by the question in its being an answer, if only in a circumstantial (i. e. inessential) manner. One indeed must question oneself in order to remember, says Plato, but the dialectic, which would be scientific, must be something else even if it remains a play of question and answer. This contradiction did not escape Aristotle: he split the scientific from the dialectic and logic from argumentation whose respective theories he was led to conceive in order to clearly define their boundaries and specificities. As for Plato, he found in the famous theory of Ideas what he sought in order to justify knowledge as that which is supposed to hold its truth only from itself. What do Ideas mean within the framework of our approach? In what consists the passage from rhetoric to ontology which leads to the denaturation of argumentation? When Socrates asked, for example, "What is virtue?," he thought one could not answer such a question because the answer refers to a single proposition, a single truth, whereas the formulation of the question itself does not indicate this unicity. For any answer, another can be given and thus continuously, if necessary, until eventually one will come across an incompatibility. Now, to a question as to what X, Y, or Z is, one can answer in many ways and nothing in the question itself prohibits multiplicity. Virtue is courage, is justice, and so on.

Phenomenology as practised by Adolf Reinach ( 1883-191 7) in his all too brief philosophical career exemplifies all the virtues of Husserl's Logical Investigations. It is sober, concerned to be clear and deals with specific problems. It is therefore understandable that, in a philosophical climate in which Husserl's masterpiece has come to be regarded as a mere stepping stone on the way to his later Phenomeno logy, or even to the writings of a Heidegger, Reinach's contributions to exact philo sophy have been all but totally forgotten. The topics on which Reinach wrote most illuminatingly, speech acts (which he called 'social acts') and states of affairs (Sachverhalte ), as well as his realism about the external world, have come to be regarded as the preserve of other traditions of exact philosophy. Like my fellow contributors, I hope that the present volume will go some way towards correcting this unfortunate historical accident. Reinach's account of judgements and states of affairs, an account that precedes those of Russell and Wittgenstein, his 1913 treatment of speech acts, his reinter pretation of Hume and aspects of his legal philosophy are the main philosophical topics dealt with in what follows. But his analysis of deliberation as well as his work on movement and Zeno's paradoxes get only a passing mention."

This volume explains how metaphors, metonymies, and other figures of thought interact cognitively and rhetorically to tell us what writing is and what it should do. Drawing on interviews with writing professionals and published commentary about writing, it argues that our everyday metaphors and metonymies for writing are part of a figurative rhetoric of writing - a pattern of discourse and thought that includes ways we categorize writers and writing; stories we tell about people who write; conceptual metaphors and metonymies used both to describe and to guide writing; and familiar, yet surprisingly adaptable, conceptual blends used routinely for imagining writing situations. The book will give scholars a fresh understanding of concepts such as 'voice', 'self', 'clarity', 'power', and the most basic figure of all: 'the writer'.

It was in the course of 1980 that it dawned upon several friends and colleagues of Manfred Bierwisch that a half century had passed since his birth in 1930. Manfred's youthful appearance had prevented a timely appreciation of this fact, and these friends and co11eagues are, therefore, not at ali embarrassed to be presenting him, almost a year late, with a Festschrift which willleave a trace of this noteworthy occasion in the archives of linguistics. It should be realized, however, that the deIay would have easily extended to 1990 if alI those who had wanted to contribute to this book had in fact written their chapters. Under the pressure of actuality, several co11eagues who had genu ineIy hoped or even promised to contribute, just couIdn't make it in time. Still, their greetings and best wishes are also, be it tacitly, expressed by this volume. Especia11y important for the archives would be a record of the celebrated one's works and physical appearance. For the convenience of present and future generations this Festschrift contains a bibliography of Manfred Bierwisch's scientific publications, which forms a chapter in itself. The frontispiece photograph was taken unawares by one of our accomplices. The title of this Festschrift may alIow for free associations of various sorts."

Fictional Discourse: A Radical Fictionalist Semantics combines the insight of linguistic and philosophical semantics with the study of fictional language. Its central idea is familiar to anyone exposed to the ways of narrative fiction, namely the notion of a fictional teller. Starting with premises having to do with fictional names such as 'Holmes' or 'Emma', Stefano Predelli develops Radical Fictionalism, a theory that is subsequently applied to central themes in the analysis of fiction. Among other things, he discusses the distinction between storyworlds and narrative peripheries, the relationships between homodiegetic and heterodiegetic narrative, narrative time, unreliability, and closure. The final chapters extend Radical Fictionalism to critical discourse, as Predelli introduces the ideas of critical and biased retelling, and pauses on the relationships between Radical Fictionalism and talk about literary characters.

Gottlob Frege (1848 1925) was unquestionably one of the most important philosophers of all time. He trained as a mathematician, and his work in philosophy started as an attempt to provide an explanation of the truths of arithmetic, but in the course of this attempt he not only founded modern logic but also had to address fundamental questions in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic. Frege is generally seen (along with Russell and Wittgenstein) as one of the fathers of the analytic method, which dominated philosophy in English-speaking countries for most of the twentieth century. His work is studied today not just for its historical importance but also because many of his ideas are still seen as relevant to current debates in the philosophies of logic, language, mathematics and the mind. The Cambridge Companion to Frege provides a route into this lively area of research.

In this book, Veikko Rantala makes a systematic attempt to understand cognitive characteristics of translation by bringing its logical, pragmatic and hermeneutic features together and examining a number of scientific, logical, and philosophical applications. The notion of translation investigated here is called explanatory, but it is not a translation in the standard sense of the word since it admits of conceptual change. Such translations can take various degrees of precision, and therefore they can occur in contexts of different kinds: from everyday discourse to literary texts to scientific change. The book generalizes some earlier approaches to translation, especially the one presented in David Pearce's monograph Roads to Commensurability. Rantala argues that the notion has something in common with Thomas Kuhn's earlier conception of scientific change and his views of language learning, but it can be used to go beyond Kuhn's well-known ideas and challenge his criticism concerning the import of the correspondence relation.

The capacity to speak is not only the ability to pronounce words, but the socially-recognized capacity to make one's words count in various ways. We rely on this capacity whenever we tell another person something and expect to be believed, and what we learn from others in this way is the basis for most of what we take ourselves to know about the world. In The Exchange of Words, Richard Moran provides a philosophical exploration of human testimony as a form of intersubjective understanding in which speakers communicate by making themselves accountable for the truth of what they say. The book brings together themes from literature, philosophy of language, moral psychology, action theory, and epistemology, for a new approach to this fundamental human phenomenon. The account developed here starts from the difference between what may be revealed in one's speech (like a regional accent) and what we explicitly claim and make ourselves answerable for. Some prominent themes include: the meaning of sincerity in speech, the nature of mutuality and how it differs from 'mind-reading', the interplay between the first-person and the second-person perspectives in conversation, and the nature of the speech act of telling and related illocutions as developed by philosophers such as J. L. Austin and Paul Grice. Everyday dialogue is the locus of a kind of intersubjective understanding that is distinctive of the transmission of reasons in human testimony, and The Exchange of Words is an original and integrated account of this basic way of being informative to and in touch with one another.

Object Lessons is a series of short, beautifully designed books about the hidden lives of ordinary things. To hyphenate or not to hyphenate has been a central point of controversy since before the imprinting of the first Gutenberg Bible. And yet, the hyphen has persisted, bringing and bridging new words and concepts. Hyphen follows the story of the hyphen from antiquity-"Hyphen" is derived from an ancient Greek word meaning "to tie together" -to the present, but also uncovers the politics of the hyphen and the role it plays in creating identities. The journey of this humble piece of connective punctuation reveals the quiet power of an orthographic concept to speak to the travails of hyphenated individuals all over the world. Hyphen is ultimately a compelling story about the powerful ways that language and identity intertwine. Mahdavi-herself a hyphenated Iranian-American-weaves in her own experiences struggling to find a sense of self amidst feelings of betwixt and between. Through stories of the author and three other individuals, Hyphen collectively considers how to navigate, articulate, and empower new identities. Object Lessons is published in partnership with an essay series in The Atlantic.

These essays by A.W. Moore are all concerned with the business of representing how things are - its nature, its scope, and its limits. The essays in Part One deal with linguistic representation and discuss topics such as rules of representation and their nature, the sorites paradox, and the very distinction between sense and nonsense. Wittgenstein's work, both early and late, figures prominently. One thesis that surfaces at various points is that some things are beyond representation. The essays in Part Two deal with representation more generally and with the character of what is represented, and owe much to Bernard Williams's argument for the possibility of representation from no point of view. They touch more or less directly on the distinction between representation from a point of view and representation from no point of view-in some cases by exploring various consequences of Kant's belief that representation of how things are physically is always, eo ipso, representation from a point of view. One thesis that surfaces at various points is that nothing is beyond representation. Each of the essays in Part Three, which draw inspiration from the early work of Wittgenstein, indicate how the resulting tension between Parts One and Two is to be resolved: namely, by construing the first part as a thesis about states of knowledge or understanding, and the second part as a thesis about facts or truths.

This book starts from three observations. First, the use of humour is a complex, puzzling, and idiosyncratically human form of behaviour (and hence is of scientific interest). Second, there is currently no theory of how humour works. Third, one useful step towards a theory of humour is to analyze humorous items in precise detail, in order to understand their mechanisms.
The author begins by considering how to study jokes rigorously: the assumptions to make, the guidelines to follow and the pitfalls to avoid. A critique of other work on humour is also provided. This introduces some important concepts, and also demonstrates the lack of agreement about what a theory of humour should look like. The language devices used in various jokes, such as puns or humour based on misinterpretation, are analysed in detail. The central part of the book develops, and demonstrates, proposals for how best to analyze the workings of simple jokes. Finally, the author makes some general suggestions about the language devices that seem to be central to the construction of jokes.
The Linguistic Analysis of Jokes will be invaluable for researchers and advanced students of humour research, linguistics and cognitive science.

In this book, Julie K. Ward examines Aristotle's thought regarding how language informs our views of what is real. First she places Aristotle's theory in its historical and philosophical contexts in relation to Plato and Speusippus. Ward then explores Aristotle's theory of language as it is deployed in several works, including Ethics, Topics, Physics, and Metaphysics, so as to consider its relation to dialectical practice and scientific explanation as Aristotle conceived it.

La Peste (in English The Plague), originally published in 1947 by the Nobel Prize-winning writer Albert Camus, chronicles the progression of deadly bubonic plague as it spreads through the quarantined Algerian city of Oran. While most discussions of fictional examples within aesthetics are either historical or hypothetical, Camus offers an example of "pestilence fiction." Camus chose fiction to convey facts-about plagues in the past, his own bout with tuberculosis at age seventeen, living under quarantine away from home for several years, and forced separation from his wife who remained in Algiers while he was abroad in Nazi-occupied France. His own lived experiences undergird an imaginative account of shared human realities with which we can identify: vulnerability to the disease, isolation, fear, and finally humanitarianism. The Plague teaches us to neither covet nor expect what we so casually took for granted. This collection of original essays on philosophical themes in The Plague is of special relevance during and in the aftermath of Covid-19 but also provides reflections that will be of lasting value to those interested in this classic work of literature. The novel explores questions of enduring importance. Do we collectively meet the threshold of ethical behaviour posed by Camus who wrote, "What's true of all the evils in the world is true of plague as well. It helps men to rise above themselves"? Or does the absurd undermine the compassionate? Do "heroes" dutifully fight a plague with "common decency," or does human nature resign itself to the normalization of uncontrollable suffering and death? There are myriad ways to approach the novel and this volume encourages readers to ponder human dilemmas in fictional Oran informed by our current pandemic.

This first book-length study of the work and life of L. Susan Stebbing relates the development of her thought to the philosophical, social and political background of her life. It also assesses Stebbing's contribution in the light of developments both in analytic philosophy and in linguistics in the decade since her death.

Language carries more than meanings; language conveys a means of conceiving the world. In this sense, national legal systems expressed through national languages organize the Law based on their own understanding of reality. International Law becomes, in this context, the meeting point where different legal cultures and different views of world intersect.

The diversity of languages and legal systems can enrich the possibilities of understanding and developing international law, but it can also represent an instability and unsafety factor to the international scenario. This multilegal-system and multilingual scenario adds to the complexity of international law and poses new challenges. One of them is legal translation, which is a field of knowledge and professional skill that has not been the subject of theoretical thinking on the part of legal scholars. How to negotiate, draft or interpret an international treaty that mirrors what the parties, who belong to different legal cultures and who, on many occasions, speak different mother tongues, want or wanted to say?

By analyzing the decision-making process and the legal discourse adopted by the WTO s Appellate Body, this book highlights the active role of language in diplomatic negotiations and in interpreting international law. In addition, it also shows that the debate on the effectiveness and legitimacy of International Law cannot be separated from the linguistic issue."

Wittgenstein was a faithful and passionate reader of Plato's Dialogues as confirmed by writings and witnesses. Here well-known scholars of Wittgenstein and Plato illuminate the relationship between the two philosophers both philologically and philosophically, and provide new interpretation keys of two of the leading figures of Western thought.

The authors explore some of the ways in which standardization, ideology and linguistics are interrelated. Through a number of case studies they show how concepts such as grammaticality and structural change covertly rely on a false conceptualization of language, one that derives ultimately from standardization.

The book explains why and how Wittgenstein adapted the Tractatus in phenomenological and grammatical terms to meet challenges of his 'middle period.' It also shows why and how he invents a new method and develops an anthropological perspective, which gradually frame his philosophy and give birth to the Philosophical Investigations .

In Rediscovering Colors: A Study in Pollyanna Realism, Michael Watkins endorses the Moorean view that colors are simple, non-reducible, properties of objects. Consequently, Watkins breaks from what has become the received view that either colors are reducible to certain properties of interest to science, or else nothing is really colored. What is novel about the work is that Watkins, unlike other Mooreans, takes seriously the metaphysics of colors. Consequently, Watkins provides an account of what colors are, how they are related to the physical properties on which they supervene, and how colors can be causally efficacious without the threat of causal overdetermination. Along the way, he provides novel accounts of normal conditions and non-human color properties. The book will be of interest to any metaphysician and philosopher of mind interested in colors and color perception.

This book develops a unified account of expressions involving the notions of "part" and "whole " in which principles of the individuation of part structures play a central role. Moltmann presents a range of new empirical generalizations with data from English and a variety of other languages involving plurals, mass nouns, adnominal and adverbial modifiers such as as a whole, together, and alone, nominal and adverbial quanitfiers ranging over parts, and expressions of completion such as completely and partly. She develops a new theory of part structures which differs from traditional mereological theories in that the notion of an integrated whole plays a central role and in that the part structure of an entity is allowed to vary across different situations, perspectives, and dimensions.

In clear and lively prose that avoids jargon, the author carefully and systematically examines the many kinds of subtly nuanced words or word-pairs of everyday discourse such as 'and'-'but', 'before'-'ere', 'Chinese'-'Chink', and 'sweat'-'perspiration', that have proven resistant to truth-conditional explanations of meaning.

An original and accessible discussion of the nature of religious language that draws on the latest research in the philosophy of language. The historical background to research on religious language is also explored and connections are made with both Continental Philosophy and Theology.

Wittgenstein's philosophy is a puzzling subject mainly because Wittgenstein himself does not appear to have given a full, explicit account of what he means by his phenomenology', phenomenological language' or phenomenological problems'. This book examines the idea of phenomenology throughout the different stages of Wittgenstein's philosophical development. The author argues that Wittgenstein's entire philosophical life was mainly concerned with what is immediately given in one's experience. Early interpretations of the phenomenological elements in Wittgenstein's philosophy usually emphasized the unique nature of his later work. However, the author here convincingly makes the case that Wittgenstein's concern with immediate experience and the way we describe it guided his philosophical journey through the phenomenological problems that pervade his work. The author offers many intriguing ideas and philosophical insights for Wittgenstein scholars and students, and philosophers interested in phenomenology who wish to study one of the most distinguished but least understood philosophers of the twentieth century. Audience: Philosophers, philosophers interested in phenomenology, Wittgenstein scholars.