Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding.
In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology.
Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic inphilosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm.
Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds.

This book is intended as an introduction to the philosophical problems of space and time, suitable for any reader who has an interest in the nature of the universe and who has a secondary-school knowledge of physics and mathematics. In particular, it is hoped that the book may find a use in philosophy departments and physics departments within universities and other tertiary institutions. The attempt is always to introduce the problems from a twentieth-century point of view. It is preferable to introduce the history of the topic if and when that history becomes relevant to the development and solution of the problems, rather than to introduce a problem that was of importance in some previous age and to trace the development of it down the years.

This thought-provoking book develops and elaborates on the artifact theory of law, covering a wide range of related theoretical and practical topics. Offering a range of perspectives that flesh out the artifact theory of law, it also introduces criticisms of previous formulations of the theory and inquires into its potential payoffs. Featuring international contributions from both noted and up-and-coming scholars in law and philosophy, the book is divided into two parts. The first part further explores and evaluates the concept of law as an artifact and analyses the background and theoretical basis of the theory. The second part comprises three sections on legal ontology, semantics and legal normativity, specifically in relation to law's artifactual nature. Providing cutting-edge insights at the intersection of law and philosophy, this book will appeal to scholars and students in philosophy of law, empirical legal studies, social ontology and the philosophy of society.

This book examines how ancient myths have developed and still survive in the collective public imagination in order to answer fundamental questions concerning the individual, society and historical heritage: On what basis do we form our opinion and develop attitudes about key issues? What is, and how should, the relationship between ourselves and nature be oriented? And what is the relationship between ourselves and others? Advancing a critical analysis of myths, Andrea Cerroni reveals the inconsistencies and consequences of our contemporary imagination, addressing neoliberalism in particular. The book elaborates a sociological theology from historical reconstruction, drawing together analytical concepts such as political theology and sociological imagination. It brings into focus a cultural matrix comprising ancient myths about nature, society and knowledge, in opposition to modern myths built around reductionism, individualism and relativism. Providing suggestions for deconstructing these myths, Contemporary Sociological Theology explores concepts of reflexive complexity, Gramscian democratic politics and a general relativisation of knowledge. Highly interdisciplinary, this book will be an insightful read for sociology and social policy scholars, for students with a particular interest in sociological theory, cultural sociology and innovation policy and for all those who seek awareness of the imagination that rules our world.

While it is generally accepted that animal welfare matters morally, it is less clear how to morally evaluate the ending of an animal's life. It seems to matter for the animal whether it experiences pain or pleasure, or enjoyment or suffering. But does it also matter for the animal whether it lives or dies? Is a longer life better for an animal than a shorter life? If so, under what conditions is this so, and why is this the case? Is it better for an animal to live rather than never to be born at all? The Ethics of Killing Animals addresses these value-theoretical questions about animal life, death and welfare. It also discusses whether and how answers to these questions are relevant for our moral duties towards animals. Is killing animals ever morally acceptable and, if so, under what conditions? Do animals have moral rights, such as the right to life and should they be accorded legal rights? How should our moral duties towards animals inform our individual behavior and policy-making? This volume presents a collection of contributions from major thinkers in ethics and animal welfare, with a special focus on the moral evaluation of killing animals.

This collection of essays by liberal and feminist philosophers addresses the question of whether marriage reform ought to stop with same-sex marriage. Some philosophers have recently argued that marriage is illiberal and should be abolished or radically reformed to include groups and non-romantic friendships. In response, Simon May argues that marriage law can be justified without an illiberal appeal to an ideal relationship type, and Ralph Wedgwood argues that the liberal values which justify same-sex marriage do not justify further extension. Other authors argue for new legal forms for intimate relationships. Marriage abolitionist Clare Chambers argues that piecemeal directives rather than relationship contracts should replace marriage, and Samantha Brennan and Bill Cameron argue for separating marriage and parenting, with parenting rather than marriage becoming, legally and socially, the foundation of the family. Elizabeth Brake argues for a non-hierarchical friendship model for marriage. Peter de Marneffe argues that polygamy should be decriminalized, but that the liberal state need not recognize it, while Laurie Shrage argues that polygamy could be legally structured to protect privacy and equality. Dan Nolan argues for temporary marriage as a legal option, while Anca Gheaus argues that marital commitments are problematic instruments for securing the good of romantic and sexual love. Taken together, these essays challenge contemporary understandings of marriage and the state's role in it.

"Chivalry is a flower no less indigenous to the soil of Japan than cherry blossom" are the opening words to Inazo Nitobe's Bushido: The Soul of Japan. It was 1900 and Inazo, a Japanese academic living in the USA, had been prompted to write the book after an American professor had wondered how the Japanese imparted moral education on their children if schools didn't offer any religious instruction. The answer, Inazo realised, was through Bushido. Bushido is the chivalric code of moral principles that the Samurai followed: rectitude, courage, benevolence, respect, honesty, honour and loyalty. Influenced by Confucianism, Shinto and Zen Buddhism, it tempers the violence of a warrior with wisdom and serenity. Alongside Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Machiavelli's The Prince, Inazo's book has become influential among military and corporate leaders looking for ways to manage their people and overcome their opponents. Beautifully produced in traditional Chinese binding and with a timeless design, Bushido Illustrated: The Soul of Japan includes the classic Inazo Nitobe text with a new introduction and colourful illustrations throughout. It will appeal to anyone interested in leadership, the code of the Samurai and Japanese culture.

The Spirit of Laws is one of the most influential books of all time. This masterpiece of political philosophy was widely read throughout Europe, attracted an especially enthusiastic readership in England, and had a profound effect on the framers of the American Constitution. Montesquieu (1689-1755), already famous and controversial through his Persian Letters, a work of his youth in which he humorously satirized the foibles of French society, turned in his later years to this serious treatise on the nature of law. But though the subject itself was profound, this gravitas did not inhibit the famous Montesquieu wit. Master of the pithy bon mot, he managed to survey a great deal of political and philosophical territory while keeping his readers charmed with memorable and artfully turned phrases. "Liberty," he says, "consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not to desire." Concerning the unpopularity of the English in France, he says it is due to their arrogance, which is such that even in peace "they seem to negotiate with none but enemies."
The scope of this masterful work is truly prodigious. Montesquieu explores the essentials of good government; compares and contrasts despotism, monarchy, and democracy; and discusses the factors that lead to corruption of governments. Among the many other topics considered are education of the citizenry, crime and punishment, abuse of power and of liberty, individual rights, taxation, slavery, the role of women, the influence of climate on the temper of a people and their form of government, commerce, religion, and a host of additional subjects.

The Spirit of Laws is essential and genuinely enjoyable reading for anyone interested in the development of democracy.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy is a volume of original articles on all aspects of ancient philosophy. The articles may be of substantial length, and include critical notices of major books. OSAP is now published twice yearly, in both hardback and paperback.
"The serial Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (OSAP) is fairly regarded as the leading venue for publication in ancient philosophy. It is where one looks to find the state-of-the-art. That the serial, which presents itself more as an anthology than as a journal, has traditionally allowed space for lengthier studies, has tended only to add to its prestige; it is as if OSAP thus declares that, since it allows as much space as the merits of the subject require, it can be more entirely devoted to the best and most serious scholarship."--Michael Pakaluk, Bryn Mawr Classical Review

Meaning (significance) and nature are this book's principal topics. They seem an odd couple, like raisins and numbers, though they elide when meanings of a global sort-ideologies and religions, for example-promote ontologies that subordinate nature. Setting one against the other makes reality contentious. It signifies workmates and a coal face to miners, gluons to physicists, prayer and redemption to priests. Are there many realities, or many perspectives on one? The answer I prefer is the comprehensive naturalism anticipated by Aristotle and Spinoza: "natura naturans, natura naturata." Nature naturing is an array of mutually conditioning material processes in spacetime. Each structure or event-storm clouds forming, nature natured-is self-differentiating, self-stabilizing, and sometimes self-disassembling; each alters or transforms a pre-existing state of affairs. This surmise anticipated discoveries and analyses to which neither thinker had access, though physics and biology confirm their hypothesis beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the question this book considers: Is reality divided:nature vrs. lived experience? Or is experience, with all its meanings and values, the complex expression of natural processes?