so self-evident, that they appear as resting self-sufficiently on their own grounds, while pursuing an increasingly abstract mathematization of nature. The sciences are left without a foundation and their meaning within the world consequently unintelligible, while their objective and valid abstract concepts continually tend to supercede the everyday life-world and render it questionable. In the end, these of belief in the everyday life-world or reflective evolving and exchanging attitudes doubt (science) ultimately leads to a disbelief in both, and a search in one direction for idol leaders and in the other for the cult of experience. This collapse of Western belief systems becomes particularly threatening as it turns into nihilism which is the development of beliefs in societal forms which employ 2 natural and social science for the liquidation of humanity and nature. Society starts becoming impossible."

I first became interested in Husserl and Heidegger as long ago as 1980, when as an undergraduate at the Freie Universitat Berlin I studied the books by Professor Ernst Tugendhat. Tugendhat's at tempt to bring together analytical and continental philosophy has never ceased to fascinate me, and even though in more recent years other influences have perhaps been stronger, I should like to look upon the present study as still being indebted to Tugendhat's initial incentive. It was my good fortune that for personal reasons I had to con tinue my academic training from 1981 onwards in Finland. Even though Finland is a stronghold of analytical philosophy, it also has a tradition of combining continental and Anglosaxon philosophical thought. Since I had already admired this line of work in Tugendhat, it is hardly surprising that once in Finland I soon became impressed by Professor Jaakko Hintikka's studies on Husserl and intentionality, and by Professor Georg Henrik von Wright's analytical hermeneu tics. While the latter influence has-at least in part-led to a book on the history of hermeneutics, the former influence has led to the present work. My indebtedness to Professor Hintikka is enormous. Not only is the research reported here based on his suggestions, but Hintikka has also commented extensively on different versions of the manuscript, helped me to make important contacts, found a publisher for me, and-last but not least-was a never failing source of encouragement."

Fragestellung und Losungsansatz der folgenden Untersuchungen 2 HUSSERL UND COHN Die vorliegende Arbeit vergleicht die Position des neukantianischen Dialektikers Jonas Cohn mit derjenigen des Phanomenologen Edmund Hus- serl. Bevor auf die thematischen Zielsetzungen der einzelnen Kapitel einge- gangen wird, seien einige Bemerkungen vorausgeschickt, die zeigen sollen, inwiefern einem solchen Vergleich Bedeutung zukommt. Grundsatzlich ist ein Vergleich philosophischer Positionen nur dann durchfuhrbar, wenn in irgend einer Hinsicht eine Gemeinsamkeit vorliegt. Sinnvoll wird ein Vergleich nur dann sein, wenn sich die Relata nicht in je- der Beziehung entsprechen und wenn die Grunde fur bestehende Diver- genzen und Konvergenzen durchsichtig gemacht werden konnen. Dabei kann, je nach Problemlage, mehr ein philosophiehistorischer oder ein kri- tisch-systematischer Blickwinkel den Vergleich bestimmen. Die vorliegende Arbeit legt den Schwerpunkt auf den letzteren Aspekt. Dies liegt nicht nur daran, dass letztlich philosophische Forschungen, an der Sa- che orientiert, sich argumentierend stets um das bemuhen sollten, woruber Ubereinstimmung herrschen kann. Wenn dem nicht so ware, bliebe alle Philosophiegeschichte bloss eine Aneinanderreihung beliebig austauschbarer Positionen. Gerade weil es aber eine Vielfalt philosophischer Ausgangs- punkte und Methoden gibt, sind die Philosophen herausgefordert, zu mogli- chen Gemeinsamkeiten Stellung zu nehmen -und dies auf eine Weise, die fur den anderen nachvollziehbar ist. Daruber hinaus ist aber gerade im Falle Husserls und Cohns eine systematisch-kritische Betrachtungsart angemes- sen.

by Paul Ricoeur It is already a piece of good fortune to find oneself understood by a reader who is at once demanding and benevolent. It is an even greater fortune to be better understood by another than by one's own self. In effect, when I look back, I am rather struck by the discontinuity among my works, each of which takes on a specific problem and apparently has little more in common with its predecessor than the fact of having left an overflow of unanswered questions behind it as a residue. On the contrary, Domenico Jervolino's interpretation of my works, which extend over more than forty years, stresses their coherence, in spite of the gap in time between my present, soon to be issued work--Temps et Recit--and my first, Philosophie de la Volonte: Ie Volontaire et l'lnvolontaire. Our friend finds the principle of coherence first of all in the recurrence of a problem: the destiny of the idea of subjectivity, caught in the cross-fire between Nietzsche and Heidegger on one side and semiology, psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology on the other. He finds it likewise in the insistence on a method: the mediating role played by interpretation, mainly of texts, with regard to reflexion on self.

The American University Publications In From its inception Philosophy has continued the direction stated in the sub-title of the initial volume that of probing new directions in philosophy. As the series has developed these probings of new directions have taken the two fold direction of exploring the relationships between the disparate traditions of twentieth century philosophy and with developing new insights into the foundations of some enduring philosophic problems. This present volume continues both of these directions. The interaction between twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy which was an implicit theme of our first and third volumes and the explicit subject of our second volume is here continued in a series of studies on major figures and topics in each tradition. In the context of these interpretative studies, Professor Durfee returns again and again to the question of the relationships between the will and the reason, and explores the conflicting goals of creativity and objectivity in formulating a philosophic position. In so doing he raises the issue as his title suggests - of the foundations of philosophy itself. He seriously challenges the belief common to both pheomenology and analytic philosophy that philosophizing can be a presuppositionless activity, objectively persued independent of the personal (and, perhaps, arbitrary) commitments of the philosopher. This issue, critical as it is to all forms of philosophy, is surely a worthy one for a series such as ours."

In a few pages I would like to express and to justify my admiration for the exceptional book of Jeffrey Barash. His training as an his torian, complemented by that of the philosopher, has served him richly, not only in the discovery of rare texts and of unpublished correspondence but in the reconstruction of the philosophical landscape at the beginning of the century, and then in the period between the two wars. Standing out in the foreground of this land scape are the two mountains constituted by Sein und Zeit and Hei degger's work following the Kehre. This reconstruction by no means intends to establish 'influences' in the mediocre, mechanis tic sense, but rather subterranean continuities between Heidegger's work and his intellectual environment in order to enhance, by the effect of their contrast, the specific intelligibility of this work. In order to appreciate the consequences of continuity as well as of discontinuity, it was necessary to identify and to emphasize a touchstone-question, endowed with the quality of great per durability, and to summon before it all of the protagonists, in cluding Heidegger himself, in an intellectual combat dating back nearly a hundred years. Announced in the title of the work, this question concerns historical meaning. By this term the author wanted to designate the stubborn ques tion, most exactly approximated by the term coherence in its ap plication to history.

The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to reintegrate Hegel's theory of knowledge into main stream epist ology. Hegel's views were formed in consideration of Classical Skepticism and Modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with other views and the difficulties they face. Setting Hegel's discussion in the context of both traditional and contemporary epistemology is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his issues, arguments, and views. Accordingly, this is an issues-oriented study. I analyze Hegel's problematic and method by placing them in the context of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston. I discuss Carnap, rather than a Modern empiricist such as Locke or Hume, for several reasons. One is that Hegel himself refutes a fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism, the doctrine of "knowledge by acquaintance," in the first chapter of the Phenomenology, a chapter that cannot be reconstructed within the bounds of this study.