Like the widely praised original, this new edition is compact, clearly written, and accessible to the nonspecialist. First, the book chronicles and analyzes the twenty-year struggle to maintain South Vietnamese independence. Joes tells the story with a sympathetic focus on South Viet Nam and is highly critical of U.S. military strategy and tactics in fighting this war. He claims that the fall of South Viet Nam was not inevitable, that an abrupt and public termination of U.S. aid provoked a crisis of confidence inside South Viet Nam that led to the debacle. Students and scholars of military studies, South East Asia, U.S. foreign policy, or the general reader interested in this fascinating period in 20th century history, will find this new edition to be invaluable reading. After discussing the principal American mistakes in the conflict, Joes outlines a workable alternative strategy that would have saved South Viet Nam while minimizing U.S. involvement and casualties. He documents the enormous sacrifices made by the South Vietnamese allies, who in proportion to population suffered forty times the casualties the Americans did. He concludes by linking the final conquest of South Viet Nam to an increased level of Soviet adventurism which resulted in the invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military build-up under Presidents Carter and Reagan, and the eventual collapse of the USSR. The complicated factors involved in the war are here offered in a consolidated, objective form, enabling the reader to consider the implications of U.S. experiences in South Viet Nam for future policy in other world areas.

In the summer of 1969, as the Vietnam War was being turned over to the South Vietnamese, Lieutenant John Raschke arrived in Chuong Thien Province deep in the Mekong Delta, eager to have a positive impact. Recounting his assignment to a provincial advisory team of military and civilian personnel, this memoir depicts the ordinary and the extraordinary of life both inside and outside the wire--mortar attacks, firefights and snipers, hot showers, good meals and comradery, the life and death struggles of the Vietnamese people and the bonds he formed with them.

On his second tour in Vietnam, U.S. Army Captain John Haseman served 18 months as a combat advisor in the Mekong Delta's Kien Hoa Province. His detailed memoir gives one of the few accounts of a district-level advisor's experiences at the "point of the spear." Often the only American going into combat with his South Vietnamese counterparts, Haseman highlights the importance of trust and confidence between advisors and their units and the courage of the men he fought with during the 1972 North Vietnamese summer offensive. Among the last advisors to leave the field, Haseman describes the challenges of supporting his counterparts with fewer and fewer resources, and the emotional conclusion of an advisory mission near the end of the Vietnam War.

Steven Grzesik's counter-culture experience in Greenwich Village ended with a bad acid trip followed by a draft notice. The Vietnam War, then at its height, seemed doomed to failure by cynical politicians and a skeptical public, a prediction he weighed against his sense of duty to himself and to his country. Through a variety of combat duties--with the infantry, the 36th Engineer Battalion, F Co. 75th Rangers and the 174th Assault Helicopter Co.--and several close calls with death, Grzesik's detailed memoir recounts his two tours in-country, where he hoped merely to survive with a semblance of heroism, yet ultimately redefined himself.

By the time of the Vietnam War, the U.S. military had transitioned to jet aircraft. Yet leaders soon learned prop-driven planes could still play a role in counterinsurgency warfare. World War II-era Douglas B-26 light bombers proved effective in close air support and interdiction, beginning with Operation Farm Gate in 1961. Forty B-26s were remanufactured as improved A-26 attack aircraft, which destroyed hundreds of North Vietnamese supply vehicles on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1966-1969. The personal recollections of 37 pilots, navigators, maintenance and armament personnel, and family members, tell the harrowing story of B-26 and A-26 Air Commando Wing combat operations in Vietnam and Laos.

The conventional narrative of the Vietnam War often glosses over the decade leading up to it. Covering the years 1954-1963, this book presents a thought-provoking reexamination of the war's long prelude--from the aftermath of French defeat at Dien Bien Phu--through Hanoi's decision to begin reunification by force--to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. Established narratives of key events are given critical reappraisal and new light is shed on neglected factors. The strategic importance of Laos is revealed as central to understanding how the war in the South developed.

At "zero dark thirty" on January 30, 1971, units of the U.S. Fifth Mechanized Division left their firebases along the DMZ heading west along Provincial Route 9. The mission, called Dewey Canyon II, was to reopen the road from Khe Sahn Air Base to the Laotian border, in support of a South Vietnamese invasion of Laos (doomed from the start) to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Alpha Company of U.S. 61st Infantry performed commendably in keeping Route 9 open, with just one casualty killed by friendly fire. They returned to Firebase Charlie-2 in April, exhausted but hopeful--the Fifth would be leaving Vietnam in July. They patrolled the "western hills" through May as rocket attacks fell each evening. On the 21st, a direct hit on a bunker killed 30 of the 63 men inside--18 were from Alpha Co. This is their story, as told to Specialist Lou Pepi by members of his unit.

In February 1968, the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division was understrength, with only enough paratroopers to deploy a single brigade. The 3rd Brigade was flown 9000 miles to reinforce American units fighting the North Vietnamese Army around Hue--received a Valorous Unit Award for their actions there. James Dorn was on Brigade staff. He later led a rifle platoon with the 3rd in the rice paddies west of Saigon. In his second year with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the Central Highlands. he again led a platoon until promoted to captain. His frank and detailed memoir recounts their diverse combat missions, inhumanity for civilians and the day-to-day life of Infantrymen in the field.

In 1968, Theodore Hammett stepped forward for a war he believed was wrong, pressured by his father's threat to disown him if he withdrew from a Marine Corps officer candidate program. He hated the Vietnam War and soon grew to hate Vietnam and its people. As a supply officer at a field hospital uncomfortably near the DMZ, he employed thievery, bargaining and lies to secure supplies for his unit and retained his sanity with the help of alcohol, music and the promise of going home. In 2008, he returned to Vietnam for a five-year "second tour" to assist in improving HIV/AIDS policies and prevention programs in Hanoi. His memoir recounts his service at the height of the war, and how the country he detested became his second home.

In 1966, Dr. Richard Carlson was just two years out of medical school and in his mid-20s. He was about to embark on a year-long tour in Vietnam to treat the many forgotten victims of the war: the civilians. During medical school he was introduced to the Los Angeles County General Hospital, the huge institution that provided medical care for LA's socially and medically deprived. Dedicated to the underserved, when drafted he applied to work in a Vietnamese civilian hospital. His tenure at the LA county hospital was the best training for what he'd experience in Vietnam. His arrival coincided with a bloody escalation of the conflict. But like many Americans, he believed South Vietnam desired a democratic future and that the U.S. was helping to achieve that goal. Armed with both his medical bag and a typewriter, Dr. Carlson diligently chronicled his efforts to save lives in the Mekong delta province of Bac Lieu. The result is a vivid recollection, detailing the inspiring stories of the AMA volunteer doctors, USAID nurses and corpsmen that he worked alongside to treat the local citizens, many of whom were Viet Cong. He gives a glimpse of the emerging understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder and his team's development of a pioneering family planning clinic. Featuring more than 80 photographs, this book relates the fighting of both exotic and common diseases and the competition among civilians for medical services. The medical facilities and equipment were primitive, and the doctors' efforts were often hampered by folk remedies and superstition.

Reuel Long's experiences as an MD in the emergency rooms of Flint, Michigan prepared him for only some of what he would see in a mobile army surgical hospital. Antiwar sentiment among the doctors in basic training at Fort Sam Houston set the tone for his tour as a general medical officer. In March 1971, the 27th MASH played a critical role treating survivors of the deadliest attack on any firebase during the Vietnam War. Long's vivid memoir recalls the casualties he cared for during the war, including one he crossed paths with 44 years later-who in his own words describes his rehabilitation from the loss of his legs and his protesting the war from a wheelchair. An addendum gives an insider's account of the U.S. military's initial failure to remedy a fatal design flaw in the M16 rifle, which caused an unknown number of American casualties.

During the first half of 1969, Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division operated northwest of Saigon in the vicinity of Go Dau Ha, fighting in 15 actions on the Cambodian border, in the Boi Loi Woods, the Hobo Woods and Michelin Rubber Plantation and on the outskirts of Tay Ninh City. In that time, Bravo Troop saw 10 percent of its average field strength killed while inflicting much heavier losses on the enemy. This memoir vividly recounts those six months of intense armored cavalry combat in Vietnam through the eyes of an artillery forward observer, highlighting his fire direction techniques and the routines and frustrations of searching for the enemy and chaos of finding him.

For Southeast Asia, the Vietnam War altered forever the history, topography, people, economy, and politics of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), Cambodia, and Laos. That the war was controversial is an understatement as is the notion that the war can be understood from any one perspective. One way of understanding the Vietnam War is by marking its time with turning points, both major and minor, that involved events or decisions that helped to influence its course in the years to follow. By examining a few of these turning points, an organizational framework takes shape that makes understanding the war more possible. Historical Dictionary of the War in Vietnam emphasizes the international nature of the war, as well as provide a greater understanding of the long scope of the conflict. The major events associated with the war will serve as the foundation of the book while additional entries will explore the military, diplomatic, political, social, and cultural events that made the war unique. While military subjects will be fully explored, there will be greater attention to other aspects of the war. All of this is done through a chronology, an introductory essay, an extensive bibliography, and over 600 cross-referenced dictionary entries. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about the Vietnam War.

United States involvement in the Vietnam War was one of the most important events in the post-World War II period. The political, social and military consequences of US involvement and defeat in Vietnam have been keenly felt within the US and the international community, and the 'lessons' learned have continued to exert an influence to the present day. This book focuses on the effects of US propaganda on America's Western allies - particularly France, West Germany and Great Britain - from the time when the Vietnam War began to escalate in February 1965, to the American withdrawal and its immediate aftermath. One of its main aims is to assess the amount and veracity of information passed on by the US administration to allied governments and to compare this with the level of public information on the war within those countries.

More than 130,000 South Vietnamese fled their homeland at the end of the Vietnam War. Tens of thousands landed on the island of Guam on their way to the U.S. Many remained there. Guamanians and U.S. military personnel welcomed them. Funded by a $405 million Congressional appropriation, Operation New Life was among the most intensive humanitarian efforts ever accomplished by the U.S. government, with the help of the people of Guam. Without it, many evacuees would have died somewhere in the Pacific Ocean. This book chronicles a part of the first mass migration of Vietnamese "boat people," before and after the fall of Saigon in April 1975-a story still unfolding almost half a century later.

As a linguist with the U.S. Navy Fleet Support Detachment in Da Nang, Herb Shippey was assigned to air reconnaissance during the Vietnam War. Flying with fellow "spooks" over the Gulf of Tonkin and Laos, his duty was to protect American aircraft and ships threatened by MiG 21 fighter jet activity. Shippey's introspective memoir recounts dangerous missions aboard non-combat aircraft (EC-121 Warning Star, P-3 Orion, A-3 Sky Warrior), rocket attacks and typhoons, and the details of his service, some of them classified for forty years.

Poems by Nguyen Phan Que Mai

Translated from the Vietnamese by Bruce Weigl and Nguyen Phan Que Mai

Nguyen Phan Que Mai is among the most exciting writers to emerge from post-war Vietnam. Bruce Weigl, driven by his personal experiences as a soldier during the war in Vietnam, has spent the past 20 years translating contemporary Vietnamese poetry. These penetrating poems, published in bilingual English and Vietnamese, build new bridges between two cultures bound together by war and destruction. "The Secret of Hoa Sen," Que Mai's first full-length U.S. publication, shines with craft, art, and deeply felt humanity.

"I cross the Lam River to return to my homeland
where my mother embraces my grandmother's tomb in the rain,
the soil of Nghe An so dry the rice plants cling to rocks.
My mother chews dry corn; hungry, she tries to forget."

On the same day the Japanese surrender ended World War II, Vietnamese nationalists declared independence from France. Within weeks, France sought to reestablish colonial rule. American merchant seamen arriving in French ports to ship GIs back to the U.S. were dismayed when French troops bound for Vietnam came aboard instead. Many merchant seamen objected to these troopship movements because American veterans awaited transport home, and because they flew in the face of Allied war aims of national self-determination. Later, with the Vietnam War effort dependent on Merchant Marine logistical support, seamen were among the first to protest U.S. involvement. With firsthand recollections, this book tells the story of the Merchant Marine in Vietnam, from deadly encounters with mines, rockets and gunfire to evacuations of refugees to rescues of "boat people" in the South China Sea.

The Viet Nam War ended almost half a century ago. This book-part history, part travelogue-reveals the war's legacy, still very much alive, in the places where it was fought and in the memories and memorials of those who survived it. The chronological story of the war is told through exploration of culture, history, popular music, and the countries who were major players: North and South Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Australia and the United States. The author traverses significant sites like Dien Bien Phu-where French colonialism ended and U.S. intervention began-the DMZ, Hamburger Hill, the Rock Pile, the Cu Chi Tunnels, and Australia's most famous battlefield, Long Tan. Residual hazards of the war remain in the form of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in such places as Siem Reap, Luang Prabang, and in Quang Tri Province, where nonprofit groups like Project RENEW work to manage removal and provide victim assistance.

An advisor to the South Vietnamese Navy Mobile Riverine Forces in 1970-1971, U.S. Navy Commander Richard Kirtley was tasked with helping implement Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization"-the rapid drawdown of U.S. troops to bring an abortive end to the Vietnam War. The program called for the turnover of arms and equipment to South Vietnamese forces, while U.S. personnel trained their counterparts to continue fighting the war alone. The U.S. Navy's supporting effort, Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese (ACTOV), emphasized "Accelerated." Kirtley's account gives an up-close look at the futility and frustration of the advisory effort during the withdrawal, the implementation of both programs-doomed to failure yet hyped to cover a lost-cause retreat-and their disastrous outcomes.

In this book, Joseph G. Morgan examines the career of Wesley Fishel, a political scientist who vigorously supported American intervention in the Vietnam War, what he deemed a "a great, and tragic, American experiment.". Morgan demonstrates how Fishel continued to champion the prospect of an independent South Vietnam, even when Vietnamese resistance and infighting among Americans undermined this effort. Morgan also analyzes how opponents questioned Fishel's scholarly integrity and his academic collaboration with the US government in implementing Cold War policies.

The Vietnam War was not going well in 1968. The January Tet Offensive-a tactical defeat but strategic victory for North Vietnam-showed the U.S. military and the American public that the enemy remained determined, no nearer defeat. Americans grew war weary while politicians and military leaders could not agree on how to win or how to withdraw. Between combat tours, the author served as a U.S. Army company commander-a job he came to despise. Experiencing what he perceived as a degradation in the Army's senior command, he resigned his commission. Yet he needed money to complete graduate school and volunteered to return to Vietnam as a combat advisor. This memoir describes his participation in the fiercest fighting of the war, on the Cambodian border, where he almost died of hookworm and was shot in a night operation. In Saigon to recuperate, he was tasked with creating an advisory team to train South Vietnamese commandos to conduct raids in the swamps south of Saigon, the Rung Sat Special Zone. For seven months they were successful, with Worthington receiving seven combat decorations.

This book revisits the American canon of novels, memoirs, and films about the war in Vietnam, in order to reassess critically the centrality of the discourse of American victimization in the country's imagination of the conflict, and to trace the strategies of representation that establish American soldiers and veterans as the most significant victims of the war. By investigating in detail the imagery of the Vietnamese landscape recreated by American authors and directors, the volume explores the proposition that Vietnam has been turned into an American myth, demonstrating that the process resulted in a dehistoricization and mystification of the conflict that obscured its historical and political realities. Against this background, representations of the war's victims-Vietnamese civilians and American soldiers-are then considered in light of their ideological meanings and uses. Ultimately, the book seeks to demonstrate how, in a relation of power, the question of victimhood can become ideologized, transforming into both a discourse and a strategy of representation-and in doing so, to demythologize something of the "Vietnam" of American cultural narrative.

In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for "tactical" nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a "special reminder" of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a "long-route" policy of providing Saigon with a "decent chance" of survival for a "decent interval" after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to offer a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.

Beginning with the withdrawal of French forces from South Vietnam in 1955, the U.S. took an ever-widening role in defending the country against invasion by North Vietnam. By 1965, the U.S. had "Americanized" the war, relegating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to a supporting role. While the U.S. won many tactical victories, it had difficulty controlling the territory it fought for. As the war grew increasingly unpopular with the American public, the North Vietnamese launched two large-scale invasions in 1968 and 1972-both tactical defeats but strategic victories for the North that precipitated the U.S. policy of "Vietnamization," the drawdown of American forces that left the ARVN to fight alone. This book examines the maturation of the ARVN, and the major battles it fought from 1963 to its demise in 1975. Despite its flaws, the ARVN was a well-organized and disciplined force with an independent spirit and contributed enormously to the war effort. Had the U.S. "Vietnamized" the war earlier, it might have been won in 1967-1968.