By the end of the American war in Vietnam, the coastal province of Phu Yen was one of the least-secure provinces in the Republic of Vietnam. It was also a prominent target of the American strategy of pacification - an effort, purportedly separate and distinct from conventional warfare, to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Vietnamese. In Robert J. Thompson III's analysis, the consistent, and consistently unsuccessful, struggle to place Phu Yen under Saigon's banner makes the province particularly fertile ground for studying how the Americans advanced pacification and why this effort ultimately failed. In March 1970, a disastrous military engagement began in Phu Yen, revealing the enemy's continued presence after more than three years of pacification. Clear, Hold, and Destroy provides a fresh perspective on the war across multiple levels, from those making and implementing policy to those affected by it. Most pointedly, Thompson contends that pacification, far from existing apart from conventional warfare, actually depended on conventional military forces for its application. His study reaches back into Phu Yen's storied history with pacification before and during the French colonial period, then focuses on the province from the onset of the American War in 1965 to its conclusion in 1975. A sharply focused, fine-grained analysis of one critical province during the Vietnam War, Thompson's work demonstrates how pacification is better understood as the foundation of U.S. fighting in Vietnam.

A newly minted second lieutenant fresh from West Point, Hugh Lenox Scott arrived on the northern Great Plains in the wake of the Little Bighorn debacle. The Seventh Cavalry was seeking to subdue the Plains tribes and confine them to reservations, and Scott adopted the role of negotiator and advocate for the Indian "adversaries." He thus embarked on a career unique in the history of the U.S. military and the western frontier. Hugh Lenox Scott, 1853-1934: Reluctant Warrior is the first book to tell the full story of this unlikely, self-avowed "soldier of peace," whose career, stretching from Little Bighorn until after World War I, reflected profound historical changes. The taste for adventure that drew Scott to the military also piqued his interest in the tenacity of Native cultures in an environment rife with danger and uncertainty. Armand S. La Potin describes how Scott embraced the lifeways of the Northern Plains peoples, making a study of their cultures, their symbols, and most notably, their use of an intertribal sign language to facilitate trade. Negotiating with dissident bands of Indians whose lands were threatened by Anglo settlers and commercial interests, he increasingly found himself advocating federal responsibility for tribal welfare and assuming the role of "Indian reformer." La Potin makes clear that "reform" was understood within the context of Scott's own culture, which scaled "civilization" to the so-called Anglo race. Accordingly, Scott promoted the "civilization" of Native Americans through assimilation into Anglo-American society-an approach he continued in his later interactions with the Moro Muslims of the southern Philippines, where he served as a military governor. Although he eventually rose to the rank of army chief of staff, over time Scott the peacemaker and Indian reformer saw his career stall as Native tribes ceased to be seen as a military threat and military merit was increasingly defined by battlefield experience. From these pages the picture emerges of an uncommon figure in American military history, at once at odds with and defined by his times.